Tilburg University
The nationality and statelessness of nomads under international law
Alexander, Heather
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Alexander, H. (2020). The nationality and statelessness of nomads under international law: With a
comprehensive examination of the nationality and statelessness of former Bedouin in Kuwait, Tuareg in Mali and
Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) in Malaysia. Studio .
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Download date: 07. Jan. 2021
The Nationality and Statelessness of Nomads under International
Law
With a Comprehensive Examination of the Nationality and Statelessness of Former
Bedouin in Kuwait, Tuareg in Mali and Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) in Malaysia
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. W.B.H.J. van de Donk, in het openbaar te
verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen
commissie in de Portrettenzaal van de
Universiteit op dinsdag 8 december 2020 om 16.00 uur
door
Heather Jean Alexander
geboren te Washington, D.C., Verenigde Staten van Amerika
1
Promotor:
Prof. Dr. W.J.M. van Genugten, em., Tilburg University
Copromotor:
Dr. L.E. van Waas, Tilburg University
Promotiecommissie:
Prof. Dr. E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, Tilburg University
Prof. Mr. G.R. de Groot, em., Maastricht University
Dr. B. Manby, London School of Economics
Prof. Mr. C. Flinterman, em., Utrecht University and Maastricht University
Prof. Dr. M. E.A. Goodwin, Tilburg University
Drukkerij Studio
Copyright Heather Alexander, 2020
2
What is a country? A country is a piece of land surrounded on all sides by boundaries, usually
unnatural. 1
0F
History is written from the perspective of the settled. 2
1F
Contents
Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................................6
Part 1: Research Statement, Methodology and Research Questions ............................................8
1.1
The Choice of Topic ..............................................................................................................................8
Why Statelessness? ......................................................................................................................................8
Why nomad statelessness? .................................................................................................................... 10
Why International Law? .......................................................................................................................... 11
Methodology ................................................................................................................................................ 14
1.2
The selection of three nomadic groups used as examples ................................................ 15
1.3
Definition of Terms ........................................................................................................................... 17
Nationality and Citizenship .................................................................................................................... 17
Statelessness and Risk of Statelessness ............................................................................................ 19
Nomad ............................................................................................................................................................ 22
Sources ................................................................................................................................................................ 26
Part 2: The Nationality and Statelessness of Nomads .......................................................................... 30
2.1
Nomads and Empire ......................................................................................................................... 30
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 30
Nomads Before Colonization ................................................................................................................. 31
Colonial Policy Towards Nomads ........................................................................................................ 52
Nationality and Empire ........................................................................................................................ 102
2.2
Nationality Law and Nomads During Decolonization ...................................................... 135
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 135
Nomads and Nationality during Decolonization ........................................................................ 136
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................. 170
1
J. Heller, Catch-22 (Simon and Schuster 1994) 257.
D. Chatty, ‘Negotiating Authenticity and Translocality in Oman: The ‘Desertscapes’ of the Harasiis Tribe’ in
Wippel Steen (ed.), Regionalizing Oman: Political, Economic and Social Dynamics (Springer 2013) 129.
2
3
2.3
State-building and the Exclusion of Nomads ....................................................................... 176
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 176
National Unity and the Exclusion of Minorities as Drivers of Nomad Exclusion .......... 178
Natural Resources as a Driver of Nomad Exclusion.................................................................. 227
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................. 256
2.4
The Bedouin, the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut Today ...................................................... 265
The Bidoon Today ................................................................................................................................... 265
The Tuareg Today ................................................................................................................................... 270
The Sama Dilaut Today ......................................................................................................................... 276
Nomads Today ......................................................................................................................................... 287
Conclusion: Some Root Causes of Nomad Statelessness.............................................................. 291
Part 3: Nomad Statelessness and International Law ......................................................................... 295
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 295
The International Norms Relating to Nationality ........................................................................... 298
The Right to a Nationality Today ...................................................................................................... 301
The Right to Registration at Birth .................................................................................................... 304
The International Commitments of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia ........................................... 305
Pathway I: The Right to a Nationality During the Succession of States ................................. 308
The Norms of State Succession.......................................................................................................... 311
The Right of Option to Choose a Nationality ................................................................................ 316
Gaps in the Laws and Norms of State Succession for Nomads Who Were Registered at
the time of Decolonization .................................................................................................................. 317
Gaps in the Laws and Norms of State Succession for Nomads without a Nationality at
Decolonization ......................................................................................................................................... 320
Defining “Habitual Residence” for Nomads Under International Law .............................. 322
Establishing Alternative “Links” for Nomads .............................................................................. 324
Establishing “Links” and the Burden of Proof ............................................................................. 325
The Role of Regional and Bilateral Treaties in Resolving Statelessness Resulting from
Decolonization ......................................................................................................................................... 327
Dual Nationality ....................................................................................................................................... 328
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................. 330
Pathway II: Prohibiting Discrimination against Nomads in the Application of Nationality
............................................................................................................................................................................. 333
The International and Regional Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in the Granting of
Nationality ................................................................................................................................................. 334
4
Applying the International Protections Against Discrimination to Nomads .................. 337
Discrimination Against Nomads Based on Race, Ethnicity, National Origins and
Historical Migration ............................................................................................................................... 339
Discrimination on the Grounds of Minority Status ................................................................... 342
Nomadism and Indigenous Status.................................................................................................... 345
Nomadism as an “Other Status” under International Law ..................................................... 349
Statelessness as “Other Status” ......................................................................................................... 351
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................. 352
Pathway III: Identifying and Resolving Inter-generational Statelessness ............................ 354
The International Laws Applicable to Children Born Otherwise Stateless ..................... 355
Establishing that Children are Born Otherwise Stateless ....................................................... 356
The International Norms on the Identification of Statelessness and Facilitated
Naturalization........................................................................................................................................... 358
Establishing Statelessness and the Burden of Proof................................................................. 359
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................. 362
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................... 364
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................... 370
Sources by Topic ............................................................................................................................................... 404
Sources on Nationality Law ................................................................................................................ 404
Sources on Nationality Theory and History ................................................................................. 404
Sources on Land Rights, Armed Conflict and Resource Extraction .................................... 406
Sources on Statelessness and Nationality in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia ......................... 406
Non-academic Sources.......................................................................................................................... 407
Sources on International Law ............................................................................................................ 407
Summary .............................................................................................................................................................. 408
Maps ....................................................................................................................................................................... 409
5
Introduction
What, however, of the case of those who have resided all their lives in a
specific country, who have perhaps been in that country as a distinct group
for generations, who never had or who no longer have effective links with
another country, who are not the subjects of a transfer of territory but who
have, nonetheless, failed to acquire the nationality of the State in which they
reside? What of those who have never had the nationality of the country in
which they have all ties... A similar question may be put for those who, in the
context of State succession, fail to acquire nationality in the place where they
have permanently resided because they are deemed to have links
elsewhere. 3
2F
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have been ones of enormous stress for many
nomadic peoples. Taken as a whole, research on nomads points to a deep and enduring
marginalization of nomads by governments around the world. Historians and
anthropologists often attribute this stress to colonization, modernization, and
globalization, including the shift to a wage economy, the growing dominance of large-scale
agriculture and resource extraction, centralized government, increased urbanization,
armed conflict, and the resulting destruction of natural ecosystems. 4
3F
This dissertation will explore nomad marginalization through a particular lens - that of
nationality and statelessness. Much is already known about nomad statelessness in
individual countries. In particular, the United Nations has identified certain nomadic and
mobile groups as stateless or at-risk of statelessness. 5 But the question of nomad
nationality and civic inclusion has yet to be addressed in depth.
4F
Identifying the causes of statelessness and, in particular, the modes by which nomads
become stateless is crucial to any analysis of solutions. There has not yet been a review of
3 C. Batchelor, ‘Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status’ 10 Int’l J. of Refugee L. 156
(1998) (hereinafter Batchelor, 1998) 177.
This dissertation adopts the word ‘stress’ to describe the current situation of many nomads, rather than
speaking of a decline or disappearance, as many nomadic and mobile communities continue to cycle in and
out of a mobile lifestyle as they adapt to new circumstances. A. Manderscheid, ‘The Decline and Re-emergence
of Nomadism’ 53 GeoJournal 173 (2002) 173. See also T. Arkell, ‘The Decline of Pastoral Nomadism in the
Western Sahara’ 76 Geography 162 (1991) 163; A. Fisher, ‘Research and Nomads in the Age of Globalization’
in A. Fisher and I. Kohl, (eds.) Tuareg Society Within a Globalized World: Saharan Life in Transition (Tauris
2010) 13-14.
4
UNHCR, ‘Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024’ Division of International Protection (2014) 18
(hereinafter Global Action Plan, 2014). The Global Action Plan lists nomads as one of the key groups who may
be at risk of statelessness. This dissertation hopes to add to the study of the problem.
5
6
the commonalities and differences faced by different nomadic groups when it comes to the
causes of their nationality and/or statelessness. Nor has there been a systematic
examination of possible solutions to the statelessness of nomads.
This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part 1 contains the introduction and
methodology sections. Part 2 looks at three examples of nomad statelessness to identify the
root causes of the problem and to examine why nomad statelessness persists. These
examples are drawn from nomadic populations whom the United Nations has identified as
being stateless or at risk of statelessness, according to existing research. 6
5F
Part 2 is primarily a legal analysis, tracing the extent to which nomads have qualified under
the law and identifying the points at which they either gained a nationality or became
stateless. Part 2 also, however, will contain an analysis of the social, historical and political
forces that have shaped the evolution of nationality law to help explain why nomads have
been included or excluded at various points in history through the present day. As Matthew
Gibney puts it, “(a)s a political issue statelessness challenges one to understand the
dynamics behind the exclusion from national membership of substantial numbers of
people.” 7 Writing of Tuareg nomads in West Africa, anthropologist Baz Lecocq observes
that, “...it is hard to underpin exactly why nomad existence is found so disturbing by those
who are not nomads.” 8
6F
7F
Part 3 is devoted to looking at possible solutions to the gaps identified in Part 2. Over the
last hundred years, states have established within international law a right to a nationality
for all. Part 3 will look at the solutions offered by states in international law and, in
particular, the right to a nationality. To do so, it will apply international law to the gaps
identified in Part 2. In examining the usefulness of international law as a solution to nomad
statelessness, Part 3 will look at the international legal regime, focusing primarily on treaty
law and general principles of law, but also other sources, including draft treaties,
declarations, statements by treaty bodies and case law. 9
8F
Beyond a strictly legal analysis, this dissertation will also seek to provide a more in-depth
analysis of the relationship between nomads and nationality. As Tendayi Bloom puts it,
speaking of indigenous peoples, “(e)xamining the political realities of the claims of
members of Indigenous groups can help uncover deeper problems in the nature of
6
Global Action Plan, 2014, 18.
M. J. Gibney, ‘Statelessness and Citizenship in Ethical and Political Perspective’ in A. Edwards and L. van
Waas (eds.), Nationality and Statelessness Under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 44-45
(hereinafter Gibney, 2014).
7
B. Lecocq, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali
(Brill 2010) 132 (hereinafter Lecocq, Desert, 2010). See also B. Lecocq, That Desert is Our Country: Tuareg
Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996) (PhD thesis, AISSR 2002) 82
(hereinafter Lecocq, Desert, 2002).
8
9 For a full list of sources of international law, see M. Shaw, International Law (6th ed. Cambridge UP 2008)
23-24 (hereinafter Shaw, 2008) 69-128.
7
dominant State citizenships.” 10 Laura van Waas and Amal de Chickera point to
statelessness as “a deeply personal problem” for individuals, but also one with deep
ramifications for the nation-state system as a whole. 11 To explore issues that go beyond
technical fixes to nationality laws, this dissertation also looks at the law in context,
exploring deeper conflicts between nomadism as a way of life and the rules and
requirements of the nation-state system.
9F
10F
Part 1: Research Statement, Methodology and Research
Questions
1.1
The Choice of Topic
Why Statelessness?
This dissertation is analysis of the causes of nomad statelessness and the possible solutions
offered by states in international law. Arguably, statelessness should be an eminently
solvable problem, because in most countries it is the direct result of government laws and
procedures over which governments have a great deal of control. Everyone on earth has
links to at least one state, both through birth and connections established during their lives
like residence, education, family ties, military service and many others. Resolving
statelessness by formalizing these links through the medium of nationality laws and
procedures is clearly within the ambit of governments and is, in fact, one of their primary
functions. Yet statelessness persists.
It is impossible to overstate the devastating effects of statelessness. 12 Without a
nationality, stateless persons often cannot access their civil or human rights under the
law. 13 Nationality status has always been intimately entwined with civil and political
rights, as well as internationally recognized human rights. 14 While today, basic human
11F
12F
13F
T. Bloom, ‘Members of Colonized Groups, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights’ in T. Bloom (ed.)
Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 158 (hereinafter Bloom, Members, 2017).
10
11 L. van Waas and A. de Chickera, ‘Forward’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless:
Children (2017) 1 (hereinafter Van Waas and De Chickera, Forward, 2017).
12
Van Waas and De Chickera, Forward, 2017 1.
J. C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (Yale 2009)
(hereinafter Scott, 2009); E. Fouberg, A. Murphy and H.J. de Blij, Human Geography: People, Place and Culture
(9th ed., Wiley 2009) (hereinafter Fouberg, Murphy and de Blij). “The right to a nationality (is) a ‘gateway’ to
the recognition of a plurality of other rights.” W. van Genugten, A. Meijknecht, B. Rombouts, ‘Stateless
Indigenous People(s): The Right to a Nationality, Including Their Own’ 19 Tilburg LR 98 (2014) 98
(hereinafter Van Genugten et al.).
13
Hannah Arendt famously claimed that the nation-state system somewhat uncomfortably “combined the
declaration of the Rights of Man with national sovereignty,” and anyone who was without a nationality was
therefore also “deprived of human rights.” H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt 1976) 272
14
8
rights are assured by states in international law regardless of nationality status, 15 it
remains true that many vital civil rights, such as the power to petition one’s government, to
access the courts and to vote, are tied to nationality. Many mechanisms to advocate for
human rights protections are reserved for nationals. Critically, many ethnic, religious and
cultural minorities struggle to assert their rights without a nationality and indigenous
peoples often cannot access their lands or support their cultures without nationality in a
state.
14F
In some cases, stateless persons may be expelled from the countries in which they live,
refused re-entry into their former countries of residence, deprived of their lands or placed
in detention. 16 In many states, access to a residency permit is not possible for stateless
people due to the inability to provide documents. 17 Some of the vital rights that are
frequently reliant on nationality include the right to own land, civil rights such as voting
and political participation, the right to access services like health care, the right to work
and attend school, the right to own land and many others. All of these rights are crucial to
individuals, but cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups also require nationality on a
group basis in order to, for example, vote for political autonomy, for culturally appropriate
education, for preservation of their languages and culture, and for a host of other collective
rights.
15F
16F
Statelessness is also bad for states as it increases instability and political tensions, can
make it more difficult for states to address crime, poverty and other social problems and
may raise tensions with neighbouring states. Arendt rightly called statelessness an
“element of (state) disintegration.” 18 Yet statelessness persists, despite its negative effects
on states, individuals and communities. As a result, research is needed to understand the
modes by which statelessness occurs and the solutions by which it may be solved.
17F
(hereinafter Arendt, 1976). See also B. K. Blitz, ‘The state and the stateless: The legacy of Hannah Arendt
reconsidered’ in T. Bloom (ed.), Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 70.
Importantly, since Arendt’s time, many vital human rights have been decoupled from nationality. For
example, the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural rights mandates access to work,
education and health care without references to nationality status, reasserting the principle that many basic
human rights are available to all. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Part 3, below.
15
UNHCR Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons (2014) 7 (hereinafter Handbook, 2014). See also
the European Network on Statelessness, ‘Protecting Stateless Persons from Arbitrary Detention: An Agenda
for Change’ (April 2017); R. M. Razali, R. Nordin and T. J. Duraisingam ‘Migration and Statelessness: Turning
the Spotlight on Malaysia’ 23 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. and Hum. 19 (2015) 8-9; J. Tucker, ‘Questioning de facto
Statelessness’ 19 Tilburg Law Review 276 (2014); Batchelor, 1998 158; The Equal Rights Trust, ‘Unravelling
Anomaly: Detention, Discrimination and the Protection Needs of Stateless Persons’ (2010) 53, 74; Fripp,
2016, 10.
16
17
Handbook, 2014, 47-49, 52-53.
Arendt, 1976, 269. It is important to note that Arendt did not distinguish between de facto stateless people
(refugees) and de jure stateless people.
18
9
Why nomad statelessness?
As stated above, the marginalization of nomadic and mobile peoples has been widely noted
by experts. Nomads “are almost by definition marginal in most countries, especially where
the state has risen and is based primarily in settled agricultural population.” 19 As nomad
rights expert Jérémy Gilbert puts it, “(m)any nomadic peoples are invisible citizens of their
own states.” 20 Bronwen Manby notes that, “(t)hose communities within Africa whose
members have found that their legal right to belong to the national community is contested
(include) ethnic groups whose pre-colonial boundaries cross modern borders, so those
speaking the same language now find themselves in two (or more) different States. Among
these groups are pastoralists whose nomadic lifestyle takes them across multiple
borders.” 21 Yet there is a need for a deeper analysis of how the marginalization and
exclusion of nomads is linked to their nationality, statelessness and civic participation.
While UNHCR has frequently noted that nomads may be at risk of statelessness, to date,
what limited research exists has primarily focused on individual groups. 22
18F
19F
20F
21F
Due to a lack of research into nomad statelessness, the current state of knowledge about
the issue is limited, though experts have noted a high risk of statelessness for nomadic
groups. The former head of the Statelessness Unit at the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees noted four categories at high risk of statelessness: (1) persons living in border
regions, (2) minorities and “persons who have perceived or actual ties with foreign states,”
(3) nomads and (4) migrant populations. 23 As UNHCR, the UN agency mandated to address
statelessness, put it in 2017,
22F
(m)ore than 75% of the world’s known stateless populations belong to minority
groups. These populations include the descendants of migrants, many of whom
arrived or who were displaced to a territory before it gained independence;
nomadic populations with links to two or more countries; and groups that have
D. Aronson, ‘Must Nomads Settle? Some Notes Toward Policy on the Future of Pastoralism,’ in P. Salzman
(ed.) When Nomads Settle: Processes of Sedentarization as Adaptation and Defense (Praeger 1980) 180.
19
20
21
J. Gilbert, ‘Nomadic Peoples and Human Rights’ (Routledge 2014) 160 (hereinafter Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014).
B. Manby, Citizenship in Africa: The Law of Belonging (Hart 2018) 313.
Van Genugten et al., 2014, 99. The authors point to the experiences of the “Hill tribes” of Thailand as an
example of the consequences of statelessness for minority, indigenous, nomadic peoples. Van Genugten et al.,
2014, 100. It should be noted that new studies and information about stateless nomads continues to be
published as part of this emerging field of study. For example, see this article about the Jogi in Afghanistan: L.
Hadi, N. Shayan, A. Siddique ‘Jogis: Afghanistan’s Tiny Stateless Minority Strives to Survive Without Rights,
Services’ Gandhara (October 14, 2019).
22
M. Manly, ‘UNHCR’s mandate and activities to address statelessness’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.)
Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 108 (hereinafter Manly, 2014),
citing UNHCR, ‘Action to Address Statelessness: A Strategy Note’ March 2010, para 35.
23
10
experienced ongoing discrimination despite having lived for generations in the
place that they consider to be home. 24
23F
Besides UNHCR, other organizations have noted the risk of statelessness for nomads. As far
back as 1983, the Council of Europe, speaking of nomads in Europe, stated that “many
nomads experience problems with their legal status...because they lack a sufficient link of
nationality or residence with a given state.” 25 In more recent years, an emerging body of
research by anthropologists, sociologists and legal experts shows the problems in accessing
nationality faced by nomadic groups in specific countries. This dissertation will provide a
synthesis of existing research on three nomadic groups in an attempt to identify some of
the underlying causes of nomad statelessness.
24F
As stated above, the question of nomad statelessness is fundamentally a question of law
and the implementation of law, but such questions inevitably touch on the perceptions
about nomads held by governments and non-nomadic groups, the perceptions of
nationality and its benefits and costs held by nomads, the ongoing question of nomad
political independence in many parts of the world, nomad land use and ownership and the
history of nomad-government relations more generally. This dissertation will explore not
only how the laws of nationality have been applied to nomads and the extent to which
international law can offer solutions, but also how wider political and sociological trends
have affected the exclusion of nomads and may impact possible solutions.
Why International Law?
In Part 3, this dissertation explores solutions for nomad statelessness available under
international law. International agencies and governments often promote international law
as a solution for statelessness. Yet, as stated above, the root causes of nomad statelessness
are poorly understood, so the extent to which international law can offer a solution to
nomads is also unclear.
International law is frequently invoked as a solution by major actors, including both state
governments and the United Nations. International law has recently been actively
promoted as a solution to statelessness by important state actors like the United States. 26
UNHCR has frequently cited to international law as a solution for statelessness and
adherence to international law and norms is a major goal of the IBelong campaign to end
statelessness. 27 In some case, international human rights law has already been applied as a
25F
26F
UNHCR, ‘This is Our Home: Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship: #IBelong’ (2017) (my
italics).
24
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, ‘Recommendation No. R (83) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on Statelessness Nomads and Nomads of Undetermined Nationality’ (22 February 1983) 1.
25
26
The United States Department of State, for example, has engaged with the Human Rights Council process in
order to resolve statelessness. U.S. Dept. of State website, archived content, accessed 10/12/2020 at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c50242.htm
27
UNHCR Global Action Plan, 2014, 18.
11
potential solution to statelessness, and Part 2 will see if such solutions could work for
nomads.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has the right to a
nationality. 28 This right has since been enshrined, in different iterations, in a multitude of
international and regional treaties, many of which will be discussed below. It has also been
invoked by individuals and communities, and its substance further developed and defined
through an expansive body of ‘soft law,’ including the authoritative guidance of UN bodies
whose mandate encompasses the issue, non-binding declarations and draft conventions
that signal the direction in which the further evolution of these standards may progress,
and the doctrinal work of international legal scholars whose analysis helps to further
unpack the content of the norms. This soft law will also form part of the legal analysis in
Part 3, below.
27F
In the last five years, there has been an enormous push to end statelessness worldwide,
spearheaded by UNHCR’s global campaign, and based on the right to a nationality in
international law. 29 UNHCR, which has the global mandate to end statelessness, is currently
the global leader in solutions to address statelessness and has, in particular, been pushing a
specific package of solutions based on international law. The solutions offered by UNHCR
are based on international human rights principles, such as the right to a nationality, the
prohibitions against statelessness and the right to be registered at birth. 30 Central to the
campaign by UNHCR to end statelessness has been the push to encourage more and more
countries to accede to the Statelessness Conventions. 31
28F
29F
30F
28
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 (III) A (Paris 1948) Art. 15.
See generally the ‘Ibelong campaign’ at http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/. See also UNHCR, ‘I am Here, I
Belong: The Urgent Need to End Childhood Statelessness’ (2015). The Global Campaign is also being
reinforced at the regional level through networks and activism, all based on the human rights framework. See
for example A. Leas, ‘Creating a regional network on statelessness in Central Asia and lessons from Europe’
(2016) at http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/creating-regional-network-statelessness-central-asia-andlessons-europe. The UNHCR Ibelong campaign, with the DHRRA (Development of Rural Resources in Rural
Areas), recently hosted a photo exhibit on stateless people in Malaysia to raise awareness. A. M. Khalib, ‘I
Belong Here Too’ 30 Dec. 2015 at http://www.themalaymailonline.com/opinion/azrul-mohdkhalib/article/i-belong-here-too.
29
See the UNHCR Ibelong campaign website at https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/. See also the UNHCR Global
Action Plan 2014.
30
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189,
p. 137, with 146 states parties (hereinafter 1951 Convention). Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
New York, 30 August 1961, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 989, p. 175, with 75 states parties. (hereinafter
1961 Convention or, when grouped with the 1954 Convention, Statelessness Conventions). See for example
the recent accession of Belize at http://www.unhcr.org/55d6fa176.html. See also L. van Waas, Nationality
Matters: Statelessness Under International Law (Intersentia 2008) 40 (hereinafter Van Waas, Nationality,
2008). See also E. Simperingham, ‘The International Protection of Stateless Individuals: A Call for Change’ (U.
of Auckland 2003).
31
12
In conjunction with this campaign to end statelessness by UNHCR, the wider international
human rights system has worked to identify, prevent and resolve statelessness through a
variety of human rights and humanitarian mechanisms, including international treaties and
treaty bodies, courts and lobbying for domestic legal changes and best practices.
Meanwhile, UNICEF, the World Bank and other actors have pushed for the expansion of
birth and civil registration, in part to end statelessness. Implied in all of these initiatives is
the idea that international law can provide a solution for nomad statelessness, or if it
currently does not, future developments can potentially fill any gaps. These assumptions
will be interrogated by this dissertation.
International law may be an important mechanism for resolving statelessness, yet it is
crucial to remember that international law is itself a product of agreement by states. The
fact that international law was created by states that have also created statelessness means
that it is important to interrogate the extent to which international law solves
statelessness, even were states to apply international law perfectly or to adopt all
developments. It is also important to examine international law with a critical eye, as
solutions that may work for other populations may not be applicable to nomads or may
even be harmful. 32
31F
This dissertation will therefore look at the solutions to statelessness currently offered by
states in international law to see if these solutions work for nomads by applying
international law to the gaps uncovered in Part 2. Once the modes by which nomads
commonly become stateless are understood, the solutions proposed by states in
international law writ large can be analysed to see if they provide a solution that is
effective for nomads, and if not, why not.
Part 3 will focus in particular on the international law frameworks currently being
promoted by key actors such as the United States, UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Bank: (1)
the right to a nationality under international law, (2) the laws to identify, prevent and
reduce statelessness, including through registration and the issuance of birth certificates
(3) the prohibitions against discrimination in the granting of nationality and (4) the
prevention of statelessness during the succession of states. 33 Other relevant human rights
treaties and frameworks will be discussed where appropriate.
32F
For an example of a critique of international law as a solution for statelessness, see C. Allerton
‘Statelessness and the lives of the children of migrants in Sabah, East Malaysia’ 19 Tilburg Law Review: Journal
of International and European Law 26 (2014) 27, 250 (hereinafter Allerton, Lives, 2014).
32
UNHCR’s Global Action Plan, 2014 stresses ending discrimination, assuring birth registration and access to
identity documents and preventing statelessness during state succession among other solutions. See the ten
actions to end statelessness at https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/global-action-plan-2014-2024/
33
13
Methodology
This thesis offers an in-depth critique of the substance of the right to a nationality under
international law as it pertains to nomads. The thesis first undertakes an evaluation of the
root causes of nomad statelessness through a rigorous exploration of three case studies,
focusing on the laws and policies of governments over time. Having identified some of the
reasons why nomads became stateless and the factors that have contributed to the
endurance of this plight over time, the thesis analyses to what extent international law
provides solutions to nomad statelessness.
In doing so, the thesis goes beyond a superficial reading of international law as out-of-step
with the reality of nomadism to expose which norms are useful and which fall short in
offering solutions to nomad statelessness. Based on the lessons learned from the case
studies, what gaps exist in the “hard” treaty standards that provide binding obligations to
state parties? To what extent have jurisprudence and soft law evolved to fill these gaps?
Even if states were to approach the right to a nationality for nomads from the perspective
of the most protective standards that current and emerging international (soft) law has to
offer, would this be sufficient to resolve and prevent nomad statelessness? In so doing, this
dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the policies and legal frameworks developed by
states and by the systems they use internationally to see to what extent states live up to
their obligations. The views of nomads and nomadic communities will be touched upon
throughout.
To identify some of the root causes of nomad statelessness, Part 2 of this dissertation will
look at the development of nomad nationality and/or statelessness from the pre-colonial
period to the present day. As this is a law dissertation, it will primarily focus on legal
analysis and an exploration of how the law has been applied, relying on sources of legal
analysis.
Decisions over nationality, however, are often made for political reasons. As stated above,
politics and history are vital to understanding how and why nationality laws came into
being and were applied, or not applied, to various groups like nomads. This dissertation
will also explore the historical and political context that surrounded the adoption and
implementation of nationality. This dissertation will look beyond the legal question of
qualifying for nationality under the law at broader historical and sociological causes of
nomad statelessness, providing the context within which the law operates. These historical
sections are not meant to be exhaustive, but are a summary of what is known about the
development of nomad nationality in the context of wider sociological and political trends.
These historical sections rely primarily on academic research, but where this is lacking,
other sources such as non-governmental reports and media sources will be used. Nonacademic sources will be noted.
A full analysis of the nationality and statelessness of nomads would not be complete
without an exploration of solutions. Part 3, as stated above, will focus on to what extent
solutions for nomad statelessness currently exist under the international human rights
framework, if properly applied. Part 3 will rely on international legal analysis.
14
This dissertation therefore seeks to make a contribution towards answering the following
questions: (1) What are some of the root causes of nomad statelessness? (2) Why does
nomad statelessness persist? (3) Does international law provide solutions to nomad
statelessness? (4) Are these solutions consistent with the human rights of nomads?
1.2
The selection of three nomadic groups used as examples
It is not possible to analyse all of the diverse peoples worldwide that either self-identify as
nomads or have been labelled as such. This dissertation has therefore selected as examples
three groups who are nomadic and/or historically associated with nomadism by their
governments and who have been identified as stateless or at risk of statelessness by
experts. These three examples are not taken as representative of all nomads, but are
selected for their diversity of location, background and type of nomadism. This dissertation
will look for commonalities in how nationality has, or has not, been applied to these
nomads, while also highlighting the differences experienced by these very different groups.
All three selected groups are either currently or recently associated with nomadism and a
mobile lifestyle, including both pastoralism and hunter-gatherer lifestyles. As well, the
groups represent geographic diversity. Geographic diversity and diversity of lifestyle
allows these examples to capture a range of nomad types and experiences. As well,
consideration was given to the strengths of the researcher, including languages (French
and English), regional familiarity and the availability of existing information on nomad
statelessness.
The first example selected for this dissertation is the Bedouin of the Gulf region in what is
now Kuwait. The Bedouin are a nomadic group practicing pastoralism and long-distance
trade. While nomadism is no longer practiced in Kuwait, many people living in the Gulf
region, including in Kuwait, are descendants of Bedouin. 34 For the Bedouin example, this
dissertation has chosen to focus on Kuwait because of the wealth of information that
already exists on the problem of statelessness for former Bedouin in that country. 35 As this
dissertation will discuss in detail, in Kuwait, the descendants of certain Bedouin groups
make up the majority of stateless people known as bidoon, or “those without status.”
Though the vast majority of former Bedouin in Kuwait are now settled, many as part of
government-sponsored settlement plans, they continue to be associated in Kuwaiti society
with nomadism.
33F
34F
The region that is now Kuwait is seen as having been traditionally occupied by Bedouin in the desert,
settled, urban Hathar living in towns, and semi-settled arib dar living on the outskirts of those towns and near
oases. C. Beaugrand, Stateless in the Gulf: Migration, Nationality and Society in Kuwait (Tauris 2018) 22
(hereinafter Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018); C. Beaugrand, Statelessness and Transnationalism in Northern
Arabia: Biduns and State Building in Kuwait, 1959-2009 (London School of Economics, PhD dissertation 2010)
88 (hereinafter Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010).
35 Bedu/Bedouin groups are stateless in a number of Arabian countries. While this case study focuses on
Kuwait, many of the points made apply to other countries in the region. D. Chatty, ‘The Persistence of Bedouin
Identity and Increasing Political Self-Representation in Lebanon and Syria’ 18 Nomadic Peoples 16 (2014)
(hereinafter Chatty, Persistence, 2014) 16.
34
15
The second group is the Tuareg, or Kel Tamasheq, a pastoral nomadic group living in the
Sahel region of Africa, primarily in Niger, Mali, and Algeria. 36 Today, there are more than a
million Tuareg in the Sahel spread out across five countries, divided by contested
borders. 37 Though the extent to which the Tuareg are stateless in unknown due in part to a
lack of data on registration, 38 Tuareg political marginalization has been well-documented
in Mali, where a civil war and refugee crisis has greatly heightened the risk of statelessness.
Expert interviews conducted for this dissertation have noted that many Tuareg in northern
Mali lack identity documents.
35F
36F
37F
The third group is the Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut 39 living in the Sulu Sea, which lies between
what are now Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, a zone of contested borders. The
Sama Dilaut are one of a number of “sea nomad” groups who used to live primarily on boats
and practice a hunter/gatherer lifestyle, though a large percentage of Sama Dilaut are now
settled. 40 Sabah, Malaysia was chosen as the country of consideration due to the welldocumented problem of statelessness in Sabah by UNHCR and other experts. 41 In addition
to these three groups, this dissertation will occasionally mention other nomadic groups
where appropriate to provide context or to help with the analysis.
38F
39F
40F
P. Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh : dépendances et révoltes : du Soudan français au Mali contemporain
(Karthala 1999) 10 (hereinafter Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999). It should be noted that while the Tuareg
experience in Niger is similar to that of Mali, the Tuareg experience in Algeria is very different. Keenan notes
that the Algerian Tuareg are much better integrated into their states, where they have “equal rights and
political representation," though they remain marginalized minorities. J. Keenan, The Lesser Gods of the
Sahara: Social Change and Contested Terrain amongst the Tuareg of Algeria (Routledge 2004) 10 (hereinafter
Keenan, Lesser Gods, 2004). Keenan is another noted anthropologist working with the Tuareg.
36
37
A. Gaudio, Le Mali (2nd ed., Karthala 1988) 183 (hereinafter Gaudio, 1988).
38
Based on expert interviews.
The Sama Dilaut are also sometimes called the Bajau Laut. This dissertation will refer to them as Sama
Dilaut on the advice of expert anthropologist Helen Brunt.
39
Sama Dilaut have much in common with other “sea nomad” ethnic groups including the Moken in Thailand
and the Orang Suku Laut in Indonesia. See generally Human Rights Watch, ‘Stateless at Sea: The Moken of
Burma and Thailand’ 25 June 2015 at https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/25/stateless-sea/mokenburma-and-thailand, on the Moken; W. White, Sea Gypsies of Malaysia (Ams Pri 1922, 1981) (hereinafter
White, 1981). See also C. Chou, Indonesian Sea Nomads; Money Magic and fear of the Orang Suku Laut
(Routledge 2003) (hereinafter Chou, Indonesian, 2003), on the Orang Suku Laut. Due to their similar
experiences, this dissertation will also refer from time to time to the parallel experiences of the Moken and
Orang Suku Laut.
40
41
For example, see the research of anthropologist Helen Blunt.
16
1.3
Definition of Terms
Nationality and Citizenship
First, this dissertation accepts as a given that the study of nomad statelessness must be
accompanied by a study of nationality law. 42 Some nomads are stateless under the laws of
their countries, but others are of undetermined, or contested, nationality. Others are at risk
of statelessness due to a lack of identity documents, even though they qualify as nationals
under the law. As a result, this dissertation will look at the nationality and the statelessness
of nomads, but also at cases of contested or unknown nationality. Cases of contested and
unknown nationality will be noted where necessary.
41F
This dissertation looks at nationality under the law. Despite being a legal concept, it is
not easy to formulate a clear definition of nationality. As some experts have pointed
out, attempts to define nationality usually “fall short” given the complexity of the
concept and the many ways nationality has evolved over the centuries. 43 Some experts
point out that nationality is too limited to fully explain the relationship between
individuals and states. 44 Some experts argue that nationality must have some
minimum content. 45 Others view nationality as first and foremost a legal status, or
identifier. 46 Hirsch Ballin defines nationality as “a status that entitles persons to
citizens’ rights, the status that is fleshed out in the legal relationships between the
42F
43F
44F
45F
M. Manly and L. van Waas, ‘The State of Statelessness Research’ 19 Tilburg Law Review 3 (2014) 5
(hereinafter Manly and Van Waas, 2014).
42
E. Isin and P. Nyers, ‘Introduction’ in E. Isin and P. Nyers, Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies
(Routledge 2014) 1 (hereinafter Isin and Nyers, 2014). The authors define nationality as “a negotiated and
dynamic institution mediating rights between political subjects and their polities..." 2. See also R. Slone,
‘Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality’ 50 Har. Int’l L. J.
1 (2009) 3 (hereinafter Slone 2009).
43
T. Bloom, ‘Citizenship and Colonization: Liberal concepts of citizenship are not adequate for understanding
contemporary individual-state relationships’ 67 Soundings 114 (2018) (hereinafter Bloom, Citizenship, 2018)
115.
44
L. N. Kingston, ‘Stateless as a Lack of Functioning Citizenship’ 19 Tilburg Law Review 127 (2014)
(hereinafter Kingston, Stateless, 2014). See also L. Kingston, ‘Worthy of rights: Statelessness as a cause and
symptom of marginalisation’ in T. Bloom, Understanding Statelessness 17-18 (hereinafter Kingston, Worthy);
E. Fripp, Nationality and Statelessness in the International Law of Refugee Status (Hart 2016) 10 (hereinafter
Fripp, 2016). “The right to an education is more than simply the right to attend school," but also includes the
right to advocate for culturally appropriate schooling." H. Alexander, ‘The Open Sky or a Brick and Mortar
School? Statelessness, Education and Nomadic Children’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ed.) The
World’s Stateless Children (January 2017).
45
F. Jault-Seseke, Droit de la nationalité et des étrangers (Presses universitaires de France 2015) 21
(hereinafter Jault-Seseke, 2015). See also H. Gulalp, ‘Introduction: Citizenship vs. Nationality?’ in H. Gulalp
(ed.), Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the nation-state (Routledge 2009) 1.
46
17
state and the citizen.” 47 Edwards argues that nationality must, at a minimum, provide
diplomatic protection and the right to enter and reside. 48 Lindsey Kingston also
questions the idea of “functioning citizenship,” or nationality that ensures the full
spectrum of rights. 49 This dissertation looks both at the extent to which nomads have
a status of any kind under the laws of their countries and the extent to which this
status protects and ensures their rights.
46F
47F
48F
As noted above, this dissertation will primarily look at nationality as a matter of law. It will,
however, also look beyond nationality as a legal status to important historical and
sociological considerations that provide context for why and how nationality laws have
been applied, or not applied, to nomads. As Tendayi Bloom puts it, “the core ideals of liberal
citizenship are compelling, but they are often lost in the real-world systems ostensibly built
upon them.” 50 Discrimination is often closely related to statelessness 51 and nationality can
be used as a tool of assimilation for minorities. 52 The cultural and political forces that
shape nationality law are therefore vital to understanding the evolution of the law itself.
49F
50F
51F
As a result, this dissertation will also look at nationality as a sociological and cultural
identity. Nationality can signify membership not only in a political state, but also in a
cultural nation, or a community of people sharing a common way of life and a shared
history of living in a particular place or homeland. 53 Nationality law also contains moral
52F
E. M. H. Hirsch Ballin, Citizen’s Rights and the Right to be a Citizen (Brill Nijhoff, 2014) 65 (hereinafter
Hirsch Ballin, 2014).
47
A. Edwards, ‘The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human rights: procedural and
substantive aspects’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness under International
Law Cambridge UP 2014) (hereinafter Edwards, 2014) 30-38. See also H. Alexander and J. Simon, ‘No Port, No
Passport: Why Submerged States Can Have No Nationals’ 26 Wash. Int’l L. J. 307 (2016); P. Lagarde, La
nationalité français (2nd ed., Dalloz 1989) 8; G. R. de Groot and O. W. Vonk, International Standards on
Nationality Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Wolf LP 2016) 36 (hereinafter de Groot and Vonk).
48
49
Kingston, Stateless, 2014, 127.
50
Bloom, Citizenship, 2018, 114.
As UNHCR has noted, “discrimination and lack of documents can be both causes and consequences of
statelessness.” UNHCR, ‘This is Our Home: Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship’ (2017) 2.
51
For more on how nationality can be a tool of assimilation, see H. Alexander, ‘The Open Sky or a Brick and
Mortar School? Nomad Children and Education’ The World’s Stateless Children (Institute on Statelessness
and Inclusion 2017). See also Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, O. De Schutter,
submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 64/15, UN General Assembly 11 Aug. 2010 7. See
also K. Staples, ‘Recognition, nationality, and statelessness: State-based challenges for UNHCR’s plan to end
statelessness’ in T. Bloom, (ed.) Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 173 (hereinafter Staples,
2017).
53 D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford UP 1995) 27 (hereinafter Miller, 1995). Miller sees a connection to a
particular territory as a constituent part of nationality in the cultural sense. Fripp, quoting Weis, calls this the
“sociological” aspect of nationality. Fripp, 2016, 4-5, quoting P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in
International Law (Brill 1979) (hereinafter Weis, 1979). See also J. H. J. Verzijl, International Law in Historical
Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 1998) 6 (hereinafter Verzijl, 1998); I. Brownlie, ‘Relations of Nationality in
International Law’ 39 British Yearbook of Int’l L. 284 (1963) 344-345; M. Koessler, ‘Subject, Citizen, National
52
18
elements. It formalizes the claims of some people to live in a particular territory and to
participate in a particular government, while excluding others. 54 As a result, this
dissertation will explore nationality as a legal status, but also give context to the
development and application of the laws by looking at the ways in which sociological
concerns effect the law.
53F
This dissertation will use the term nationality rather than citizenship throughout because
nationality is the generally preferred term in international law. 55 This dissertation will use
“citizenship” where it occurs in original quotes or documents. It is important to here note
here that the term citizenship is sometimes used by experts to express distinct concepts or
meanings. 56 Fransman, for example, differentiates between the two terms in British law:
54F
55F
Citizenship...defines one’s place and conduct in society, such as voting, standing
for election, jury service, military service, eligibility for appointment to the civil
service, state financial assistance and health care and state-sponsored
education...(whereas nationality is) one’s international identity as belonging to a
sovereign state and may be evidence by a passport...In the case of citizenship, the
relationship is more concerned with the individual within the state, in the case of
nationality, it is more concerned with the individual and the state in the
international context. 57
56F
For the purposes of clarity and simplicity in this dissertation, however, the word
nationality will be used to define both the municipal and the international aspects of
nationality.
Statelessness and Risk of Statelessness
This dissertation adopts a broad, inclusive definition of statelessness as advocated by
UNHCR and many experts. According to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, Art. 1, a stateless person, or apatride, is a “person who is not considered
as a national by any state under the operation of its law.” 58 Statelessness occurs for many
57F
and Permanent Allegiance’ 56 Yale Law Journal 58 (1946) (hereinafter Koessler, 1946); E. Ehrlich,
‘Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law’ (Transaction Publishers 1936) 55; Jault-Seseke, 17.
54
Miller, 18-19.
De Groot and Vonk, 3. See also Eric Fripp, Nationality and Statelessness in the International Law of Refugee
Status (Hart 2016) 3 (hereinafter Fripp, 2016).
55
56
I am indebted to Bronwen Manby for her comments on this point. See also Edwards, 13-14.
L. Fransman QC (ed.), Fransman’s British Nationality Law (3rd edn., Bloomsbury 2011) 3-4 (hereinafter
Fransman, 2011).
57
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 360, 117,
art. 1 (hereinafter 1954 Convention, or, when grouped with the 1961 Convention, Statelessness Conventions).
Though many states have not ratified the Convention, this definition is arguably a matter of customary law.
Handbook, 2014 9. See also L. Pilgram, ‘International Law and European Nationality Laws’ (EUDO Citizenship
Observatory 2011) 2 (hereinafter Pilgram, 2011), 8; L. van Waas, ‘The U.N. Statelessness Conventions’ in A.
58
19
reasons, including via expressly discriminatory nationality laws, discrimination in how
nationality laws are applied, gaps between otherwise neutral nationality regimes within
states and gaps between the nationality laws of different states. Statelessness is also a
common result of the breakup of states, including during the decolonization process and
the creation of new states in the middle of the 20th century. Statelessness may also be
caused by denationalization or by the renunciation of nationality.
It is important to understand what is meant by “under operation of its law” in the definition
of statelessness. 59 The operation of law is made up of many different aspects, including
court decisions, statutes, administrative rules, procedural rules, and treaties and custom.
Sources of law may vary depending on the legal system used in a country. Sources of law in
the common law system, for example, include case law and statutes, as well as customary
law and “conventional law”, or law by agreement. 60 As a procedural matter, nationality can
either be conferred automatically, when the requirements of the law are met, or following a
formal procedure. 61 As a result, the registration of nationality and the issuance of
documentation may play a determinative role in establishing nationality, or may be
important evidence of nationality. Operation of law also includes the actions of tribunals
and administrative bodies who apply the law.
58F
59F
60F
When determining statelessness, therefore, it is necessary to look at all points at which
nationality is determined, from the procedures used at local registration offices in issuing
documents to relevant court cases to changes made to the laws by legislatures, to the
actions of embassies. 62 As the UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons puts it,
“(t)he reference to ‘law’ in Article 1(1) should be read broadly to encompass not just
legislation, but also ministerial decrees, regulations, orders, judicial case law (in countries
with a tradition of precedent) and, where appropriate, customary practice.” 63 In so doing,
this dissertation adopts an expansive definition of statelessness. As Gabor Gyulai puts it,
“(e)stablishing statelessness is often a cumbersome exercise and if the evidentiary rules
61F
62F
Edwards and L. van Waas, Nationality and Statelessness Under International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 78
(hereinafter Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 2014).
59
1954 Convention.
J. Salmond, Jurisprudence, or the Theory of Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1924) 168 (hereinafter Salmond,
1924).
60
While the acquisition of nationality is automatic in some cases where certain conditions are met, such as
birth within the territory of the state, the failure to obtain an ID or register a birth can result in undetermined
nationality, even where the individual qualifies as a national under the law. Handbook ,2014, 13.
61
Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 80-81 (discussing the meaning of “under the operation of law”). See
also Salmond, 182. For example, an individual may qualify as a national under the nationality law of a state,
but be denied nationality by a court or embassy. See S. Jaghai, ‘Statelessness at Home: The Story of a Stateless
Student at Tilburg Law School’ 19 Tilburg L. Rev. 108 (2014).
62
63
Handbook, 2014, 12.
20
are too strict, this can easily undermine the protection objective of the 1954 Convention.” 64
As UNHCR has pointed out, the manner in which the law is applied, the practice of the state,
is key. 65 “Widespread discrimination” against certain groups in the granting of nationality
and the issuance of documents “should give rise to a presumption of de jure
statelessness...” 66 This dissertation will therefore look not only at the letter of the law, but
also how it is applied, including the absence or presence of identity documents.
63F
64F
65F
At the same time, this dissertation remains sensitive to the problems with applying the
term “stateless” to nomads. The term “stateless” may impose a negative label on persons
who view themselves as rightfully the nationals of their state. Calling some nomads
“stateless” risks doing them harm or reinforcing negative government stereotypes. The use
of the term “stateless” should be seen as referencing a legal category defined by states in
international law, not making a value judgment. Nevertheless, in recognition of the
sensitivity of the issue, the term “stateless” is therefore used with caution. 67
66F
Some nomads may qualify for a nationality under the law, but have no identity documents
to prove their nationality. The mere fact that an individual lacks identity documents does
not mean that person is stateless. 68 As Mark Manly points out, “(l)ack of birth registration
is not sufficient to render a person stateless." 69 Persons who have no identity documents
and whose parents have no identity documents, however, may be at-risk of statelessness. 70
Lack of registration can have many of the same affects as refusing to grant nationality, such
as making it impossible for children to attend school or for an individual to return home
67F
68F
69F
G. Gyulai, ‘The Determination of Statelessness and the Establishment of a Statelessness-specific Protection
Regime’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas, Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge UP
2014) 137 (hereinafter Gyulai). See also Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 79; R (on the application of
Semeda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (statelessness; Pham (2015) UKSC 19 applied) IJR
(2015) UKUT 658 (IAC).
64
65
Handbook, 2014, 13.
L. Bingham, J. H. Reddy and S. Kohn, ‘De Jure Statelessness in the Real World: Applying the Prato Summary
Conclusion’ (Open Society Justice Initiative 2011) 5-6 (hereinafter Bingham, Reddy and Kohn).
66
H. Massey, ‘UNHCR and de facto Statelessness’ UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (2010)
(hereinafter Massey) 53. See also Batchelor, 1998, 158.
67
“Failing to distinguish between the stateless and those who lack documentation, and the failure to
distinguish stateless persons who lack documentation, can lead to the wrong solutions and frameworks being
pursued, with little or even negative gain.” A. de Chickera and L. van Waas, ‘Unpacking Statelessness’ in T
Bloom (ed.), Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 65. As Mark Manly points out, “the definition of a
stateless person in the 1954 Convention is more complex than it appears at first glance and has been
interpreted in wildly diverging manners,” so this section opts here for the most inclusive interpretation.
Manly 2014 95. See also Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 20.
68
69
Manly, 2014, 107.
UNICEF, ‘Every Child’s Birth Right: Inequalities and Trends in Birth Registration’ (2013) at
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Embargoed_11_Dec_Birth_Registration_report_low_res.pdf.
70
21
from abroad. 71 As UNHCR has noted, failure to register and obtain an ID or paperwork can
lead to a cycle of exclusion that is compounded by discrimination and marginalization, 72
placing people at risk of statelessness. 73 The line between statelessness and at-risk of
statelessness can be fluid and blurry. 74 As the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion has
noted, persons lacking in documentation may be at risk of statelessness and “some of them
are likely to already be stateless.” 75 This dissertation will also use the term “at risk of
statelessness” where appropriate.
70F
71F
72F
73F
74F
As well, this dissertation will also look beyond the narrow interpretations of the law to
explore the wider context of discrimination and exclusion that makes up a large part of
statelessness. Laws and their implementation are not the only factors relevant to an
analysis of statelessness. Government attitudes and policy goals are crucial in
understanding why nationality laws are drafted and applied in certain ways. An overly
narrow focus on laws and their implementation in isolation risks missing the larger context
of why and how statelessness occurs. This dissertation therefore follows the advice of the
UNHCR Handbook in applying a broad and flexible approach to discuss the nationality
status of nomads, looking at the totality of the circumstances and history of each group. 76
75F
Nomad
“Nomad” is not a legal term and has no definition in law, but it is frequently employed by
anthropologists, governments and settled peoples 77 to define the shrinking minority of
people who do not rely on agriculture and the cultivation of plants as the primary source of
76F
Van Waas cites to the 1997 issue of UNHCR’s ‘The State of the World’s Refugees’ as the beginning of
UNHCR’s push to highlight the importance of registration to establishing nationality and preventing
statelessness. Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 151-152, citing to UNHCR, ‘Statelessness and Citizenship’ in
UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, (Oxford 1997) 226. Registration may also
be used in an international setting to establish “functional nationality”, or nationality for the purposes of
settling an international disputes and determining the subjects of international treaties. I. Brownlie,
‘Relations of Nationality in Public International Law’ 39 British Yearbook of Int’l L. 284 (1963) 347-349
(hereinafter Brownlie, Nationality).
71
For example, see UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Persons at Risk of Statelessness in Serbia,
June 2011. See also Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 153-157; B. Manby, ‘Legal Identity for All’ and Childhood
Statelessness’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ed.), The World’s Stateless Children (January 2017)
320-321 (hereinafter Manby, Legal).
72
See generally the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless (December 2014) at
http://www.institutesi.org/worldsstateless.pdf (hereinafter Institute, Stateless).
73
74
Batchelor, 1998, 172. See also Massey; Handbook, 2014 5; Fripp, 2016, 102.
75
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless (Wolf 2014) 43. See also Manly, 2014, 103.
76
Handbook, 2014, 12-14.
In anthropology, “sedentism”, or what I will call “settlement,” is defined as “the settled, immobile location of
the household during the annual round of productive activities.” P. Salzman, ‘Introduction’ in P. Salzman (ed.)
When Nomads Settle (Praeger 1980) (hereinafter Salzman, Introduction) 10.
77
22
their food. 78 There is no established and agreed upon definition for the word nomad and,
as a result, this dissertation will take an inclusive approach, looking not only at currently
mobile and nomadic groups, but recently nomadic groups who are still strongly associated
with mobility by their governments and other outsiders.
77F
While there is no definition in law for the term nomad, several organizations have made an
attempt to define it. The Council of Europe defined nomads as; “persons who, for
traditional reasons, are accustomed to follow an itinerant way of life." 79 This definition
arguably fails to capture the diversity of nomadic lifestyles, however. A joint report by the
International Organization on Migration, ECOWAS, the European Union defines nomadism
as, “(c)ontinuous movement of people with their herds. Very mobile production system,
opportunistic movements according to pasture availability, often without own fields and
annual return to a fixed base.” 80 Once again, this definition fails to take into account mobile
traders and artists and is therefore too limited. The ECOWAS report also distinguishes
nomadism from pastoralism and transhumance. This dissertation will adopt an expansive
view of the term nomad to include all forms of mobile lifestyle, including pastoralism,
mobile fishing, trade, mobile arts and transhumance.
78F
79F
Self-identification is often a key factor in nomad identification. This is in part because
colonial attitudes have coloured and distorted the historical record in ways which are still
being uncovered and discussed. 81 Nomadism is a diverse, mutable and changeable
characteristic, with many nomadic populations moving in and out of nomadism over
time. 82 Nomads move in and out of nomadism. They may have relatives who are sedentary
and/or close contractual relationships with settled communities. As such, it can be difficult
to speak of nomads as separate, distinct groups. For example, Youssouf Diallo prefers not to
classify cattle herders as nomads, but rather as herders who have gone through periods of
nomadism. 83
80F
81F
82F
Defining nomadism is also difficult because nomadism is not simply an economic activity,
but also a social and cultural way of life. Nomads may also be defined as a separate
For a discussion of the origins of the word “nomad,” see Y. Diallo, Nomades des espaces interstitiels:
Pastoralisme, identité, migrations (Burkina Faso - Cote d’Ivoire) (Rudiger Koppe Verlag 2008) (hereinafter
Diallo) 23-28.
78
Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (83) 1 of the Committee of Ministeres to Member States on
Stateless Nomads and Nomads of Undetermined Nationality (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 22
February 1983 at the 356th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
79
Regional Policies and Response to Manage Pastoral Movements within the ECOWAS Region, International
Organization on Migration, ECOWAS, the European Union and ECOWAS ‘Support to Free Movement of
Persons and Migration in West Africa’ (FMM West Africa) (September 2017) vii.
80
Recent studies of Australian aboriginals highlight the dangers of labeling groups as nomadic. B. McMahon,
‘Scientist debunks nomadic Aborigine “myth”’ The Guardian (9 Oct. 2007).
81
82
D. Chatty, Mobile Pastoralists (Columbia UP 1996) (hereinafter Chatty, Pastoralists) 82.
83
Diallo, 27- 33.
23
ethnicity or as a class of people within an ethnicity. Many nomads practice different
religions or speak unique languages from nearby, settled communities, but in other cases, it
is cultural or economic practices that form the primary point of difference with agricultural
or urban groups. As a result of the difficulties in defining nomadism and classifying
nomadic and mobile peoples, this dissertation will apply a broad approach.
Many groups that were historically associated with nomadism during the colonial period
are now semi-settled or settled, a fact which will be explored at length in this dissertation.
Many nomads have close family or patronage relations with settled, urban or agricultural
peoples and live in a state of economic and social inter-dependence with settled
communities, forming part of complex societies where the line between nomad, farmer and
urbanite was frequently blurred. The distinction between nomadic and settled groups is
therefore often not clear nor is it always politically or socially relevant. While nomadism
was frequently a feature drawn out and much commented upon by the colonial
administrators who often created important historical records, recent scholarship has done
much to correct the record on nomad land use and the extent of nomad land ownership,
their relations to settled and urban communities and the extent and limits of their
mobility. 84
83F
The term nomad is also fraught with problems due to its negative connotations. 85
Anthropologist Dawn Chatty promotes the term “mobile peoples” in response to the
imprecise and often negative connotations of the term nomad. Her use of “mobile peoples”
is in line with the Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation. 86
84F
85F
This dissertation will use the term nomads rather than mobile peoples because nomads is
the term most used by governments and other outsiders to describe historically mobile
peoples and others associated, rightly or not, with a nomadic lifestyle. The bias and
negative perceptions associated with the term nomad are very much a factor in nomad
statelessness. In some cases, the term nomad continues to be applied to settled, former
nomads in tandem with their continued exclusion. In this context, the context of outsider
perceptions and biases, the term nomad is appropriate.
In particular, as this dissertation will explore, the term nomad imposes an imagined
ideology, a world-view, on otherwise dispirit groups coming from different cultures and
living in vastly different circumstances, creating a dichotomy between nomads and the rest
of society. It is inherently a loaded and exclusionary term and this dissertation will explore
they ways in which its negative connotations, and tendency to isolate and exclude the
groups to whom it is applied, are very much relevant to nomad statelessness. For example,
nomadism has sometimes been negatively associated with illiteracy and, as a result, a poor
84
See for example Diallo, 28-32.
85
Diallo, 27-28.
D. Chatty, ‘Nomadic Peoples, Migration and Biodiversity’ SGI Quarterly (October 2003) (hereinafter Chatty,
Nomadic Peoples). See also the Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation, Fifth World Parks
Conference, Durban, South Africa (September 2003) (hereinafter Dana Declaration).
86
24
understanding of religion. Max Weber, for example, believed that “urban life in contrast
with rural or desert life provides an individual with greater facilities for becoming literate,
for becoming acquainted with the written, authentic version of his or her faith..." 87
86F
There are also difficulties and ethical issues associated with labelling marginalized peoples
like nomads, where a clear classification does not exist for the group in question and there
are negative associations with the term. 88 As a result, it is difficult to say how many mobile,
nomadic and non-settled peoples remain in the world, nor is it the purpose of this
dissertation to uncover the number. As with statelessness, discussed above, it may not be
possible or desirable to quantify the practice of nomadism. Therefore, this dissertation will
not enter into a detailed discussion of different types of nomadism or evaluate the extent to
which modern populations continue to practice nomadism. For the purposes at hand, this
dissertation selected three groups as examples which are commonly and historically
associated with nomadism by others, including governments, and have members who selfidentify as nomads or mobile peoples or who identify with a nomadic lifestyle or culture as
part of their identity, even though they may not practice a mobile lifestyle themselves.
87F
Despite the enormous diversity of nomad lifestyles and societies and the dangers
associated with a term that has frequently been used pejoratively, there are some general
points to help frame the populations that are the subject of this dissertation, beyond the
simple fact of self-labelling or having been labelled as nomads by outsiders. According to
the Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation, cited above, mobile peoples may
be defined as,
a subset of indigenous and traditional peoples whose livelihoods depend on
extensive common property use of natural resources over an area, who use
mobility as a management strategy for dealing with sustainable use and
conservation, and who possess a distinctive cultural identity and natural resource
management system. 89
88F
According to the 2007 Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists,
P. Clarke (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the sociology of religion (Oxford 2009) 127, quoting R. Bendix, Max
Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (London 1966), (hereinafter Clarke) 114.
87
For examples of some of the ethical and practical concerns in counting and quantifying indigenous and
nomadic peoples, see B. Elias, K. Busby and P. Martins, ‘One little, too little: Counting Canada’s indigenous
people for improved health reporting’ 138 Social Science and Medicine 179 (August 2015). The authors
describe some of the problems with classifying and labeling indigenous populations, including selfidentification, gender discrimination and mixed-race individuals, problems with record keeping and defining
family relationships. See also L. Heikkilä, ‘Welfare services in enhancing good life for the Sámi: A reflection on
conducting ethically responsible research and developing an improved sense of culture’ 59 International
Social Work 653 (2016) for reflections on the ethical challenges of field research of the Sami people, an
indigenous, mobile nomadic group, including the role of subjectivity, the challenges of participatory
approaches and carrying out research applying indigenous concepts and theory.
88
89
Dana Declaration.
25
Pastoral livelihoods are based on seasonal mobility and common property of
natural resources (particularly rangelands), regulated by customary law and
practices, customary institutions and leadership, all making use of local and
indigenous knowledge. 90
89F
Seasonal, patterned mobility is one of the common features that many anthropologists use
to categorize nomads. 91 Drawing on this definition, the groups chosen as subjects of this
dissertation all use, or have used in the past, mobility as a strategy to manage natural
resources. All have a distinct cultural identity from the majority populations of what are
now the nation-states in which they live.
90F
Finally, some, but not all, nomadic peoples may also self-identify as indigenous peoples.
Many indigenous peoples are also nomadic and mobile, or were nomadic or mobile in the
past. Some indigenous peoples were labelled nomadic by colonizing governments, though
the extent to which this is true is now debated. 92 The intersection between nomadism and
indigenous status will be referenced in this dissertation where appropriate.
91F
Sources
This dissertation does not employ any original field research. Instead, this dissertation
aims to be a synthesis and an analysis of what is already known about government laws,
attitudes and policies towards the three selected nomadic groups, an analysis which is then
used as grounds to explore and critique possible solutions under international law. As this
is a law dissertation, it will focus on nationality law, both in the municipal and international
Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists, La Granja, Segovia, Spain (14 September
2007).
90
Nomadism may be defined as “movement of the household during the annual round of productive
activities.” P. C. Salman, When Nomads Settle: Processes of Sedentarization as Adaptation and Response
(Praeger 1980) 11. Keenan points out that nomads live in areas where “natural resources are not only scarce,
but also insecure from year to year,” so movement is required. Keenan, Lesser Gods, 2004, 165. See also F.
Hole, ‘Pastoral Mobility as an Adaptation’ in J. Szuchman, Nomads, Tribes and the State in the Ancient Near
East (U Chicago 2009) 269-270, where he says, “I see pastoralism in its various forms as examples of
adaptation to environmental and social conditions within a mixed agro-pastoral economy.”
91
According to Bourgeot, nomadism may be defined as “regular and periodic migration for the purpose of
pastoral industry” or “a mode of herding or raising livestock over long distances.” A. Bourgeot, Les sociétés
touarègues; Nomadisme, identité, résistances (Karthala 1995) 155 (hereinafter Bourgeot, Résistances) (my
translation), citing to the definitions of A. Bernard, N. Lacroit and R. Capot-Rey. Nomadism, however, should
not be treated as synonymous with pastoralism as it also encompasses wandering traders, peripatetic
minorities and hunter-gatherers. Some anthropologists argue the term nomad should be reserved for
pastoralists. “In my view, wandering hunters and gatherers on the one hand, and mobile pastoralists, on the
other, have too little in common to unite them under a single label.” A. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside
World, (2nd edn U Wisconsin P 1983) (hereinafter Khazanov, Outside) 15-16. Khazanov’s work focuses on the
interrelation and inter-dependence between nomadic and settled peoples.
See generally J. Castellino and C. Doyle, ‘Who are Indigenous Peoples: An Examination of Concepts
Concerning Group Membership in the UNDRIP’ in J. Hohmann and M. Weller, The UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (Oxford 2018) (hereinafter Castellino and Doyle).
92
26
spheres. To do so, it will look both at nationality laws and how they are implemented,
including the implementation of nationality at the local level.
This examination is multi-faceted, looking not only at nationality laws, but also at the
issuance of identity documents by registration departments, the courts and other organs of
the state. It will also explore access to nationality rights and proof of nationality by looking
at voting records, school attendance, land ownership and other areas where nomads
interact with the organs of the state. Reference will therefore be made both to laws and
their implementation, as well as secondary scholarship documenting voting histories,
access to education, health care and official work, taxes, the census and other official
registries.
But the problem of nomad statelessness should not be examined only through legal
analysis. This dissertation will draw on a diverse wealth of sources to explore why certain
nomads became stateless by examining key state goals that affected and intersected with
the status of nomads. Manly and Van Waas cite the “need to explore statelessness from an
interdisciplinary perspective...” 93 Statelessness as government policy is influenced by
negative perceptions held by governments, government officials and society at large.
Matters of perception and what is sometimes referred to as “public opinion,” including the
presentation of nomadic groups by media and outside scholars, are of relevance. This
dissertation will look beyond the fact of the law to explore the rationale behind how the
law has been applied, or not applied, to nomads and the wider political context, looking at
history, philosophy, geography, politics and sociology.
92F
Perhaps most crucially, this dissertation includes an analysis of the political theories and
philosophies that have influenced nomad-state relations from the colonial period through
the modern age, including the philosophies underpinning the nation-state system and the
use of nationality to govern citizen-state relationships. It will also look at how nomad
inclusion and exclusion relate to the control and use of land, including theories of private
property ownership and state control. To do so, this dissertation will draw from other
disciplines including history, sociology, geography, anthropology and others to inform its
legal analysis.
This dissertation does not seek to do any quantitative analysis of nomad statelessness
because reliable data does not exist for either stateless persons or nomads in most
countries. 94 Quantifying statelessness in many contexts may not be possible or desirable
due to the ways in which stateless people are often invisible to state structures and
93F
93
Manly and Van Waas, 2014, 6.
There are currently a number of statelessness mapping projects being undertaken in various countries.
UNDP is currently undertaking a mapping exercise of statelessness for one of the three groups cited in this
dissertation: the Sama Dilaut of Sabah, Malaysia. Future mapping projects may assist in quantifying
statelessness, but at the time of writing, statistics on statelessness are usually not available.
94
27
bureaucracies and the ways in which official statistics may be manipulated and misused. 95
Likewise, the difficulties in defining nomadism and identifying nomads make quantitative
studies of nomads extremely difficult. 96 Instead, this dissertation presents an in-depth
analysis of the legal framework in the three selected states, as pertains to the three selected
nomad groups. This academic research is fleshed out by an analysis of media, government
and non-profit publications about nomads, documents which help to explain the attitudes
and opinions of nomads held by many governments and international actors during
different key historical moments in nomad-state relations.
94F
95F
Missing from this dissertation are the opinions and views of the nomads themselves,
including how they see nationality. It is hoped also that this dissertation will serve as a
jumping off point for further discussion of nationality from the nomadic perspective.
Another limitation on this dissertation is the frequent lack of quality sources from the
colonial period. Due to the lack of nomad sources from the colonial period, this dissertation
must rely on colonial sources that may be inaccurate and biased. In fact, the topic of
colonial bias against nomads is a major topic of this dissertation, so there is a certain irony
in being forced to rely on biased sources for a dissertation about that very bias. The
challenges in using colonial sources are acknowledged where appropriate.
A good example of reliance on colonial sources is the use of J. Spencer Trimingham’s Islam
in West Africa. 97 While subsequent scholars have criticized Trimingham’s book as being
“outdated,” it remains “the only survey of its kind,” 98 in that it is one of the few major
works pulling together a broad array of scholarship into one place. Another example would
be the contested history of the origins of Bedouin tribes in the Gulf region, where much of
the scholarship is contradictory. 99 Another example is arguments between anthropologists
on the extent to which the Sama Dilaut were a “pariah people” during the precolonial
period given that many of the records of the Sama Dilaut are based on colonial European
sources. 100 A number of more recent scholars have worked to place colonial era sources in
their proper context and this dissertation will therefore also rely on the work of
anthropologists like Dawn Chatty and historians like Bruce Hall to help interpret and
situate colonial sources. It will also acknowledge disputed history where necessary.
96F
97F
98F
99F
Part 3 will look at a wide variety of sources, including treaties, customary international law
and general principles of law, but also draft treaties, declarations, cases, treaty body
See Manly, 2014, 101 for a discussion of the difficulties of quantifying statelessness. For an example, see the
discussion around collecting statistics on the bidoon of Kuwait in C. Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 33-38.
95
96
See generally the work of Dawn Chatty and the Dana Declaration.
97
J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in West Africa (Clarendon 1959) (hereinafter Trimingham).
R. S. O’Fahey, ‘Islamic Hegemonies in the Sudan: Sufism, Mahdism and Islamism’ in Louis Brenner (ed.),
Muslim Identity and Social Change in Subsaharan Africa (Indiana 1993) 21. See Part 2, below.
98
99
For more on this issue, see Part 2, below.
100
For more on this issue, see Part 2, below.
28
reports and guidance issued by organs of the United Nations. 101 Soft law is particularly
important in the case of nomads, where little treaty law exists beyond bilateral treaties on
specific populations. 102 Soft law can assist in interpreting key terms and how key concepts
in treaties may be applied to the specific circumstances faced by nomads. It is therefore
necessary to explore international law writ large and draw on all available sources. This
approach will also allow Part 3 to examine not only what states have bound themselves to
do, but also where the law might develop in the future, particularly on emerging issues.
100F
101F
Regional instruments are particularly important because they are often supported by
regional human rights courts or committees and can help to define key terms and concepts
and show how the law might be applied to particular groups, like nomads. 103 Court cases
often involve an in depth examination of particular terms and concepts. “The courts are
often a valuable tool in vindicating the equal rights of stateless people, including their right
to a nationality.” 104 Where applicable, Part 3 will explore these regional instruments,
including the dicta of courts and findings of relevant committees.
102F
103F
Draft conventions and declarations can give insight into the emerging consensus on the
importance of the right to a nationality in the international sphere, even where they are not
yet legally binding on states. 105 They can give a picture of possible reforms and future
advancements in international law. They can also help guide the interpretation of existing
treaties and commonly used terms in the law. As Brownlie puts it, “such instruments…may
stand for a threshold of consensus and confront states in a significant way.” 106
104F
105F
Finally, this dissertation will look explicitly at guidance provided by organs of the United
Nations, particularly UNHCR, which the UN General Assembly has given the global mandate
to combat statelessness. 107 UN guidance can help define how treaties are to be applied in
certain circumstances. Where applicable, this dissertation will also consider the opinions of
noted international law scholars, in line with Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. Such guidance can illuminate legal consensus on how treaties like the
Statelessness Conventions should be applied to particular groups under particular
106F
101
Shaw, 2008, 70.
102
For an example, see the Jay Treaty, Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, ‘Border Crossing
Issues and the Jay Treaty’ Senate of Canada (June 2016).
103
See Shaw, 2008, 70. Shaw cites to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as the
authority on international law sources. See also Brownlie, 2008, 3-29.
A de Chickera and J. Whiteman, ‘Addressing statelessness through the right to equality and nondiscrimination’ in L. van Waas and M. Khanna, Solving Statelessness (Wolf 2017) 119.
104
105
See for example the Draft Articles, 24. See also Edwards, 38; de Groot and Vonk, 71-72.
106
Brownlie, 2008, 4.
107
UNGA Resolution A/RES/49/169 of 23 December 1994 and A/RES/50/152 of 21 December 1995.
29
circumstances. For a list of sources organized by topic, see the section on Sources by Topic
at the end of this dissertation.
Part 2: The Nationality and Statelessness of Nomads
2.1
Nomads and Empire
Introduction
(T)he root causes of statelessness are complex and multifaceted including
state succession, decolonization, conflicting laws between States, domestic
changes to nationality laws, and discrimination. 108
107F
Part 2 will discuss the nationality and statelessness of the Bedouin, the Tuareg and the
Sama Dilaut in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. It
will explain how nomads went from being vital participants in pre-colonial states to
marginalized minorities during the colonial period. It will also examine the types of status
given to some nomads during the colonial period and the reasons why some nomads
received no status at all. This history is crucial to understanding how and why some
nomads became stateless and what types of status were available to nomads during the
colonial period.
Part 2 begins by introducing the three nomadic groups examined in this dissertation,
summarizing how belonging was defined in their societies in the decades before colonial
conquest. This section is mainly a work of historical analysis. Next, Part 2 will discuss the
colonial period, a time when the status and role played by nomads in society radically
changed. The section on the colonial period begins with a historical analysis and concludes
with a section on legal analysis.
108 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice Initiative (on behalf
of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya) v. the Government of Kenya, Decision No 002/Com/002/2009, African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) (22 March 2011) (hereinafter Nubian
Children) para. 45.
30
Nomads Before Colonization
The Bedouin of the Persian Gulf
Possible Locations of Bedouin Tribes During the Colonial Period
For thousands of years, the Bedouin practiced nomadic pastoralism and trade across the
Arabian peninsula, living alongside and intermingled with settled oasis and coastal
communities. 109 The area today known as Kuwait has always been very dry, containing less
than 1% arable land, making nomadic pastoralism an ideal use of land away from oasis and
coastal areas. 110 As will be shown, the desert environment that made pastoralism so ideal
would also prove to contain large quantities of oil and natural gas, but during the precolonial period, pastoralism, pearl fishing and trade formed the foundation of the desert
economy. 111 Much of Kuwaiti history is disputed, particularly when it comes to the origins
108F
109F
110F
Chatty, Pastoralists, 5-6. See also A. al-Ashker and R. Wilson, Islamic Economics: A Short History (Brill
2006) 4; F. F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, the Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Columbia U. Press
1997) 11-12 (hereinafter Anscombe). Anscombe is a historian who has published widely on Ottoman and Gulf
history. This section relies on a blend of sources from anthropology, history and other social sciences. Where
there are different opinions from scholars from different fields, these differences will be noted.
109
110
M. Casey, The History of Kuwait (Greenwood Publishing Group 2007) (hereinafter Casey) 4-5.
111 As Commins puts it, mobility was one of the “distinctive features” of Gulf society. D. Commins, The Gulf
States: A Modern History (Tauris 2012) (hereinafter Commins) 6.
31
of certain Bedouin tribes. Nevertheless, this section will attempt to present an overview of
what is known about Bedouin society prior to British Protectorate period.
Modern Kuwait is located on the Persian Gulf and is centred around Kuwait City, an ancient
trading port. During the 1700s, a “wave” of Bedouin tribes migrated to the region. 112 Over
time, the economies of the Gulf region and the area now known as Kuwait came to rely on
regional trade both by sea and by camel caravan. Bedouin served as guides and protection
for the caravan trade that drove the regional economy. 113 Bedouin society was hierarchical,
with camel herding tribes at the top of the social structure. 114 The desert came to be
dominated by noble Bedouin tribes, either nomadic or semi-settled and often practicing
long distance trade, and semi-nomadic tribes employed in sheep, camel or goat pastoralism
and centred around oasis or coastal towns. 115
111F
112F
113F
114F
For much of its recent history, the Gulf was nominally controlled by various empires,
including the Romans, Persians, and Ottomans. During this period, local Bedouin sheiks
retained control over their domains, though they remained influenced, pressured and, to a
certain extent, threatened by larger and stronger empires to their north and west. 116
Kuwait Town became rich off of trade, fishing and pearling and developed a wealthy
merchant class. 117 During the early modern period, the town, ruled by the powerful AlSabah family 118, capitalized on its position at the edge of the Ottoman empire, where it
could benefit from being somewhat independent from the Empire and attract non-Ottoman
trade, including British trade. 119 Beyond the walls of Kuwait Town, Bedouin confederations
controlled the desert, herding camels, sheep and goats and trading in caravans between the
Mediterranean and the Gulf port cities, including Kuwait. 120 Tribes would trade over long
distances between urban centres; such seasonal trade was called musabila and formed an
115F
116F
117F
118F
119F
112
Commins, 9.
113
Commins, 8.
114
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 68.
115
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 45-53.
116
Casey, 18.
B. J. Slot, Mubarak Al-Sabah: Founder of Modern Kuwait: 1896-1915 (Arabian Publishing 2005) 8. Slot is a
historian publishing on the region’s history, particularly its early history. See also Casey, 18.
117
A. N. Longva, ‘Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice’ in Nils A Butenschon, Uri Davis
and Manuel Hassassian (eds.), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East (Syracuse 2000) 181. See also A. alDekhayel, Kuwait: Oil, State and Political Legitimization (Ithaca Press 2000) 1 (hereinafter al-Dekhayel); J. S.
Ismael, Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State (UP of Florida 1993) 17, 21 (hereinafter Ismael). I am
indebted to anthropologist Anthony Toth’s comments.
118
P. Carmichael, Nomads (Collins and Brown 1991) 66-78
(hereinafter Carmichael).
119
120
Slot, 8, 11.
32
important part of town-desert relations. 121 The ruling Al-Sabah family in Kuwait Town
relied on loyal Bedouin groups to protect the town from Saudi raids and to work in the
pearl industry. 122 As well, connections with powerful Bedouin camel tribes gave the AlSabah family access to the caravan routes and long-distance trade. Groups would travel
from northern Arabia and what is now Iraq to trade in the town and pasture their
animals. 123
120F
121F
122F
Like with other pastoral nomads such as the Tuareg, discussed below, pastoral Bedouin
maintained a relationship to land that was shifting and seasonal, frequently relying on
collective ownership and informal agreements between tribes to determine control of a
dira, or pasturage area, and water sources. 124 Many Bedouin tribes, however, also owned
land which they hired out to others for cultivation, blurring the distinction between settled
and non-settled peoples, particularly in oasis areas. 125 The coastal areas contained diverse
communities, including many Bedouin practicing agriculture, fishing and pearling. 126
Several of the tribes inhabiting what is now northern Kuwait had extensive areas of
influence in what are now Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Bedouin in this area are sometimes
now called the “northern tribes”. 127
123F
124F
125F
126F
Belonging and membership in Bedouin tribes was based on family and kin relationships,
but Islam also served as a cultural unifier across the region. The foundation of Bedouin
society was the tribe, with membership based on descent from a Bedouin father. Clans, or
ibn ’amm, would often encompass multiple generations descended from the same male
ancestor. 128 Belonging in Bedouin society was based along kinship lines, with clans
organized into large confederations. 129 But as Beaugrand notes, Bedouin political alliances
were often fluid and shifting, particularly when it came to alliances with settled, urban
127F
128F
121
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018 11.
122
Carmichael, 66.
R. Fletcher, ‘Between the Devil of the Desert and the Deep Blue Sea: Reorienting Kuwait: 1900-1940’ 50
Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2015) 58.
123
Chatty, Pastoralists, 3; J. Janzen, Nomads in the Sultanate of Oman (Westview Press 1986) 64; Anscombe,
11 (hereinafter Janzen); J. C. Wilkinson, ‘Traditional Concepts of Territory in South East Arabia’ 149
Geographic Journal (1983) (hereinafter Wilkinson) 306-307. For more on Bedouin territoriality see K. Franz,
‘The Bedouin in History or Bedouin History?’ 15 Nomadic Peoples 11 (2011).
124
125
Wilkinson, 305.
126
Casey, 17-18.
Both northern and southern Bedouin tribes included Shi’a and Sunni members. Beaugrand, Stateless,
2018, 50.
127
M. al-Serhan and A. L. Furr, ‘Tribal Customary Law in Jordan’ 4 S. Ca J. of Int’l L. and Bus. 17 (2008) 18
(hereinafter al-Serhan and Furr).
128
129
Al-Serhan and Furr, 21; Janzen, 12.
33
rulers. 130 The delineation between nomads, agriculturalists and urbanites was not strict in
pre-colonial Arabia and there was much intermingling and overlap between settled and
nomadic communities. Many families settled in Kuwait Town had Bedouin relatives, while
clans and federations were frequently allied with settled families. 131
129F
130F
For example, the Bani Khalid confederation dominated the Arabian interior and had a
significant presence in what would become Kuwait, coming to run the large caravan trade
with Iraq. 132 Kuwait Town is usually described as being founded by the Bani Utub
federation who migrated to the region, settled on the natural harbour and took up fishing
and trade. 133 Kuwaiti historian Salwa Alghanim argues that the Utub lacked the
connections to desert clans that had typified the rule of the Bani Khalid. 134 While the
history of these tribal confederations is often disputed by modern scholars, alliances forged
during this period of Bedouin history play a role in modern Kuwaiti politics, including the
politics of belonging. Over centuries, other groups settled in the area, including Bedouin
from other parts of Arabia, as well as immigrants from Persia.
131F
132F
133F
Territoriality as the basis of political membership played a role in Bedouin society. Yet, the
role of territoriality in forming group identity under Islamic law is debated. 135 What is
knows is that adherence to Islam and family ties could united Bedouin leaders and urban
elites across long distances. While Islam bound together Bedouin and urban and oasis
dwellers, however, it is important to note that Bedouin custom differed in important points
134F
Beaugrand cites the shifting allegiances of the Ikhwan during the early 20th century. Beaugrand, Stateless,
2018, 64.
130
131
Carmichael, 10.
Carmichael, 62. See also Casey, 23. The exact history of the founding of Kuwait is somewhat contested. See
for example S. Alghanim, The Reign of Mubarak-Al-Sabah: Shaikh of Kuwait 1896-1915 (Tauris 1998) 5-6,
(hereinafter Alghanim) which notes the problem with historical sources from this period.
132
A. N. Longva, ‘Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice’ in N. A. Butenschon, U. Davis
and M. Hassassian (eds.), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East (Syracuse 2000) 181 (hereinafter
Longva, Citizenship). See also al-Dekhayel, 1; Ismael, 17.
133
Alghanim, 6. The extent to which this lack of relations with desert Bedouin tribes informs later Kuwaiti
politics is simply not clear from the literature review done by this dissertation. Alghanim notes the
problematic nature of many sources from this period in Kuwait’s history.
134
For an overview of this debate, see J. D. Fry and M. H. Loj, ‘The Roots of Historic Title: Non-Western PreColonial Normative Systems and Legal Resolution of Territorial Disputes’ 27 Leiden J. of Int’l L. 727 (2014).
“(C)lassical Islamic law concepts ... practically ignored the principle of territorial sovereignty as it developed
among the European powers and became a basic feature of nineteenth century western international law.”
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial
Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute),9 October 1998 at 118, 130, quoted in J. D. Fry and M. H. Loj, ‘The Roots
of Historic Title: Non-Western Pre-Colonial Normative Systems and Legal Resolution of Territorial Disputes’
27 Leiden J. of Int’l L. 727 (2014) 741.
135
34
from Sharia law, particularly in matters of the solving of disputes and inheritance, a fact
which sometimes complicated nomad-urban relations. 136
135F
Though ownership of resource points like water sources and grazing land was not
delineated on maps, both settled and nomadic families had clear ownership of territory.
Ownership could change hands as families declined in importance or lost control of a
resource. 137 As historian Ben Slot puts it, “(t)he desert is like the sea: it is difficult to
delineate precise borderlines there. Nomadic peoples move amongst each other and tribal
loyalties may shift from one paramount shaikh to another.” 138 Bedouin land ownership
was often non-exclusive and changed over time. This fluidity suited the desert environment
and the fragility of water sources, pastures and trade routes.
136F
137F
The Bedouin had clearly established connections with both settled oasis towns and coastal
trading ports like Kuwait. These relationships can be demonstrated through the systems of
taxation and contracts that existed at the time:
Economic life functioned through a series of integrating structural processes,
activated by face to face participation, formulated in terms of contracts, treaties
and agreements and validated through customary law and practice. 139
138F
As trade increased in importance throughout Arabia, it led to the growth of finance, money
lending, money changing and other commercial activities that required regulation by
contract and custom guided by tradition and, over time, Islamic legal principles. 140 Islam
provided a comprehensive set of economic, cultural and political rules that helped
standardize things like taxes, land ownership and trade throughout the region, rules which
blended with ancient customs and practices. 141 Important to this system was the payment
of various types of taxes such as khuwwa (brotherhood) or zakat (alms). Settled
populations and traders would often pay various taxes to powerful Bedouin in exchange for
protection while traveling across their territories or as an expression of allegiance. 142
Beaugrand argues such payments were a de facto recognition of tribal dominance in a
139F
140F
141F
136
Al-Serhan and Furr, 22.
137
I am indebted to Anthony Toth for his points on this issue.
138
Slot, 8.
W. Lancaster and F. Lancaster, ‘Integration into Modernity: Some Tribal Rural Societies in the Bilad AshSham’ in D. Chatty (ed.), Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century (Brill
2006) 339.
139
140
Al-Ashker and Wilson, 21.
141
Al-Ashker and Wilson, 56-76.
142
Commins, 8.
35
particular region and would later be used by Ibn Saud in the early 20th century to claim
territory in what would become Saudi Arabia. 143
142F
Islam also created the concept of umma, or a community of believers that could incorporate
all Muslims, a fact which would sometimes cut against territorial divisions in Gulf society.
Islam would also create new divisions in Gulf society between different Islamic sects,
particularly between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. 144 Throughout this period, the Bedouin
occupied a central role in broader Gulf society, linked to urban and oasis dwellers by blood,
religion, culture and the trade economy. At the risk of over-simplification, Gulf society
before the colonial period is best described as one of mutual dependency between nomadic
and urban groups; a web of economic, social and family relationships.
143F
The example of the Bedouin in the Gulf region is instructive of the ways in which nomadic
and settled society blended together into an inter-dependent whole. 145 Common family,
social, religious, linguistic and economic ties united many Bedouin communities with
settled coastal and oasis towns. The line between nomadic and settled Bedouin was often
unclear or not determinate of either allegiance or status. 146 Yet, while Kuwait Town
became an important hub of trade and, as a result, relations with merchant families were
critical to Bedouin welfare, relations with other regional cities were also important. Many
Bedouin families maintained wide-ranging alliances with clans in what are now Saudi
Arabia and Iraq.
144F
145F
While remaining independent, the arrival of British interests in the Gulf would begin to
change the relationship between the Bedouin and the settled merchants of Kuwait Town as
well as the Al-Sabah family. No longer on the edge of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait became
central to British power in the region. In particular, the British period would usher in an
era dominated by obsessive concerns over Kuwait’s borders and the protection of the port
city from being “overrun” by “lawless” desert nomads. 147 Meanwhile, the fluid and complex
political structure if the Bedouin did not easily align with a territorial model of statehood
upon which the British empire was based, as future sections will explore.
146F
143
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 63.
144
Carmichael, 18-21.
145
Al-Ashker and Wilson 5, noting that the line between settled and nomadic in Arabia was “unclear.”
146
G. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World (Amsterdam UP 2009) 33 (hereinafter Parolin).
See for example the signing of the Bahra and Hadda agreements with Ibn Saud in 1925, which were in part
signed to restrict the movement of nomadic tribes. Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 64.
147
36
The Tuareg of the Sahel
Tuareg Trade Routes, 13th-14th century
Bedouin and Tuareg society contain many points of similarity. Like the Bedouin, the
Tuareg, or Kel Tamasheq, are a nomadic, pastoralist group. They occupy a broad area from
northern Mali and Niger to southern Algeria. Today, they remain one of the region’s main
pastoralist groups, though many Tuareg are settled in towns. 148 It is difficult to generalize
about Tuareg society before colonization as many of the sources for our knowledge of precolonial Tuareg society come from verbal histories of Tuareg that have been filtered
through the writings of outsiders like Muslim explorers, French soldiers and
administrators and non-Tuareg scholars based in urban areas like Timbuktu and Masina.
Many important histories of the region are old, though more recent scholarship has done
much to fill in the blanks and correct the record. This section will attempt to acknowledge
weaknesses in the source material where appropriate. Nevertheless, scholarship into
147F
D. Boureima, ‘La constitution d’un réseau régional avec les communautés pastorales d’Afrique de l’Ouest :
le Réseau Billital Maroobé’ in Pasteurs Nomades et Transhumants Autochtones (L’Harmattan 2010) 113
(hereinafter Boureima). Dodo Boureima is a noted expert on pastoralism in the Sahel.
148
Current statistics for the Tuareg are not reliable, but an example may be found in M. Leonhardt, ‘Regional
Policies and Response to Manage Pastoral Movements within the ECOWAS Region Study on behalf of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), within the framework of the Support to Free Movement of
Persons and Migration in West Africa (FMM West Africa) Project’ (FFM West Africa 2019) 37.
The Tuareg are the largest nomadic group in Mali, but there are also groups of nomadic Arabs, or “Maures”.
While this case study is primarily about the Tuareg, the two groups live in close contact with each other and
many studies address both groups. Where this dissertation refers to nomads in the region more generally,
rather than specifically to the Tuareg, it will be talking about both Tuareg and Arab nomads. S. Pezard and M.
Shurkin, Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali: Approaches to Engaging Local Actors (Rand Corp. 2013)
(hereinafter Pezard and Shurkin).
37
Arabic sources and the oral record have augmented colonial sources and given a clearer
picture of Tuareg society, though there is still much work to be done and the recent
political situation has made field research difficult. 149 As with the Bedouin section, above,
this section will rely on the work of historians and anthropologists. Disagreement between
experts will be noted where appropriate.
148F
The exact origins of the Tuareg are unknown, but it is generally agreed upon that they are
Berber peoples who first migrated south into present day Mali in the fifth century,
increasing in numbers in the 1700s. 150 Unlike the Bedouin in the Gulf, the Tuareg migrated
into a region that had been the site of several major empires over several centuries,
including the Mali and Songhai Empires and, in the 19th century, the Masina caliphate.
When the Tuareg arrived, major trading cities like Timbuktu had already been famous
centres of learning and culture for hundreds of years. During the period immediately
preceding French conquest, Tuareg society was in a state of constant flux, changing rapidly
due to internal social pressures, but also as a result of the turmoil that accompanied the fall
of the Songhai Empire and the rise of the Masina caliphate in what is now central Mali. 151
The collapse of the Songhai Empire in the 16th century led to a period of instability in the
region in which multiple smaller caliphates, like the Ayar Sultanate in what is now Niger
and the larger Masina caliphate, would flourish. Some scholars argue that the arrival of the
Tuareg in the Sahel played a role in the decline of the Songhai Empire, but this claim is
disputed. 152
149F
150F
151F
Like Bedouin society, nomadic Tuareg society was hierarchical. Pastoral Tuareg were
divided into clans, or “drum groups,” each comprising a noble class in charge of military
protection or religious learning, vassals in charge of raising livestock, slaves and haratin, or
semi-free agriculturalists and herders, often of sub-Saharan origin. 153 The slaves and
152F
See the discussion of sources on this period of Tuareg history in D. M. Hamani, Au carrefour du Soudan et
de la Berbérie : Le Sultanat Touareg de l’Ayar (Institut de Recherches en Sciences Humaines, Niamey 1989)
(hereinafter Hamani) 17-31. Djibo Mallam Hamani is the Director of the Institut de recherches en sciences
humaines in Niger. See also the work of Bruce Hall on using original sources. B. Hall, A History of Race in
Muslim West Africa, 1600-1960 (Cambridge UP 2011) (hereinafter Hall).
149
According to Pierre Boilley, a noted anthropologist who has extensively studied the Tuareg, Many Tuareg
trace their lineage back to Morocco. Boilley, Les Touaregs ,1999, 47-48.
150
151
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 58.
O. O. Kane, Beyond Timbuktu: An Intellectual History of Muslim West Africa (Harvard UP 2016) 6, 46
(hereinafter Kane); M. Hiskett, The Development of Islam in West Africa (Longman 1984) 152 (hereinafter
Hiskett); Gaudio 1988 66, 175. See also M. Tymowski, The Origins and Structures of Political Institutions in
Pre-Colonial Black Africa; Dynastic Monarchy, Taxes and Tributes, War and Slavery, Kinship and Territory
(Edwin Mellen Press 2009) 11.
152
Bourgeot, Résistances, 24-28, 344. J. Keenan, ‘Resisting Imperialism: Tuareg Threaten US, Chinese and
Other Foreign Interests’ in A. Fischer and I. Kohl (eds.) Tuareg Society within a Globalized World: Saharan Life
in Transition (Tauris 2010) 32. (hereinafter Keenan, Resisting). Gaudio 1988 176-181
153
The vassal clans are also known as Kel Ulli, or goat herders. They may or may not be nomadic. Bourgeot,
Résistances, 25. The Haratin are a class of settled peoples of sub-Saharan and Berber descent. They may or
38
haratin were involved in agriculture, goat herding and other tasks, leaving the Tuareg
nobility free to focus on warcraft, learning and culture. 154
153F
As with the Bedouin, there was much contact, conflict and cooperation between nomadic
and settled Tuareg. 155 Tuareg society included both settled and nomadic elements, as many
Tuareg settled in large, urban centres like Timbuktu. There was also considerable diversity
of lifestyles between Tuareg groups, with some drum groups, such as those near Air in
Niger, forming fixed, sedentary villages along the caravan routes and others living an urban
lifestyle in capital cities such as Agades. 156 The relationship between Tuareg rulers and
settled rulers was often complex. Rulers of the kingdom of Mali, 157 for example, would have
had sovereignty over local villages and their inhabitants. 158 The place of the Tuareg in
relation to the rulers of sedentarised kingdoms, however, is less clear. Tuareg nobles often
occupied positions of high status in the region, in control of political, religious and
economic life. While the Tuareg nomadic nobility was politically independent for much of
this time, it maintained strong economic, cultural and social ties with urban rulers.
154F
155F
156F
157F
At the time of the French invasion, the Tuareg city of Agadez was critical node in the
Saharan web of trade and a centre of learning and culture. 159 Though the Sultan of Ayar
and other urban rulers would collect taxes, their power was always weak and
decentralized, running parallel to the power of the nomadic Tuareg nobility. 160 The line
between pastoralists and agriculturalists in the Sahel was often fluid. French sources likely
confused the extent to which nomadic and settled Tuareg formed separate communities. 161
158F
159F
160F
may not be considered as Tuareg by anthropologists. See generally the work on race in the Sahel by Bruce
Hall and also Keenan, Resisting, 62. See also E. Bernus, ‘Dates, Dromedaries, and Drought: Diversification in
Tuareg Pastoral Systems’ in J. G. Galaty and D. L. Johnson, (eds.) The World of Pastoralism: Herding Systems in
Contemporary Perspective (Guilford P. 1990) 152.
154
Keenan, Resisting, 8, 62. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 29.
There was conflict between settled and nomadic groups throughout the Sahel. Diallo notes, writing of the
Fuble peoples in the Sahel, that even in pre-colonial times, nomads were often presented by settled rulers as a
menace and cause of destabilization. Diallo, 27.
155
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 22, 33. See also Bourgeot, Résistances, 85, 153; B. Lecocq, ‘Tuareg City Blues Cultural Capital in a Global Cosmopole’ in I. Kohl and A. Fischer (eds.) Tuareg Society Within a Globalized
World: Saharan Life in Transition (Tauris 2010) 52; Clarke, 91.
156
157
In 1337, the Mali Empire stretched from the mouth of the Gambia river to Gao.
J. Ki-Zerbo, ‘À quand l’Afrique : entretien avec René Holenstein,’ Éditions de l’Aube, (2003) 79, cited in
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, ‘The Right to Nationality in Africa’ (2015) 8.
158
159
Hamani, 292.
160
Hamani, 292.
D. Badi, ‘Genesis and Change in the Socio-political Structure of the Tuareg’ in Anja Fisher and Ines Kohl
(eds.), Tuareg Society Within a Globalized World: Saharan Life in Transition (Tauris 2010) 75 (hereinafter
Badi).
161
39
Urban and pastoral Tuareg communities, however, were parallel communities politically,
with pastoral communities organized into a loose federation headed by an Amanokal who
wielded considerable power, and urban communities such as the Ayar Sultanate governed
by a Sultan. According to the French, who spent “much time collecting and drawing up
genealogical tables” of nomadic society, the following major drum groups of nomadic
Tuareg existed in French West Africa (Afrique occidentale française - AOF) in the late 1800s
and early 1900s: the Iwellemmedan, Tengeregif, Igawaddaran, Kel Temulayt, and
Irraganatan. 162 Each of these drum groups occupied a particular region of the Sahel and
each would have had many vassal clans, slaves and haratin families under their
protection. 163
161F
162F
Tuareg traders played an important role in the salt trade, running some of the trans-Sahara
caravans upon which the region’s economy was based. 164 In exchange for military
protection, noble Tuareg families levied taxes of grain and other agricultural products,
called tiwse, against their vassals, but also taxed the trading caravans who travelled
through their lands. 165 Despite operating under parallel power structures, there was much
inter-connectedness and inter-relatedness between town and countryside. 166 Strong
cultural and linguistic bonds connected nomadic and urban Tuareg in places like the
Moroccan-influenced kingdom of the Arma based around Timbuktu, as well as Hausa
kingdoms to the south and, in the 19th century, the Sokoto and Masina caliphates. These
post-Songhai kingdoms prospered from the Sahel’s far-flung system of trade in which
nomadic Tuareg played a key role in offering military protection, as well as profiting from
local livestock-rearing and agriculture, activities with which the Tuareg were deeply
involved. 167
163F
164F
165F
166F
While unified by a common language, nomadic Tuareg society was often multi-racial
incorporating Berber people, local agriculturalists and slaves from as far away as what is
now Sudan. This diversity of both ethnicity and lifestyle means that the Tuareg are united
primarily by language, culture and family alliances. The Tuareg, however, unlike the
Bedouin, were a small minority in much of the Sahel, even in pre-colonial times. Alongside
the Tuareg lived many Arab clans like the Kunta, who also engaged in Sahara trade and the
spread of Islam, as well as communities of settled agriculturalists such as the Songhai and
162
Hall, 187.
163
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 53.
164
Hamani, 301.
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 54. See also Hall, 250; Hamani, 313; A. Khazanov, ‘Nomads in the History of
the Sedentary World’ in A. Khazanov and A. Wink (eds.), Nomads in the Sedentary World (Curzon 2001) 1.
165
166
Hamani, 301-313. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 49.
Hiskett, 148, 151-155. See also Kane, 6. During this period, the region’s trade with Europe also increased,
linked via the caravan trade. Trimingham, 185, 191.
167
40
Bambara peoples. 168 The region was also home to Mande West Africans, Arma peoples
descended from Moroccan invaders, and many others. 169
167F
168F
In part because of their minority status, Tuareg played an important role in the spread and
interpretation of Islam, though the level of adherence among the Tuareg to Islamic law
should not be overstated. 170 While many other communities retained animist beliefs in the
Sahel, 171 certain noble Tuareg families had abandoned the warrior lifestyle and devoted
themselves to Islam, becoming a religious class, with prominent religious figures offering
advice and council throughout the region. 172 In this, they served a similar function to Arab
scholars who would sometimes cross the Sahara to spread Islamic learning. Islam served a
unifying role across the region by creating a common frame of reference between traders
and rulers of various caliphates in the 18th century. The Sahara caravans, through which
Islam spread, also served as a cultural unifier across the region and a connection to Muslim
communities to the north and east. 173 Being Muslim indicated adherence to a common
system of laws. 174 Tuareg and other nomad groups would attend prayer in towns when
possible and all Muslims were expected to give Zakat as part of mandatory taxation,
169F
170F
171F
172F
173F
168
Hall, 152, 187.
The question of race in the Niger Bend and, in particular, among the Tuareg is hotly debated by scholars.
See for example Keenan, Resisting, 63, 68; D. J. Stewart, What’s next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and
Challenges to Stability (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2013) 16 (hereinafter Stewart); J.
Chipman, French Power in Africa (Basil Blackwell 1989) 27 (hereinafter Chipman); Bourgeot, Résistances, 40;
Hiskett, 34.
169
Lecocq points out that the French did much to advance the idea that the Tuareg were not native to the region.
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 99. See also Hall, generally, chapter one. Lecocq argues that white and nomad have now
come to be synonyms used by the Malian government to designate the “other.” Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 101. The
issue of race in the Sahel is disputed.
170
Trimingham, 69, 186.
171
Clarke, 58.
172
Keenan, Resisting, 63, 151. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 30, 32; Hiskett 47-48.
Trimingham, 73-74, 85, 146. Trimingham argues that the universal quality of the Wahhabi school provided
standard rules on trade and, in particular, contract law and limits on usury. Trimingham, 193-194. See also
Kane, 82-83. The Sahara caravans brought not only Muslim clerics, but also books, paper and other
necessities for establishing an Islamic society, as well as facilitating the pilgrimage and study trips to Arabia, a
religious development with which the Tuareg were active participants. As Kane puts it; “(b)eing Muslim was a
marker of status in urban centers located in the axes of the trans-Saharan trade prior to the arrival of
Europeans. Merchants trading with Arabs built strong relationship based on trust, gained by belonging to the
same religion." Kane, 63.
173
174 In particular, Islamic law determined the rules of personal status, including the legitimacy of enslavement
and the status of non-Muslims. Kane, 84, 98, 105-106.
41
including a tithe from nomad herds. The extent to which the Tuareg adhered to Islamic law
as opposed to their customary traditions, however, remains somewhat disputed. 175
174F
Like the Bedouin, pastoral Tuareg clans dominated specific territories that were well
defined and recognized by neighbouring clans and urban rulers. Certain Tuareg groups
became associated with particular regions, or akals, such as the Air massif in Niger or the
Adrar des Ifoghas, the mountains of the Ifogha clan, in the Soudan. 176 Like the powerful
Bedouin clans, Tuareg drum groups would escort caravans that travelled through their
areas in exchange for a tax, an expression of their sovereignty over their regions. 177 It
should be noted that the issue of Tuareg territoriality is debated by anthropologists. As
with the Bedouin, Tuareg land use differed from that of agricultural societies like the
Songhai, who had a long established system of individual, family-based land tenure. 178 As
the next sections will show, these differences in land ownership systems would play an
important role in how the Sahel was administrated by the French.
175F
176F
177F
Land use often caused conflict in the Sahel before colonization between the Tuareg and
other ethnic groups. Urban rulers sometimes attempted to bring pastoral Tuareg under
their control 179 and Tuareg often enslaved and raided sedentary villages. 180 During the
18th century, Tuareg mobility was also sometimes viewed as inhibiting the spread and
development of Islam, which required daily prayer and study. Perceived tensions between
the practice of Islam and the practice of nomadism was sometimes a factor in Tuareg
settlement programs instituted by caliphates like Masina prior to the arrival of the French.
As the next section will explain, these attempts to settle the Tuareg would foreshadow
future settlement policies of French administrators. The relationship between nomadic
178F
179F
175 Kane, 44-49; Trimingham, 91-98. Ibn Battuta, the Arabic scholar, noted that the Tuareg leaders were
Muslims on his 1352 visit to Takedda in Air. P. Clarke (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion
(Oxford 2009) 54 (hereinafter Clarke).
176
Hamani, 313.
C. Gremont, ‘Villages and Crossroads: Changing Territorialities among the Tuareg of Northern Mali’ in J.
McDougall and J. Scheele (eds.) Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa (Indiana UP 2012)
133-135, 143 (hereinafter Gremont). Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 26, 28. Like the Bedouin, wells were some
of the only fixed points in the Tuareg territories, but though grazing areas would shift with the seasons, most
Tuareg drum groups controlled specific regions. Bourgeot, Résistances, 148; Keenan, Resisting, 141. J.
Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the 20th Century (Cambridge 2012). See
also Hall, 262; Bourgeot, Résistances, 150-151.
177
178
Hall, 262.
179
Hiskett ,178, 193. See also Clarke, 124-129.
V. Azarya, ‘The Nomadic Factor in Africa: Dominance or Marginality’ in Anatoly M. Khazanov and Andre
Wink (eds.), Nomads in the Sedentary World (Curzon 2001) (hereinafter Azarya) 257-259. See also W. J. Foltz,
From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (Yale U P 1965) 8 (hereinafter Foltz). See also J. LaGarde, ‘La
nomadisation des Ifoghas et son contrôle (1943-1944-1945)’ in Nomades et commandants : l’administration et
sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993) 117; Hiskett, citing Marion Johnson, 178;
Trimingham, 146.
180
42
Tuareg drum groups and the various urban and agricultural empires, caliphates and
kingdoms that developed in the Sahel in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries was therefore
multi-layered, complex and overlapping.
43
The Sama Dilaut of the Sulu Sea
Sama Dilaut Fishing Zones, 1960s, in green (orange and blue are other “sea gypsy" groups)
The Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) 181 are an ocean-dwelling group who have lived for centuries
in the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the southern Philippines and the island of Borneo.
They occupy an area that is now divided between Malaysia, the Philippines and
Indonesia. 182 While some facts about the Sama Dilaut are contested, there is more
180F
181F
While the Sama Dilaut refer to themselves by a number of different names, some anthropologists argue the
term Sama Dilaut is more accurate. Thanks to Helen Brunt for her comments on this point. See also C. Sather,
‘Commodity, Trade, Gift Exchange, and the History of Maritime Nomadism in Southeastern Sabah’ 6 Nomadic
Peoples 20 (2002) (hereinafter Sather, Commodity) 24.
181
182 H. Brunt, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) Children in Sabah, Malaysia, (Asia Pacific Refugee
Rights Network 2015) 3 (hereinafter Brunt, Vulnerability). See also G. Acciaioli, H. Brunt and J. Clifton,
‘Foreigners Everywhere, Nationals Nowhere: Exclusion, Irregularity, and Invisibility of Stateless Bajau Laut in
Eastern Sabah, Malaysia’ 15 J. of Imm. and Ref. Studies 232 (2017) 233.
The “sea nomads” of southeast Asia can be divided into three main groups: the Moken of Thailand/Burma, the
Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut of Malaysia/Philippines and the Orang Suku Laut of Indonesia. Acciaioli, Brunt and
Clifton are anthropologists working on the Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut. See also L. Lenhart, ‘Recent research on
Southeast Asian sea nomads’ 36 and 37 Nomadic Peoples 245 (1995) 246 (hereinafter Lenhart). Lenhart is an
44
consensus about their lifestyle and relationship to settled kingdoms than for the Bedouin
and Tuareg. However, there is less agreement over the extent to which the Sama Dilaut
should be classified as nomads. While some scholars argue that the Sama Dilaut are not
nomads because they do not practice pastoralism and should instead be referred to as
mobile peoples, this dissertation will refer to them as nomads because this is how they are
viewed by the Malaysian government and many outsiders. 183
182F
In the pre-colonial period, boat nomadism could be found scattered throughout Southeast
Asia 184 and until the mid-1950s, the Sama Dilaut lived almost exclusively in boats. 185 They
practiced hunting, gathering and mobile, seasonal fishing. 186 There is evidence of sea
nomadism off the coast of what is now Sabah, Malaysia going back as far as 3,000 years. 187
The Sama Dilaut, however, had a close relationship with shore communities, trading sea
products, collecting fresh water and burying their dead on land. 188 Before the arrival of the
British, Sama Dilaut migration followed a seasonal pattern throughout the Sulu Sea
between what is now Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 189
183F
184F
185F
186F
187F
188F
Like the Tuareg and the Bedouin, the Sama Dilaut had established relationships to certain
ocean zones and islands. Sama Dilaut families would fish in certain areas or regions,
controlling moorage and fresh water points. 190 Boats of families would travel the seas
within recognized fishing ranges, fishing for valuable sea cucumber and other commodities
to trade with shore-based groups. 191 Like other nomads, however, the ways in which the
Sama Dilaut related to their ocean domains was dominated by seasonal and shifting use
189F
190F
ethnologist working on “sea gypsy” groups, including the Bajau Laut/Sama Dilaut, Moken and Orang Suku
Laut. Where relevant, this section will make references to the experiences of these related groups.
Lenhart argues against the use of the term nomadic for non-pastoralists, because nomadic implies pastoral
nomadism. Lenhart 245.
183
184
A. Wink, Indo-Islamic Society: 14th-15th Centuries (Brill 2004) 103-104.
185
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27.
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 20. See also C. Warren, ‘Consciousness in Social Transformation: The Sama
Dilaut of East Malaysia’ 5 Dialectical Anthropology 227 (1980) 227 (hereinafter C. Warren, Consciousness); C.
Sather, The Sama Dilaut: Adaptation, History, and Fate in a Maritime Fishing Society of South-eastern Sabah
(Oxford UP 1997) 2-8 (hereinafter Sather, Adaptation). Sather and the two Warrens are anthropologists
whose careers have produced much of the scholarship on the Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut).
186
187
B. Andaya and L. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (Palgrave 2nd 2001) (hereinafter Andaya) 14.
188
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 23; C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 227-228.
J. Warren, The North Borneo Chartered Company's administration of the Bajau, 1878-1909; the pacification
of a maritime, nomadic people (Ohio U. 1971) 65-66 (hereinafter J. Warren, Chartered).
189
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27 See also C. Chao, The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia: The Inalienable Gift
of Territory (Routledge 2010) 10 (discussing the similar practices of the Orang Suku Laut) (hereinafter Chao,
Riau). Chao writes generally of the sea nomads of the Sulu Sea region during the colonial period.
190
191
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27.
45
without hard borders or exclusive ownership arrangements. Families might shift fishing
areas from season to season as fishing stocks changed and certain islands and reefs might
become too dangerous due to the presence of pirates. 192 Families would also take longer
voyages to visit relatives to what is now the Philippines and Indonesia, though the Sama
Dilaut themselves did not engage in long distance trade. 193 Rather, they served as the first
link in a chain of trade in sea cucumber and other delicacies that stretched all the way to
the royal courts of China. 194 In this regard, the Sama Dilaut had a similar relationship to the
ocean as the Bedouin and Tuareg did to the desert: shifting, seasonal use, though with close
ties to certain islands and fishing zones.
191F
192F
193F
Like the Tuareg and Bedouin, the Sama Dilaut maintained close relations with shore-based
peoples as they supplied products for regional trade. Many families had exclusive trade
relationships with patrons from the land-based aristocracy in Borneo. This patronage
relationship offered the Sama Dilaut a great deal of autonomy, but also provided them with
clearly established trading partners and protection. Importantly, the Sama Dilaut were not
slaves, but were rather clients of land-based communities under an established and widely
recognized patronage system. Having a patron was vitally important in an age of “endemic
violence” on the high seas. But patronage was not exclusive; Sama Dilaut families could end
patron relationships at any time and would often have multiple patrons. 195
194F
Like with the Tuareg and Bedouin, therefore, the Sama Dilaut were involved in longdistance trade, though they did not practice it themselves. The seas around Borneo were
less dividers of land masses than they were linkages between trade-oriented city-kingdoms
in constant competition with each other for trade and manpower, 196 and the Sama Dilaut
formed the first link in a web of trade upon which much of the Sulu Sultanate’s wealth was
195F
192 Anthropologist Cynthia Chou writes that the Orang Suku Laut, a related group, view borders as “temporary
markers” that shift along with the changing political realities of the region imposed upon them by outside
groups. Chou, Riau, 80.
193
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27 See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 67.
There are records of trade with India and China going back to the fifth century and records of Bajau
maritime trade since at least 1,000 BC. Andaya, 11 See also V. Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia: Linking
East and West (Allen and Unwin 2003) 29-35 (hereinafter Hooker). See also N. Tarling, Sulu and Sabah; A
Study of British Policy Towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late 18th Century (Oxford U. P.
1978) 1.
194
C. Sather, ‘Sulu’s Political Jurisdiction over the Bajau Laut’ 3 Borneo Research Bulletin (1971) 59
(hereinafter Sather, Political).
195
This point is made most compellingly by James Warren in J. Warren, The Sulu Zone: 1768-1898 (Singapore
UP 1981) (hereinafter Warren, Zone). See also Hooker, 16-17.
196
James Warren refers to the Sulu Zone, or the area around the Sulu Sea, as a “web of exchange” that united
various kingdoms and cities on the coasts together into a single economy in which the Sama Dilaut served a
critical role as deep sea fishermen of valuable sea products like sea cucumber. See also J. Warren, ‘Looking
Back on ‘The Sulu Zone’: State Formation, Slave Raiding and Ethnic Diversity in Southeast Asia’ 69 Journal of
the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (1996) 21-33, 23 (hereinafter Warren, Looking).
46
based. This trade fuelled the growth of great trading cities throughout the region like
Melacca, Johor and Kuta Raja (Banda Aceh). 197
196F
The dominant rulers on the island of Borneo were the Sultanate of Sulu, centred around the
Sulu Sea, and the Sultanate of Brunei, centred on northern Borneo. For many centuries,
these kingdoms prospered off long distance Arab trade in pearls, sea cucumber and other
sea products, particularly with India and, later, China. Many of these products were sourced
by the Sama Dilaut. 198 Like in the Gulf region and the Sahel, these Sultanates did not have
territorial borders, but rather ruler-client relationships with various subject groups,
including the “sea nomad” populations. 199 This does not mean that the Sultanates had no
concept of territoriality, rather that they did not impose strict boundaries. As Clifford
Sather puts it, “the state was defined...by reference to its centre, not its geographical
boundaries.” 200
197F
198F
199F
The role played by the Sama Dilaut in the Sultanate of Sulu, however, was arguably
different than that played by the Tuareg or Bedouin. Like the Bedouin and the Tuareg,
Sama Dilaut society was very much dependent upon the settled societies with which it
traded. But many of the Sama Dilaut were not Muslims, unlike many of the Bedouin and
Tuareg. While Clifford Sather argues that the Sama Dilaut were regarded by settled Bajau
and other land-based communities as a “pariah class” due to their animist beliefs, this
categorization is somewhat disputed. 201
200F
Like in the Gulf and the Niger Bend, belonging in the Sulu Sultanate was rooted in the
customary law of the period blended with Islamic principles, with Islam creating a common
sense of belonging and identity throughout the Sultanate. 202 As well, rather than offering
protection to settled communities, the Sama Dilaut required protection from the ethnic
Tausug (Suluk) ruling class, not the other way around. 203 Also, the Sama Dilaut were
ethnically and culturally distinct from the ruling classes of the Sultanate of Sulu and were
instead most closely related to other Sama/Bajau coastal peoples who lived under Tausug
201F
202F
197
Andaya, 12-14; Hooker, 72-77; See also Chao, Riau, 8.
198
Andaya, 61, 62, 80.
Chao, Raiu, 42, 50 See generally International Court of Justice, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) (2008) ICJ Rep. 625.
199
200
Sather, Political citing T. M. Keifer, The Sultanate of Sulu: Problems in the Analysis of a Segmentary State 46.
Sather, Political Jurisdiction, 1971, 61. See also Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27-29; Sather, Adaptation, 1997,
61-63; C. Warren Consciousness, 1980, 227 The idea that the Sama Dilaut were a “pariah class” is debated
among experts. See also the work of James Warren.
201
J. Holbrook, ‘Legal Hybridity in the Philippines: Lessons in Legal Pluralism from Mindanao and the Sulu
Archipelago’ 18 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law (2010) 403, 409-410.
202
Warren, Chartered, 109. Sather claims the Sama Dilaut’s status as non-Muslims was enforced by landbased Muslims like the land Bajau and Tausug. Sather, Political, 62.
203
47
rule. 204 While seafaring lay at the heart of the Sulu economy, long-distance seafaring was
not an activity undertaken by the Sama Dilaut. Instead, long-distance trade was dominated
by Arab seafarers.
203F
Nevertheless, like in Gulf region and the Sahel, the Sama Dilaut were critical to trade as a
source of products to be traded. In North Borneo, powerful Tausug and Malay rulers relied
on the Sama peoples for much of their wealth and competition for the allegiance of fishing
communities was crucial to the survival of the great trading cities in northern Borneo. 205
Over time, the Sultanate of Brunei declined and the Sultanate of Sulu became more
prominent, in part by winning the loyalty of the coastal and nomadic Bajau/Sama
peoples. 206 The Sama Dilaut were one of a number of fishing societies whose allegiance
was key to any trading empire in the region. The Sama Dilaut not only participated in trade,
they may have been employed as crew on slave ships along with other Bajau/Sama
peoples, though there is less information on this role played by Sama Dilaut. 207 In a 2002
case before the International Court of Justice, the Malaysian government went so far to
argue that the Sama Dilaut owed allegiance to the Sultan of Sulu. The government also
claimed that the Sultan appointed the leaders of the Sama Dilaut clans, though these points
are disputed. 208
204F
205F
206F
207F
Unlike the Tuareg and Bedouin, the Sama Dilaut did not share a common religion with
shore-based peoples. Once again, however, as with Bedouin and Tuareg nomads, the
relationship between settled communities, partially settled Bajau fishing communities and
the Sama Dilaut in the Sulu Sea is best described as one of inter-dependence, with the Sama
Dilaut occupying a valuable niche in the economy and politics of the region, despite their
non-Muslim status. 209 The Sama Dilaut were quite well-integrated into the Sulu economy,
208F
204
Sather, Political, 61.
J. Akamine, ‘The Role of Sama/Bajaus in Sea Cucumber Trades in the Sulu Sultanate Economy: Towards a
Reconstruction of Dynamic Maritime History in Southeast Asia’ (Hitotsubashi University Conference Paper,
March 2017).
205
206
Andaya, 80.
Andaya, 113. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 40. See also S. Eklof, Pirates in Paradise, A Modern History
of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders (Nias Press 2006) 5 (hereinafter Eklof). See also J. Warren, ‘Trade for
Bullion to Trade for Commodities and ‘Piracy’: China, the West and the Sulu Zone, 1768-1898’ in S. Amirell
and L. Muller (eds.) Persistent Piracy: Maritime Violence and State-Formation in Global Historical Perspective
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014) (hereinafter Warren, Trade).
207
208 International Court of Justice, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia),
(2008) ICJ Rep. 625.
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 30 See also T. P. Barnard, ‘Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and Their
Decline in History’ 80 Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 33 (2007) 34.
209
48
trading with settled Bajau, Tausug and Suluk communities in a state of mutual dependence.
210
209F
It is important to here note that despite some evidence that some Sama Dilaut might have
been involved in ocean raiding, the Sultans drew distinctions between slave taking and
“legitimate” raiding versus outright piracy. 211 Nevertheless, because the Sama Dilaut also
served the Sultanates as fishermen and crew for raiding ships, they came with time to be
associated with slaving during the colonial period and, later, with “lawlessness.” 212 By the
end of the eighteenth century, as the Sultanates declined, piracy and slave raiding in the
Celebes and Sulu seas came to be dominated by the Illanun peoples, who also employed
Samal and Bajau fishermen and sea nomads as crew. The links between the Sama Dilaut
and their land-based patrons began to decrease in importance and increased political
fragmentation meant that sanctioned raiding often blended seamlessly into piracy. 213 The
relationship between the Sama Dilaut and what the British would come to call piracy would
be extremely important during the colonial period, when the British came to see sea
nomadism as associated with lawlessness and a challenge to establishing borders in the
region.
210F
211F
212F
210
Lenhart, 247.
Chao, Riau, 55. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 40 (explaining that the economy of Sulu was maintained
by “a system of active marauding”). See also T. Barnard, ‘Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and
Their Decline in History’ 80 Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 33 (2007) 35.
211
212
Hooker, 141.
213
Eklof, 9. See also Chao, Raiu, 23.
49
Conclusion
The above sections show that the line between nomadic and settled communities in precolonial society in the Gulf, the Sahel and the Sulu Sea was often blurry, with nomads and
settled communities highly dependent on one another in trade-based societies where
mobility, often across long distances, was key. Nomads often controlled their territories,
even levying taxes on non-nomadic communities, but this control was not exclusive. There
were few hard borders in pre-colonial kingdoms and allegiance relationships might exist
over long distances, often based on the shared values of Islam or economic ties.
Though enjoying a certain degree of political independence, nomads in the Gulf, the Sahel
and the Sulu Sea also performed numerous specialized functions in society that were
crucial to the local economy and society as a whole, including the spread of culture, religion
and information, the protection of the caravan trade and the production of specialized
products like sea cucumber. The place of nomads in wider society varied greatly and
encompassed enormous diversity, but in none of the three examples explored in Part 2
were nomads outsiders living apart from settled society. Quite to the contrary. The
relationship between nomads and settled peoples in the three examples is perhaps best
described as one of fluid inter-dependence.
Critically, belonging in these pre-colonial societies in the Gulf, the Sahel and the Sulu Sea
was often determined by factors like religion, trade contracts, and extended family and clan
relationships. Such relationships often spanned long distances and knit far-flung empires
together into a web of economic and social connections. Pre-colonial empires often
contained both nomadic and settled communities. Place of birth was often far less
important than religious, economic and social ties. Nevertheless, nomads had a strong
sense of territoriality, occupying and claiming certain regions as their own, even if they did
not set borders or use land or oceans exclusively. Frequently, these ownership rights were
acknowledged and respected by others. Far from being wanderers with no claims to land,
nomads frequently owned water sources, grazing areas, moorage points and other pieces of
immovable property and were recognized as owning these resources by society at large.
It is important to note, however, that negative opinions of nomadism existed among settled
rulers and thinkers of the day, as can be seen in West Africa during the period of the
establishment of various Islamic kingdoms, amongst the Sultans and administrators of the
Sulu Sultanate, and even in the Gulf region amongst the settled, urban elite. Despite these
negative opinions, however, nomads remained economically, socially, militarily and
politically important to settled societies and kingdoms.
In the Gulf and the Sahel, nomads often occupied positions of high status. In some places,
like the Sahel, they were politically independent, though allied with urban rulers. In other
places, they occupied a particular class in an existing empire, such as the Sulu Sultanate.
Political independence, which was enjoyed by some nomadic societies for portions of their
history, did not mean political isolation. In fact, it is perhaps unhelpful for the purposes to
think of nomads as separate, discrete groups in the pre-colonial period, but rather as part
50
of a continuum of economic and social activity that made up trade-based societies that
relied on mobility of all kinds.
As the next section will discuss, the status of all three nomadic groups, the Bedouin, the
Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut, would radically change with the coming of European
colonization. The next sections will explore the changes brought by colonization to the
nomadic way of life and to their standing in society and how these changes influenced the
development of nationality law during the colonial period.
51
Colonial Policy Towards Nomads
To regard a population in the normal case as related to particular areas of
territory is not to revert to forms of feudalism but to recognize a human and
political reality which underlies modern territorial settlements... 214
213F
The colonial period marked the beginning of the nationality and statelessness of many
nomads. Nationality law developed in tandem with colonization and would evolve to be an
important tool of colonial rule. The following sections will explore colonial policy towards
nomads and how these policies affected nomad nationality during the colonial period.
While the early colonial period was marked by an almost total vacuum of laws for
colonized peoples, 215 over the course of the colonial period, many colonized peoples would
be granted some sort of nationality status. Yet not all colonized peoples would be treated
the same under this emerging system of laws.
214F
This section will explore colonial policies towards nomads. European governments saw the
establishment of colonial empires as a fundamental good, necessary for the progress of
civilization and modernization. This often-meant remaking colonized societies in the image
of Europe. 216 But colonization was also an economic endeavour, undertaken to enrich
Europe. As a result, colonization was a fiercely competitive process. It was a scramble to
grab, claim and secure territory against competing claims, both by other colonial powers
and local leaders. It was these dual goals, the goal to remake colonized societies in the
image of Europe and the goal to claim territory, that would drive colonial policy towards
nomads.
215F
The British and French administrations are the two colonial administrations most relevant
to this dissertation as they were the primary operators in the Gulf region, the Sahel and
North Borneo. 217 British and French policies would have a deep and lasting effect on the
nomads living in their territories. Both the French and British colonial administrations had
very clear policies and attitudes towards nomadic populations living in their colonies.
These policies and attitudes would come to have a profound effect on the nationality of
nomads, both during the colonial period and beyond.
216F
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford UP 2003) 568 (hereinafter Brownlie,
Principles).
214
215
Van Genugten et al., 2014, 99.
As historian J. Bury explains in the Idea of Progress, “(t)he ‘idea of progress’ means that civilization has
moved, is moving, and will move in a desirable direction.” J. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its
Origin and Growth (Macmillan 1932) 2.
216
The Ottoman Empire was also relevant to the Bedouin in the Gulf, though most of the Bedouin in the
region around Kuwait were not directly affected by Ottoman policy, as Kuwait marked the outer-most sphere
of the Ottoman Empires’ influence. See the section on the Bedouin, below.
217
52
Determining the proper role of nomads in the colonial project was not a side-issue in
European colonial thought, it presented a major challenge to legal and philosophical
thinking of the time. The examples discussed below did not happen in isolation, but were
part of a global system and worldview. While important differences existed between the
French and English colonial systems, there were many similarities in how colonial territory
was invaded, conquered and administrated, and colonial policy towards nomads and
mobile peoples also shared many commonalities. This section will summarize some of what
is known about colonial theories on nomadism in order to understand the policies
implemented in Kuwait, French Soudan and North Borneo, described in the next sections.
This section is meant to be a summary of some of the main colonial theories on nomads. It
should not be taken as an exhaustive account of this topic, nor is it a review of all the
relevant literature. 218 Where there is disagreement among experts, this will be noted.
217F
Colonial Theories on Nomads
Since Europeans first came into contact with nomadic societies in the 15th century,
European scholars struggled to fit nomads into the European model of the state. 219 This
section will explore the theories European colonialists developed towards nomads. Most
importantly, European political theory developed the idea that nomads cannot form states.
According to European legal theories popular at the time, land ownership is key to
civilization and statehood. 220 Colonial powers needed to promote agriculture, mining and
other activities that would make productive use of the land. 221 While not universally
accepted, the colonial idea that nomads were incapable of forming states would prove to be
218F
219F
220F
For more on this subject, see the work of Jérémie Gilbert, which contains a thorough review of sources and
theories.
218
Diallo, 28, talking about colonial views of the Fulbe people in Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire. For another
example, see Great Britain’s Enclosure Act: An Act for the better Cultivation, Improvement, and Regulation of
the Common Arable Fields, Wastes, and Commons of Pasture in this Kingdom 13 Geo 3. c. 81 (1773). To a
certain extent, these ideas continue to influence nomad-state relations in Europe. See for example N. Sigona,
‘How can a Nomad be a Refugee? Kosovo Roma and Labeling Policy in Italy’ 37 Sociology 69 (2003) 71-72, 75
(discussing Roma in the Kosovar and Italian contexts). See generally M. Goodwin, ‘The Lessons of Romani
National Claims for Conceptions of European Citizenship: From and Imaginary Community to an Imagined
One?’ in A. Ott and E. Vos, Fifty Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspectives (Asser Press
2009) (discussing Roma people and the modern European conception of the territorialized nation-state).
219
For a discussion on settlement and state formation in natural law theory, see Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 5970.
220
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 58-63, 60-61, 91-92. At the risk of oversimplifying European philosophy on state
formation, European thought centered state legitimacy on property rights and the productive use of land.
Locke, Grotius, Vattel and other Enlightenment philosophers believed that property rights are created when
individuals make productive use of land. The political state forms in order to enforce exclusive and
productive land use. K. Baynes, ‘Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract’ 72 The Monist 433 (1989)
434. See also S. Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Clarendon Press 1991) 189
(hereinafter, Buckle). See also Sack, 74, (217).
221
53
highly influential throughout the colonial period and beyond. 222 According to dominant
theories of the day, nomads had no states of their own, but only tribes. 223 Important to this
theory was the idea that nomads were not territorial. New research has often uncovered
that presentations of nomads as not territorial were a colonial interpretation, 224 yet this
view of nomadism became entrenched during the colonial period.
221F
222F
223F
At the risk of oversimplification, under this widely accepted theory of European state
formation, territoriality was key to statehood. The oft-cited starting point for the modern,
territorial model of statehood in Europe is the Peace of Westphalia, which ending the
Thirty Years War in Germany. This treaty helped to establish the principle of exclusive
state sovereignty over an area of bounded territory, though the influence of this single
event in European history remains the subject of much debate. 225 Under popular theories
of statehood of the day, the state ultimately controls all territory and resources, like farms,
mines, and fisheries. 226 As international law expert Ian Brownlie put it, “(t)he state
territory and its appurtenances (airspace and territorial sea), together with the
government and population within its frontiers, comprise the physical and social
manifestations of...the state.” 227
224F
225F
226F
See for example K. Yelpaala, ‘Western anthropological concepts in stateless societies: A retrospective and
introspective look at the Dagaaba’ 17 Dialectical Anthropology 431 (1992) for a critique of the “stateless
society” theory. See also Tymowski, 5.
222
223
Gibney, 2014, 54.
224
For example, see B. McMahon, ‘Scientist Debunks Nomadic Aborigine ‘Myth’’ The Guardian (9 Oct. 2007).
A copy of the treaty can be found online at Yale’s Avalon Project. For an overview of the role the Treaty has
played in theories of state formation, see Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 59 . It is not the purpose of this
dissertation to enter into this debate, but rather to demonstrate that hard borders between competing
European empires was a major goal of colonial administrators.
225
226 For an expression of this theory of state formation, see for example Island of Palmas, quoted in Shaw 2008
211, footnote 74. See also Conklin, where he points to the state’s “radical title to all territory under its
control.” W. Conklin, Statelessness: The Enigma of an International Community (Oxford 2014) 73.
Brownlie, Principles, 57 71-72, 76, 105 (discussing the role of territory in the creation of states). See also
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933,
entered into force, 26 December 1934, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) art. 1. See also Shaw, 2008, 197-204 (discussing
the role of territory in the creation of states); Van Panhuys, 33, 43, 195; Weis, 7; T. Baldwin, ‘The Territorial
State’ in Hyman Gross and Ross Harrison (eds.) Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays (Clarendon Press 1992)
(hereinafter Baldwin) 210-211 (examining the origins of the territorial conception of a state in Europe); M.
Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 78 (arguing that exclusive territorial sovereignty is necessary for the
exclusive use of force); Crawford, 37 P. Jessup, ‘Remarks at UNSCOR, 383d mtg. at 9-11, Supp. No. 128,’ (2
December 1948) UN. Doc. S/P.V. 383; R. Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law (2nd Edn
Transnational P. 1994), 5; Shaw, 2008, 48-64, 171; V. Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press,
2007) 207; J. McAdam, ‘Disappearing States, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law’ in J.
McAdam (ed.) Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford, 2010), Sec. VIII.
227
“A territory without a people, a government without a clearly bounded community to be governed, makes no
sense.” V. Stolcke, ‘The “Nature” of Nationality’ in V. Bader (ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion (Universiteit van
54
As Gilbert puts it in his work on the treatment of nomads during colonization, nomads were
seen as ineffective occupiers of their territories, creating a “sovereignty vacuum” that could
only be filled by settled peoples. 228 Nomad areas were, to quote Sack, “an emptiable and
fillable mold.” 229 The amount to which colonized societies were recognized by Europeans
as being states, or as “state-like,” depended upon the extent to which they resembled
European societies, including the extent to which they were settled. 230 As Diallo, an
anthropologist and expert on nomads in West Africa, puts it:
227F
228F
229F
On the question of land rights, the European system and the West-African system
on agricultural and pastoral land use seem to oppose one another. 231
230F
Under European theories of state formation, nomadic land use, by contrast, did not create
sovereignty, so nomadic communities had no rights to their land. 232 The early colonial
period coincided with the feudal period in Europe, where the herding of animals was
231F
Amsterdam 1997) 61. “...protecting territorial integrity is the obverse side of the power of the state to assert
its jurisdictional authority.” S. Benhabib, ‘Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms?
Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times’ in E. Isin, P. Nyers, and B. Turner (eds.), Citizenship between Past and
Future (Routledge 2008) 23.
The requirement of territory, however, while widely accepted, remains under examined. See for example A.
Simmons, ‘On the Territorial Rights of States’ 35 Noûs 300-326 (2001) (discussing the moral claims of states
to territory). See also A. Stilz, ‘Why do States have Territorial Rights?’ International Theory 185 (2009) 188; P.
Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un français ? histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Bernard Grasset 2002)
10. Control of territory, however, should be distinguished from control over a particular piece of territory. K.
Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (Librairie Droz 1968) 21 (arguing that
“territorial changes are irrelevant to the problem of state identity.”)
J. Gilbert, ‘Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to Nomadic Peoples' Land Rights’ 7 Human
Rights L. R. 681 (2007) 685. See also Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 67. For examples of forced settlement from
outside this dissertation, see A. Stilz, ‘Nation, States and Territory’ 121 Ethics 572 (2011) 573. Forced
settlement was also practiced against nomads in Europe. See J. Gilbert, ‘Still No Place to Go: Nomadic Peoples
Territorial Rights in Europe’ 4 European Yearbook on Minority Issues 141 (2004-2005) 144-145, 159
(hereinafter Gilbert, Still). See also James Scott, who cites to the forced settlement of nomadic peoples in
Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s. Scott, 2009, 12.
228
229
Sack 88. Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 29-31.
J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2006) 257, 260
(hereinafter Crawford). See generally M. Moretti, International Law and Nomadic People (Author House UK
2012) (hereinafter Moretti). See also H. van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality in International Law (A. W.
Sijthoff 1959) 108 (hereinafter Van Panhuys); Shaw, 2008, 23-24; Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 59-60.
230
231
Diallo, 28.
In North America, for example, there were no “‘cities, castles, townes, and villages’, but only ‘empty space’
with primitive people and communal land use.” R. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History
(Cambridge UP 1986) 132, quoting the Letters Patent of King Henry VII to John Cabot in 1496.
232
55
limited by strict rules on land use. 233 Where pastoralism existed in Europe, it often did so
as a highly regulated activity under the feudal system. 234
232F
233F
The idea that nomads do not form states or own their lands would develop into the concept
of terra nullius, which labelled nomad territories as empty and ripe for colonial
exploitation. 235 Because nomad lands had been deemed terra nullius in many regions, their
lands were seen as being best administrated directly by the state. 236 According to similar
theories, the oceans could not be owned because they could not be improved upon or
occupied. 237 This theory, that of mare liberum, meant that the oceans could not be under
private control or the control of any one monarch. 238
234F
235F
236F
237F
It should be noted that the above theories on the lack of nomad statehood and territoriality
were not universally accepted at the time and continue to be debated today. Some colonialera European scholars continued to argue in favour of nomad land rights. 239 Nevertheless,
theories that nomads do not form states have been very influential, 240 and these theories
would influence colonial policy towards nomads during the colonial period and during
decolonization. 241 Even today, the link between nomads, land and statehood remains
238F
239F
240F
233
Diallo, 28.
234
Diallo, 33.
235
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 90-100. See also Sack, 127-129.
In the United States, Eleanor Roosevelt noted the link between nationality and the seizure of nomad lands
by “predatory interests.” Bloom, Members, 2017, 162. See also Scott, 2009, 8.
236
Buckle highlights the importance of occupation or possession of property as giving rise to ownership
rights in the theory of Grotius, another European philosopher critical to the development of the concept of
statehood in Europe and the ocean as unowned space. Buckle, 14. See also J. Larkins, From Hierarchy to
Anarchy; Territory and Politics before Westphalia (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 25 (talking about Rousseau). See
also Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 685-686; Bloom, Citizenship, 2018, 119.
237
See the work of philosopher Hugo Grotius. H. Grotius, ‘Mare Liberum Sive De Jure Quod Batavis Competit Ad
Indicana Commercia Dissertatio’ (Elsevier 2014).
238
Moretti cites to the work of Christian Wolff, who rejected all arguments against the land rights of nomadic
and indigenous peoples. Moretti.
239
As Bader puts it, “(c)ontrary to the legal and political myth of absolute, unitary, and indivisible
sovereignty, states have never been as sovereign as that.” V. Bader, ‘Introduction’ in V. Bader (ed.) Citizenship
and Exclusion (U Amsterdam 1997) (hereinafter Bader) 1. Crawford refers to sovereignty’s “long and troubled
history” and “variety of meanings.” Crawford, 32 See also Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 90-102; Kane, 9 140). See
the section on Kant in Moretti
240
There has been extensive scholarship on the question of whether or not pre-colonial nomad societies were
states or participated in states and how these concepts related to nomad settlement. Some of this literature is
summarized by Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 63-67. See also for example, S. Dicken and F. Pitts, Introduction to
Cultural Geography: A Study of Man and His Environment, (Ginn and Company 1970) (hereinafter Dicken and
Pitts) 40. See also Chatty, Pastoralists, 80-81; Fouberg, Murphy and de Blij, 2009, 241; Sack, 7-8, 55, 66-67;
Salzman, Introduction, 11; Khazanov, Outside, 198-199.
241
56
debated, but the idea that nomads do not form states and are not territorial persists and
remains highly influential. 242
241F
Closely related to the idea that nomads can’t form states is the colonial idea of nomadism as
a backward stage of human development that is destined to die out. Even when seen
through the misty lens of European romanticism that often typified European writings on
nomads, nomads were considered to be an obstacle to progress by even the most admiring
colonial administrators. Colonial administrators adopted negative views of nomadism even
in places where nomadism was a crucial and thriving part of the local economy. While on
the one hand, these writings present nomadism as a “‘golden age of simplicity,” it was also a
way of life that must die out for “progress” to occur. 243 As a result, European
administrators consistently showed a preference for settled groups over the “wandering
peoples.” 244
242F
243F
The view that nomadism was somehow backwards would persist into the post-colonial
period. Writing of government responses to Bedouin nomads in the Middle East,
anthropologist Hilary Gilbert points out that:
(p)astoralism, constructed as rooted in a primitive, pre-agricultural past, affronts
the linear narratives of ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’ adopted by many states.” 245
244F
“The emergence of nomadic states was linked with at least limited sedentarization (because) a nomadic
aristocracy could not do without towns which were the centres of political power, handicrafts and trade.”
Khazanov, Outside, 232. The example of the Tuareg is illustrative of the ways in which scholars and experts
have argued over whether or not nomads form states. See for example Azarya, 258, 277; Boilley, Les
Touaregs, 1999, 44; Bourgeot, Résistances, 39-41; A. Bourgeot, ‘Sahara : espace géostratégique et enjeux
politiques (Niger)’ 31 NAQD 153 (2014) 31 (hereinafter Bourgeot, Sahara); Foltz, 1-2; Tymowski, 1.
The nomadic Tuareg were often contrasted with agricultural societies like the Songhai, which were described
as “state-like.” Foltz, 4. Trimingham claims that not only the Tuareg and Arab nomads, but all Sahara
kingdoms, lacked territoriality, claiming that “(i)t is impossible to demarcate these spheres upon a map for
the frontier did not exist nor was there a capital city...Empires were spheres of influence, defined not by
territorial borders or boundary lines, but by social strata...” Trimingham, 35. The point of this section is not to
take a side in the argument over whether or not nomads can form states, but merely point out the theories
that contributed to colonial policy.
R. Bauböck, ‘Transnational Citizenship and Political Autonomy’ in T. Faiset and P. Kivisto (eds.), Dual
Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship (Palgrave 2007) 84-85. See for example
E. Marushiakova and V. Popov, ‘The Roma – a Nation without a State? Historical Background and
Contemporary Tendencies’ in Bernhard Streck (ed.), Segmentation und Komplementarität. Organisatorische,
ökonomische und kulturelle Aspekte der Interaktion von Nomaden und Sesshaften (6 Orientwissenschaftliche
Hefte 2004) 71.
242
243
Bury, 8.
244
Larkins, 25, 186 (discussing the views of colonizers towards indigenous and nomadic peoples).
245 H. Gilbert, ‘‘This is Not Our Life, It’s Just a Copy of Other Peoples’: Bedouin and the Price of ‘Development’
in South Sinai’ 15 Nomadic Peoples 8 (2011) 7 (hereinafter H. Gilbert, 2011).
57
Yet, as the sections above showed, pastoralism was not a “primitive” or “pre-agricultural”
way of life in the Middle East during the pre-colonial period. To the contrary, as the
example of Bedouin nomads in Kuwait exposed, far from being a problem, nomadism in the
Middle East was a key part of the economy, linking settled kingdoms together in a web of
trade upon which the entire region depended. Pastoralism formed an integral part of the
economy. Despite their mobility, many nomads in the Middle East claimed territory, owned
land as individuals and had close ties to settled communities. Yet the idea that nomadism
was somehow primitive and destined to die out became entrenched in colonial policy,
influencing governments up to the present day. 246
245F
Importantly for the question of nomad nationality, nomads were seen as incapable of the
exclusive allegiance that was necessary to create sovereignty. 247 Feudal society required
exclusive allegiance between ruler and peasant. 248 The concept of exclusive allegiance was
crucial to claiming colonized peoples as subjects under treaties. Tribal allegiance, however,
as supposedly practiced by nomadic communities, was seen as incompatible with
allegiance to a state. Even though colonial militaries signed treaties with nomad leaders,
over the course of the colonial period, it became increasingly common to view nomads as
tribal and as unsuitable subjects for such treaties. 249
246F
247F
248F
While colonial administrators and military leaders did sign treaties with nomad leaders,
these “colonial treaties were mainly acts aimed at achieving control over trade
relationships with specific tribes, or capitulation arrangements.” 250 Over time, as
colonization progress beyond the initial conquest period, treaties with urban rulers were
favoured over alliances with nomadic leaders. Protectorate agreements and other, more
permanent relationships were mainly forged with settled and urban rulers. 251 By the 19th
century, under laws like the Berlin Act of 1880, earlier treaties with nomadic peoples were
invalidated on the grounds that nomads could not form states or fulfil their obligations
249F
250F
246
Diallo, 52-53
Brownlie, Principles, 106-107. As Shaw puts it, “(p)erhaps the outstanding characteristic of a state is its
independence, or sovereignty.” Shaw, 2008, 211, 228, quoting the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of States (1949); Simmons, 308-309 (discussing the moral rights of states to territory and particular
territories); Larkins, 35 (territoriality is a founding principle of international relations theory). Conklin dates
the notion of absolute state control of territory to Vattel. Conklin, 73-74.
247
Van Panhuys, 139; Jault-Seseke, 22; Conklin, 181-183 (discussing the concept of allegiance in early
European philosophy); Edwards, 12; A. Boll Multiple Nationality and International Law (Brill 2006) 38-39 4347 (hereinafter Boll); R. Kubben, ‘To Belong or Not Belong’ 19 Tilburg LR 136 (2014); A. Shachar, The
Birthright Lottery (Harvard UP 2009) 113-114 (hereinafter Shachar).
248
Shaw, 2008, 29, 39. See also Sack, 15, 66-71; N. Elias, The Civilizing Process: State Formation and
Civilization (Basil Blackwell 1994) 295-297 (discussing feudal Europe’s land rush and land ownership as the
fundamental basis of society); Dicken and Pitts 184-193 237, 322, 406; Carmichael 8.
249
250
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 61.
251
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 90-102. See also Dicken and Pitts, 415; Fouberg, Murphy and de Blij, 2009, 240.
58
under such treaties. 252 It should again be noted that not all legal theorists of the day agreed
that nomads had no sovereignty. 253 Nevertheless, such views of nomads were dominant
and very influential.
251F
252F
Meanwhile, the existence of nomads in the colonies was seen as weakening colonial
sovereignty and the primacy of settled, urban rulers. 254 Nomadism came to be seen as a
problem for colonization and the sovereignty of local, settled rulers under the colonial
system. 255 The prioritization of urban rulers would lead a sharp decline in the status and
power of nomads, while many colonial administrators adopted forced and coercive
settlement programs for nomads. These programs will be explored in depth in the
examples, below.
253F
254F
The idea that nomads did not form states also affected how they were seen by international
legal theorists. Once again, though not universally accepted, nomads were also excluded
from the international definition of statehood by some theorists:
So entirely is (international law’s) conception of a state bound up with the notion
of territorial possession that it would be impossible for a nomadic tribe, even if
highly organized and civilized, to come under its provisions. 256
255F
These theories were highly influential on colonial policy in both British and French
colonies. In particular, Gilbert notes that the forced settlement of nomads became a major
goal of many colonial administrators. 257 Nomadic settlement was more than simply the
accidental by product of political and economic development during the colonial period.
Forced and deliberate, coercive settlement were major features of colonial policy. While
nomadism has always waxed and waned as nomads have adjusted to the surrounding
256F
252
Bloom, Members, 2017, 160. See also Crawford, 269.
253
See generally Moretti.
254
Diallo, 28.
255
Diallo, 25.
256
Lawrence, The Principles of International Law 58, quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 62.
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 67-70. See also J. Maury, Nationalité: Théorie générale et droit français (Paris
Recueil Sirey 1931) 22 (hereinafter Maury). It is important to note, however, that the process of
sedentarization during the colonial period had complex causes, with many factors occurring in tandem.
257
Deliberate policy encouraging settlement went hand in hand with environmental change, the introduction of
a cash economy, the broader re-orientation of trade towards routes that were more suitable for Europeans
through the creation of railroads, ports and other infrastructure and the centralization of trade under
European control. This re-orienting of trade, encroachment of the cash economy and environmental change
would continue after colonization ended. Salzman, 11-12 (discussing the impact of drought, military defeat,
modernization and urbanization on pastoral settlement). See also J. Galaty, ‘The Maasai Group-Ranch: Politics
and Development in an African Pastoral Society’ in P. Salzman (ed.) When Nomads Settle (Praeger 1980) 161
(discussing land development projects in Kenya); P. Salzman, Pastoralists: Equality, Hierarchy and the State
(Westview 2004) 122.
59
conditions, moving in and out of the nomad economy as it suited them, the colonial period
brought about a long decline in nomadism due, in part, to colonial policies deliberately
targeting nomadism as undesirable and backward. 258 Meanwhile, negative views of
nomadism would continue to dominate sociology, anthropology and other fields both
before, during and after the colonial period. 259 These views would, in turn, deeply influence
how nomads were treated during the colonial period and beyond.
257F
258F
It is important to note that in other parts of the world not examined by this dissertation,
the extermination of entire nomadic societies was not uncommon. 260 Negative treatment of
nomads has been documented across the colonial system, including many cases of mass
murder and mass forced removal from land. 261 As Jérémie Gilbert points out in his book on
nomads and human rights, sometimes forced settlement, relocation and extermination was
the inadvertent effect of disease and destruction of habitat, but often it was purposeful,
part of clearing areas to make room for settlement and removing nomadic groups. 262
259F
260F
261F
Acts of elimination and mass killing were based on a racist bias against nomadic
peoples, not only because of their race or ethnicity but because they were
nomads… 263 the crimes (against nomads by colonists) were committed on the basis
of historical stereotyping in which the nomadic element has played a central role. 264
262F
263F
This section has summarized some of the negative theories on nomads and state formation
that influenced colonial policy. The next sections will explore how these colonial theories
on nomadism influenced colonial polices towards nomads in Kuwait, French Soudan and
North Borneo.
258
Lenhart, 248.
For an overview of the subject, see the work of geographer Robert Sack and the field of geography more
generally. See also Diallo, 28.
259
This occurred to the entire nomadic population of Uruguay, the Selk’nam population of Patagonia, and
almost the entire Techuelche nomadic population in Argentina. Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 22-25.
260
The view that nomads have no sense of territoriality justified, for example, President Andrew Jackson’s
argument for the Indian Removal Act of 1830 in the United States. President Jackson’s Message to Congress,
‘On Indian Removal,’ December 6, 1830; Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990; Record Group 46;
Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990; National Archives. See also Conklin, 74 (on the use of title
against native peoples.)
261
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 23. See also S. Irudaya Rajan, V. J. Varghese and M. S. Jayakumar, Dreaming Mobility
and Buying Vulnerability: Overseas Recruitment Practices in India Routledge 2011) 26-28, discussing the
maistry and kangani systems.
262
263
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 31.
264
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 54.
60
The Bedouin in the Sheikdom of Kuwait
Kuwait, 1954
This section will summarize British colonial policy towards the Bedouin. Colonial policies
on nomad land use, sovereignty and allegiance would have a devastating impact on
Bedouin nomads. The British territorial system of administration would also have a deep
and lasting effect on the makeup of the Kuwaiti state. Most importantly, the alliance
between the British Crown and the Emir of Kuwait would centralize power in the hands of
the urban Al-Sabah family and bisect Bedouin lands by hard borders. These events would
come to have enormous repercussions for Bedouin nationality at the time of
decolonization. While in the 1920s and 1930s, the Kuwaiti government would “go out of its
way” to facilitate Bedouin trade, 265 by the 1960s, Bedouin movement was viewed as a
security threat and a problem for Kuwait’s sovereignty.
264F
In the 1930s, according to Toth, there were approximately 10,000 Bedouin in Kuwait. 266
Many more Bedouin groups migrated across what would become Kuwaiti territory or lived
in oasis towns in the interior. 267 As the proceeding sections explored, there was always a
distinction in Kuwait between the Bedouin, or Bedu, peoples of the desert and the settled
merchants of Kuwait City. By the mid-twentieth century, however, this distinction had
become so entrenched in Kuwaiti society and politics that it became the defining feature of
Kuwaiti nationality. Why this happened can only be explained by looking at the creation of
the Kuwaiti territorial state and the discovery of oil during the British Protected State
period. During the period of British influence, the territorial concept of statehood that had
developed in Europe, described above, was imposed on the Middle East. But most crucially,
265F
266F
265
Longva, Citizenship, 188.
F. al-Nakib, ‘Revisiting Hadar and Badu in Kuwait: Citizenship, Housing, and the Construction of a
Dichotomy’ 46 Int'l J. of Middle Eastern Studies 5 (2014) 6 (hereinafter al-Nakib); A. Toth, ‘Tribes and
Tribulations: Bedouin Losses in the Saudi and Iraqi Struggles over Kuwait’s Frontiers, 1918-1943’ 32 British
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 145 (2005) 149, citing Dickenson (hereinafter Toth, Tribes).
267 Toth, Tribes, 149.
266
61
it was imposed in a way that divided the Bedouin between different states and centralized
power in Kuwait Town.
In particular, this section will explore how the drive to set borders and exclusively claim
the Arabian desert, would dominate British policy in the Gulf. 268 As Toth points out, “the
appearance of modern states was an important factor in the decline of Bedouin power and
independence.” 269 The creation of Kuwait is best seen as only part of a much larger story
involving the dividing up of the Arabian Peninsula and the mass settlement of, and
movement restrictions on, Bedouin nomads, two events that were intimately entwined. The
establishment of the borders of Kuwait coincided with the carving up of “greater Syria” in
1920 during the Mandate period, which resulted in the large-scale division of Bedouin kin
groups across the peninsula. 270 As Chatty puts it, “(w)ith the consolidation of state power
and authority in the ‘state’...most of the nations of the Middle East turned to their pastoral
populations with a view to settling them in one place...(to)...assure control over them.” 271
Controlling the Bedouin was important to the colonial powers and, increasingly, local
sheiks of the Gulf because it led to the control of Bedouin territories.
267F
268F
269F
270F
The British Protectorate period saw the creation of borders as key to protecting the
sovereignty of Kuwait and its control over the desert regions outside of Kuwait Town.
These entwined goals, settling the Bedouin and setting borders in the desert, would be
adopted by the Kuwaiti government after the British left.
The fight for exclusive sovereignty over the desert would only intensify with the discovery
of oil in 1938. 272 In 1890, the population of Kuwait Town was around only about 20,000,
excluding seasonal Bedouins. Over the next sixty years, however, Kuwait would explode in
size and economic importance as it became a major oil supplier. 273 The discovery of oil
under the desert would greatly raise the stakes for control of the desert beyond mere
strategic importance.
271F
272F
This example will focus primarily on the treatment of the Bedouin by the British, but French and Ottoman
colonial treatment of the Bedouin in northern Arabia was markedly similar to British policy, with a focus on
forced settlement, formal boundaries and the establishment of a western administrative structure. Chatty
discusses French administration of the Bedouin in Chatty, Persistence, 2014, 20-22 (discussing the Syrian and
Lebanese contexts.)
268
269
Toth, Tribes, 146.
Al-Serhan and Furr, 19. Much of the Kuwaiti Bedouin experience was replicated in other countries, such as
Jordan.
270
271
Chatty, Pastoralists, 2.
272 A. Rush, Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwait’s Ruling Family, 1752-1987 (Ithica 1987) 4. Today,
Kuwait controls 10% of the world’s oil reserves. Casey, 7. Because of WWII, oil exploration did not begin in
Kuwait until 1946. Longva, Citizenship, 182.
273
Slot, 53-54.
62
The sedentarization projects for pastoral nomads undertaken in the Middle East
between 1950 and 1970 did not mark a departure from policies carried out
during the Mandate period or in Wahhabite Arabia. Then, as earlier, the solution
suggested for the nomad ‘problem’ was the same: sedentarization. 274
273F
The scramble for territory also influenced the actions of local rulers, none more than Ibn
Saud in what would become Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud in particular, used alliances with
Bedouin rulers as part of his expansionist strategy to claim territory for his empire. 275 The
British become both willing participants and pawns in these state-building exercises, which
brought the European concept of statehood, with exclusive allegiance, territorial
sovereignty and hard borders, to Gulf politics. This meant that alliances with the Bedouin
came to be crucial to exerting sovereignty over the desert. At the same time, however, the
British and many local leaders came to see the Bedouin as a “problem,” hindering attempts
to set borders and establish clear zones of influence in the desert.
274F
The “problem” of the Bedouin began under the Ottoman Empire, which had established a
foothold in the region at Basra at the end of the 18th century. Kuwait Town, however,
remained almost entirely independent during the Ottoman period. 276 Nevertheless, the
Ottoman Empire established administrative and military outposts to the north, particularly
at Basra, as well as a system of tax collection, policies to promote agriculture and other
attempts to create sovereignty in the region. 277 While the Bedouin enjoyed a great deal of
autonomy during the Ottoman period, they began to feel the influence of the colonial
struggle for territory. 278 This period would usher in the beginning of a “great historical
transformation” that would culminate in the creation of modern states in the region. 279
“(T)he long period of Bedouin hegemony in the desert and the steppe diminished, probably
forever.” 280
275F
276F
277F
278F
279F
R. Bocco, ‘The Settlement of Pastoral Nomads in the Arab Middle East: International Organizations and
Trends in Development Policies, 1950-1990’ in D. Chatty (ed.) Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North
Africa: Entering the 21st Century (Brill 2006) 302.
274
275
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 65-66.
276
Al-Dekhayel, 1. See also Slot, 9.
Slot, 9, 13-36. See also A. Toth, ‘Last Battles of the Bedouin and the Rise of Modern States in Northern
Arabia: 1850-1950’ in D. Chatty (ed.) Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st
Century (Brill 2006) 59-61 (hereinafter Toth, Battles); B. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf: 1894-1914 (U.
Cal P. 1967) 95 (hereinafter Busch).
277
F. Stewart, ‘The Contract with Surety in Bedouin Customary Law’ 2 UCLA J. Islam 163, 168-169. (2003)
(focusing mainly on Bedouin in the Sinai).
278
279
Toth, Tribes, 145.
280
Toth, Tribes, 145.
63
In general, the Ottoman authorities viewed nomadism as a “problem” to nation-building in
their Arabian colonies. 281 Nomads were “bandits,” attacking Ottoman caravans and towns
and leading to instability, making it difficult to secure borders and territory. 282 They were a
“disease that needed to be cured,” as one Ottoman official put it. 283 According to many
Ottoman administrators, the Bedouin frequently refused to pay Ottoman taxes, did not
acknowledge the authority of the Empire, raided their settled farmer neighbours and were
seen as an obstacle to agricultural development and making the region “self-sufficient,” by
which the Ottoman government really meant the opposite; dependent on Ottoman
control. 284 The Ottomans employed what would become a familiar strategy for territorial
empires against the Bedouin: forced settlement, military reprisals and the promotion of
agriculture. 285 For example, Fazil Mustafa Pasa, who became Grand Vizier in 1689, ordered
the settlement and registration of nomads in order to promote farming, despite the
unsuitability of many parts of the Gulf for a large-scale expansion of agriculture.
280F
281F
282F
283F
284F
In the end, Ottoman policies brought few changes to Kuwait as the Ottomans were
overstretched. In general, as long as the Bedouin paid taxes, the local Ottoman
administrations often failed to carry through on settlement programs. Camel-herding
Bedouin from the desert interior were frequently left alone by Ottoman administrators,
who tended to focus on smaller, sheep herding groups living closer to settled areas. 286
Ottoman administrators were often reduced to paying off Bedouin leaders in order to
maintain security. 287 By the 19th century, the Ottomans were still struggling to control
even coastal areas around Basra, register plots of land and establish a land tenure
system. 288
285F
286F
287F
Meanwhile, the Arabian interior remained primarily under nomadic Bedouin control, its
markings and orientation points entirely a matter of Bedouin rules and customs. At the
dawn of the 20th century, while Kuwait’s northern border was “relatively well-defined,”
though “disputed,” its southern border was a “shifting line between tribes loyal to the AlJ. Büssow, ‘Negotiating the Future of a Bedouin Polity in Mandatory Syria: Political Dynamics of the Sba'a
'Abada During the 1930s’ 15 Nomadic Peoples 70 (2011) 78-79 (hereinafter Büssow). I am indebted to
Anthony Toth for his comments on Ottoman influence in Kuwait.
281
B. Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History (Cambridge UP
2013) 95.
282
R. Kasaba, A Movable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants and Refugees (U of Wash P 2009) 7 (hereinafter
Kasaba).
283
284
Kasaba, 60. See also Anscombe, 42.
285
Anscombe, 42.
286
Kasaba, 66, 103. See also Toth, 61-62.
287
Masters, 96.
288
Anscombe, 33-38, 43.
64
Sabah and those loyal to whichever ruler controlled Najd...” 289 The struggles to control the
Bedouin, establish sovereignty and set borders would later be taken up by the British and
the Al-Sabah family. 290
288F
289F
By 1899, Sheikh Mubarak of the ruling Al-Sabah family in Kuwait Town, sensing Ottoman
weakness and distrustful of their intentions as well as worried about attack by hostile
Bedouin groups, entered into a treaty with Britain for protection. 291 The Sheikh, with his
position as the head of the powerful Al-Sabah family in Kuwait town, had already been
recognized as the authority over Kuwait Town by the Ottomans. The British would further
elevate the Sheikh as the recognized authority not only in Kuwait Town, but over Kuwait as
a territorial state. The Sheikh and Britain were natural allies, since the Sheikh could
provide the British with access to Kuwait’s harbour. Control of Kuwait’s port was not only
important economically, it provided a foothold for British territorial expansion on the
Peninsula. 292
290F
291F
Until the discovery of oil, Britain’s interest in Arabia was focused on the coastal areas and
shipping. The desert interior was valuable primarily for strategic reasons. Kuwait was
dependent on freshwater supplies from Basra, its economy based on pearl fishing and
cross-desert trade for which the Bedouin were crucial. 293 For the Kuwaiti Emir, the
Bedouin were important allies. 294 Unlike in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which in the early
20th century remained majority Bedouin, Kuwait’s Bedouin were only one seventh of the
total Kuwaiti population and in a constantly moving into and out of the region throughout
the seasons. 295 The Sheikh would call upon friendly tribes for defence, and tribes would
migrate to Kuwait Town and other towns to trade, but Al-Sabah sovereignty did not extend
much further than Kuwait Town’s walls. 296
292F
293F
294F
295F
Over the next few decades, Kuwait would became a British Protected State under the
authority of the Sheikh. 297 The agreement with Sheikh placed the might of the British
military in service of protecting Kuwait’s “independence” as an exclusive client of
296F
289
Slot, 8-9.
290
Kasaba, 5.
Longva, Citizenship, 182; Slot, 88; Al-Dekhayel, 2; Busch, 108. In 1901, the Sheikh and Britain reaffirmed
their pact.
291
292
Carmichael, 107.
293
Casey, 21.
Anscombe, 26. See also Y. Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State (I. B. Tauris
2007) 60 (hereinafter Alon).
294
295
Commins, 145.
296
Al-Dekhayel, 89.
297
Anscombe, 122; Casey, 21.
65
Britain. 298 For both the British and the Al-Sabah family, the loyalty of the Bedouin and the
need for a hard border would emerge as major, and closely related, security issues.
297F
In 1912, the protectorate agreement between Britain and Kuwait was finally formally
recognized by the Ottomans. The British began their aggressive push to fix not only
Kuwait’s border, but borders throughout the Gulf. 299 The issue of borders had long worried
the British, who during the Ottoman period had been eager to demarcate the “‘line between
the two empires,’ or spheres of influence." 300 Following the logic of territorial sovereignty
described in the proceeding section on the European system of statehood, Britain wished to
set a border through the desert to prevent attacks on their allies and foil expansion by
other European empires. 301
298F
299F
300F
The border was also of growing concern to the Sheikh, who was mainly worried about
Kuwait’s independence from his inland neighbours, such as Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. 302 As
the region developed into territorial units along the European model, the allegiance of the
Bedouin and, by proxy, control of the desert would come to be a major issue. At the same
time, however, as power centralized in the hands of urban rulers, border lines would be
drawn through Bedouin areas, slicing through the heart of Bedouin society. While the
border began as a semi-circle drawn on a map, in time, it would weaken Bedouin society,
harm trade and shift political power away from Bedouin leaders.
301F
The border was finally set down by the Anglo-Ottoman agreement. Critically, this
agreement included a clause placing the “tribes within the territory” of Kuwait as
“subordinate” to the Kuwaiti Sheikh. 303 This clause may have represented an effort to
create a ruler-subject arrangement between the Emir and the Bedouin groups living within
an arbitrary circle created for the first time by this very agreement. If so, it ignored the
complex relationship between many Bedouin and the Sheikh. It is not clear to what extent
the various Bedouin groups with ties to Kuwait were consulted on either the position of the
border or their relationship to the Sheikh now that Kuwait was being set up as a territorial
state, though the sources cited in this section imply that little outreach and consultation
with the Bedouin was undertaken. What is clear from research, however, is that
subsequent attempts to secure the border in practice were met with widespread Bedouin
resistance.
302F
298
Slot, 114-115.
Slot, 384-387. See also Carmichael,101. The location of the border was the subject of much debate and
compromise.
299
300
Slot, 41.
301
Busch, 336. See also Carmichael, 109.
302
Slot, 131. See also Carmichael, 101.
303
Slot, 380.
66
As Slot puts it, “(n)obody seems to have envisaged how this geometric circle might be
applied to daily desert practice.” 304 In particular, the border would inevitably cut through
long-distance trade routes, as well as Bedouin territories and pastures, disrupting the
region’s economy. This was of little concern to the British, who saw Bedouin trade as
competition for ocean trade routes. In fact, the creation of a hard border would transform
Bedouin trade into a state regulated activity, as trade must now take place subject to
government regulation, not Bedouin rules.
303F
The border also created a question as to the loyalty of many Bedouin tribes, who were now
expected not only to choose sides between various urban power centres, but to express
these loyalties spatially through adhering to certain artificially drawn, invisible boundaries
in the desert.
In a situation where there was a general scarcity of funds, the colonial
administrations in Syria and Iraq, much like their predecessors, the Ottomans,
treated tribes as groups with rights and responsibilities who would guarantee
some measure of order in a peripheral territory and would help in the
outsourcing of some administrative functions such as public security and
taxation. 305
304F
Yet right from the start, the British struggled with their project to pacify the Bedouin in
order to use them to support the border. Because Bedouin groups often travelled long
distances and owed allegiance to several sheikhs depending on the time of year or shifting
political alliances, they were viewed by the British as unreliable allies. 306
305F
The Al-Sabah family had long relied on the support of loyal Bedouin for military protection,
but many Bedouin and former Bedouin were now allies of Ibn Saud, including the powerful
Ikhwan. 307 Meanwhile, the Saudis began to look to make their own deal with the British, 308
and Kuwait Town, with its access to one of the best ports in the region, was a prize worth
taking.
306F
307F
In 1920, the Sheikh’s concerns over the growing power of Ibn Saud proved justified. In an
attempt to absorb Kuwait Town into the emerging Saudi empire, thousands of Bedouin
fighters under Faisal al-Dawish, allied to Ibn Saud, attacked the oasis town of Jahra not far
from Kuwait Town. 309 The town pushed the invasion back with British support. Families
from Kuwait Town worked nonstop for two months to build a wall around the town,
308F
304
Slot, 378.
305
Büssow, 88. See also Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 67.
306
Commins, 159.
307
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 57.
308
Slot, 400.
309
Toth, Tribes, 147-148Casey, 21; Carmichael, 110.
67
helping to repel the invasion. 310 Both the Al-Sabah family and British government,
however, feared future attack. This moment, the foiled invasion and the construction of the
border wall around Jahra, would become the founding story of Kuwaiti national identity
and would influence Kuwaiti nationality law in the decades to come.
309F
Following the attempted invasion, the British and Emir again tried to establish a firm
border around Kuwait Town with the Uqair Protocol, centralizing the Kuwaiti state on
Kuwait City. The line drawn by the Uqair Protocol was based on previous treaties, including
the Anglo-Ottoman agreement mentioned above. 311 The extension of the Sheikh’s territory
into the desert would provide a “buffer zone” around the city, taking into account what the
British believed to be Al-Sabah’s sphere of influence, including neighbouring towns like
Jahra. The agreement was a clear attempt to elevate the legitimacy of the Emir and weaken
the claims of Bedouin rulers to Kuwaiti territory.
310F
For the time being, the new border would have little practical effect, though the British
made many attempts to secure the border areas of Kuwait using a combination of treaties
and military force. 312 At this point, there were no border posts and nothing to prevent
Bedouin migration, which continued in spite of the lines drawn by the British on maps. The
creation of a hard border, however, would begin to have an effect on how mobility was
viewed by the governments of the region. 313 Now there was a Saudi side of the desert, an
Iraqi side, and a Kuwaiti side. In the scramble for control of the Arabian Peninsula, not only
the Al-Sabah family, but also Ibn Saud and others were intent on claiming as much territory
as possible. 314 As a result, by the early 20th century, the territorial conception of statehood
had been entirely adopted by leaders in the region. Increasingly, Gulf leaders began using
311F
312F
313F
310
Longva, Citizenship, 186.
Ismael, 69; Casey, 21. The Protocol affirmed the border as a semi-circle 80 miles from Kuwait City. The
boundary was described as; “(t)he frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the west from the junction of
the Wadi al ‘Awja’ with Wadi al Batin, leaving Raq’i to Najd; from this point it continues in a straight line until
it joins latitude 29 degree and the red semi-circle referred to in Article 5 of the Anglo - Turkish Agreement of
July 29, 1913. The line then follows the side of the red semi-circle until it reaches a point terminating on the
coast south of Ras al Qali’ah and this is the indubitable southern frontier of Kuwait territory.”
311
A “wadi” is a seasonal riverbed. See also Commins, 120. The agreement had created a zone of sovereignty for
Kuwait extending 80 miles outward from Kuwait City. Another 100 kilometers beyond this border was
designated as the Sheik’s “zone of influence.” For examples of earlier proposals for Kuwait’s border, see
photos, Slot, 270. For examples of the complex web of Bedouin allegiance at the time, see Beaugrand,
Stateless, 2018, 53-62.
312
Toth, Tribes, 149-150.
313
Conversations with experts. See also Commins, 139.
314
Toth, Tribes, 149.
68
the word watan to describe the state, a word associated with territory, rather than the
traditional term umma, with its emphasis on the Muslim community. 315
314F
Kuwait was not the only place where the British attempted to control the Bedouin
territorially in order to support their newly drawn borders. Governments across the
region, many with the cooperation and encouragement of Britain and France, tried a
combination of “carrot and stick” approaches to restrict the movement of Bedouin,
including financial rewards and penalties, inter-tribal marriages, formal recognition of
smaller tribes, and forced emigration of certain individuals and groups. 316 In Iraq, for
example, the British offered land to Syrian Bedouin to entice them to settle in Iraqi
territory. The French in Syria were also trying to force the Bedouin to settle. 317 Forced
settlement became a major government goal even in countries with majority Bedouin
populations like Jordan. 318 Settlement programs for the Bedouin in the desert regions was
part of larger economic development schemes increasingly undertaken by local, as well as
colonial, administrators. 319
315F
316F
317F
318F
Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, the borders of Kuwait would become facts on the
ground for many Bedouin as Ibn Saud began a blockade of caravans to Kuwait City. 320 Ibn
Saud made many exceptions to the blockade when politically necessary, but the blockade
did much to reduce the power of Bedouin groups to move freely across the border. To
weaken Kuwait’s economy and raise money, Iraq also instituted border controls in the
1930s, labelling Bedouin trade that did not comply with the new laws and taxes as
“smuggling.” 321 While many Bedouin continued to cross the border clandestinely, these
319F
320F
315 N. Partrick, ‘Nationalism in the Gulf States,’ in D. Held and K Ulrichsen, The Transformation of the Gulf
(Routledge 2011) 59.
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 68. These programs were employed across the region, sometimes leading to
armed conflict. Janzen, 232-250. See also Alon, 8-9 (on Oman).
316
317
Büssow, 78, 81.
318
Alon, 60-72, 75-76.
Saudi Arabia issued identity documents to Bedouin tribes living in border regions with Oman in order to
claim that territory. Janzen 71 Many government settlement programs in Saudi Arabia, including relocation,
farm loans, and land grants, however, were later abandoned because agriculture did not take hold in the very
dry desert environment. S. Yizraeli, Politics and Society in Saudi Arabia: The Crucial Years of Development
1960-1982 (Oxford 2012) 166-174, 178-179 (hereinafter Yizraeli).
319
Because the Bedouin made up the majority of the population in Saudi Arabia, While Saudi policy came to be
more inclusive of the Bedouin nomads than in Kuwait, nevertheless, unsettled Bedouin became increasingly
poor and marginalized in Saudi society, and nomadism often went hand in hand with lack of registration and
access to public welfare programs designed for settled populations. Alon, 1-7 See also Yizraeli, 181.
Fletcher, 58; See also Toth, Tribes, 145, 148, 155, 159, 162. In 1943, a trade agreement was established
between the two countries. Toth, Battles, 160.
320
321
Toth, Tribes, 160.
69
border controls began to have an impact on Bedouin economics, pushing yet more nomads
to settle.
This marked the beginning of the treatment of traditional Bedouin movement as “illegal”
border crossings, a theme which will reoccur during the post-protectorate period. The
blockade, and subsequent border restrictions, along with drought and famine, would take a
great toll on the Bedouin during this period, reducing Bedouin movement and fuelling
urban settlement. 322 While “smuggling,” as it was now called, became big business for some
Bedouin and was tacitly supported by the Al-Sabah family in some cases, 323 the overall
effect of the border was to decrease movement and encourage settlement in towns.
321F
322F
Nevertheless, Bedouin families continued to come to Kuwait City to take part in seasonal
pearl diving before returning to their herds, maintaining close connections between certain
tribes and Kuwaiti merchants. The Al-Sabah family still relied on its Bedouin allies for
economic and political support. 324 The status of the Bedouin in regional politics, however,
was beginning to decline rapidly due to the discovery of oil.
323F
Oil would elevate the problem of the Kuwaiti border to an issue of paramount importance.
It would make the desert zone surrounding Kuwait City incredibly valuable to all
governments in the region and external actors as far away as the United States. The
extreme wealth it generated would catapult the ruling families of the region like the AlSabah family into competition for territory. 325 Crucially for the Bedouin, the discovery of
oil would also shift the economy away from Bedouin trade, as well as weakening the
merchant families in Kuwait Town, breaking down their historical economic interdependency. 326 The Bedouin would increasingly find themselves less valuable as trade and
military allies.
324F
325F
The oil economy would accelerate Bedouin settlement in urban areas as Bedouin began to
migrate to cities to take part in the emerging wage economy. While the imposition of
borders and the shift to the oil economy encouraged settlement, state actors also actively
coerced Bedouin settlement. Local administrators, as well as agents of the British and
French, used land grants and subsidies to tribes to settle the population. As Toth points out,
states like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq often employed the same methods as the British
in order to solidify their sovereignty and control the Bedouin. 327 Many Bedouin families
settled in shanty towns outside Kuwait’s urban areas.
326F
322
Toth, Tribes, 156.
323
Fletcher, 58-59.
324
Fletcher, 60-61.
325
Longva, Citizenship, 181.
326
Longva, Citizenship, 182.
A. Toth, ‘Control and Allegiance at the Dawn of the Oil Age: Bedouin, Zakat and Struggles for Sovereignty in
Arabia, 1916-1955’ 21 Middle East Critique (2012) 57 (hereinafter Toth, Control).
327
70
The idea that the Bedouin were a “problem” for which settlement and relocation to urban
areas was the “solution” was now firmly entrenched in government policy. Though no
longer as important to the economy, by the 1960s, both the Saudis and the Al-Sabah family
still relied on the Bedouin for military troops, meaning that claiming loyal Bedouin groups
would become vitally important for the protection of the state. In the case of Kuwait, this
meant settling and assimilating those Bedouin families who were loyal to the Emir while
excluding groups seen as problematic. 328 Certain nomadic Bedouin were now seen as
disloyal and, potentially, criminal.
327F
“Nomadic tribes were armed, mobile and flexible in their political allegiances, making them
an often menacing and unpredictable quantity in the eyes of rulers in the settled zone.” 329
On the eve of the termination of the protectorate agreement and the withdrawal of British
administrators, both local and foreign administrators were united in a desire to secure
regional borders, establish exclusive sovereignty, cut down on what they termed smuggling
and, to accomplish all of these goals, restrict Bedouin movement and settle the Bedouin.
328F
At the termination of the protectorate agreement, Kuwait would inherit the borders
established by the Uqair Protocol alongside concerns over ownership of the oil against the
claims of neighbouring states, worries over the arbitrary border and, most importantly for
this dissertation, concerns over the suitability of Bedouin as nationals and ongoing
questions over their loyalty. “In the 1960s, modernity, in the form of national borders and
oil explorations, forced (the Bedouin) to give up their traditional law of life.” 330
329F
328
Toth, Tribes, 149. See also Toth, Control, 59.
329
Toth, Control, 2012, 58.
330
Longva, Citizenship, 188.
71
The Tuareg in French Soudan
West Africa, 1887-1889
Arguably even more than the Bedouin, colonial views on the ability of the Tuareg to help
establish French sovereignty over the Sahel would prompt French administrators to divide
Tuareg lands with borders and to push aggressively to settle the Tuareg. Like the British in
Kuwait, the French in the Soudan would centralize economic and political power in cities
with urban rulers.
The Sahel came under nominal French control when Colonels Joffre and Bonnier entered
the fabled city of Timbuktu in 1894 under dubious authority, against orders from the
French government, and encountering stiff local resistance. The French had secured
European recognition for their sovereignty over West Africa at the Conference of Berlin in
1884-1885, but French presence on the ground was for many years limited to a few
military outposts. 331 As in the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahel was mainly important to the
French during the early colonial period for strategic reasons. France needed to occupy the
desert and sign treaties with local rulers, in order to protect from incursions by other
colonial powers. Yet establishing sovereignty in desert areas would prove difficult.
330F
French estimates put the number of Tuareg in norther French Soudan at around 60,000 in
1906, with an additional 24,000 nomads of Arab descent. 332 Like in Kuwait, the push to
establish French territorial sovereignty would dominate French-Tuareg relations. Though
far less important than oil in the Gulf, however, the possibility of mineral wealth would also
331F
Bourgeot, Résistances, 276 (discussing the ongoing struggles of the French for even nominal military
control of the region). Up until 1945, there were only nine French citizens in all of the Kidal region, for
example, all military. Only in 1948 did Kidal get its first on-site civilian administrator. T. Benetti, Entwicklung
des Verhältnisses zwischen Tuareg und staatlichen Strukturen in Mali (University of Vienna 2008) 43
(hereinafter Benetti).
331
332
Hall, 143.
72
come to influence French policy. As with the British in Kuwait, the French struggled to
administer the nomadic population. Colonial administrators came to work most closely
with urban and agricultural communities, even as they romanticized Tuareg culture. Right
from the start, French administrators would treat the Tuareg as antithetical to the running
of the French empire in the Sahara and would adopt settlement as the solution. This section
will look at how French territorial ambitions shaped the status of the Tuareg during the
colonial period in ways that would have a profound effect on how the Tuareg were treated
at decolonization.
The incorporation of French Soudan into the French Empire began as a tactical move by the
French military, who were intent on connecting France’s holdings in north Africa with
those in west Africa. 333 In this way, French goals were somewhat different from those of
the British in the Gulf region, where the presence of a natural harbour made Kuwait a
valuable target in its own right and the later discovery of oil made the desert the subject of
intense economic competition. While consisting of vast areas of territory, 334 France’s
holdings in West and Central Africa were never as important to France as its north African
colonies, particularly Algeria. 335 The “scramble for Africa” had led France to invade the
Sahara and northern Sahel more for prestige and territorial continuity than material
benefit. 336
332F
333F
334F
335F
By the end of the colonial period, however, minerals and mining would emerge as a major,
secondary cause of concern for territorial control of the Sahel. The French never
determined how to fully economically exploit the Sahel, however, and they continued to
occupy it militarily for strategic reasons, 337 establishing quasi-military rule over the
Tuareg while expanding civil administration in settled and urban areas, including, as the
next sections will discuss, civil registration. The differences between what this dissertation
terms French military rule versus administrative rule will be discussed in more detail
below.
336F
The borders of France’s African holdings were determined completely arbitrarily, with the
border between Algeria and the AOF originating at the place where French troops met
coming from opposite directions near the wells of Timiaouine, in present-day Algeria.
During the early colonial period, Tuareg seasonal migration was relatively unaffected by
French borders, though they divided Tuareg territories. At the end of the colonial period,
however, lines that had been drawn on maps were destined to become international
F. Cooper, Nationality between Empire and Nation, Remaking France and French Africa 19451960(Princeton UP 2014) 21 (hereinafter Cooper). See also Stewart, 16; Chipman, 2
333
On the eve of the second World War, French West Africa, or AOF, a colony with its capital at Dakar,
encompassed almost 5 million miles and had a population of almost 15 million people. Chipman, 88.
334
335
Stewart, 16.
336
Chipman, 2.
337
Cooper, 23.
73
boundaries and barriers to Tuareg movement. 338 The administrative regions and borders
were created by the French with almost no Tuareg input, and would be handed to the postcolonial governments with almost no revisions, applying the doctrine of uti possidetis,
which says that territory remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless
otherwise provided by treaty. 339
337F
338F
Unlike in the Gulf, however, the vast federation of French colonies of the AOF (which
included French Soudan), and its proximity to Algeria, another French colony, meant that
during the French colonial period, the Tuareg could move relatively freely between
colonies. French Soudan was also insulated from incursions by rival colonial powers. 340 As
a result, boundaries between colonies controlled by a single European power, like the AOF,
were “somewhat fluid.” 341 Nevertheless, the French administration viewed the settlement
of the Tuareg as a major goal.
339F
340F
French influence would bring momentous change to the region and to the lives of the
Tuareg. 342 The French began a long reorientation of the trade economy towards the coasts,
sapping the relevance of the trans-Saharan routes and beginning to weaken the importance
of the Tuareg to the economy. 343 Bamako, far to the south of Tuareg areas, was made the
capital of French Soudan in 1920. 344 Landlocked Niger and French Soudan remained
poorer than the coastal colonies of Senegal and Ivory Coast throughout the colonial period.
341F
342F
343F
Much of the French effort in the Niger Bend was directed towards “pacification” and forced
settlement of the Tuareg. While pockets of Tuareg resistance continued until the 1930s, the
French slowly allied themselves with friendly Tuareg leaders and eliminated rivals. 345
344F
338
Keenan, Resisting, 49, 194.
S. Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis (MQUP 2012) 108. See
also M. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ 3 European Journal of In’t Law 478 (1997) (hereinafter
Shaw, Boundaries, 1997) 493. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
339
Cooper, 23. See also A. Zatzepine, Le Droit de la nationalité des Républiques Francophones d’Afrique et de
Madagascar (Paris 1963) ; 7. B. Kamian « La dynamique des intégrations, de la période coloniale à nos jours »
in B. Sanankoua (ed.) Les États-nations face à l’intégration régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest : Le cas du Mali
(Karthala, Paris, 2007) 53-56.
340
C. Young, ‘The Colonial State and Post-Colonial Crisis’ in P. Gifford and W. Louis, Decolonization and African
Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980 (Yale UP 1988) 5.
341
342
Gaudio, 1988, 77-87; Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 62-63; Stewart, 17-18.
343
Trimingham, 213; Kane, 8.
344
Chipman, 88; Gaudio, 90-92, 1988; Foltz, 16.
Stewart, 20. In 1894, the influential Tuareg chief Sobbo ag Fondogomo allied with the French, beginning a
period of Tuareg and French cooperation. Hall 161-163, 184-185. In July 1916, the Tuareg leader Fihroun was
killed during one of the last Tuareg revolts, and his successor, Akorakor, signed a treaty with the French,
becoming the Amanokal over all the Tuareg in northern Soudan with French support. Gaudio, 1988, 87;
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 11, 93.
345
74
Ultimately, the French did not have the resources to police the Sahel, so they instead sought
to control the Tuareg through treaties and agreements, including letters of cooperation
signed with various Tuareg leaders. These letters had dubious value to the Tuareg
themselves, who would ignore these treaties when it suited them. 346
345F
The French got intimately involved in the selection of Tuareg leaders. 347 They encouraged,
or sometimes forced, the Tuareg to settle the land for agriculture and to access schools. 348
As well, the promoted the end of slavery, liberating the agricultural class and empowering
agriculturalists over the nomadic nobility. 349 Many of these efforts were designed to keep
the Tuareg within local administrative limits and reduce nomadism. 350
346F
347F
348F
349F
The French administration began a series of programs designed to limit Tuareg mobility
and “develop” the region, by which they meant settlement and the promotion of
agriculture. For the French, a settled population living in towns or practicing agriculture
would facilitate French control, particularly through the establishment of a clear land
tenure and taxation program. 351 Treaties or no, Tuareg who did not cooperate with these
programs would be treated as hostile. Unlike in Kuwait, with Kuwait’s harbour of regional
importance to British shipping, the French lacked a clear economic strategy for the region
apart from the goal of promoting agriculture in the desert and eliminating resistance to
French sovereignty. 352 The extreme difficulties in creating a settled, agricultural society in
the Sahel among a nomadic population were simply ignored. Meanwhile, any Tuareg
resistance to French “development” was cast as a dangerous security threat.
350F
351F
In 1917, Kaocen of the Kel Air Tuareg also signed a peace treaty. Despite the cooperation of key Tuareg
leaders, guerrilla movements against the French continued. Boilley gives the example of the Tuareg guerrilla
leader Alla in Kel Adagh. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 256. See also Beamus, 158-159, discussing treaties
signed by the Kel Denneg and Kel Geres.
346
Hall, 138.
347
Hall, 193. See also Keenan, Resisting, 41.
R. ag Alfarouk, « La politique coloniale d’affaiblissement de la confédération Kel Denneg de 1900 à 1949 »
in Nomades et commandants : administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993) 90-91.
348
349
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 196.
350
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 196.
R. Bates, ‘Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa’ in D.
Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (eds.) State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Westview Press 1982)
15. See also Foltz, 16.
351
J. Frémeaux, « La mise en place d’une administration aux marges sahariennes de l’A.O.F. (1891-1930) » in
E. Bemus, P. Boilley, J. Clauzel, J. Triaud (eds.) Nomades et commandants : administration et sociétés nomades
dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993) 24.
352
75
Commander Betrix, head of the Gao region, heavily favoured settlement for the Tuareg and
their conversion to agriculture in his plan to administer the Tuareg. 353 French
administrative goals, however, could not have been more at odds with the functioning of
the nomadic Tuareg noble class. As described above, the nobility relied on mobility,
pastoralism, fluid control of territory, traditional forms of education and the
vassalage/slavery system.
352F
In reality, the French instituted only a fraction of the changes envisioned by administrators
like Commander Betrix, but their attempts to transform Tuareg society in line with the
European administrative model would have a lasting effect on the Tuareg and would be
taken up by the Malian government at independence. 354 French power was mostly
concentrated in military posts in cities like Gao and Timbuktu, far from the areas occupied
by the nomadic Tuareg. 355 These bases would later become the headquarters of French
administrative regions, called cercles around which the various colonial departments
would form, cutting the Tuareg’s pastures into units centred around towns. 356 The local
administrators, chosen by the French rather than according to Tuareg law, were often
viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of the Tuareg.
353F
354F
355F
In part as a result of these factors, the French administrators struggled to retain a
relationship with nomadic Tuareg leaders, which led to a “double administration” with a
more hands-on approach to the sedentary population and a more hands-off approach for
the Tuareg. 357 As Bourgeot points out, racial theories also guided the way the French
divided nomadic and settled populations. Skin tone was often invoked by the French to
justify the hands-off approach of local French military administrators. 358 This may have
created the illusion of independence for the Tuareg at the time, but while in theory, the
Tuareg retained some independence, the French administration began to consolidate
administrative functions in urban areas to the detriment of the nomadic population,
including civil registration. 359 Over time, this separate administration distanced the Tuareg
356F
357F
358F
353
Quoted in Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 88-89 (my translation).
354
Gaudio, 1988, 88. See also Hall, 170.
355
Hall, 137-138.
356 Hall, 138. Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 14. These “circles” were further divided into subdivisions, and finally into
cantons under local administrators chosen by the French. See also Foltz, 12-13; Bernus, 161.
P. Loiseau, « L’administration et les rapports nomades/sédentaires » in E. Bemus, P. Boilley, J. Clauzel, J.
Triaud (eds.) Nomades et commandants : administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala
1993) 160-161.
357
358 Bourgeot, Sahara, 39-41. The issue of race in the Sahel is contentious. This section will note the ways in
which race and nomadism intersected in influencing French policy. For an overview of the topic of race in the
Sahel, see Bruce Hall.
359
Stewart, 18. See also Hall, 114-119.
76
from the French administrative system and placed their leaders outside a developing
system of government that would form the basis of the Malian state.
Meanwhile, the colonial period saw the gradual decline of Tuareg economic importance as
the focus of economic activity shifted to the coasts and away from Sahara trade. 360 Like the
Bedouin, the Tuareg would become less and less crucial to the Sahel economy and would
watch their political importance decline over the course of the colonial period. In
particular, the division of Tuareg regions into administrative divisions oriented towards
the south, the decrease in the caravan trade and the settlement policies of the French
would not only decrease Tuareg economic and political power, it would influence their
perceived status and usefulness to the state in ways that would have a profound effect on
their later status during decolonization. 361
359F
360F
During the early 1900s, the fluid borders of the AOF slowly solidified, bringing increased
movement restrictions. 362 For the Tuareg, the introduction of arbitrary borders in the
hitherto limitless Sahara would mark the beginning of restrictions on their traditional
movement, the decline of Saharan trade, and convert the nobility to a more sedentary
life. 363 At first, the imposition of borders and a centralized administration did little to
change the Tuareg way of life. Tuareg families could simply move from one region to
another to evade the census taker and tax collector. 364 To keep the Tuareg within their
designated areas, the military was frequently employed to force Tuareg families to stay
within their regions. 365 The Tuareg complained bitterly that such restrictions prevented
them from adjusting their movements according to the rains and seasons. ControllerGeneral Barba, a French administrator, stated that the Tuareg on the border with Algeria
seemed “not to understand” the difference between the two colonies. 366
361F
362F
363F
364F
365F
Stewart, 18. See also Hall, 127, 132-133. Bourgeot cites the defeat of the Tuareg at In Salah in present day
Algeria in 1905 as the turning point in the Tuareg wars against the French. Bourgeot, Résistances, 279-282,
311, 320.
360
361
Stewart, 19.
For example, under the decree of 24 April 1928, indigenous persons in the AOF could not leave their
colonies without an identity document. See M. Rodet, Les migrantes ignorées du Haut-Sénégal : 1900-1946
(Karthala 2009) 196-198. It should be noted that not all Tuareg groups were affected by the French in the
same way, with the southern Tuareg, mostly the Iwellemmeden, being impacted the most. French control
became more and more tenuous northwards, particularly in the Kidal region.
362
For more on the effect of borders on Tuareg life in southern Algeria, see P. Marnham, Nomads of the Sahel
(Minority Rights Group 1979).
363
364
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 241.
365
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 58, 243.
J.-F. Barba, « L’administration en zone frontalière algero-soudanaise » in E. Bernus, P. Boilley, J. Clauzel
and J.-L. Triaud (eds.) Nomades et commandants : administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F.
(Karthala 1993) 38.
366
77
The French also used borders to adjust the social hierarchy in northern Soudan and
decrease the power of Tuareg nobles. Ending slavery had become a goal of the empire as a
whole, 367 but freeing the slaves also served to decrease nomadism. The French created
separate administrative regions for settled and pastoral groups, attempting to keep the
Tuareg away from villages and towns, in order to end the domination of the Tuareg over
the settled villages and their agriculturalists. 368 As the Tuareg became confined to limited
administrative areas, their migrations became more conscribed. 369
366F
367F
368F
Along with other aspects of the western state, the French brought the concept of
registration and identity documents to the Soudan, services that were centralized in urban
areas. The French also changed the systems of taxation, basing everything on
administrative regions. 370 Tax collection was divided into two categories, taxes on the
sedentary population, including Tuareg slaves and vassals, and taxes on the nomads, with
the two groups often paying different rates. Over time, the French put tax collection under
the control of settled, rather than nomadic, chiefs, greatly strengthening the authority of
settled rulers and placing the Tuareg at a severe disadvantage. 371 Tax collection and the
census both relied on territorial administrative regions but also reinforced them,
decreasing not only Tuareg mobility, but all mobility while also increasing the
marginalization of the entire region. French Soudan was now one of the most marginalized
regions in French colonial Africa. The imposition of taxes based on centralized,
administrative regions would most negatively affect the Tuareg, who relied on their own,
contradictory, system of allegiance and taxation.
369F
370F
The Tuareg opposed French taxation and often left the area to avoid paying. The French
response, however, was to forcibly return nomad groups to their assigned territories. 372
Jean-Marie Payen, head of administration in Niger, admitted that the Tuareg got little in
return for their taxes, as what services the French provided were located in towns and
oriented towards the settled population. 373 Payen called taxes and the census a way to
reduce Tuareg mobility and liberty; a form of “administrative confinement” for the
371F
372F
367
In 1848, French law abolished slavery in the colonies. Décret du Gouvernement provisoire du 4 mars 1848.
368
Hall, 180-181.
369
Azarya, 260.
For example, the French levied a tax on the Amanokal of the Ouelleminden Tuareg in 1902 of 150 cows
and 50 camels. J.-M. Payen, « Le recensement et l’impôt » in E. Bernus, P. Boilley, J. Clauzel and J.-L. Triaud
(eds.) Nomades et commandants : administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993)
121-122 (hereinafter Payen). The census of the sedentary population was first taken in 1906 and listed 7,000
upper class settled families and 45,000 farmers, many of whom were probably Tuareg slaves and haratin. See
also Hall 253.
370
371
Azarya, 260. See also Hall, 145, 251; Foltz, 17-18; Grémont, 136; Bourgeot, Résistances, 32.
372
Benetti, 49.
373
Payen, 125.
78
Tuareg. 374 As a result, registration became entwined with abusive taxation and movement
restrictions in the minds of many Tuareg.
373F
The Tuareg resisted the census, which would later cause problems for them when it came
to voter registration. 375 In the Soudan, the French attempts to establish electoral lists, take
a census and issue family cards became limited to the sedentary population. 376 Registering
the Tuareg was so difficult it was often not completed, leaving many Tuareg without
documents. 377 Towards the end of the colonial period, Badi, the chief of the Kounta Tuareg,
offered to travel around northern Soudan to educate the Tuareg about the importance of
registering with the French before independence so that they could vote, but reported that
many Tuareg did not appear to understand the need. 378 This would greatly affect the rollout of nationality among the Tuareg, as the next section will explore.
374F
375F
376F
377F
Throughout their tenure, French investment in the Sahel and Sahara regions was poor, as
the area was thought to be of greater strategic than economic value. 379 Uranium mining
was still decades away. Nevertheless, settlement for agriculture was the main economic
goal and the French actively promoted agriculture in the fertile areas around the Niger
Bend. In particular, the French disliked what they saw as the destructive habit of the
Tuareg nobles of raiding the farming communities of Songhai living close to the Niger river.
While the French eventually came to accept pastoralism as a necessary part of the Sahel
economy, they encouraged agriculture throughout their tenure, 380 and many French
administrators saw the Songhai as struggling under the “yoke” of Tuareg dominance. 381
378F
379F
380F
French agricultural policy would encourage both settlement and overgrazing, as the French
pursued their goal of turning the Sahel into a second “fertile crescent.” 382 Despite the
environmental and economic benefits of nomadism in desert regions, the French
increasingly came to see the Tuareg as a menace to the environment and as a hindrance to
the economy. 383 Ironically, the imposition of borders restricting Tuareg movement and the
381F
382F
374
Payen, 125.
375
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 234-239.. See also Payen, 125.
376
Gaudio 1988, 88.
377
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 237..
378 G. Féral, ‘Administrations comparées en pays nomade’ in E. Bernus, P. Boilley and J-L. Triaud, Nomades et
commandants : Administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993) 110 (hereinafter
Féral). See also Boilley 283, footnote 11.
379
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 203..
380
Hall, 259, 269.
381
Hall, 260-261.
382
Marnham, 6.
383
Hall, 179.
79
encouragement of settlement and overgrazing would overtax the fragile ecosystem of the
Sahel, worsening subsequent droughts while limiting the Tuareg’s ability to cope through
nomadism. 384
383F
The process of settlement, along with the concentration of the Tuareg into smaller areas
and over-grazing would culminate in the devastating droughts of the 1960s and 1970s,
discussed below. The French promotion of agriculture and ban on slavery, however
ineffectual, contributed to the decline of the noble class and the settlement of nomadic
Tuareg. 385 It also shifted the balance of power in the region, as many French policies
favoured the settled population.
384F
As part of their efforts to mould Tuareg society along European lines, including by
promoting land ownership, the French attempted to apply a land tenure system, already in
use by the Songhai, to the Tuareg. They settled the lesser Tuareg vassal families, who were
already engaged in some agriculture, and assigned them land. 386 The French also promoted
land ownership by Tuareg chiefs, sometimes taking prime land from Songhai chiefs to
entice the Tuareg nobles to settle. 387
385F
386F
Pastoral groups often ignored the edicts to remain within their designated areas, giving rise
to complaints by the Songhai of “illegal" Tuareg grazing. 388 The French also limited
pastoral access to the river in response to Songhai complaints. 389 French land grants to the
Tuareg were in many cases never viewed as legitimate by the Songhai, who came to see
themselves as the original owners of the land. 390 French agriculture promotion led to
conflict between the Tuareg and the Songhai, as well as between Songhai clans, as
unoccupied agricultural land became scarce and the Tuareg nobles lost their dominance
and, therefore, the ability to enforce their grazing rights. 391 The land policies of the French
increased tensions with the Songhai agricultural class, a process that would continue under
Malian administration.
387F
388F
389F
390F
By the 1920s, the Tuareg had lost control of much of the Sahel and needed to adapt to the
way of life imposed by the French in order to survive, a way of life that was hostile to
384
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 261..
Hall, 183-190, 209, 287-288. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 215; Keenan, Resisting, 40, 62; Azarya
259-261.
385
386
Hall, 264.
387
Hall, 265, 267.
388
Hall, 268.
389
Gremont, 135.
390
Hall, 271.
391
Hall, 270-271.
80
nomadism. 392 The promotion of settlement increased in the 1920s and 1930s as the French
looked for ways to increase economic output. 393 Unlike in the Gulf, much of the Sahel’s
mineral riches, particularly lucrative uranium mining and the possibility of oil beneath the
Taoudeni basin, had not yet been discovered. The French instead began infrastructure
development designed to encourage settlement and agriculture. They introduced irrigation
and began building roads. 394 The promotion of agriculture in particular would later be
aggressively adopted by the Malian government. 395
391F
392F
393F
394F
The French also tried to bring education and health care in line with their ideas of
centralized control and settlement on land. Health projects like the Assistance médicale
indigène, created in 1926, were mostly located in cities like Timbuktu and Gao. Because
most Tuareg lived far from the urban centres where health services are located, this meant
that only urban populations could access such services. 396 Schools were also used as a tool
to encourage settlement, and, as such, were viewed with suspicion and hostility by many
Tuareg. As Michel de Geyer d’Orth, administrator of the Agadez region, put it, nomadism
presented an “‘insurmountable handicap” to development and required an “evolution
towards settlement.” 397
395F
396F
In order to encourage “modernization” among the Tuareg, the French decided to educate
the sons of the Tuareg noble class, seeing them as the logical future administrators of the
Sahel, but this program, like so many others, was mostly unsuccessful. Education in Tuareg
areas lagged far behind other parts of French Soudan. In 1912, the system in southern
French Soudan was reorganized in line with the system in France, with primary schools,
professional schools and normal schools. In the Sahel, however, what few schools existed
were reserved for the sons of chiefs until as late as 1947. 398 Even in the 1940s, there were
only two schools in the entire administrative cercle of Gao for nomads. 399 Once again, this
placed the Tuareg at a disadvantage at decolonization.
397F
398F
Schooling emerged as a contentious issue for the Tuareg. The Tuareg resisted French
schooling as a plot to transform their children into foreigners and eradicate their
392
Azarya, 260.
393
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 247.
394
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 204. See also Hall, 285.
395
Hall, 170.
396
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 207-209.
M. de Geyer d’Orth, « Les actions de développement, » in E. Bernus, P. Boilley and J-L. Triaud, Nomades et
commandants : Administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993) 127 (hereinafter de
Geyer d’Orth).
397
398
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 219.
399
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 220.
81
knowledge of nomadism. 400 To attend school, Tuareg children had to be separated from
their parents. This separation was not only hard on families, but it prevented the children
from learning vital skills related to nomadism, such as raising and caring for animals. 401 As
a result, many Tuareg fought bitterly to keep their children out of French schools. The
French only ended forced recruitment for schools in the late 1950s, because at that time
enough Tuareg had settled to make schooling voluntary. 402 At the end of their rule, the
French administration began to consider the idea of mobile schools that would travel with
the Tuareg families and incorporate more traditional skills, but independence came before
this idea could be implemented. 403 In the end, as stated by Ibrahim Ag Litny, former
student of a “nomad school” in Kidal, French schools amongst the Tuareg were mostly a
failure. 404 After independence, all ideas of nomadic or traditional schools were abandoned
as the new government sought to unify the Malian nation, and saw western style schools as
key to this effort. Ag Litny states that while this effort would “democratize” teaching in
Kidal, the new schools were also primarily unsuccessful as they did not allow the nomads
to follow their lifestyle. 405
399F
400F
401F
402F
403F
404F
Over time, the French began to recognize that their attempts to limit Tuareg migrations and
promote agriculture were ineffective and causing a great deal of tension between Tuareg
leaders and French administrators, as well as increasing tensions between the nomadic and
settled populations. French administrators began allowing the Tuareg to apply for special
permits to leave their areas to find better pasturage. To apply for such permits, families had
to register with the French authorities and obtain identity documents, such as family cards.
The French signed also agreements with Tuareg leaders, called “Conventions for
Nomadism", in an attempt to legalize and control the movements that were already taking
place, while limiting their scope. 406 In this way, registration became linked to movement
restrictions in the eyes of many Tuareg.
405F
Ultimately, French attempts to control the movement of the Tuareg were limited by the fact
that the French did not have the manpower, or the interest, to police such vast areas, the
environment simply could not support such a rapid expansion of farming, and local
400
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 197.
401
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 228.
402
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 232.
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999 231. A series of these camping schools were begun in 1958 in the Niger Bend.
For a description, see H. Combelles, « La scolarisation et les écoles nomades au Mali » in E. Bernus, P. Boilley
and J-L. Triaud, Nomades et commandants : Administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala
1993) 137.
403
I. Ag Litny, « La première école de l’Adagh » in E. Bernus, P. Boilley and J-L. Triaud, Nomades et
commandants : Administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993) 153.
404
405
Ag Litny, 153.
406 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 246. Page 248 of Boilley’s book contains an example of an agreement between
the French and Tuareg limiting Tuareg movement. See also J.-F. Barba, 36.
82
political conditions were against such meddling in land rights. 407 The Tuareg continued
their seasonal migrations despite fines and deportations. 408 This would change when the
Malian government came into being, as controlling the Sahel would be a primary goal of the
new government, as opposed to a minor side issue in the governing of a vast empire. In
particular, movement restrictions would become vital to enforcing what were now borders
between sovereign states and the discovery of uranium in Niger would fuel new interest in
the Sahel as a money-generator.
406F
407F
While the French presence ultimately lead to greater sedentarisation, by the end of French
rule, many Tuareg remained nomadic. 409 Nevertheless, French policies would begin the
slow process of the transformation of the Tuareg nobility from regional elites to
discriminated-against minority. 410 French programs to promote agriculture, settlement
and the imposition of territorial, administrative regions took their toll on nomadism. 411
French policies created tensions between nomads and settled communities and associated
registration in the minds of many Tuareg with movement restrictions and taxation.
408F
409F
410F
By the 1950s, independence loomed and some Tuareg leaders began to push for their own
state. The concepts of territoriality and sovereignty had crept into the Tuareg discourse
with the French in their negotiations over the possibility of an independent Tuareg
state. 412 Some Tuareg leaders saw independence as an opportunity to unite the Sahara
region as a single, political unit: a Sahara français. 413 Many educated Tuareg feared
independence as bringing the “real colonization” of northern Mali by the south. 414 In 1958,
Mohamed El Mehdi, the chief of the Kel Antassar and Territorial Advisor for Goundam, near
Timbuktu, told the French government of his desire to create a “Republic of the Veiled” in
the Sahel. Muhammad Ali ag Attaher, a leading Tuareg noble, wrote to Charles de Gaulle to
protest dividing the Malian Tuareg from their relatives in Niger. 415 He organized a trip
through Saudi Arabia and Libya to promote combining the Tuareg areas of Niger and Mali
411F
412F
413F
414F
407
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 245.
408
Grémont, 137.
Grémont, 135. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 12, 198; Keenan, Lesser Gods, 79-80, 147-149
(discussing Tuareg settlement in Algeria following independence); S. Randall and A. Giuffrida, ‘Forced
Migration, Sedentarization and Social Change: Malian Tuareg’ in Chatty (ed.) Nomadic Societies in the Middle
East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century (Brill 2006) 431.
409
410
Foltz, 41.
Pezard and Shurkin, 8. Hall, 208. Hall calls it the pax Gallica, Boilley the pax français. See also Boilley, Les
Touaregs, 1999, 99, 108, 152.
411
412
Grémont, 137.
413
Bourgeot, Sahara, 33-35.
414
Bourgeot, Résistances, 268. See also Bourgeot, Sahara, 33-34.
415
Hall, 308.
83
with Morocco. 416 Tuareg chiefs sent petitions to France expressing their desire to separate
from the rest of French Soudan. 417
415F
416F
In 1951, concerned over losing the potential mineral wealth of the Sahara and leaving
unstable states with nomadic minorities, the French considered setting up a new colony in
the Saharan and Sahel regions called Afrique saharienne français. 418 The idea of shifting
boundaries in the Sahara was not without precedent, as the French had moved boundaries
and transferred territory throughout their tenure in West Africa. 419
417F
418F
It should be noted that there is some historical debate over the extent to which these
efforts were really organized and promoted by the French, rather than by Tuareg leaders,
though it is clear that many Tuareg leaders were involved in this effort. 420 According to
Marnham, some Tuareg leaders wanted to be included in Algeria and asked that the border
be moved south to reflect this. 421
419F
420F
News of the desire to separate the Niger Bend and the Kidal region from the rest of what
would become Mali reached the south, causing great concern. Prominent southern
politicians visited the north throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s to campaign against
partition and in favour of Malian unity. 422 Neither the UN nor the Organization of African
Unity took up the question of self-determination for the Tuareg, instead allowing
421F
416
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 298.
The first was sent in 1957, and again in 1958, by Mohammed Makhmoud ould Cheikh, an influential leader
in Timbuktu. The second took the form of a letter to Charles de Gaulle from the notables of the Air region. It
was signed by the “customary chiefs, the notables and the businessmen of the Niger bend” including several
Songhai. The letter expressed their desire to remain a part of the French Empire rather than become part of
an “autonomous or federal system with black Africa...” that did not represent their “interests and aspirations.”
They asked for a separation “politically and administratively” from the Soudan in order to become part of a
“French Sahara.” It should be noted that the history of this letter is contested. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999,
292-293.
417
Oil was discovered in southern Algeria in 1954. See also Claudot-Hawad, « La question touarègue, quels
enjeux? » in M. Galy, La guerre au Mali : Comprendre la crise au Sahel et au Sahara : enjeux et zones d’ombre
(Découverte 2013) 664. See also Hall 299; Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 47. The discovery of uranium in Niger has led
to political tensions between the Tuareg and the government. I. Kohl and A. Fischer, ‘Tuareg Moving Global:
An Introduction’ in I. Kohl and A. Fischer (eds.) Tuareg Society within a Globalized World: Saharan Life in
Transition (Tauris 2010) 6.
418
For example, part of French Soudan had been transferred to Mauritania in 1944 in order to better
administer the area, called the Hodh. Hall, 298. See also J. Rocaboy, « Le cas hamalliste » in E. Bernus, P.
Boilley, J. Clauzel and J.-L. Triaud (eds.) Nomades et commandants : administration et sociétés nomades dans
l’ancienne A.O.F. (Karthala 1993) 41.
419
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 297. There is considerable argument over how genuine were the desires of
the Tuareg nobility to be independent.
420
421
Marnham, 6.
422
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 305.
84
decolonization, for the most part, to fall along existing borders. 423 During decolonization,
the principle of uti possidetis was used to resist any changes in the makeup of the
territories of the colonies. 424 Decolonization would show “no consideration for the social,
political and territorial integrity of the Tuareg and other (nomadic) societies like the Peul
(Fulbe, Wodabee) or Berber (Imaziŕen), but in fact established their marginalization.” 425
422F
423F
424F
The question of Tuareg self-determination would greatly influence Tuareg nationality at
decolonization. There was considerable support for self-determination in international
law, 426 yet during decolonization, the right to self-determination was invoked as a
rationale for ending colonial rule, but not for reordering the colonial system. 427 In 1945,
the United Nations placed eleven states under the Trusteeship system to facilitate their
progress towards independence, but the breakup of colonial empires would eventually take
place along the borders that had been already established by Europeans. 428
425F
426F
427F
In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 1514 on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as existing political groups, enshrining
what Weller calls the territorial approach to decolonization. 429 Though the right to selfdetermination was a motivating factor for decolonization, the supposed stability of the
post-colonial system was a major concern for all of the parties involved in the process and
ultimately outweighed other concerns. 430 Resolution 1514, for example, expressly applied
self-determination only to former colonies as a whole; “(t)rust and Non-self-governing
428F
429F
E. Keller, ‘The State, Public Policy and the Mediation of Ethnic Conflict in Africa’ in D. Rothchild and V. A
Olorunsola (eds.) State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Routledge 1983) 252.
423
S. Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis (MQUP 2012) 108. See
also Shaw, Boundaries, 1997, 493. See also Organization of African Unity, Resolution 16(1) (1964).
424
425
Kohl and Fischer, 5.
Prior to decolonization, the principle of self-determination had been successfully invoked in limited cases
by the League of Nations in the Aland Islands case following WWI, where the Islands wished to be a part of
Sweden rather than Finland based on their sociological links to Sweden. Aaland Islands Case (1920) League of
Nations Official Journal Spec. Supp. 3. See also Crawford, 108.
426
M. Weller, ‘Settling Self-determination Conflicts: Recent Developments’ 20 European J. of Int’l L. 111 (2009)
117-118 (hereinafter Weller). See also Shaw, 2008 252-253; Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 692-693; Crawford,
108, 122. Though not expressly in the United Nations Charter, the right to self-determination was enshrined
in UNGA Resolution 1514 and was also guaranteed by several important early human rights treaties including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in art. 1, as well as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNGA Res. 1514 (XV) A/RES/1514(XV) (1960).
427
428
Shaw, 2008, 252.
Weller, 118. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 Dec. 1960.
429
James Crawford has comprehensively addressed the decolonization process in The Creation of States in
International Law, Chapter 13, ‘Mandates and Trust Territories’ and Chapter 14, ‘Non-Self-Governing
Territories: The Law and Practice of Decolonization’.
430
85
territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence." 431 Selfdetermination was therefore limited to existing political and territorial units. 432 As a result,
the decolonization process left many ethnic and indigenous groups, both nomadic and nonnomadic, without states of their own. 433
430F
431F
432F
In 1970, the UN General Assembly passed the Declaration on Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States preventing self-determination claims that would
“dismember...sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” 434 The International Court
of Justice affirmed the right to independence from colonization for former colonies in the
Namibia Opinion of 1971. 435 As a result, while the right to self-determination from
European colonization is arguably jus cogens, the right to self-determination by minorities
and indigenous peoples within post-colonial states does not find similar support.
433F
434F
The 1975 Western Sahara case, however, provided something of an exception to the
general focus only on European colonization and provides a limited example of a nomadic
group successfully advocating for self-determination. The case provided nomadic groups in
the western Sahara region with independence from both European states and earlier
colonization by Morocco. The decision recognized that nomadic peoples were “socially and
politically organized” as grounds for their claims to self-determination both from European
colonization, but also the near colonization of a pre-colonial entity, Morocco. 436 While
Western Sahara could have provided a blueprint to granting political independence to
435F
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 Dec. 1960.
431
432
Weller, 119.
Shaw 2008 256-257; S. Craig, ‘Indigenous Self-Determination and Decolonization of the International
Imagination: A Plea,’ 18 Hum R Quart 814 (1996) 817; Crawford, 116; J. Habermas, The Postnational
Constellation (MIT Press 2001) 72 (hereinafter Habermas); W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal
Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford UP 1995) 27 (hereinafter Kymlicka).
433
Beside the Tuareg, there are many other groups who do not “...represent traditional colonial entities.” I.
Barnsley and R. Bleiker, ‘Self Determination: From Decolonization to Deterritorialization’ 20 Global Change,
Peace and Security 121 (2008) 121-122. Barnsley and Bleiker point to the breakup of the former Soviet Union
and the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia as examples of successful self-determination unrelated to the
colonial context, though it could be argued that both cases were rooted in colonialism, as most of the former
soviet states were Russian colonies from the 19th century and Eritrea became part of Ethiopia due to Italian
colonization.
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/25/2625, 24 October 1970.
434
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970).
435
436
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). See also Crawford, 122-123, 605; Moretti, 173.
86
more nomads, it has not been followed by a wave of nomad, or even indigenous,
independence and state formation. 437 Quite the opposite. 438
436F
437F
Ultimately, the proposal of a Tuareg state would be set aside due to the strenuous
objections of the new colonies, including Mali, in favour of an economic organization, the
Organization Commune des Regions Sahariennes (OCRS). 439 Discussions around the creation
of this new economic block would only increase the mistrust between what would become
the Malian government and the Tuareg. 440 Mali and Niger, in particular, saw this as Tuareg
collusion with French imperialism. The long shadow of the Sahara français and the OCRS
would darken future relations between the Tuareg and the Malian government, which
would always present Tuareg independence as veiled French imperialism. 441 Once again,
like in Kuwait, nomadic communities were presented as potential allies of foreign
governments and disloyal to the state. All parties were concerned over the possible mineral
and oil wealth hidden beneath the Sahara, and the new governments in the region viewed
any sign of separatism by the Tuareg with extreme suspicion. 442
438F
439F
440F
441F
Various Tamasheq and Bidân leaders in Soudan Français actively supported
either the French or the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, or all at the same time.
Their support for these ‘foreign’ claims made them highly suspect in the eyes of
“Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” UNGA Res.
1514 (XV), para. 2, cited in Crawford, 335.
437
438 Rather than supporting the right to self-determination, more recent decades saw a shift towards the
recognition of only partial autonomy for many indigenous and minority groups, sometimes called internal
self-determination. For more examples, see Weller, 120-122. For more on the perceived risks to states from
self-determination, see Habermas, 64.
Meanwhile, events like the breakup of the former Yugoslav republic demonstrated that self-determination
may require a Security Council resolution before it is legal under international law. “Within the legal
framework of the United Nations Charter, notably on the basis of Articles 24, 25 and Chapter VII thereof, the
Security Council may adopt resolutions imposing obligations under international law.” International Court of
Justice, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010.
E. Grégoire and J. Schmitz, « Monde arabe et Afrique noire : permanences et nouveaux liens » in E. Grégoire
and J. Schmitz, Afrique noire et monde arabe : continuités et ruptures (Institut de recherche pour le
développement 2000) 8-9 (hereinafter Grégoire and Schmitz).
439
Grégoire and Schmitz, 43-44. The OCRS was a semi-autonomous alliance of Sahel and Saharan regions,
existing from 1957 to 1963, containing the Saharan and Sahel regions of French Soudan, Niger, Algeria and
Chad. Loi N. 57-27 du 10 Janvier 1957, Créant une Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes, JORF (11
janvier 1957) 578. The stated purpose of the OCRS was to promote economic development, manage natural
resources and represent the peoples of the Sahara to the French government, but was viewed with hostility
by many African politicians as a thinly veiled attempt to create a Saharan colony. Hall, 301-304.
440
441
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 286.
442
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 287, 306.
87
the Malian nationalists. After independence they were regarded as enemies of the
Malian state and ‘vassals’ to the ‘French neo-imperialist cause’. 443
442F
The OCRS ended in 1962, but the concerns of some Tuareg leaders over their future as part
of what would become Mali, would long outlast it. 444 Disappointment over the failure of a
Tuareg state and anger at Mali’s southern dominated post-colonial government were
factors in the first Tuareg rebellion of 1962, the rebellion that would end Tuareg
integration into Mali before it had even begun. 445 Badi, the chief of the Kounta Tuareg, is
quoted by Gabriel Féral as saying,
443F
444F
Quand vous (les français) partirez, c’est Bamako qui va commander, ce sont les
sédentaires, les nègres... maintenant, les choses ne se font plus avec le fusil, avec
la takoba, tout cela c’est fini, cela se fait avec le vote, avec les élections. Or nous,
nous, les nomades, nous sommes en minorité... (When you (the French) leave, it’s
Bamako who will rule, the settled peoples, the blacks...now, things are no longer
done with the gun, with the takoba (sword), all that is finished, it will be done with
the vote, with the elections. But we, the nomads, are in the minority...) 446
445F
The departure of the French brought breathtakingly swift changes to northern Mali,
discussed below, as the new Malian government moved aggressively to settle the nomads,
free the Tuareg slaves and promote agriculture. Meanwhile, the administrative structure
created by the French would persist into the post-colonial period, with power centralized
in the hands of urban and southern rulers and international borders dividing the Tuareg
and placing them at the periphery of political power.
443
Lecocq, Desert, 2002 ,48.
444
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 291.
Hall, 275. Tuareg chiefs were also involved in the border dispute between Mali and Mauritania following
independence, deepening Malian suspicion of Tuareg loyalty. Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 67-68.
445
446
Féral, 111. (My translation).
88
The Sama Dilaut in British North Borneo
Like the Bedouin and Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut would suffer from colonial attitudes about
the ability to nomads to participate in states, their ability to own their territories and their
alleged backwardness. Like the Bedouin and Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut would be subjected to
forced and coercive settlement practices which went hand in hand with registration and
taxation. And like the Bedouin and Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut would find their territories split
by colonial borders.
The Spanish had come to the Sulu Sultanate in 1578, conquering the Sultanate in the early
1600s and signing a series of treaties with the Sultan in the mid-1600s and early 1700s. 447
Spanish influence over the Sultanate was weak, however, and large-scale changes to the
way of life in North Borneo did not begin until the arrival of the British. Invasive British
policies would begin the forced settlement of the Sama Dilaut. As Warren puts it,
Sama/Bajau “mobility and independence from the land gave them a practical immunity
from government authority...”, a fact which made their settlement by the British,
“imperative.” 448 As this section will show, however, Sama Dilaut mobility didn’t simply
threaten colonial control over individual Sama Dilaut families, it also implied a lack of
control over the oceans at a time when the British government was trying to establish its
dominance over ocean trade.
446F
447F
The colonial period began the marginalization of northern Borneo in the region, as it had
resulted in the marginalization of northern French Soudan. The British focused mainly on
their colonies in the Malay Peninsula, which was of enormous regional trade
importance. 449 Meanwhile, northern Borneo with its dense jungles, was seen as less
448F
N. Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion (Department of the Interior, Philippines, 1905) 164
(hereinafter Saleeby).
447
448
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 77.
Four of the British controlled city-states on the Peninsula eventually became the Straits Settlements, a
Crown Colony, with the capital at Singapore. The remaining Peninsular states became British Protected
States. Andaya, 126. See also Hooker, 135.
449
89
economically useful at the time. With its unknown and uncharted potential, it came to the
attention of various British adventurers looking to make money in southeast Asia. 450 For
the early part of the colonial period, it was under the exclusive sovereignty of the British
North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBC), a quasi-sovereign, private entity with little
oversight from London. 451 While there was technically a formal charter governing the
terms of North Borneo’s governance, in reality, North Borneo operated in a legal vacuum.
North Borneo officially became a Protected State in 1888, but remained under the
administration of the BNBC. 452 North Borneo was converted to a Crown Colony after WWII.
449F
450F
451F
The BNBC claimed sovereignty over north Borneo in an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu
in 1877. 453 A Chartered Company, the BNBC typified the public-private, semi-military
nature of British expansionism of an earlier era, and was an anachronism in the late
1800s. 454 The Company had sovereign powers like those of a state, but was unofficial and
lacked resources and accountability. 455
452F
453F
454F
Next door, James Brooke of England became Rajah of Sarawak in 1839, taking over much of
the former Brunei Sultanate, which his family ruled as their personal kingdom until the end
of World War Two. 456 Despite their sweeping claims on maps from the period, neither
Brooke nor the BNBC had much control over their supposed territory. 457 What control the
BNBC and Brooke family did have was based almost exclusively on the coasts.
455F
456F
As in the Gulf, the late 19th and early 20th centuries in North Borneo saw a succession of
shifting and unclear borders as various European powers struggled for supremacy. North
Borneo (Sabah, Malaysia) began the colonial period as a semi-autonomous area
sandwiched between Dutch-controlled Borneo territories and the Spanish-controlled
H. Singh, South Asia Defense and Strategic Year Book (Pentagon Press 2015) 216 (hereinafter Singh). The
British North Borneo Company was the creation of English businessman Alfred Dent and German adventurer
Baron de Overbeck. It obtained its Royal Charter in 1881.
450
451 M. Clark and J. Pietsch, Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Cultural heritage, politics and labour migration
(Routledge 2014) 158 (hereinafter Clark and Pietsch). See also J. Warren, Looking, 1996, 21-33, 23.
452
Andaya, 185, 207, 241-248.
Andaya, 188. See also K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan, Malaysia: Growth and Equity in a Multiracial Society
(Johns Hopkins UP 1980) 12 (hereinafter K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan); Hooker, 131 ; J. Warren, Chartered,
1971, 33-35.
453
454
Warren, Chartered, 1971, 2-3.
455
Warren, Chartered, 1971, 3.
456
Hooker, 109.
Resources were so taxed that, for example, the BNBC had only twenty-three officers overseeing all of
Sabah in 1882. Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 45. Warren describes the BNBC as “relatively weak,” but that it
nevertheless left a “profound impression” on the Sama Dilaut. J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, ix.
457
90
Philippines. In 1824, with the Spanish in decline, the British and Dutch 458 signed the AngloDutch Treaty dividing Southeast Asia into spheres, with the Malay Peninsula in the British
sphere and the islands of the East Indies in the Dutch sphere. 459 No mention was made of
Borneo in this Treaty. The maritime border between Sabah and the Philippines was set
down in Article III of the Treaty of Paris of 1898. 460
457F
458F
459F
Over a period from 1891 to 1915, the Dutch and British officially established the border
between their colonies in Borneo, which became the modern-day border between Malaysia
and Indonesia. 461 In 1930, the boundary between north Borneo and the Philippines was
fixed by the British and the United States (who succeeded the Spanish in the Southern
Philippines). 462 One result of this period was the division of northern Borneo from both
southern Borneo and the rest of the Sulu Sultanate. 463 Southern Borneo remained under
Dutch control, dividing the island, while Jolo, Sulu and other parts of the former Sulu
Sultanate were now under Spanish control. 464
460F
461F
462F
463F
As with other colonial treaties described in the previous sections, little regard was given to
local political organizations or the needs and realities of the local trade-based economy.
Instead, these treaties set aside centuries of trade and political unity between the islands of
the East Indies, including Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula, where a web of trade and
alliances had united diverse peoples for centuries. 465 These treaties would lay the
foundation for the modern maritime borders in the region and the breakup of the region
into discrete, territorial units. 466
464F
465F
458
The Dutch had by this point gained a foothold in southern Borneo and Sumatra.
Hooker, 132. For a detailed description of the subsequent establishment of the border, see J. Warren,
Chartered, 1971, 49-50.
459
Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain; December 10, 1898 (1898) Art. III. United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). See also G. Poling, ‘The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the
Limits of Maritime Dispute’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (2013) 3-7.
460
Andaya, 190. International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia) (Merits) Judgment of 17 December 2002. For more on the establishment of
the border, see J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 48-51.
461
Convention Between the United States of America and Great Britain Delimiting the Boundary Between the
Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo (1930), 1932.
462
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia v. Malaysia) (Merits) Judgment of 17 December 2002.
463
L. Wright, ‘Historical Notes on the North Borneo Dispute’ 25 J. of Asian Studies 471 (1966) (hereinafter
Wright).
464
465
Andaya, 125.
“The new post-colonial states that emerged in Southeast Asia after 1945 inherited the idea of a system of
sovereign states with fixed maritime and territorial boundaries.” Eklof, 13.
466
91
In particular, these treaties marked the beginning of the division of the Sultanate of Sulu,
laying the foundation for later arguments over ownership of North Borneo. 467 These
agreements between colonial powers took no account of the outlines of the Sulu Sultanate
or the social and trade links between peoples on the ground. Today, there are multiple
border disputes between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia due to the complex
history of shifting borders and the multitude of historical documents establishing
sovereignty by one or another power at different points in time. 468 Crucially for this
dissertation, Sama Dilaut territories would end up being at the epicentre of some of the
most acute of these border disputes.
466F
467F
As in French Soudan and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, British policy in North Borneo focused
on the settlement of the nomadic population. The British North Borneo Company was
anxious to clearly establish its sovereignty over Northern Borneo. Unlike in French Sudan,
however, but more like in Kuwait, the region around North Borneo was one of intense
competition by colonial powers anxious to control regional shipping and trade. As a result,
the key goals of the BNBC were similar to those of the British government in the Gulf: to set
borders against the claims of other colonial powers in the region and protect British
shipping from “piracy.” What the British called “piracy” in Borneo was often attacks by
rival, local traders, to some extent sponsored by the Sulu Sultanate, whose income
depended on trade that was now being supplanted by the British. 469
468F
The BNBC were alarmed by what they perceived as the lack of centralized authority in
Borneo, which they viewed as being left to its own devises by the weakening Sultanates of
Sulu and Brunei. 470 The crackdown on piracy and the introduction of a police force were
BNBC goals to make the area safer for settlement and increased trade. 471 Brooke launched
a violent military offensive against what they labelled piracy in the region, 472 and, in the
early twentieth century, the BNBC began an anti-piracy program targeting the Sama
Dilaut. 473
469F
470F
471F
472F
Brooke and the BNBC viewed nomadism as practically synonymous with piracy, which they
saw as harming trade and creating insecurity. 474 It is not clear, however, to what extent the
Sama Dilaut were actually involved in piracy and raiding as opposed to fishing and
473F
467
These border disputes are discussed in greater detail below.
468
See generally Wright.
469
Andaya, 135-136. See also Chao, Riau, 55.
470
Warren, Chartered, 1971, 44-45.
471
Warren, Chartered, 1971, 45.
472
Andaya, 128-129.
473
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 47.
474
J. Warren, Trade, 2014, 167.
92
trade. 475 Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 20th century, boat nomadism and the Sama
Dilaut had become synonymous with piracy, lawlessness, the weakness of the maritime
border and lack of sovereignty.
474F
The Sama Dilaut and Orang Suku Laut were particularly targeted by anti-piracy
programs. 476 The British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBC) considered the Sama
Dilaut to be a “martial,” “rebellious” people who could not be governed except by their
conversion to a settled way of life. 477 Forced settlement and the eradication of nomadism
therefore became among the most important goals of the BNBC administrators. Warren
continues:
475F
476F
(e)ssential to the establishment of thorough control in the region would be a
reorientation of the Bajau toward a surplus productivity involving them in a cash
economy and in more sedentary habits. 478
477F
Arguably, this negative attitude was even more extreme than the one held by British and
French administrators towards the pastoral nomads of the Niger Bend and the Gulf. By the
1840s, the colonial powers had come to dominate the South China Sea, reducing noncolonial trade, with disastrous results for the local economy. 479 The reduction in “piracy”,
or non-European trade, led to a sharp decline in the Sulu Sultanate and a breakdown of the
patronage system that has sustained the Sama Dilaut for centuries. 480
478F
479F
Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut migrations also appeared to threaten the establishment of the
border between US and British interests. The BNBC and the American authorities in Jolo
claimed “roving bands of Bajau”, or “bad hat Bajaus”, as one administrator called them,
plied the seas and islands between the two powers, supposedly attacking outposts and
raiding shops. 481 The Sama Dilaut were quickly characterized not only as “pirates,” but also
480F
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 91-93. Piracy was dominated by other groups such as the Tausug/Suluk and
Iranun.
475
Andaya 134-135. See also T. Barnard, ‘Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and Their Decline in
History’ 80 Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (2007) 33-49, 35.
476
477
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 106-107.
478
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 77-78.
Eklof, 11. So-called piracy persisted in the Sulu Sea under the weak Spanish government until the United
States gained sovereignty over the Philippines in 1898.
479
480
J. Warren, Looking, 1996, 21-33, 30.
481
J. Warren, Chartered, 1871, 4, 91-9.
93
as “rebels,” a threat to British sovereignty in the region. 482 Across the region, including in
what would become Indonesia, the colonizing powers labelled boat nomads a “disgrace”. 483
481F
482F
The Sama Dilaut were seen as too involved with the Sulu Sultanate, centred around Jolo,
loyal to the Sultan and not to the British. 484 Settlement of “sea nomads” was a universally
adopted solution to the “problem” of uncontrolled mobility and links to the territory of
what would become the Philippines. The colonial powers worked to limit the areas in
which the “sea nomads” could travel to keep them within agreed upon spheres of
influence. 485 The BNBC began to put into place various restrictions on Sama Dilaut
movement, including a system of boat licenses. 486 This helped bring to an end the Sama
Dilaut long distance migrations to what is now the southern Philippines and Indonesia. 487
483F
484F
485F
486F
A large part of ending Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut movement involved relocating supposedly
far-flung or nomadic, families to villages on the coast. Starting in 1909, the BNBC began
relocating Sama/Bajau villages to more central locations near big towns to bring them
under centralized control. 488 This brought many nomadic Sama Dilaut groups into contact
with British administration for the first time. 489
487F
488F
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the BNBC had begun to gain enough control over
the local population that they could begin to put into place a system of indirect rule similar
to that in other British colonies. In 1898, the BNBC began to appoint of local leaders,
usually drawn from the shore-based elite. Unlike in the Gulf and the Sahel, however, the
Sama Dilaut were used to a patronage relationship with powerful, shore-based rulers, so
this hierarchy was not necessarily a big change for them. Nevertheless, a centralized
administrative structure was as foreign to the Sama Dilaut as it was for other nomads.
To justify the settlement of sea nomads and other sea faring groups, colonial
administrators described the nomad’s way of life as “wretched”, implying that any change
would be an improvement for the nomads themselves. 490 They cast the shift from a
maritime-based lifestyle to agriculture as part of their development from a “primitive” way
489F
482
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 14.
483
Chao, Riau, 55-58.
484
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 92.
485
Chao, Riau, 55.
486
Andaya, 136.
487
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 30.
488
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 93-94.
489
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 94.
490
Chao, Riau, 8.
94
of life to a “modern” one. 491 Settlement and centralization therefore came to be associated
with modernization and economic growth, despite the clear unsuitability of many colonial
agricultural efforts from an environmental and economic perspective.
490F
The BNBC faced challenges in making a profit in North Borneo. The trade-based economy
could be taxed, but the Sama Dilaut in particular were in the habit of decamping to Jolo
whenever they were confronted by BNBC tax collectors. This cut off one of the main ways
the colony sought to make money: taxing local trade. To end piracy and promote more
controllable economic activity, both the BNBC and the Brooke family forced the local
communities to settle and take up agriculture despite the unsuitability of the Borneo
terrain for large-scale agriculture. 492
491F
The BNBC also began to make inroads into the interior, opening up land to some
agricultural production, a shift in the local economy that would have huge repercussions
for the Sama Dilaut. 493 The first crop the BNBC attempted in Borneo was the coconut tree,
which provided the justification for their first attempt at mass relocation and settlement of
the Bajau peoples, including Sama Dilaut. The BNBC relocated Bajau peoples, both nomadic
and sedentary, from remote islands to mainland Borneo for this project. 494 Settlement of
the “roving” Sama Dilaut was not really necessary to obtain workers for the new
plantations, as the BNBC also imported Chinese workers for this task. 495 Rather, it was key
to shifting the Sama Dilaut and other seafaring peoples away from nomadism and “piracy”
to a mode of life that was easier for the colonial administrators to control and would
protect British trade. 496
492F
493F
494F
495F
Importantly, such projects were not side issues for British administrators, they were a
major part of their empire-building strategy. Carol Warren calls the efforts by the British to
settle the Sama Dilaut as “strenuous”. 497 It involved massive manpower and policing to
round up scattered villages and flotillas of Bajau peoples, both nomadic and semi-nomadic,
and train them to grow coconuts. At first, the Sama Dilaut ignored British efforts to settle
them for agriculture, but when the United States took over in the Philippines from the weak
Spanish administration in 1898, the Sama Dilaut could no longer easily relocate to the
496F
491
Chao, Riau, 17.
492
J. Warren, Trade, 2014, 168-170.
493
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 45-46. See also Hooker, 138.
Hooker, 141. See also Sather ,Adaptation, 1997, 27, 47 (discussing resettlement schemes and coconut
plantations). See also J. Warren, Chartered, 69.
494
Forced settlement of the Sama Dilaut and other sea faring groups would supply the British with more
workers. It should be noted that the need to settle the Sama Dilaut in order to procure more workers is
debated by historians. For example, Virginia Matheson Hooker disagrees with this point in Hooker, 141. See
also Lenhart, 248.
495
496
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 49.
497
C. Warren, Consciousness, 1990, 228.
95
southern Philippines to escape British policies. As a result, Sama Dilaut settlement
accelerated. 498
497F
Despite their steady promotion of agriculture, the BNBC struggled to make a profit in
Borneo. Like in the Sahel, the topography and climate was simply unsuited to large-scale
agriculture. 499 The BNBC tried various cash crops such as tobacco and rubber, eventually
turning to timber, beginning the devastation of Borneo’s forests. 500 By independence,
Borneo’s timber, its most successful export, was already running out. 501 The British
replaced the traditional system of land tenure to bring more acres under cultivation, but
still struggled with low productivity. 502
498F
499F
500F
501F
In a further attempt to crack down on Sama Dilaut migration and raise revenue, the BNBC
introduced a system of boat registration. 503 British agents travelled the islands issuing and
checking licenses. 504 While not expensive, many families might have been unable to pay. It
was also, however, viewed by many Bajau communities as an impermissible attempt to
restrict freedom of movement. 505 As Sather explains, for most of the first decade of the
twentieth century, the BNBC was almost wholly occupied with enforcing boat registration
as a means to collect revenue, restrict mobility, and get the local communities to provide
“acknowledgment of Company sovereignty”. 506
502F
503F
504F
505F
After considerable resistance, boat registration was finally, grudgingly, accepted by the
Sama Dilaut, which lead to the sharp reduction in long distance boat travel. 507 A similar
system of boat registration was introduced by the United States in the Philippines, but the
systems were not integrated, meaning that boats registered in Borneo could not easily
travel to what was now the Philippines. Boat registration was not relaxed until after
independence, but by that point most Sama Dilaut families had settled in “water villages”
near urban centres like Semporna. 508
506F
507F
498
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 79.
499
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 3.
500
Andaya, 222-225.
501
Andaya, 222-223.
502
Andaya, 212.
503
See generally J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 79-9. See also Hooker, 141. See also Sather Adaptation 1997 47.
504
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 82.
505
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 80.
506
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 47.
507
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 47-48.
508
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 69.
96
In addition to programs settling the Sama Dilaut and restrict their movement, the BNBC
also encouraged settlement through more indirect means. The British granted pardon to
Bajau and Sama peoples who broke the law, including convicted pirates, in exchange for
their settlement. 509 The rise of agriculture and logging in Borneo also contributed
indirectly to Sama Dilaut settlement in a number of ways, by introducing the cash economy,
wage labour and modern technology.
508F
As the Sama Dilaut began to settle on pile houses in villages near shore, the old barter
system was replaced with a cash economy, and the introduction of the engine and nets gave
the Sama Dilaut something to buy in the face of growing competition from commercial
fishing. 510 The founding of Semporna Town, for example, was a key moment in the
settlement of the Sama Dilaut. The town provided a centre for what had been dispersed
trade, a central market for trading all ocean products in one place, and provided security in
the form of the police and, eventually, a navy, the role that had been formally played by the
Sama Dilaut’s wealthy, settled patrons. 511
509F
510F
Such indirect means of promoting settlement were part of Britain’s “development” and
“civilizing” programs in the region. As one Company official put it,
under British rule, the Bajau is proving himself a good workman, and is building
up a permanent home, in place of leading the roving piratical life he was formerly
accustomed to. 512
511F
The Sama Dilaut were not the only nomads encouraged or forced to settle in the rush to
claim sovereignty over Borneo. Crop raising and timber cutting placed pressure on
Borneo’s nomadic groups living in the interior. Their settlement was also actively
encouraged by the BNBC as they slowly began to penetrate the mountainous interior of
Borneo and began to stake a claim against the Dutch in Indonesia. 513 In Sarawak, the
Brookes granted extensive logging contracts over the objections of nomadic groups and
implemented policies to encourage the nomads to settle and work in the timber industry.
The Brooks also encouraged large-scale Chinese migration and settlement in Sarawak,
greatly increasing the population and clearing and claiming so-called empty land owned by
nomads. 514
512F
513F
509
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 83.
510
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 32, 38-39. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 67.
511
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 38-39. Hooker, 142. See also J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 66-67.
L. Lovegrove, British North Borneo, 60 J. of the Royal Society of Arts 545 (1912) quoted in Warren,
Chartered, 1971, 86.
512
Andaya 225. For information on the setting of the land boundary with Indonesia, see F. Durand and R.
Curtis, Maps of Malaysia and Borneo: Discovery, Statehood and Progress (Editions Didier Millet 2014) 243.
513
514
Andaya, 224-225.
97
As in Kuwait and Mali, the goals of exclusive territorial sovereignty, hard borders and
exclusive allegiance among the population would be passed on to post-colonial
governments. The goal of hard borders and exclusive sovereignty over land and contiguous
waters in North Borneo would only grow in importance to the government of Malaysia
after independence. 515 Like in Kuwait, the discovery of oil off the coast of Borneo would
drastically raise the stakes for borders and sovereignty over the oceans in the region. It
would create a number of maritime boundary disputes throughout the region. 516 It would
also begin a gradual shift of the economy away from trade and towards oil exploration, just
as it did in Kuwait and, to a lesser extent, Mali.
514F
515F
By 1919, the British administrations in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were increasingly
looking at uniting the Malay Peninsula with their Borneo territories in preparation for
independence. The British and many of the Sultans wished to unite North Borneo with the
colonies of Peninsular Malaysia. 517 The vulnerability of Borneo as a political entity on its
own was exposed during the Japanese invasion during World War II, when the poorly
defended Borneo territories quickly fell to the Japanese, a target because of their recently
discovered oil and proximity to shipping lanes. 518 The allied bombing campaign had
destroyed most of the infrastructure in Borneo, and the return of British rule was now cast
as a rebuilding period as a Crown Colony followed by a transition to a unity state
comprised of all the former British colonies in the region.
516F
517F
Creating the Federation of Malaysia would not be an easy task. 519 Uniting British holdings
in the region would require unifying many different, diverse territories under a central
government. While North Borneo under the Sulu Sultanate had had relations with the
kingdoms of the Malay peninsula dating from the pre-colonial period and the common
experience of British rule had led to administrative and political ties, these relations would
not easily form the basis of a new political unit along the lines of what the British and some
Sultans envisioned. 520 The unification of many former British colonies into the Federation
of Malaysia would leave the Sama Dilaut on the periphery of two states, divided by an
international border, their lands now a disputed border zone containing vast oil reserves.
518F
519F
515
C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228.
For information on some of the other boundary disputes between Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, see the
work of R. Haller-Trost.
516
517
See generally Wright. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 64-65.
518
Hooker, 217.
519
Hooker, 181-186.
E. Fernandez, ‘Philippine-Malaysia Dispute over Sabah: A Bibliographic Survey’ 7 Asia Pacific Social Science
R. 53 (2008) 53.
520
98
Conclusion
As the examples showed, it is not an overstatement to say that European colonization was a
disaster for nomads. In particular, colonization would impose on nomads a set of extremely
negative views on nomadism. These negative opinions included the view that nomads
neither formed states nor participated in them, that nomads merely “wandered” over land
without owning or improving upon it, and that nomads were unreliable allies whose way of
life needed to be eliminated in order for the colonial project to succeed.
Anti-nomad bias was reflected in almost every aspect of colonial policy, from the
establishment of urban schools to the issuance of identity documents, licenses and other
paperwork to keep nomads within administrative areas. This bias against nomads during
the colonial period had an important impact on their status. Nomads ended up at the
bottom of the colonial hierarchy, their lands split by borders, their leaders marginalized
while power vested in urban rulers. Nomads now lived long distances away from state
structures and were left out of important decisions.
Negative views of nomadism would fuel strenuous projects to eliminate it in places like the
Gulf, the Sahel and the Sulu Sea. Eliminating nomadism through forced or coercive
settlement became a major project of the colonial era, despite how feasible, practical or
economically desirable it might be. The treatment of nomads by colonial administrators
stands in stark contrast to the important role nomads played in the local and regional
economies at the time of colonization, as described in the first section, above. While treaties
were sometimes signed with nomadic leaders, colonial administers saw their true partners
in the powerful Sultans and Emirs in the great capitals of the Gulf, Sahel and Sulu Sea.
During the colonial period, nomadic leaders became increasingly marginalized and nomad
societies were often governed by military, rather than civilian, administrations.
As colonization moved into the 19th and early 20th century, early treaties with nomads
were often invalidated or ignored. Instead, colonial administrators granted vast authority
to urban rulers in ways that did not actually reflect their authority over nomadic societies.
The centralization of power in urban areas was a key part of colonization. Far flung trade
relationships, the bond created by Islam and the web of family and clan allegiances
described in the first section were overlooked in the establishment of an administrative
system of government based on centralization, borders, agriculture and urban living.
The French and British would use various strategies to settled nomad areas, including the
promotion of agriculture as part of so-called development, the imposition of movement
restrictions, military force, taxation, centralized schooling and other methods. In North
Borneo, nomads were forcibly settled in water villages, away from their fishing regions,
and attempts were made to convert them to agriculture. In other cases, like the Sahel and
the Gulf, nomads were administered under a separate system designed to limit their
movement and contain them within designated areas while subjected to coercive
settlement policies and movement restrictions. Agriculture was often prioritized in order
to settle nomads, even in places like the jungle or desert where agriculture was not
desirable.
99
To justify forced settlement policies, nomadic trade was labelled as “piracy” or criminal
activity. Border crossings were criminalized. Nomadic areas that could not be settled, like
the ocean or the middle of the desert, were labelled as “remote” and often became the
location off borders between colonial empires, dividing nomadic communities. These
border zones were now areas of military, rather than civilian, rule. The fact that such
borders severed trade routes and fishing zones was ignored as nomad territories were
declared to be “empty.” Meanwhile, settled, urban Emirs and Sultans were happy to
support such arrangements, which placed their cities at the centre of colonies and
regulated nomadic communities to the periphery.
Pastoralism, trade and fishing, which had occurred as part of normal life, were now recast
as criminal activities, a threat to borders and the integrity of empire. This fed the view of
nomadism as illegitimate, taking place outside of the activities of the administrative state,
and cast nomads as inherently antithetical to the goals of colonial empires. This bias would
also have devastating consequences for nomads at decolonization.
The placement of borders through such “remote” areas divided nomad groups, making
them into minorities and placing them at the edge of empires, rather than in the centre of
political and economic life. Colonial administrators frequently placed nomads under
military domination, rather than civil administration, placing nomads outside the bounds of
the administrative state. While this may have appeared to give nomads more political
independence, in reality it began a long period of political marginalization.
All of the above factors led colonial administrators to treat the nomadic and settled
portions of society very differently from one another, even when this was not justified by
the reality of life on the ground. A system of tiers began to emerge, with nomads at the
bottom of the colonial hierarchy, often in border zones and under military rule, subject to
policies designed to eliminate their way of life. This trend can be seen in all three examples.
In the case of the Tuareg, an explicitly separate, parallel system of governance emerged.
This appeared to grant the Tuareg some independence from colonial rule, but in reality,
state functions, including registration, slowly concentrated in urban areas. In other places,
such as the Gulf, the British forged close ties with the Emir in Kuwait to the detriment of
nomadic leaders. At the moment of crucial decisions, such as the setting of the border
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, it appears that nomadic communities were left out. In
North Borneo, the Sama Dilaut were often treated as pirates who existed outside of society
and whose way of life needed to be eliminated.
Such anti-nomad policies were not always driven by economics. Colonial administrations
struggled to farm in desert or jungle areas and wasted huge resources cracking down on
local trade. In Borneo, the BNBC attempted to forcibly settled nomadic Sama Dilaut
fishermen to farm coconuts in what can be only termed a failure. In the Sahel, the French
administrators promoted agriculture in the desert environment, risking increased draught.
The reasons for such bad policies had less to do with the individual incompetence of
colonial administrators in a given colony and more to do with the ways in which the
settlement of nomads was seen not only as good economic policy, but as necessary to the
establishment of the administrative state.
100
Finally, as the examples showed, the process of civil registration had already begun during
colonization as part of the creation of the administrative state, which included the taking of
the census, registration for schooling, the issuance of licenses and permits, and the
collection of taxes. These administrative systems either excluded nomads or placed them
under special registration or licensing schemes that were administrated separately from
settled and urban populations. Registration often went hand in hand with coercive
settlement policies and forced schooling, meaning that nomad societies came to view
registration negatively, part of invasive state control, rather than as key to their belonging
and inclusion. Such registration procedures also reinforced the centralization of
administrative authority in urban and coastal areas. In some cases, like Kuwait, such
systems were actually implemented by the Emir.
The next section will focus on one particular aspect of colonial administration: the
establishment of nationality. It will explore the development of nationality law under the
colonial system and how these laws were implemented in Kuwait, Borneo and French
Sudan.
101
Nationality and Empire
Citizenship is the one human right whose meaning is bounded by territory and is
thus tied invariably to claims of sovereignty. 521
520F
The above sections summarized colonial policy towards nomads. The next sections will
focus on a particular aspect of colonial policy: the enactment of nationality laws and the
registration of colonized populations. Like all aspects of colonial policy, nationality during
colonization was heavily influenced by the overall goals of colonization. European theories
on nomadism and the inability of nomads to form and participate in states would influence
how nationality laws came to be applied to nomads.
Belonging during the colonial period was dominated by the almost total lack of laws
pertaining to the status of colonized peoples. This does not mean, however, that all
colonized peoples were treated the same. Some colonized peoples received a nationality
during the colonial period. Others were recognized as being in a position of authority in
their regions. Others were entirely marginalized.
The following sections will explore the development of nationality law in the British and
French empires and how these laws were applied in Kuwait, French Soudan and North
Borneo. In particular, it will discuss what is known about how these laws were applied, or
not applied, to nomads.
Nationality Law in the Colonies
This section will provide a brief overview of nationality law under the colonial system.
Nationality law developed beginning in the 17th century and in particular the 19th century
in tandem with colonization. Nationality law was uniformly centred on a territorial
approach, supporting both colonial sovereignty and colonial borders. In order for European
sovereignty to be established on colonized territory, empires would often settle their own
nationals on it, or, when this was impractical, they would sign treaties with local leaders to
create jurisdiction through indirect rule. 522 Colonial administrators often treated nomads
as having no status beyond that of membership in their tribes. 523 Nomads were often
governed separately and placed under military rule. As settled and urban peoples moved
slowly towards the recognition of some sort of civil status during the final decades of the
521F
522F
C. Odinkalu, ‘Natives, Subjects, and Wannabes: Internal Citizenship Problems in Postcolonial Nigeria’ in R.
Howard-Hassmann and M. Walton-Roberts, The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept (University of
Pennsylvania Press 2015) 99.
521
See generally C. Nine, ‘Colonialism, territory and pre-existing obligations’ Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy (2020).
522
523
Maury, 17.
102
colonial period, many nomads were treated as entirely outside the realm of political
membership and their status often worsened. 524
523F
To support territorial sovereignty, nationality law employed what Van Waas calls
“variations on the same theme.” 525 Common methods to establish nationality at birth or by
naturalization were often based on a “link” between the individual and the territory of the
state, such as birth in the territory of the state (jus soli), descent from a national (jus
sanguinis) or residency in the state. 526 Different European empires adopted different
combinations of these principles, 527 but in all cases, a primary function of nationality law
was used to reinforce territorial sovereignty. 528 In England, courts established the
principle of jus soli, while Germany, France and other continental nations developed the
principle of jus sanguinis. 529 Each of these methods of establishing nationality supports a
territorial approach to group membership in the state, based on a connection between
people and land.
524F
525F
526F
527F
528F
While nationality by descent, or jus sanguinis, may on first observation lack a territorial
element, the principle of jus sanguinis reinforces territoriality by excluding the offspring of
immigrants and favouring those with family histories in the territory of the state.
Nationality by descent may cut off when the link to the territory of the state becomes to
tenuous, for example, upon the marriage of a woman to a non-national or multiple
524
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 20-23; 61-62. See also Shaw, 2008 ,39, 49-54.
Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 32. See also Edwards, 16-17; Brownlie, Principles, 388-394, 397; Brownlie,
Nationality, 302-303; P. Courbe, Le nouveau droit de la nationalité (Dalloz 1994) 4.
525
Jus soli and jus sanguinis are the most common types of acquisition of nationality at birth. De Groot and
Vonk, 42, 52. Stolcke discusses the use of jus soli in Germany and France to balance exclusion and inclusion of
immigrants. Stolcke, 67. For more on residence as a “link” for the purposes of nationality, see Fransman 17.
See also M. Verwilghen, Conflits de nationaltiés, Plurinationalité et apatridie (Brill 1999) 62 (hereinafter
Verwilghen); Maury ,14; Stilz 188; Shaw 2008 647-648; Verzijl, 7; Larkins 47 (discussing the symbolic value
of territory); Montevideo Convention; Habermas, 63; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 32-33; Brownlie,
Principles, 407, quoting the German government in 1929, 406-407. See also de Groot and Vonk ,9-10, 25.
526
There are other pathways to a nationality that are not territorial, including naturalization through military
service, financial investment, and, in modern times, asylum.
527
“The automatic change principle (of the transfer of nationality) is rooted in medieval theories of land
conveyance, according to which people were appurtenances to land - quite literally corporeal hereditaments title to which was disposed together with title to the territory.” G. van Ert, ‘Nationality, State Succession, and
the Right of Option: The Case of Québec’ 36 Canadian Yearbook Int'l L. 151, 156.
528
See for example Calvin’s Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a, as an early attempt to define British nationality. See also
the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914; Verzijl, 16; Baynes, 434; Stilz, 576; Maury, 13; Van
Waas, Nationality, 2008, 32-34.
529
103
generations born abroad. 530 Jus sanguinis helps to build and retain close ties between
populations and territories. 531
529F
530F
The territorial nature of nationality law is not an accident but reflects the political realities
of Europe during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. It is, as Arendt put it, a key part of the
“trinity of European statehood” 532 and closely linked to the theories of state formation
described in the proceeding section. “The modern concept of nationality...is primarily
related to power over territory.” 533 In this way, nationality law came to reinforce the
theories of statehood described above.
531F
532F
Reflecting this territorial approach, habitual residence emerged as a major means of
establishing nationality. It became one of the most employed requirements for
naturalization under both the British and French systems. 534 Under French law, the system
of double birth meant that two generations of residence could create a nationality “link.”
Residence also became crucial to establishing nationality for persons who had never before
had a nationality status. Habitual residence in the territory of a state would also become
the key way to create what this dissertation will call “the first body of nationals” of a new
state during decolonization. As Brownlie points out, for cases where a state, “has no
nationality legislation...(t)here is interesting evidence of reliance on settlement together
with the existence of the political and diplomatic protection of a particular sovereign...” to
create a presumption of nationality. 535
533F
534F
Territoriality is therefore a key feature of nationality law. Another key feature of
nationality law that is important to the nationality of nomads is the concept of an exclusive
relationship, one of exclusive allegiance, between state and citizen. 536 Because, as the
above sections established, one of the main goals of colonization was the establishment of
exclusive territorial sovereignty in the colonies, particularly against the claims of other
colonial empires, 537 the exclusive allegiance of colonized peoples became a key issue in
both the British and French empires. 538 Britain and France had encouraged the settlement
535F
536F
537F
530
Maury, 13 cf Zimbabwe Citizenship Act 2001, 2003. See also Van Waas, Nationality, 63.
Kymlicka, 1. See also Habermas, 64; C. Dumbrava, ‘Bloodlines and Belonging: Time to Abandon Jus
Sanguinis?’ in C. Dumbrava and R. Bauböck Bloodlines and Belonging: Time to Abandon Jus Sanguinis?
(European U. Institute 2015); Arendt, 1976, 272-273; Stilz ,575.
531
532
Arendt, 1976, 282.
533
De Groot and Vonk, 7. See also Longva, Citizenship, 179; Weil, 11.
534
Donner, 279-280. See also Crawford, 210.
535
Brownlie, Principles, 407. See also Van Panhuys, 139.
536
Brownlie, Principles, 406.
537
Conklin ,121-122.
538
Brownlie, Principles, 318-319.
104
of their colonies by Europeans. 539 The question of nationality for colonized peoples,
however, remained under contention. Empires attempted to claim jurisdiction over
colonized populations, often through systems of indirect rule, while limiting their rights.
538F
As nationality in Europe developed into a status affording important rights, such as voting,
holding office and access to the courts, colonial empires like Britain and France began to
face the question of whether or not these rights should be extended throughout their
empires. 540 The idea of nationality granting civil rights gained ground across the Europe,
541 but was totally at odds with the goals of the colonial project, chief of which was to claim
colonized peoples for the purposes of creating territorial sovereignty, not to grant
colonized peoples political rights. 542
539F
540F
541F
The question of the rights of colonized peoples would come to dominate the late colonial
period in both British and French colonies. During this period, nationality developed to be
more than a system of laws, it came to encompass a moral element. The 19th century saw
the development of the philosophy of romantic nationalism, 543 which emphasized the
natural link that developed between populations, governments and territories. A
community based in a particular territory, a homeland, had the right to exclude
outsiders. 544 As Arendt puts it, in order for nations to function as states, they require
“homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil.” 545
542F
543F
544F
In this idealized, European model of the nation-state, the link between individual and
homeland, a link of “blood and soil,” is a natural phenomenon. 546 As Miller puts it, a nation
“...connects a group of people to a particular geographic place...a nation must have a
homeland.” 547 Under this theory of state legitimacy, as people grouped together on specific
545F
546F
« Le droit positif en vigueur dans un État est un baromètre de l’état de l’opinion, favorable à l’immigration
ou protectionniste, parfois dominée par des courants xénophobes. » Jault-Seseke, 1.
539
Jault-Seseke correctly points out that « (l)a nationalité évolue donc constamment. » S. Barbou des Places, S.
Corneloup and F. Jault-Seseke, Droit de la nationalité et des étrangers (Presses universitaires de France 2015)
46. See also M. Martignoni and D. Papadopoulos, ‘Genealogies of Autonomous Mobility’ in Routledge
Handbook of Global Citizenship (Routledge 2014) 42.
540
541
Donner, 137. See also Verwhilgen, 63; Edwards, 24.
R. Brubaker, ‘Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States’ 26 Int’l Mig. R. 269 (1992) 38 (hereinafter
Brubaker). See also Koessler, 4; Maury, 13, 16.
542
Van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality in International Law: An Outline (A. W. Sythoff 1959) 59, 150
(hereinafter Van Panhuys).
543
544
Miller, 68.
545
Arendt, 1976, 270.
Z. Bauman, ‘Soil, Blood and Identity’ 38 Sociological Review 675 (1992) 684. See also Kymlicka 1;
Habermas 64.
546
547
Miller, 24. My italics.
105
areas of land, geographical features influenced their culture and development, binding
them together in a common way of life that necessitate common government. 548 The nation
nurtures a group of people over generations, imbuing them with their particular
character. 549
547F
548F
The moral element of nationality would come to shape the development of nationality as a
system of laws in the colonies. European philosophers such as John Stuart Mill believed
that nations were best expressed as political states, and, conversely that states containing
multiple nations were doomed to failure. 550 Natural law principles provided European
states with a moral argument against extending full nationality rights to colonized
persons. 551 Yet, it also increasingly begged the question of whether and to what extent
colonies should have their own nationalities.
549F
550F
The concept of romantic nationalism, of nations expressed as states, 552 remained
controversial in Europe, but perhaps even more so in the colonies. Numerous wars, colonial
occupations and successions constantly shifted borders, both in Europe and abroad,
confusing the issue of which nations supposedly lived in which homelands. 553 As well, the
question also became to what extent colonies should be their own states. While romantic
nationalism helped to justify the exclusion of colonized peoples from colonial nationality, it
also seemed to conflict with the concept of indirect rule and raised the question of the
nationality status of colonized peoples. 554 The purpose of this section is not to argue the
legitimacy of nationalism as a concept, but merely to point out its influence on nationality
law during the crucial period when the question of nationality and rights in the colonies
was most acute.
551F
552F
553F
By the early 20th century, the spread of nationality to the colonies would be plagued by
contradictions. Was, for example, the British Empire an “extension of the nation state, a
548 Courbe refers to « la proximité géographique. » Courbe, 5. See also N. Thrift, ‘Taking Aim at the Heart of the
Region,’ in Human Geography: Society, Space and Social Science in D. Gregory, R. Martin and G. Smith (eds.) (U
of Minnesota Press 1994) 202-203, summarizing the work of geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache. See also G.
Benko and U. Strohmayer, Human Geography: A History for the 21st Century (Arnold 2004) 28 on de la Blache
and the French School. Sack, 59.
549
Van Panhuys, 59, 150.
550
Kymlicka, 52.
551 Miller, 17. “...the political community has remained distinct, and being a member of a political community
has remained a unique form of belonging.” P. Cole, ‘Introduction: “Border Crossings” - The Dimensions of
Membership’ in G. Calder, P. Cole and J. Seglow (eds.) Citizenship Acquisition and National Belonging:
Migration, Membership and the Liberal Democratic State (Palgrave 2010) 1.
552
Kymlicka, 124.
553
Arendt, 1976, 277-278.
A. Smith, National Identity (U. of Nevada 1991) 17 (on the difficulties of defining national identity and selfdetermination) (hereinafter A. Smith); Donner, 127; Weis, 3; Verzijl, 7; Miller, 19; Maury, 11-12; Jault-Seseke,
32 .
554
106
separate entity in itself, or a type of ‘world state’?” 555 Confusion about the nature of the
Empire versus the state led to confusion about nationality and the level of status of
colonized peoples.
554F
(The) unofficial, rhetorical, and localized nature of citizenship gave rise to great
discrepancies among imperial subjects in rights, benefits, and duties. 556
555F
Such philosophical tensions drove enormous changes in nationality law as it was applied in
the colonies. In the early colonies, those who had a nationality were almost exclusively
European settlers and their descendants. 557 By the end of the colonial period, many
colonized peoples had also begun to receive a status, but this status was often not the same
as that given to Europeans. Meanwhile, many colonized peoples receive no status.
Nationality came to mean something very different in Europe than it did in many colonies
and different statuses were granted to different classes of people within the colonies,
creating a system of tiers.
556F
The colonial period also saw the mass introduction of paper identity documents in places
where no such systems of identification had existed before. Registration and the issuance of
identity documents are today used under the western model as vital evidence of nationality
and can be the mechanism by which nationality is established in some cases. 558 The
widespread use of documents as evidence of nationality also means that a lack of
documents can be used as evidence of non-national status. Registration of nationality
developed as an area of administrative law during the colonial period and came to be of
vital importance in the colonies. The introduction of the registration of nationality would
divide colonized populations by type of documentation.
557F
Registration of nationality included not only the issuance of national IDs, but of other forms
of documentation like birth certificates and voter registration cards. 559 All of these forms of
documentation would be issued during colonization to some colonized persons, alongside
attempts to take a census and in other ways document the persons under colonial
jurisdiction. The system of registration of nationality would come to be highly influential in
the post-colonial period. The absence or presence of state issued personal identification
558F
D. Gorman, Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester UP 2006) 2
(hereinafter Gorman).
555
556
Gorman, 20.
557
Gorman, 20, 164.
Handbook, 2014, discussing the importance of identity documents to establishing nationality or
statelessness. See also Fripp, 2016, 75. See also P. Brett, ‘Discrimination and Childhood Statelessness in the
Work of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s
Stateless: Children (Wolf 2017) 177.
558
L. López, T. Sejersen, N. Oakeshott, G. Fajth, T. Khilji and N. Panta, ‘Civil Registration, Human Rights, and
Social Protection in Asia and the Pacific’ 29 Asia-Pacific Population Journal (2014) 77. Manby stresses the
importance of other civil documentation, such as marriage certificates. Manby, Legal, 319.
559
107
can be an important factor in proving nationality, particularly in places where it is
contested. 560
559F
During the colonial period, the standardization of identity documents also emerged, with
the widespread use of birth certificates, nationality certificates and passports. In many
systems of civil registration in Europe employing jus soli, the birth certificate became the
key document for proving nationality. Proof of nationality in the French system came to
require the acquisition of a certificat de nationalité française, which must be issued by a
court or embassy of France. 561 Today, passports, birth certificates and ID cards may all be
used as evidence in obtaining a certificat de nationalité, but they are not in and of
themselves proof of nationality. 562
560F
561F
Other documents, however, such as title to land, registration of the payment of taxes,
licenses issued by the state, school registration and others may serve as evidence today in
cases where an individual is trying to establish their long-term residence in a territory.
During the colonial period, a variety of documents and forms of registration not related to
nationality, but in some cases establishing jurisdiction, were available to some colonized
persons during the colonial period. These documents would help to establish the legal
identity of colonized persons during the colonial period and, as subsequent sections will
show, at decolonization. The colonial administrative state, therefore, came to exercise
enormous control over huge numbers of people, often delegating power to certain
privileged, local rulers under systems of indirect rule.
How was this emerging system of nationality in the colonies applied to nomads? First,
enormous powers were vested with particular settled and urban rulers in regions under
indirect rule, including the power to issue documents. As the above sections on colonial
policy towards nomads demonstrated, colonial administrators believed nomads to be
incapable of political allegiance outside of being members of their tribes, a fact which
would greatly influence the registration, or non-registration, of nomads. 563
562F
Civil and administrative functions were often based in towns and the power to issue
documents often vested with settled and urban rulers, rather than nomadic leaders.
Colonial administrators viewed nomads as a problem, as a source of criminality and the
creators of a vacuum of state sovereignty. These views on nomadism, described in the
previous section, would intersect with the system of nationality in the colonies, as
described in this section.
Weis, 204-236, discussing proof of nationality before international tribunals. See also Van Waas,
Nationality, 2008, 153; De Groot and Vonk, 21; Bingham, Reddy and Kohn, 5.
560
561
Weil, 265.
See for example the Code de la nationalité française (1994) arts. 149-151. See also Weis, 216. Exchange
with Bronwen Manby.
562
563
Bloom discusses the effects of exclusive membership on colonized peoples. Bloom, Members, 2017, 160.
108
The next sections will explore in more detail how the development of European nationality
played out in particular cases, looking at the particular laws and policies enacted by
colonial governments in Kuwait, French Soudan and British North Borneo, and how these
laws and policies were applied, or not applied, to nomads. When reading this section, it is
important to keep in mind the negative views of nomads described in the previous section,
which influenced how the laws were applied, or not applied, to nomads.
Nationality in the British Empire: Kuwait and North Borneo
Passport from the Aden Secretariat of the British Empire
Gulf States have found themselves at odds with the normative language of the
international community that has tended to territorialise citizenship. 564
563F
Today, there is a strong correlation between being related to certain Bedouin tribes and
being stateless in Kuwait.. 565 While most local people in the Gulf lived without an official
nationality status during this period under the colonial system, this did not mean that all
local populations were afforded the same status or treated in the same way. The seeds of
statelessness in Kuwait were sowed during this period. Similarly, many Sama Dilaut in
Malaysia are now stateless, as there was a high correlation between civil registration in
North Borneo and being settled in a coastal town or water village. This section will trace
the origins of this exclusion by looking at how local populations were classified and
afforded status during the British protected state period, when Kuwait and Malaysia were
first configured as territorial states with civil registration regimes.
564F
The British had a wide variety of types of colonies, all of which employed the concept of
“indirect rule” to varying extents. Both the Bedouin and the Sama Dilaut lived in a type of
British colony called British Protected States, which in the case of Kuwait, more resembled
a strategic alliance between the Emir and the British government than a colonization.
564
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 10.
565
Conversations with an expert.
109
Under this system of indirect rule, local rulers like the Emir had jurisdiction over internal
matters while the British administration dealt with matters of foreign policy, including
consular affairs. 566 British administrators could offer informal ‘advice’ on internal matters
which could be taken or ignored, given the circumstances. 567
565F
566F
The purpose of this system was to limit British responsibility for the local population while
simultaneously ensuring British sovereignty over colonized territories. 568 Types of British
territories included Crown Colonies, Protected States, Protectorates, Dominions and
Dependencies. As Crawford points out; “the variety of dependent status in practice has
been considerable: almost every permutation of rights and powers can be instanced from
near-independence to practical absorption in another State.” 569
567F
568F
In the dominions, the 1914 Nationality and Status of Aliens Act applied the principle of jus
soli in the granting of nationality. 570 As decolonization progressed and many dominions
became independent, the British Nationality Act of 1948 converted the status of British
subject to that of “Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies,” and applied to colonies and
to certain persons in the protectorates via naturalization or registration. This status
maintained the right for citizens abroad to enter the UK until the law was changed in 1962,
but this right was not extended to the holders of BPP status. 571
569F
570F
Both Kuwait and North Borneo went through periods when they were administrated as
Protected States. North Borneo also spent a short time as a Crown Colony, during which it
had a nationality law based on jus soli, discussed below. British Protectorates and Protected
States granted the colony the right of protection from outside aggressors while leaving
nationality and local governance up to the traditional rules of the local leader, such as the
This was not always the case for Protectorates. J. Harding, ‘Matters Colonial, Consular and Curious’ in P.
Hinchcliffe, J. Ducker, and M. Holt (eds.) Without Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat from Aden (Tauris 2013)
282.
566
567
Harding, 280.
568
Shachar, 113-115.
Crawford, 284. See also Van Panhuys, 197; Maury, 30-31; Weis, 4-9; Verzijl, 1, 6-7, 13-14; Habermas 65; de
Groot and Vonk, 12.
569
British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 17, s. 10(1). The term dominions was
never defined in British law. For a discussion of how nationality law affected the indigenous population in
North America, see Bloom, Members, 2017, 161-165.
570
Weis, 13-14. See also Cole, 12; R. Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain (Oxford UP
2000) 5-6, 29. After 1962, increased migration from its former colonies encouraged Britain to slowly restrict
immigration. J. Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of Demographic
Governance in Postwar Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 16-19.
571
110
Kuwaiti Emir. 572 Protected States had supposedly internal administrations. 573 In colonies
retaining internal sovereignty, such as Protectorates and Protected States, determinations
of status for the non-British population were left up to the rules of the local authorities, 574
but they were also considered to be under British protection and, therefore, British
sovereignty. 575
571F
572F
573F
574F
As Fransman notes, the Protectorate system was something of a fiction, as they were for
practical purposes more like Crown Colonies than independent states. 576 But the
Protectorate system allowed Britain to limit the application of British nationality, or British
Subject status, to Britain and the crown colonies, while preserving jurisdiction over its
protectorates and Protected States. The result of the Protectorate system was to create
British territorial sovereignty while limiting the rights and status of colonized peoples.
575F
While there was no formal nationality law for most colonized peoples in the British Empire,
the ways in which various colonized groups were treated arguably led to important
differences in their status at decolonization. As the Empire developed, the British began to
grapple with the question of nationality in their colonies, coming up with a variety of
different levels of status for different classes of people living in different types colonies. In
1774, Campbell v. Hall 577 established that the inhabitants of a British Dominion or Crown
Colony were automatically British subjects. Later, subject status was codified under the
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 and subsequent amendments. 578 Neither this
principle of common law nor later statutes, however, applied to Protectorates or Protected
States.
576F
577F
Instead, as Protected States under the British Empire system, all inhabitants of Kuwait and
North Borneo were technically under British “protection,” though they remained the
subjects of their Emir or Sultan. 579 In this way, the status of local peoples in British
Protectorates and Protected States remained vague and ill-defined, as the British Empire
578F
572
Crawford, 284, 317.
British Protectorates had administrations established by the Crown. Shaw, 2008, 216-217. See also
Fransman, 69-71. For an overview of Protected States, see Crawford, 292.
573
574
Crawford, 284.
575
Crawford, 317.
576
Fransman, 69.
577
Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 ER 1045 (1774).
Weis ,18-20. See also Shachar, 113-115. For details on the evolution of British Subject status, see British
Home Office, ‘Historical background information on nationality, Version 1.0’ 21 July 2017. At this point,
Britain used a system primarily based on jus soli. The switch in British law to a predominately jus sanguinis
system of nationality would not fully occur until 1981. British Nationality Act, c. 61, 30 October 1981. See also
Maury, 39-40; Stolcke, 71.
578
579
Gorman, 19, 164. For example, see the British The Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890.
111
had not extended nationality to them, but their local rulers lacked the political
independence to develop nationality systems of their own.
By the early 20th century, the British had begun to develop a sort of pseudo-status for the
occupants of British protectorates and protected states, that of British Protected Persons
(BPP). This status, however, only offered diplomatic and consular protection abroad. It
offered far fewer rights than that of British subject status afforded to other classes of
persons under British rule. Nevertheless, BPP status was a type of personal status and it
did provide some persons with an internationally recognized identity document.
Originally, British Protected Persons status was determined on an ad hoc basis for people
who needed travel outside of their protectorates or protected states, or for other specific
reasons. In 1934, the British Protected Persons Order codified BPP status. The law replaced
vague references to “indigenous persons” with jus soli. 580 By 1949, BPP status had become
a statutory status. BPP status now applied to all persons born in the Protectorate or
Protected State or, if born outside, to a father born in the state.
579F
Crucially, however, BPP status only applied for international purposes. It allowed persons
from Protectorates and Protected States to claim British protection while traveling abroad.
This made BPP status for all intents and purposes a type of derivative status that did not
confer rights to persons within their protectorates and protected states, where they
remained under the jurisdiction of their local leaders, whatever that might mean. 581 In
some cases, holders of BPP status could obtain the right to live and work in the UK more
easily than other aliens, 582 but in practice, they were often prevented from doing so by
local laws preventing them from leaving their colonies. 583 Meanwhile, most indigenous
persons were without a formal status provided by their local rulers, meaning that they
remained in a grey zone. As a result, BPP status fell well short of providing the rights
usually associated with nationality, yet for some, it provided an identity and some rights vis
a vis the British government. 584
580F
581F
582F
583F
For an overview of BPP status, see Brownlie, Nationality, 318-319. See also Fransman, 60-70; Weis, 18-20.
BPP status was only one of several alternate British types of status created to deal with colonized populations
that in essence offered few of the benefits of British Subject status.
580
Weis, 19-20. See also H. Lauterpacht, International Law (vol. 3 Longmans, Green and Co 1955) 30. In
recognition of the fact that BPP status is not equivalent to full nationality, the 2002 UK Nationality, Asylum
and Immigration Act resolved the issue for many of those without an alternative nationality. UK Nationality,
Asylum and Immigration Act. BPP status was mostly replaced by the nationality of individual states at
independence.
581
582
Weis, 18-20.
583
C. Parry, Commonwealth Citizenship with Special Reference to India (Indian Council of World Affairs 1954)
4.
For a discussion of whether or not BPP status qualifies as a nationality, see H. Alexander and J. Simon, No
Port, No Passport: Why Submerged States Can Have No Nationals Wash. Int’l L.J. 26.2 (2017) (hereinafter,
Alexander and Simon). In recognition of the fact that BPP status is not equivalent to full nationality, the 2002
584
112
As a result, BPP status was primarily for the purposes of identifying persons as under
British jurisdiction for international purposes. It failed to offer the same rights as British
subject status. Today, lesser forms of national status like BPP status are often viewed as
inherently unjust, sometimes referred to as “second class citizenship.” 585 The effect of BPP
status was to place people under British jurisdiction without giving them as many rights as
persons of British descent. 586 Most importantly, because BPP status was only used when
traveling abroad, very few people ever actually obtained it. As a result, few local people
were registered or received identity documents, creating yet more problems at
decolonization. 587
584F
585F
586F
Essentially, this left the vast majority of people in Kuwait and North Borneo (during its
period as a protected state in a grey zone. While in theory they had BPP status for
international travel purposes, their nationality was to be determined by local laws. A BPP
travel document was usually available from a consular officer, often located in a large,
coastal trading city in places like Kuwait and North Borneo under the control of a Sultan or
Emir. This meant that access to BPP status even for elite members of local society was
limited to people who were in good standing with the Sultan, Emir or other favoured local
authority.
The process by which BPP status was verified by local authorities and travel documents
were issued shows the extent to which it localized power in the hands of a few Sultans and
Emirs. According to the memoir of a British consular officer in Aden, in what is now Yemen,
the representative of the Sultan would verify the applicant’s identity for the British officer,
who would simply issue the document. This meant that the Sultan essentially held the
authority over who was granted this document. The Sultan’s office, however, was also
issuing travel documents that could be used for travel to other states in the region, setting
up a competing authority for travel documents. At the same time, a rival Sultan in Yemen
was also issuing his own travel documents. 588 This example is illustrative of the deep flaws
587F
UK Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act resolved statelessness for some of those who ended up British
Protected Persons without another nationality.
Kymlicka, 124. See also Fripp, 2016, 10. BPP status, however, should be distinguished from de facto
statelessness, which is defined as persons outside of their country who lack diplomatic or consular
protection. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Expert Meeting - The Concept of Stateless Persons
under International Law (Prato Conclusions), May 2010. See also L. Bingham, J. Reddy and S. Kohn, ‘De Jure
Statelessness in the Real World: Applying the Prato Summary Conclusion’ (Open Society Justice Initiative
2011). More will be said on second-class citizenship and the human right to a nationality in Part 3. For more
on tiers of nationality, see L. van Waas and S. Jaghai, ‘All Citizens are Created Equal, but Some are More Equal
Than Others’ 65 Netherlands International L. R. 413 (2018).
585
586
Crawford, 292.
587
Weis, 4, 6, 19-20. See also Verzijl, 6-7, 14; Habermas, 65; Lauterpacht, 30.
Harding, 283. Harding lists the BPP Passport, a one-time travel document, or an internal pass as
documents he was empowered to issue.
588
113
with the protected state system, where the lack of a clear authority created a vacuum of
state sovereignty and cases of overlapping sovereignty.
It also shows one of the many ways in which the power over civil administration became
vested in the person of the Emir or Sultan as the favoured local authority under the
Protectorate system. In this way, the inhabitants of the protected states began to be divided
by the British into two groups: those with standing and access to the colonial bureaucracy
and those who existed outside the system. As well, rulers were divided between those who
had standing with the British to issue documents and validate membership, whereas other
rulers were left out, regardless of the political realities on the ground.
In the Gulf, the tendency to favour some rulers over others would have long-standing
consequences. In his memoir, the consular officer in Aden acknowledged that his role in
issuing BPP passports was “problematic” because he relied almost entirely on the judgment
of the local Sultans and Emirs whom the British had identified as the local authorities. 589 As
the consular officer put it, determining who qualified for travel documents required a
complex process of verification with these coastal authorities based on their pre-existing
clan alliances. As few locals “had birth certificates... (and a)pplicants had to provide
guarantors” from the local administration. This gave certain Sultans and Emirs the status of
gatekeepers, determining who could access the British administration and who was
excluded. 590
588F
589F
While BPP status enabled some elites to obtain a travel document, 591 such a document was
wholly unnecessary to cross colonial borders within the Gulf region and this dissertation
was unable to uncover any evidence that applications for BPP status were common
amongst the Bedouin. The British made no effort to ensure that members of the general
population in Kuwait were issued documents. As the consular officer put it, discussing the
situation in what would become Yemen;
590F
(A) problem which was never satisfactorily settled was the issue of passports to
British Protected Persons of the Mahra state (in Yemen.) ‘State’ in this case was a
misnomer, for Mahra...inhabited by fiercely independent tribes, was under the
control of neither the British nor its titular ruler, (the) Sultan..." 592
591F
In truth these Bedouin tribes were not independent from colonialism, or even if they could
have been considered independent at this point, they would not long remain so. According
to official British policy, the Bedouin were the inhabitants of a British Protected State being
589
Harding, 280.
590
Harding, 281-282.
591 For an example of a travel document issued in Kuwait under the BPP system, see Passport Collector,
‘Kuwaiti Travel documents’ (2012) at http://www.passport-collector.com/kuwaiti-travel-documents/
(accessed July 28 2020).
592
Harding, 282.
114
administrated from Aden, or, in the case of Kuwait, from Kuwait City. This fact would come
to be enormously important for the Bedouin in the decades to come.
The creation of a nationality in former British Protected States brought about the automatic
termination of BPP status for those who qualified for the new nationality. 593 Technically,
those who did not gain a new nationality were entitled to continue to hold BPP status, 594
but a lack of BPP documents by most Bedouin made this impossible.
592F
593F
Meanwhile, under the protectorate system, local leaders began to pass their own
nationality laws. In the Saudi desert, Ibn Saud granted a nationality to certain Bedouin
tribes in order to assert his sovereignty over their lands. Ibn Saud’s consolidation of
Bedouin support, in part accomplished through the granting of nationality, was viewed
with hostility by both the British and the inhabitants of Kuwait Town. As Beaugrand puts it,
This idea of the desert as a hostile environment subject to foreign influence and
manipulation was deeply anchored in the minds of the Kuwaiti townspeople by
the time of the definition of nationality. 595
594F
In Kuwait, the protectorate agreement between the British government and the Emir also
invested the Emir of Kuwait with the authority to pass a nationality law. 596 Kuwait’s first
nationality law took the form of an official decree in 1948. 597 It cemented in Kuwaiti law a
distinction between original and naturalized citizens, a system of tiers of nationality that
granted more rights to original Kuwaitis. This created a type of second-class citizenship. 598
Kuwaiti law would also adopt a territorial-based approach. 599
595F
596F
597F
598F
“Original" (asil) Kuwaitis were defined in the 1948 official decree as members of the ruling
family, residents of Kuwait since 1899, the children of Kuwaiti fathers, or children born in
Kuwait of an Arab or Muslim father. 600 Naturalization was granted in a separate decree for
persons residing in Kuwait for at least ten years who could also speak Arabic and meet
599F
593
Alexander and Simon, 8-9.
594
See Fransman, 244.
595
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 67.
596
Casey, 21. See also Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 80.
597
Kuwait Order n. 3, 23-30 (1948).
598
Heater, 262.
Longva, Citizenship, 185. See also Parolin, 77, 89 115; M. Lund-Johansen, Fighting for Citizenship in Kuwait
(University of Oslo 2014) 24 (hereinafter Lund-Johansen).
599
Kuwait, Law n. 2, 35-49 (1948). See also Kuwait, Order No. 3, 23-30 (1948). See also Fransman, 10551056; Parolin, 89; Longva, Citizenship, 185; Commins, 186; A. N. Longva, ‘Neither Autocracy nor Democracy’
in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori (eds.), Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the
Gulf (Tauris 2005) 121 (hereinafter Longva, Autocracy).
600
115
certain other requirements. 601 As a result of this law, the authority to determine
nationality in Kuwait was now vested in the hands of the Emir.
600F
Kuwait’s nationality law therefore complied with principles of Islamic law, as nationality
flowing by descent from the father, but was also compatible with jus sanguinis. But in
keeping with British legal principles, it also employed jus soli. These decrees were quite
inclusive, in compliance with British law, while promoting Kuwait’s identity as a Muslim
and Arab state. 602 Given the lack of clarity around Kuwait’s borders, however, this law
must be seen as mainly favouring Kuwait’s urban centres, particularly Kuwait City, and
members of the urban community. This fact would have a huge impact on nationality in
Kuwait in the future.
601F
Naturalization in Kuwait would go through a number of important changes during the
protectorate period. In 1959, the years needed for naturalization increased to fifteen years
of residence for non-Arabs and ten years for Arabs. Naturalized citizens could not vote for
twenty years following their naturalization, nor pass on nationality to their children. 603 In
1960, the number of naturalizations was limited to 50 individual applications. As
naturalization became more limited, the concept of being a resident of Kuwait became
increasingly critical.
602F
Unlike Kuwait, North Borneo would eventually become a Crown Colony following World
War II. Unlike in Kuwait, however, North Borneo would be incorporated into the larger
Malaysia Federation, a process which would greatly affect the ways in which nationality
law was applied during the late colonial period and decolonization. Ethnic and religious
divisions between Britain’s Malay colonies meant the problem of a single nationality status
became a pressing political issue during the colonial period.
From the beginning of the process to create a unity state in Malaysia, both the British and
the Sultans struggled with the configuration of the new federation and the nationality
status of its members. 604 Until the 1930s, immigration to Malaysia was unrestricted and
encouraged by the British. 605 In the 1840s and 1850s, the British brought large populations
of foreign workers to the Malay colonies from India, China and Indonesia to work on the
rubber plantations. 606 As a result, the British and the Sultans struggled to determine the
eventual status of so-called immigrant populations in what would become Malaysia,
603F
604F
605F
601
Kuwait, Law n. 2, 35-49 (1948). See also Kuwait, Order No. 3, 23-30 (1948).
For a discussion of this law, see C. Joppke, ‘Citizenship in Immigration States’ in A. Shachar, R. Bauboeck, I.
Bloemraad, M. Vin (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Oxford 2017) 390.
602
603
Ismael, 118-119.
Some examples of possible forms the unity state could have taken include confederation with Indonesia
and the inclusion of Singapore. Hooker, 209.
604
605
Clark and Pietsch, 168.
C. Hirschman, ‘The Meaning and Measurement of Ethnicity in Malaysia,’ 46 Journal of Asian Studies 555
(1987), 558 (hereinafter Hirschman).
606
116
particularly the Chinese population. In 1909, the Manchu government in China had
declared all overseas Chinese descended via the male line to be citizens of China unless
they opted out, regardless of where they had been born. 607 This policy immediately called
into question the status of overseas Chinese around the world, including the Malay
colonies. 608 North Borneo remained somewhat removed from these discussions, but would
come to be affected by the question of nationality in Malaysia following Malaysian
Federation. As a result, the development of nationality law in Peninsular Malaysia would
come to have an indirect effect on nationality in the Borneo states.
606F
607F
In 1867, the Straits Settlements, consisting of the larger city-states on the Malay Peninsula,
now Crown Colonies, passed a Naturalization Act based on residence. 609 Persons born in
the Straits Settlements were therefore British subjects. 610 In 1904, the Federated Malay
States, which were Protected States on the Peninsula under separate British rule,
introduced the Uniform Naturalization Laws based on jus soli or five years of residence. 611
The remainder of the Peninsula was made up of the Unfederated Malay States, which were
British Protected States, but which had no formal nationality law. 612 As a result, Malaysia
would enter the post-colonial period with the urgent need for a single, unifying status for
its population, but with great ethnic and political challenges as to who would qualify for
that status.
608F
609F
610F
611F
Several decades after these laws were passed on Peninsular Malaysia, the British passed a
nationality law in North Borneo, the North Borneo Ordinance No. 1 of 1931. 613 Nationality
at birth was granted to,
612F
(a)ny person born within the State of North Borneo unless and until he
proves that at the time of his birth he possessed under the law of some other
State the nationality of such State, and…Any person born out of the State of
North Borneo whose father was a citizen of the State at the time of that
person’s birth and either was born within the State or was a person to whom
a certificate of naturalization had been granted under the provisions of this
607
Andaya, 207.
Ko Swan Sik, (ed.) Nationality and International Law in Asian Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 1990) 33-34
(hereinafter Ko Swan Sik).
608
V. Sinnadurai, ‘Nationality and International Law in Asian Perspective’ in Ko Swan Sik, (ed.) Nationality
and International Law in Asian Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 1990) 312 (hereinafter Sinnadurai).
609
610
Andaya, 243.
611
Sinnadurai ,313.
H. Ting, ‘Malaysian history textbooks and the discourse of ketuanan Melayu’ in Daniel Goh, Matilda
Gabrielpillai, Philip Holden, Gaik Cheng Khoo, Race and Multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore (Routledge
2009) 42 (hereinafter Ting).
612
613
Fransman, 697.
117
Ordinance, and…Any person born on board a ship registered in the State of
North Borneo unless and until he proves at the time of his birth he possessed
under the law of some other State the nationality of such State. 614
613F
Under this law, everyone born in North Borneo automatically acquired the nationality of
British North Borneo. When North Borneo became a Crown Colony in July 1946, following
three years of Japanese occupation, this nationality was automatically converted to British
Subject status. According to the North Borneo Cession in Council of 1946,
all persons who on the fifteenth day of July, 1946, are citizens of the State of North
Borneo by virtue of the provisions of the North Borneo Naturalisation Ordinance,
1931, shall, on that day become British subjects. 615
614F
Unlike in Kuwait, the inhabitants of North Borneo entered the decolonization period with
British subject status which later converted to Citizen of the UK and Colonies (CUKC)
status. 616 But the reality of implementation meant that few inhabitants of the Borneo
colonies received documents or any official acknowledgement of their status. 617 The
British had only begun issuing identity cards in Malaya in 1948, a process continued by the
Malaysian government after independence. 618 The short period between Japanese
occupation and political independence left no time for the proper registration of the
population. While the passage of these laws meant that on paper, the CUKCs of North
Borneo should have been automatically converted to Malaysian nationals at the creation of
Malaysia’s nationality law, the lack of registration of North Borneo’s population during the
colonial period meant that these laws were not implemented, with serious consequences at
decolonization.
615F
616F
617F
Meanwhile, the territories that would become Malaysia were preparing for independence
and a large amount of attention was devoted to the vexing question of a uniform Malaysian
nationality. The British pushed for a uniform nationality law for all of their former colonies
that would apply to all groups including the immigrant Chinese and Indian populations
who had been brought to the region as workers, as well as indigenous, non-Malay groups,
like the Bajau populations living in what was now Sabah. 619 But the Sultans worried about
Chinese dominance on the peninsula, while the question of Malay dominance would remain
a concern in the Borneo states. The tension created over the inclusion of non-Malay
618F
614
615
Fransman, 697.
The North Borneo Succession Order in Council 1946, Buckingham Palace, the Tenth day of July, 1946.
617
Fransman, 141.
617
Fransman, 141.
T. Mathews, ‘Is Malaysia’s Mykad the ‘One Card to Rule Them All’? The Urgent Need to Develop a Proper
Legal Framework for The Protection of Personal Information in Malaysia’ 28 Melbourne University Law
Review 474 (2004) 474.
618
619
Clark and Pietsch, 161. See also L. Hong Hai, 103; Ting, 42.
118
populations would greatly influence both Malaysia’s nationality laws and their
implementation. Meanwhile, the lack of registration, particularly of rural and oceandwelling communities in Borneo, would leave the status of those communities open to
question. While discussions about Malaysian nationality were ongoing between the British
and the Sultans both on the Peninsula and in Borneo, nomads were left entirely out of these
discussions.
Nationality in French Soudan
Postage stamp from the Soudan Français
Unlike for the majority of Bedouin in Kuwait and Sama Dilaut in Borneo, the registration
and enfranchisement of the Tuareg began during the colonial period as the French moved
towards establishing nationality and registering the population in their colonies, including
French Soudan, the territory now called Mali. 620 The French would develop tiers of
membership in the French Empire. But the French system suffered from arbitrary
adjudication that left nationality and the issuance of identification documents up to the
whims of individual administrators and a pernicious vagueness in the law that left critical
categorizations open to interpretation and manipulation. 621 The application of nationality
to many French colonies would never be properly implemented among nomadic groups
like the Tuareg.
619F
620F
Meanwhile, as in Borneo, despite an attempt at registration in colonies like French Soudan,
many Africans living in French territory ended colonial rule as French nationals under the
law, but the lack of registration, or état civil, meant that many of them could not access or
C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘Nationalité et citoyenneté en Afrique occidentale français : Originaires et citoyens
dans le Sénégal colonial,’ 42 The Journal of African History 285 (2001) 286 (hereinafter Coquery-Vidrovitch).
620
621
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 287.
119
prove their nationality. This became most true for persons living in so-called “remote”
areas away from the centralized bureaucracy created by French administrators and, in
particular, many Tuareg. As colonization moved towards decolonization, issues in French
Soudan like borders, exclusive sovereignty, nationality and the role of nationalism would
preoccupy both colonial and post-colonial governments, influencing how nationality was
applied.
French nationality law developed into three separate systems, with one nationality law
applicable in France, one in certain privileged colonies such as Algeria and cities in Senegal,
and one in the rest of France’s colonies. This system of tiers somewhat resembled the
British system, which distinguished between British subject status and BPP status. France’s
first codified nationality laws were the Civil Code of 1804, during the post-revolutionary
period, and the Napoleonic Code, which established French nationality by jus sanguinis. 622
Nationality in France had developed based on the concept of the citoyen holding important
civil rights like voting, but this status was not extended to indigenous persons in the
colonies. 623 A redraft of French nationality law in 1851, partly to resolve the cases of
statelessness that were arising out of the previous laws, introduced the principle of doublebirth whereby a person is French if born of a father himself born in France. 624 Double-birth
provided nationality to the descendants of immigrants. 625 The government benefited from
the unity created by the idea of a common French homeland and common, uniform
nationality in France. Nationality in the colonies, however, continued to develop along a
separate track.
621F
622F
623F
624F
Despite the supposed universality of citoyenneté the French created a system of tiered
nationality, distinguishing between the holders of so-called “active” and “passive”
nationality. 626 By the 20th century, however, the fact of limited civic rights in the colonies
came increasingly into conflict with the ideals of the revolutionary period and the supposed
universal nature of the citoyen. 627 Belonging in the colonies, including French Sudan, went
through a drastic series of changes, culminating in the granting of French nationality to all.
625F
626F
P. Lagarde, La nationalité français (Dalloz 2011) 41 (hereinafter Lagarde). See also Maury 30, 86-87; Weil
12, 37; D. McGovney, ‘French Nationality Laws Imposing Nationality at Birth,’ 5 Am. J. of Int’l L. 325, 329; JaultSeseke, 95; De Groot and Vonk, 9.
622
P. Decheix, « Le Code de la nationalité Malienne » 697 Penant 300 (1963) 301. See also Maury, 15; Courbe,
23.
623
McGovney, 334. See also Legarde, 50; Maury, 87. Weil, 12, 60. French nationality law went through a series
of revisions, most particularly in 1880, 1889 and 1927, when efforts were made to unify and simplify the
nationality code, but retained the basic principles of jus sanguinis and double-birth and continued to exclude
indigenous persons in the colonies. During the Vichy period during WWII, there was an increase in
government control of nationality in line with the increase in xenophobia in France, including
denationalization of the Jews.
624
625
Weil, 60, 211.
626
Cooper, 14. See also Weil, 14; de Groot and Vonk, 9.
627
Jault-Seseke, 28-29.
120
At the heart of the conflict over identity in the French Empire was the lack of clarity over
whether or not the colonies were to remain separate nations, distinct from France, with
their own nationalities, or if the ultimate goal of French colonization was the incorporation
of the colonies into a type of “greater France.” 628 Colonial nationality law would reflect this
tension throughout the colonial period. 629
627F
628F
By about 1890, the inhabitants of French Soudan, the territories that are now Mali, were
technically under the jurisdiction of France as French subjects, not as citizens. 630 French
Soudan was governed as a protectorate, 631 but the French administrators welded an
enormous level of control over the local population, including the Tuareg. Haut Sénégal was
established as a protectorate in 1887 by a treaty between representatives of France and
certain chiefs. Haut Sénégal, after many territorial changes, was later separated from Niger
and renamed Soudan Français. 632
629F
630F
631F
In 1833, the rights that attached to the French Civil Code had been granted to some French
colonies, including certain cities in Senegal, 633 but not to others. By 1905, however, the
French government officially abandoned the goal of assimilating colonized peoples and
adopted instead the policy of “association,” whereby the majority of French colonies would
be part of the Empire, but not granted the same rights as Metropole France, or even the
departments of Algeria. 634 “Association” was a form of indirect rule that in theory allowed
colonies to maintain their pre-existing local government structures and rules of belonging
and membership, including adherence to Islamic law. 635 In reality, however, the French
made all the important decisions in Africa regarding land use, government, the economy
and military. Only personal relations like marriage and inheritance were governed by local
law, including Islamic law. This was also true in French Soudan. What the policy of
association really accomplished was to keep most Africans excluded from the rights
associated with French citizenship, such as voting.
632F
633F
634F
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 285. The debate over association versus assimilation dominated the French colonial
period. For a summary, see Cooper, 15.
628
629
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 285. See also Foltz, 10; Chipman, 56; Cooper, 7.
630
Decheix, 300.
631
France, Décret du 18 avril 1890, 350 JORF (1890). See also Decheix, 300.
632
Decheix, 300.
633
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 288.
Territorial France was defined as the metropole, Algeria, and departments of the outre-mer. Jault-Seseke,
101. See also Chipman, 57; Foltz ,11. The metropole refers to French territories in Europe that had been
centrally controlled by Paris since the mid-1500s.
634
635
Cooper, x.
121
Importantly, some colonies had access to French nationality. The French created a system
of tiers of belonging based mainly on location.
The French by the end of 1945 had developed 6 distinct layers of
sovereignty: 1) the metropole (European France), 2. Algeria, with Muslim
non-nationals and non-Muslim nationals, 3. older colonies in the Caribbean
and Senegal with a kind of French nationality, where slavery had been
abolished in 1848, and new colonies in French Africa and the pacific islands,
where most people were merely subjects. 636
635F
After World War One, France was accorded certain Mandate Territories and Protectorates
and retained many of her other colonies. Under this sprawling and complex system, most of
the inhabitants of French overseas departments and Algeria could not vote and were not
officially French citizens, but were nevertheless considered to be French nationals. 637
Meanwhile, the inhabitants of other French colonies like the French Soudan had few rights
of any kind 638 and the French Civil Code did not apply to them as les indigènes. 639 In 1887
and 1928, decrees reaffirmed that indigenous persons in the colonies were excluded from
French nationality. 640
636F
637F
638F
639F
In 1912, however, the French government introduced laws by which certain persons in the
colonies could become naturalized French citizens. 641 According to Coquery-Vidrovitch, an
expert on French nationality law in the colonies, at this moment France had established a
system that drew a distinction between French citizenship and French nationality. 642
Naturalization took two forms, naturalization as a change of nationality and accession à la
nationalité, for persons without another nationality. The Decree of 5 November 1928
640F
641F
636
Cooper, 21. See also Foltz, 73.
For example, the Algerian descendants of ethnically French immigrants, or colons as they were called, were
granted full rights and representation in government and paid lower taxes, while persons of Arab descent in
Algeria did not. Maury, 90.
637
638
Jault-Seseke, 102.
Maury, 15. The Civil Code of 1804 did not contain specific provisions for the colonies and subsequent
codes did not adequately address the issue. The colonial period was marked by confusion and disagreement
over the status of colonized populations in the Empire. For example, the Decree of 7 February 1897 in Art. 17
explicitly stated that “nothing was changed” in regards to the nationality of indigenous people in the colonies.
This article is usually interpreted to mean that indigenous persons were not covered by French nationality
law.
639
640
Decheix, 301.
641
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 289.
642
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 290.
122
reaffirmed that French nationality law was not applicable to indigenous persons in the
colonies who lived in colonies like French Soudan, unless the person was naturalized. 643
642F
Colonized peoples were subject to forced labour, fines and punishments, often with
recourse only to poorly implemented customary courts despite their lack of clear status, as
the French government retained sovereignty over them and their territories. During this
period, the French set up special courts or separate administrative bodies to deal with
indigenous affairs. Personal status, such as it was, was regulated not by French nationality
law, but by special laws and decrees, including the Code de l’Indigénat, which subjected
indigenous people to forced labour and arbitrary punishment by special courts. 644
Importantly, the term indigène was never defined. The indigénes were not subject to the
French Civil Code, but rather to local law or custom, including Islamic law. 645 Africans were
banned from politics 646 and under the jurisdiction of a French administrator. 647 French
courts were for French nationals, primarily of European descent, and other immigrants and
the adjudication of criminal offenses affecting the peace. All other matters were treated by
customary law by local leaders, though African courts were subject to colonial oversight. 648
643F
644F
645F
646F
647F
Though there was an elected legislative body representing the colonies, Le Conseil
Supérieur des Colonies, it represented only French nationals in the colonies, French
nationals with holdings or businesses in the colonies, and those few Africans with French
nationality or citizenship. 649 As a result (with a few exceptions) there was almost no
African participation in government until after World War II. 650 Those Africans who were
French nationals or holders of French citizenship, many of whom lived in Senegal, were
called les évolués and were mostly African notables and urban, educated elites. 651 While
some Africans in certain territories were citizens while also being exempt from the French
648F
649F
650F
Décret du 5 novembre 1928, Fixant, sauf en ce qui concerne les indigènes, les conditions de jouissance des
droits civils d’acquisition, de perte, et de recouvrement de la qualité de français dans les colonies autres que
la Guadeloupe, la Martinique et la Réunion, J.O.R.F. du 15 novembre 1928. See also Decheix, 301.
643
644
Maury, 91.
645
African Commission, para 54.
646
Stewart, 20.
647
Cooper, 7.
Young, 6. See also B. Kamian, « La dynamique des intégrations, de la période coloniale à nos jours » in L.
Moudileno, Les États-nations face à l’intégration régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest - Le cas du Mali (Karthala
2007) 64.
648
649
Foltz, 18.
650
Foltz, 20.
Foltz, 18-20. See also Cooper, 6. Africans could become French nationals by performing extraordinary
duties for the French state or by become professionally accredited under the French system, for example, the
medical system. Zatzepine, 8; Cooper, 28; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 295.
651
123
Civil Code, most had to abandon other forms of law, such as Islamic law, and adopt French
marriage and inheritance law under the Civil Code in order to qualify for nationality. 652
651F
According to Coquery-Vidrovitch, naturalizations were deliberately difficult to obtain and
arbitrary, as the law vested great powers in the whims of colonial administrators to decide
when an African person had achieved mastery of the French language, or to what extent
that person had good morals. 653 In the 1940s in French West Africa, (Afrique occidentale
française - AOF), out of a total population of fifteen million people, there were 15,000
Europeans with full French citizenship, but only 5,000 Africans. 654 In French Soudan, the
number of naturalized French citizens or persons who had achieved French nationality
between 1946 and 1949 was only four. 655
652F
653F
654F
Throughout this period, the état civil remained almost non-existent in most parts of Africa.
As Ruth Dickens describes it:
(r)egistration of births, marriages, and deaths on the état civil was so routine
in France that metropolitan officials though it a perfectly reasonable
expectation for the colonies. 656
655F
Though civil registration had been provided by law since the 1930s, prior to 1945, it had
not been compulsory for the African population and few saw the need of it. Certain events,
such as traditional marriages, were often seen as outside the scope of French
administration and were not recorded. Only those few individuals holding French
citizenship were required to register. In 1944, the French had made only about 100,000
entries in the état civil for indigenous persons in the AOF, mostly for births.
This system of tiers of nationality proved unsustainable, particularly given that many
Africans had fought for France in two World Wars. In the early 1900s, the demand for
African nationality with full citizenship rights in the French empire was considered to be
revolutionary; by the 1950s it had begun to look inevitable. 657 Over the next few years, the
French government and African notables like Léopold Sédar Senghor and Félix HouphouëtBoigny would attempt to bring greater representation to the colonies while keeping the
656F
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 291. See also Cooper, 5, 16-18; Chipman, 57. Numerous differences also existed
between the rights of nationals in Algeria and the departments like Guadeloupe, Martinique or Reunion and
citizens in the Metropole, including the fact that the principle of “double-birth” did not apply in the
departments, even though the departments were considered to be part of France. Décret du 7 février 1897,
referenced in Jault-Seseke, 102. See also Maury, 87-90; Weil, 225-227.
652
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 293. For example, Coquery-Vidrovitch points to at least one case where an African
family was allowed to naturalize despite being in a polygamous union. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 291.
653
654
Cooper, 27, 46; Chipman, 88.
655
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 300.
656
R. Dickens, Defining French Citizenship Policy in West Africa (doctoral thesis, Emory U. 2001) 255.
657
Chipman, 59, 72. See also Young, 7; Cooper, 7.
124
relationship with France intact. 658 The process of enfranchisement in the AOF came in
stages: in the period before 1945, the vast majority of Africans were French subjects but
not nationals; 1946-1955 was the period of the application of the 1946 Constitution and
the creation of the French Union with limited voting rights for many Africans; 1956 and
after saw the implementation of the Loi Cadre granting universal suffrage, though not
necessarily equal representation, and the creation of the French Community, a type of
federation, and 1958-1962 was the transition to full independence. 659
657F
658F
After WWII, the French attempted to expand nationality status throughout the Empire. 660
Despite these attempts at what Coquery-Vidrovitch calls “imperial nationality,” however,
confusion over the status of different colonized peoples would plague the French
government until colonial independence and would influence the ways in which nationality
was applied during decolonization. 661 Beginning with the Brazzaville Conference in 1944,
this process eventually produced a new Constitution in 1946 creating the French Union, 662
but the Constitution only passed because the issue of nationality in the colonies was left
somewhat vague. 663 The Loi Lamine Guèye of 1946, named after a prominent African
politician, gave universal suffrage and French citizenship, in theory, to all the ressortissants
of France’s overseas colonies. 664 The group to whom this law would apply was not clear as
the term ressortissant may refer to citizens, nationals or inhabitants depending on the
context.
659F
660F
661F
662F
663F
The 1946 Constitution would be used as the basis for the nationality law of many of the
newly independent colonial states. Under it, all subjects of the French empire now
automatically had French nationality, but the question of who qualified as a subject was not
answered by the law. 665 The Constitution read:
664F
Tous les ressortissants des territoires d'outre-mer ont la qualité de citoyen, au
même titre que les nationaux français de la métropole ou des territoires d'outre-
658
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 32-33.
K. Panter-Brick, ‘Independence, French Style’ in Gifford and Louis, Decolonization and African
Independence (Yale 1988), 75. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 32.
659
Cooper, 7, 14. Cooper cites the example of the struggle for nationality in the West Indies. See also Decheix,
300.
660
661
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 293. See also Cooper, xi. African Commission, para 54; Legarde, 50; Maury, 31.
French Constitution of 27 October 1946. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999 272; Cooper, 9-12, 27, 40, 86,
91-93; Chipman, 82, 88, 92-97; C. Diarrah, Vers La IIIe République Du Mali (L’Harmattan 1991) 26; Foltz, 22;
Hal,l 273.
662
663
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 293.
Loi n° 46-940 du 7 mai 1946, tendant à proclamer citoyens tous les ressortissants des territoires d'outremer. See also Coquery-Vidrovitch, 292.
664
665
Lagarde, 43. See also Coquery-Vidrovitch, 296.
125
mer. Des lois particulières établiront les conditions dans lesquelles ils exercent
leurs droits de citoyens. (All ‘ressortissants’ (nationals) of the overseas territories
have the quality of a citizen on the same basis as French citizens of the metropole
or of the overseas territories. Specific laws will establish the conditions under
which they will exercise their rights as citizens.) 666
665F
It was not clear under the Constitution who qualified as a ressortissant. This term is usually
translated as “national,” or sometimes “subject,” depending on the context, but here, it is
not clear if the law was meant to apply to all persons who had French nationality or all
persons under French jurisdiction, regardless of whether or not they had received an
official status. It is not likely to have meant all inhabitants or residents, leaving the status of
those persons somewhat unclear. It is also not clear what was meant by having the quality
of a citizen as opposed to simply being a citizen.
Article 82 allowed Africans to exercise some of their rights without adopting French Civil
Code, but the Constitution did not resolve the issue of how polygamous marriages or other
conflicts between the French civil code and local practices were to be treated by French
institutions. 667 The Constitution also limited the political rights of African citizens. It split
the French General Assembly into two bodies, the double college, with Africans able to vote
only for the second, consultative body. As a result, the Constitution inserted more
vagueness into a system of laws that already suffered from excessive vagueness.
666F
The new Constitution did accomplish some things, including immediately voiding
discriminatory legislation for the indigènes in the colonies, as this class of people no longer
existed. 668 Nevertheless, the structural problems with the Union became apparent almost
immediately. The French government faced the monumental task of registering millions of
new nationals under the état civil, each living under different local systems of government
with different customary practices. 669 The French had realized they urgently required an
état civil indigène, but there was not time to register persons before the next election. 670
The first elections reflected the limited electorate. In French Soudan from 1945-1957,
writer and influential politician Fily Dabo Sissoko and his Parti Progressiste Soudanais
(PSP) represented French Soudan on a traditional, conservative and pro-French platform,
also showing the dominance of non-Tuareg politicians at that time. 671 France’s colonies in
667F
668F
669F
670F
666 French Constitution of 27 October 1946 Art. 80 (my translation). Cooper 21, 121. See also African
Commission, para 57; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 297.
667
Constitution, Art. 82. See also Cooper 8-9, 121, 163; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 303; Dickens, 383.
668
Cooper, 123-125, 134, 163.
669
Cooper, 130.
670
Dickens, 255. See also Foltz, 17, 22-23; Cooper, 28, 33, 61, 137.
671
Diarrah, 27. See also Gaudio, 1988, 95.
126
Africa were being split between a francophone, urban elite and the rural population, which
included many nomads, who remained unregistered and unable to vote.
Eventually, the French Union proved unsustainable and the Empire moved inexorably
towards decolonization. 672 This period was dominated by a confusing series of laws that
attempted to identify persons who qualified for French nationality and expand their civil
rights. Article 81 of the Constitution states:
671F
All French nationals (nationaux français) and nationals/subjects (les
ressortissants) of the French Union have the quality of citizenship of the French
Union.
It is clear that the French government meant to expand citizenship beyond the narrow class
of persons who had previously been so defined but the grounds on which one qualifies as a
ressortissant under the law remained extremely vague. Would a nomadic family who only
spent a few months out of the year in French territory qualify as a ressortissant of France?
Once again, it is not clear what was meant by having “the quality of citizenship.” Meanwhile,
the voting rights of Africans continued to be difficult to enforce, due to poor registration
and the dismal state of the état civil, particularly in so-called remote areas where the
Tuareg lived. 673
672F
A new law also cemented the individual colonies as separate territories with their primary
ties to France, rather than federated with each other. 674 In Cooper’s view, this was the
beginning of the separation of West Africa into separate states. 675 Léopold Sédar Senghor
lamented what he called the “balkanization” of Africa 676 and the ability of some persons to
cross internal borders that typified the colonial period began to come to an end. Africans
accustomed to move easily between colonies now found themselves facing international
borders. 677 Perhaps no group would be more affected by the so-called balkanization of
Africa than the Tuareg.
673F
674F
675F
676F
Changes to France’s nationality laws in the colonies came rapidly in the 1950s. The decree
of 1953 applied a single status to all French nationals regardless of their previous status as
citizens or nationals by extending the application of the French Code of Nationality to the
672
Diarrah, 28. See also Cooper, 75-80.
673
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 42.
Loi n. 56-619 du 23 juin 1956 autorisant le gouvernement à mettre en œuvre les réformes et à prendre les
mesures propres à assurer l'évolution des territoires relevant du ministère de la France d'outre-mer (Arrêté
de promulgation n° 1059 APA du 10 août 1957). See also Chipman, 100; Diarrah, 26, 30; Gaudio, 1988, 98;
Cooper, 215.
674
675
Cooper, 215.
676
Quoted in Cooper, 279.
677
Cooper, 74, 333-338, 352.
127
outre-mer, simplifying the confusing rules under the 1946 Constitution. 678 Once again, the
exact population to whom this law applied remained vague due to the lack of civil
registration in many parts of the outre-mer. In 1956, the Loi-Cadre Defferre, named for
French politician Gaston Defferre, created a new administrative structure that devolved
more authority to the colonies, elected by universal suffrage. Finally, after much politicking
by all sides, the French Constitution of 1958 created the French Community, which granted
limited independence to the colonies in a federated system. 679 According to most French
jurists, there was now only one nationality, that of the Community. 680
677F
678F
679F
But questions remained both over the content of Community nationality and over its
territorial scope. Some African leaders saw French nationality operating for Africans’
relations external to their states, but a sort of local, common patrie, as Senghor put it, for
internal matters, particularly social and cultural matters. 681 As well, it was not clear how
Community nationality should be determined for those who had never qualified for, or
received, a status of any kind before. Ultimately, the French Community failed to solve the
issues of nationality and belonging for Africans, just as the Union had failed. 682
Nevertheless, the move towards greater autonomy was well received in Africa among those
who could vote. In French Soudan, over 800,000 people voted in the referendum for the
Constitution, with an overwhelming vote in favour of the creation of the Community. 683
680F
681F
682F
In the struggle to register people and issue identity documents, the same issues came up
again and again, among them polygamy, Islamic customary law and discrimination against
women, reflecting the difficulties in registering people to vote without universal
application of a Civil Code. 684 As well, registration was left up to local administrators and
varied widely by region. 685 The lack of clarity around who qualified as a national, given that
huge numbers of people had no official status at all prior to 1946, remained a serious
683F
684F
Décret n° 53-161 du 24 février 1953 déterminant les modalités d’application du code de la nationalité
française dans les territoires d’outre-mer, 50 J. O.R. F. 1984 (27 Fév. 1953). See also Decheix, 301.
678
Constitution de la Ve République, du 28 septembre 1958, promulguée par le président de la République le
4 octobre. French Soudan entered this period as part of a federation with Sénégal. Cooper, 284-306, 325. See
also Diarrah, 32; Decheix, 301.
679
“The 1958 Constitution stated that there was only one nationality of the Community. According to most
French jurists, the colonies did not have their own nationality, only French nationality.” Cooper 306-311, 349.
See also African Commission, para 58.
680
681
Cooper, 349.
682
Cooper, 363-368.
Diarrah, 33. See also Cooper, 316, 321, 324. Guinea, alone in West Africa, voted no, leading to its full
independence.
683
684
Cooper, 270-273.
Some French officials tried to get around the issue of registration by arguing that voting itself should be
used as proof of nationality, but this approach was not employed on the ground. Cooper, 155.
685
128
problem. The French government began to focus on one particular aspect of nationality
registration: voter registration. The efforts to register voters give a window into the
challenges of issuing nationality documents to all eligible people in France’s African
colonies. In particular, voting records clearly demonstrate that many Tuareg had received
French nationality and were now voting, while many others likely remained unregistered.
In 2018, the International Criminal Court prepared a report on documentation in Mali,
finding:
The civil status registration was introduced in Mali by the French colonial
administration in the late 19th century and beginning 20th century. During
that period, the registration and documentation system was generally poor
and access was limited to large cities. There was a lack of means and of
verification/control by the civil registry officers as well. 686
685F
Despite the slow start and continuing problems with voter registration, voting greatly
increased in the AOF during the 1950s, particularly after the Loi Cadre. 687 Voting was
limited, however, by the lack of registration and failure to issue civil documents. 688
Registration remained up to the whims of local administrators and many people lacked the
necessary documents.
686F
687F
How did these developments in access to nationality and voting in the French Soudan affect
the Tuareg? Despite the momentous changes taking place in French Soudan and in West
Africa more generally, northern Soudan and the Tuareg remained largely uninvolved,
though there is evidence that many Tuareg were registered and participated in
elections. 689
688F
As the above sections have shown, the territorial organization of the AOF meant that it was
far easier for sedentary farmers to register, as they were organized in cantons and districts
headed by a chef de canton or district chief, while pastoralists were organized into non-
International Criminal Court, Annex I: Public Registry’s Report on Proof of Identity Documents Available in
Mali and Transmission of Proposed Application Forms for Rule 85(b) RPE Victims and Groups of Victims, No.
ICC-01/12-01/18 18 May 2018 (my italics).
686
Cooper, 139, 236. See also Foltz, 24. In the first election of 1946, 800,000 people registered out of an
approximate population of 15 million. In 1951, 3 million had registered, and by 1956, 6 million had
registered. Following the Loi Cadre in 1956, ten million people registered to vote in the AOF, over half the
population. Actual voting also increased. In the January 1956 elections for the Assembly National, before the
Loi Cadre, 3.3 million people in West Africa voted out of the 6 million who were registered. In the first
elections after the Loi Cadre passed, for territorial assemblies in March 1957, 4.8 million voted out of the ten
million who registered. Africans had gained nationality and they were exercising their rights. A broader
African electorate brought a new group of more radical African politicians to the National Assembly, like
Soudanese socialist Modibo Keïta.
687
688
Cooper, 61-62.
689
Foltz, 119.
129
territorial family groups or fractions subjected to a separate taxation system. 690 This
system of separate administration allowed for a more hands-off approach to the nomadic
population, but meant that it was harder for nomads to access registration and obtain
documents. Registration was more common in urban and coastal areas, becoming less
common in the interior and away from towns in areas like the Sahel. The preferences for an
urban, francophone elite, particularly in coastal cities, meant that registration and voting
came to disfavour rural and nomadic populations like the Tuareg, who became increasingly
marginalized and excluded from political participation during the late colonial period.
689F
Pierre Boilley provides extensive information on the voting patterns of the Tuareg during
this critical period. Voter registration in the French Soudan increased from one million to
two million between 1958 and 1959, even in the northern Kidal province. But voter
turnout among the Tuareg in Soudan’s first elections was low, 691 and the rate of
participation in elections by the nomadic population, Tuareg and Arab, decreased as time
went on. 692 1956 was the year of the Loi Cadre and the setting up of a more representative
government in the colonies, a watershed year for elections in French Africa, but the Tuareg
mostly sat it out. 693 In 1958, during the vote that created the French Community, more
than 90% of the nomadic population in Adagh abstained from voting in a decline from
earlier elections. 694 Nomad political participation therefore declined right at the moment
when African participation overall was increasing. While more research is needed, it is
likely that a lack of participation in voting was closely related to a lack of registration.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that some Tuareg were registered and did vote during
this period. Clearly, some Tuareg had begun to exercise their nationality rights.
690F
691F
692F
693F
690
Leonhardt, 9.
691
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 272, 279. See also Benetti, 53-54.
In the 1946 election, only persons considered to be sedentary and of sufficient note in the community,
such as persons in the French administration and shop owners, were eligible to vote, amounting to less than
1% of the total population. By 1951, the number of nomads registered to vote had increased to 4,599, and the
number of sedentary voters to 287. This represented about 29% of the total sedentary population and 33% of
the nomadic population. While the number of sedentary voters would continue to increase with time, this was
to be the high point of Tuareg participation. By 1956, Tuareg participation in elections had fallen off sharply,
with only 28 persons voting out of those registered as nomadic, or less than .6% of the voters in northern
Soudan.
692
Boilley takes this as evidence that by this point the Tuareg had become “totally disinterested” in colony-wide
political life in the Soudan. The most complete numbers on Tuareg voting in northern Soudan come from
Pierre Boilley’s book on the Kel Adagh Tuareg in Kidal. The French kept records of voting in northern Soudan,
dividing the electorate into sedentary voters, including sedentary Tuareg, Songhai and others, and nomadic
voters, including Tuareg and Arabs. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 276. Lack of interest in voting was not limited to
the Tuareg in Soudan. Féral reports that the nomads in Agadez in Niger were similarly uninvolved in the
elections. Féral, 110.
693
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 278.
694
Diarrah, 33, 35. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 277-280.
130
If the rest of West Africa was slowly beginning to vote, why did turnout among the Tuareg
decrease? Low turnout among Tuareg voters was due to a number of factors, including
ongoing problems with the état civil and registration in remote areas, as well as lack of
awareness among the Tuareg of the importance of both voting and registration. 695 The
French did not make an effort to bring voting to the nomadic Tuareg; polling stations were
located in distant cities and registration was done by residence in an administrative
region. 696 But perhaps most importantly, the Tuareg arguably did not feel a sense of
common purpose with the rest of the Soudan, a point made by Foltz in his book on the
period. 697 The French made no effort to create a common national identity in French
Soudan, in fact, they had administrated the nomadic Tuareg separately and under military
rule. 698
694F
695F
696F
697F
Yet it is important to note that the colonial system had made civil registration a fraught
experience for the Tuareg, who were divided by borders, transformed into a minority in the
colonies, and discouraged from registration. Colonial registration for the Tuareg had
usually meant unfair taxation, forced schooling and coercive settlement policies. Under
such circumstances, this dissertation does adopts the view that the Tuareg did not so much
reject civic participation, but were rather placed by the French administration in an
impossible situation with only bad options.
Registration was done mostly for the sedentary population. According to the governor of
French Soudan; “such tasks (registration)...could be accomplished only for the sedentary
part of his population, step by step, and at high cost.” 699 Boilley argues as well that the
nomads in Kidal felt that the political options presented to them under the French
Community were unpalatable and favoured the sedentary population. 700 Lecocq argues
that the Tuareg were initially very interested in voting, but were only interested in voting
for French, Tuareg and Arab candidates, distrusting the other candidates. 701 As a result of
all of these factors, French nationality was mostly granted to the settled, urban population
and voting was oriented towards these groups.
698F
699F
700F
But even though political participation by the Tuareg in the French Community was low,
some Tuareg were registering and voting nonetheless and, importantly, the French began
appointing Tuareg into key posts in the military, police and administration as part of
695
Cooper, 132.
696
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 280.
697
Foltz ,94.
698 Keller, ‘The State, Public Policy and the Mediation of Ethnic Conflict in Africa’ in D. Rothchild and V. A
Olorunsola (eds.) State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Routledge 1983) 251.
699
Cooper, 154, quoting the Governor.
700
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 277-278.
701
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 43, 45, 47.
131
Africanization. 702 All this would change with independence, when hostility between the
new government and the Tuareg would break out into armed conflict. According to Lecocq,
for many Tuareg, colonization merely continued during the formation of Mali. 703
701F
702F
Conclusion
Territory, both socially and legally, is not to be regarded as an empty plot:
territory...connotes population, ethnic groupings loyalty patters, national
aspirations, a part of humanity, or, if one is tolerant of the metaphor, an
organism. 704
703F
This section explored how nationality was applied, or not applied, to colonized peoples in
the Sheikdom of Kuwait, French Soudan and North Borneo. While many colonized peoples
received no nationality status during the colonial period, some nomads did obtain a
nationality, while others were eligible for BPP status that did not grant the same rights as
other nationality statuses and others may have been registered by colonial
administrations, but not as nationals. 705 As a result, nomads entered decolonization with a
patchwork of different types of status.
704F
It is no accident that nationality as an area of law developed in tandem with colonial
expansion, a time when European empires were scrambling to claim territory both in
Europe and abroad. Nationality came to reflect a territorial conception of the world, where
place of birth, long-term residence and historic ties to land were prioritized over other,
non-territorial relationships and attachments. Place of birth and habitual residence became
crucial to determining status under the colonial system, but colonial sovereignty remained
fuzzy in the border zones where many nomads lived.
But while residence and place of birth became increasingly crucial to determining status
during the colonial period, a lack of civil registration left the matter of individual cases,
particularly in border regions, left the question of nationality for many nomads up for
debate. There were particular problems with the vagueness of key terms like ressortissant
and habitual residence in the colonial context. Even for laws based on place of birth, where
the category of eligible persons was clearer cut, the lack of civil registration created a
significant gap. While rural villagers might rely on a presumption of birth and residence in
a particular place, nomads could not necessarily establish such a presumption.
Under the British system, Kuwait and North Borneo were Protected states and, in the case
of North Borneo, a Crown Colony. As protectorates, nationality was determined by local
rulers, but with much input from the British. Under this system, the determination of
belonging and membership was taken away from nomadic leaders. In the case of Kuwait,
702
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 170.
703
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 104-105.
704
Brownlie, Principles, 658.
705
Crawford, 264.
132
the British established a relationship with the Emir in Kuwait Town and, as a result, the
power to determine nationality largely vested in the hands of the Al-Sabah family. In North
Borneo, the British were preoccupied by unifying their Malay colonies. The inhabitants of
North Borneo were eligible under the law for nationality, at least on paper, towards the
close of the British colonial period, but a severe lack of civil registration meant that this
nationality was not applied. In both cases, the British had also created British Protected
Person (BPP) status, which granted a type of non-nationality, personal status to some
persons without actually granting nationality itself.
The French government created multiple tiers of nationality in the colonies, differentiating
between active and passive nationals. Nationality heavily favoured persons in urban areas
and near the coast, particularly those who adopted French culture and civil law. In French
Soudan, holders of French subject status were eventually transformed into nationals
through a long and complex process that favoured settled persons living in urban areas.
Just as importantly, the colonial period imposed a worldview on post-colonial states that
would deeply affect nomad-state relations. The colonial period created tiers of
membership, with some persons receiving more rights than others. 706 It favoured settled
and urban peoples. Finally, colonization entrenched the nation-state system in colonized
regions, bringing hard borders and zones of exclusive sovereignty, which required
exclusive nationality. These changes would hit nomads very hard. In all three locations, the
lack of fixed borders, particularly within colonies, made the application of concepts like
residence, ressortissant and even place of birth very difficult to apply.
705F
As a result, while urban and settled communities benefited from increased access to
documents, registration and even some rights as nationals of empire, nomads were often
completely excluded from these developments. While this may have appeared as quasiindependence at the time, in reality, state systems were growing up around nomads
without their participation or input. As European-style states began to develop in urban
and coastal areas, nomads were often not included in this system, or came to reject it as
irrelevant or even harmful to their way of life. This mis-match, the mis-match between
nomadism and the needs and requirements of the nation-state system, would only worsen
during decolonization.
Once crucial point seen in all three examples is that under systems of indirect rule,
Europeans often signed agreements and imbued with administrative authority local
leaders with little regard to the complex political systems existing on the ground. Often,
“The modern concept of nationality... is primarily related to power over territory.” De Groot and Vonk, 7,
18. See also Bloom, Members, 2017, 157; Bader, 1; Van Panhuys, 32; J. Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’
18 LQR 49, 274, 278 (1902). Lesser forms of national status should not be confused with other, supplemental
forms of status, such as federal citizenship or EU citizenship. Lauterpacht, vol. 3, 11.
706
In the later cases, the individual holds multiple types of status. Brownlie, Principles, 397. Lesser forms of
nationality were a common tactic used during the 19th century to avoid giving full nationality rights to the
inhabitants of colonized territories. See for example L. Kerber, ‘Toward a History of Statelessness’ 57
American Quarterly 727 (2005) 734, for a discussion of lesser forms of nationality used by the United States.
133
nomadic rulers were overlooked in favour of settled, urban rulers. These leaders then
became the governments of post-colonial states and the arbitrators of nationality policy.
This fact can be seen in Kuwait, with the elevation of the Al-Sabah family over Bedouin
leaders of interior tribes. It can also be seen in the privileging of non-Tuareg leaders in Mali
and the Malay kingdoms in Malaysia. While some groups, like the Tuareg, pushed for a
reconsideration of colonial borders and state authority at decolonization, these efforts
were mostly ignored. Colonialism therefore created a shift of power away from nomad
leaders and into the hands of urban elites. This shift would have an enormous effect on the
status of nomads at decolonization and beyond.
134
2.2
Nationality Law and Nomads During Decolonization
Introduction
It can sometimes be difficult for theorists in the liberal tradition to examine
citizenship divorced from the mythology of emancipation surrounding its
development…The new forms of political membership in France, for example,
have been described as born of nationality, blood, family and land, and so in direct
rejection of serfdom. The Indigenous peoples discussed here did not share this
history. 707
706F
The proceeding section, above, identified the origins of a bias against nomads that formed
during the colonial period. It also explored how this bias created a mismatch between the
requirements to establish nationality, including civil registration and habitual residence,
and the practice of nomadism. This bias would place nomads at a severe disadvantage in
establishing their nationality in three important ways. First, it meant that the nomads who
survived the colonial period were often divided by fuzzy and disputed borders and lived in
zones of disputed sovereignty. Second, nomads were often cast as the source of disputed
sovereignty, labelled as criminals and problems. Third, nomads were often administered
separately under military, rather than civilian, rule and their nationality status was decided
by laws and procedures written by urban outsiders, rather than nomad leaders.
The policies of colonialism towards nomads would mostly be continued and enlarged upon
by post-colonial governments in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. But the process of state
formation and the development and implementation of nationality would take centre stage
during decolonization as weak colonial structures became post-colonial states. Meanwhile,
colonial nationality was extinguished and, in theory, replaced by post-colonial nationality.
Yet the roll-over of nationality that should have occurred was hampered by poor civil
registration, discrimination against minority groups and a lack of attention paid to the
problem of statelessness by the international community, post-colonial states and former
colonial powers.
This section will look at how the nationality regimes established during colonization were
continued, altered and expanded during decolonization. This section begins as a work of
legal analysis, charting the changes and developments made to the nationality laws in
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia and the ways in which these laws were applied to nomads by the
administrative state through civil registration.
This section will also look at the context surrounding the enactment of nationality laws in
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia and how these laws were applied, or not applied, to nomads. As
UNHCR explains in the Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons, it is important to
look at “not just legislation but also...practice” when analysing the creation of
707
Bloom, Members, 2017, 161.
135
statelessness. 708 The UNHCR Handbook goes on to say, “a state may not in practice follow
the letter of the law, even going so far as to ignore its substance.” 709 This section will look
therefore not only at nationality laws, but also at how they were implemented, both in the
immediate post-colonial period and in the decades following.
707F
708F
An analysis of how states applied nationality to nomads, however, cannot be fully
understood without the larger context of the decolonization period. In many ways, for
nomads, decolonization would simply mark a continuation and worsening of their
exclusion. This section will next look at how concerns over identity, immigration and state
control of territory and natural resources influenced the development and implementation
of nationality laws in the three new states, particularly in relation to nomads. Finally, this
section will end with a summary of the current status of nomads as nationals, stateless
persons or persons of undetermined nationality in their states.
Nomads and Nationality during Decolonization
Decolonization, a long process sometimes taking decades, was sometimes begun by treaty
and these treaties often contained provisions on nationality. 710 While each former colony
went through a slightly different process, in the former British Protectorates and Protected
States, a Royal Proclamation or Order in Council usually stipulated nationality provisions
which were mirrored in the Constitutions of many of the new states. 711
709F
710F
Post-colonial states like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia adopted laws based on principles of
European nationality law described above. As this section will discuss, statelessness may
result from both deliberately discriminatory nationality laws, but also from the
discriminatory application of facially neutral nationality laws, which employed fuzzy
concepts where nomads were concerned, easing the path of discriminatory treatment, and
from the widespread lack of civil registration, which made transitional laws impossible to
apply. 712 One important question in many post-colonial states was the extent to which
colonial-era nationality, such as it was, should roll-over into post-colonial nationality. To
solve this problem, many states drafted transitional laws based on residence and birth in
the territory of the state 713 to establish what this dissertation will call the state’s “first body
of nationals.”
711F
712F
708
Handbook, 2014, 12.
709
Handbook, 2014, 13.
710
Weis, 153.
711
Weis, 153.
712 R. Razali, R. Nordin and T., ‘Migration and Statelessness: Turning the Spotlight on Malaysia’ 23 Pertanika J.
Soc. Sci. and Hum. 19 (2015) 22-23, 28-29. See also Fripp, 2016, 320. In some cases, such discrimination may
amount to persecution. Handbook 2014 5; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008 20.
713
Donner, 278-280. See also Brubaker, 278.
136
But concepts like ressortissant, “habitual resident” and “domicile” were ill defined under
colonization and hard to apply in border areas and zones of fuzzy or disputed
sovereignty. 714 This was particularly true for nomads, who frequently found themselves in
border zones and whose migrations made concepts like habitual residence hard to apply.
While nationality laws were enacted based on supposedly hard borders and robust civil
registration, the reality for many nomads was quite different. 715 The lack of civil
registration during the colonial period meant that post-colonial states had to accomplish
large-scale registration exercises in these zones, yet it was difficult to register nomads or
prove they qualified under nationality laws. As Conklin puts it,
713F
714F
members of nomadic and travelling groups generally lack fixed addresses, which
are needed to qualify for nationality documentation. 716
715F
As well, colonial-era anti-nomad policies had often blamed nomads for the problem of
unclear borders and fuzzy sovereignty. Nomads were perceived as having ties to multiple
states, loyal only to their tribes and lacking the exclusive allegiance needed for nationality.
Arendt highlighted the particular vulnerability to statelessness of peoples who are
perceived as lacking fixed ties to any country. 717
716F
This section will also explore the increasing important of documents, something that was
mostly unimportant during the pre-colonial period and of middling importance to nomads
during the colonial period. The post-colonial period would see an explosion in the
importance of ID. Passports, ID cards, and birth certificate are all relatively recent
inventions, dating to the 19th and 20th centuries, yet they have quickly become vital in the
post-colonial period to proving nationality, legitimacy and belonging. 718
717F
Finally, this section will also highlight how the international community and the former
colonial powers mostly ignored the problem of statelessness at decolonization, with
catastrophic results. Even as the problem of statelessness came to be viewed with
increasing seriousness in Europe, few decolonized states ratified the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness of 1961. Article 10 provides that no one should become stateless
as a result of a transfer of territory, which is highly relevant to the status of nomads at
Jault-Seseke notes that the term domicile continues to be difficult to define and “the evaluation of domicile
has fluctuated.” Jault-Seseke, 111.
714
715
Bloom, Members, 2017, 160. See generally Koessler.
716
Conklin, 124.
Arendt, 1976, 289. Border populations during decolonization often ended up stateless. For an example, see
Thai villagers who ended up in Burma after the separation of the two countries in 1893, but who now live in
Thailand. Bangkok Post, ‘Stateless Fight for their Thai Identity’ 19 March 2016 at
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/special-reports/903200/stateless-fight-for-their-thai-identity
(Accessed July 2020).
717
The international passport system, for example, came into being after World War I. Weis, 223; Maury, 1819.
718
137
decolonization, 719 yet statelessness was extremely low on the decolonization agenda. The
extent to which the ratification of this treaty might have provided a solution to nomad
statelessness at the time will be discussed at greater length in Part 3, below.
718F
The next sections will explore the decolonization period, looking at the nationality of the
Bedouin in Kuwait, the Tuareg Mali and the Sama Dilaut Malaysia as transitional nationality
laws were enacted and rolled out, then replaced by permanent nationality laws. It was
during this critical period that many nomads became stateless.
UN General Assembly, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 989, 175, Article 10 (hereinafter Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness).
719
138
The Bedouin Under Kuwait’s Nationality Law
Statelessness in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) can be seen to
have initially arisen following the creation of the modern states in the
region. 720
719F
This section will discuss nationality during the creation of Kuwait’s “first body of nationals"
and the drafting of Kuwait’s nationality law. Many stateless people in Kuwait, labelled the
bidoon jinsiya, or those without status, can trace their family history back to a Bedouin
grandparent or great-grandparent who, for reasons explored in this section, remained
unregistered during the crucial post-colonial period. 721 As this section will show, the
failure to register many Bedouin at decolonization opened the door to later
statelessness. 722
720F
721F
Kuwaiti independence was achieved by the termination of the protectorate agreement by
the Kuwaiti Emir and Britain over a number of years ending in 1961. 723 One of the Kuwaiti
government’s first tasks was to draft a nationality law in 1959. 724 This law drew on
previous decrees, discussed above, and was influenced by the western concepts of
nationality and sovereignty. The law also incorporated descent from a Kuwaiti father, a
core principle of belonging under Islamic law.
722F
723F
Original Kuwaiti nationals are those persons who were settled in Kuwait
prior to 1920 and who maintained their normal residence there until the
date of the publication of this Law. Ancestral residence shall be deemed
complementary to the period of residence of descendants. A person is
Z. Al Barazi and J. Tucker, ‘Challenging the disunity of statelessness in the Middle East and North Africa’ in
T. Bloom (ed.) Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 87.
720
See for example the applicant in Refugee Appeal No. 74467, No. 74467, New Zealand: Refugee Status
Appeals Authority, 1 September 2004:
721
“The appellant is a single man aged 22 years. His parents and eight younger siblings remain living in Kuwait.
He and his family are bidoons meaning ‘without nationality’. His grandparents, he believes, and their
forebears were desert-dwelling bedouins who moved with their flocks of sheep within the area between
Jahra and Al-Ahmadi some 50 kilometres south of Kuwait city. He understands from his father that his
grandparents had a permanent house – the location of which he is uncertain – though they would move with
their sheep during springtime, living in their tents. They sold their sheep in Kuwait City. His parents, from the
time of their marriage, have lived a settled life in the city though his father has always traded in sheep.”
Across the Middle East, registration exercises after colonial independence often created stateless
populations by failing to register certain groups, or purposefully excluding them. Manby, Legal, 324.
722
723
Crawford, 319. See also Casey, 21.
724
Fransman, 185.
139
deemed to have maintained his normal residence in Kuwait even if he resides
in a foreign country if he has the intention of returning to Kuwait. 725
724F
The law adopted a clearly territorial approach. The law was considerably more restrictive
than the 1948 decree, removing belonging based on religion and ethnicity. It got rid of the
provision allowing the children of Muslim and Arab fathers born in Kuwait to be Kuwaiti
nationals, centring Kuwaiti nationality even further around territoriality, rather than
religion and ethnicity. It instead elevated settlement in Kuwait at the time of the Battle of
Jahra (1920) to be a key determinant of Kuwaiti belonging. 726 Under this law, the defence
of Jahra and Kuwait Town from so-called Bedouin invaders was made central to Kuwaiti
nationality. Most of the Hathar population clearly qualified as original Kuwaitis under the
law. 727 Tribal politics, however, would continue to play a role in Kuwaiti naturalization, as
will be discussed, below.
725F
726F
The increasing reliance on residence to determine Kuwaiti nationality was widely accepted
at the time as a way to avoid statelessness. Weis, speaking of the example of Burma, states
that by using residence, “statelessness is thus normally avoided although cases of
statelessness have occurred...” 728 In Kuwait, however, many persons became stateless as a
result of gaps in this process of determining the first body of nationals because (1) serious
gaps in civil registration in Kuwait meant that only a very few inhabitants of the colonies
had ever obtained identity documents to prove their residence, (2) the power to determine
nationality had been centralized under the authority of the Emir who did not regard some
Bedouin clans in Kuwait as his allies and (3) the vague concept of residence and the fuzzy
nature of Kuwait’s borders meant that determining who qualified under the transitional
law was an arbitrary process rife with discrimination. This was particularly true of the
Bedouin.
727F
The older system of clan and family alliances that determined belonging in Kuwait before
1962 would come into play in how the new nationality law was implemented, however.
This is because while Kuwait’s nationality law appeared neutral on its face, in reality it was
vague when applied to the Bedouin. It would also play a large role in the process of
naturalization, a process which would occur in stages over the next decade. Because the
law was vague when it came to the Bedouin because it was not clear what it meant to be
‘settled’ in the Bedouin context, this opened the door for discrimination. It is important to
note the significance of the Battle of Jahra for some Bedouin, who were now framed as
attackers of Kuwait, rather than as nationals. Beaugrand argues that Kuwait’s nationality
1959 Nationality Law of Kuwait, art. 1 (translation on Refworld). See also Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 2;
Ismael, 188.
725
726
Lund-Johansen, 24.
727
Al-Nakib, 11-12.
728
Weis, 153. He goes on to mention Uganda.
140
law has led to a nationality system that is based more on “networks of proximity” than the
provisions in the law. 729
728F
Registration would be crucial for Bedouin attempting to prove Kuwaiti nationality under
this vague, territorial law. As a result, the committees tasked with registering the
population had enormous discretion to determine which Bedouin should qualify, leaving
room for considerations of clan and family alliances that were not written into the law, but
were suggested by the focus on the date 1920. Beaugrand highlights what she calls the
“hyper-localized” process by which the committees made their decisions. 730
729F
Because the law appeared neutral on its face and complied with European norms, it did not
trigger the sort of push-back that might have occurred had Kuwait adopted strictly tribal
criteria in determining its first body of nationals. As the above sections explored,
predicating nationality on settlement was not considered to be discriminatory under
European law, but rather a natural expression of state formation. The idea that Kuwait’s
law was inherently discriminatory against the Bedouin seems to not have been raised at all
at the time, though more research is needed.
To register Kuwaitis during the post-colonial, transitional period, the government created
committees to asses who qualified under the law. The process, however, was very biased.
Even when evidence of nationality was produced by Bedouin, it was often ignored. 731 Some
Bedouin with documents showing, for example, that they owned property in what was now
Kuwait were often prevented from registering. 732 As well, the work of these committees,
based in Kuwait City, was probably unknown to many Bedouin.
730F
731F
Many more Bedouin likely did not have any documentation to prove that they owned land
in what was now Kuwait. 733 It was not clear what other forms of documentation might be
used to prove residence. Beaugrand notes the committees often had “almost no
documentary records to prove settlement before 1920” and sometimes may have
discounted oral testimony. 734 Most committees were based in urban areas 735 and, as with
Mali, registration was often performed by members of the urban population. Beaugrand
notes that “(s)imilarity of culture, traditions, appearance, dialect and costume” may have
732F
733F
729
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 75.
730
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 81-82.
731
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 124-125.
734F
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 124. See also Lund-Johansen, 25, where she calls the process
“arbitrary.” See also Al-Nakib, 12.
732
733
Al-Nakib, 12.
734
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 83-84.
735
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 83.
141
confused committees trying to determine the legitimacy of Bedouin claims. 736 Failure to
register the Bedouin was therefore likely a mixture of deliberate exclusion, ignorance and
the total mismatch between Bedouin forms of belonging, discussed above, and the paperbased, territorial system introduced during colonization.
735F
The registration of the Bedouin was also complicated by the location of the border. The
division of nomad lands had left many clans divided between what were now separate
nation states, giving further cause for the Kuwaiti government to exclude them as nonresidents. No mechanism was put in place during decolonization to force adjacent states
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to negotiate to find a solution for the nationality of crossborder populations. In this way, the lack of compatibility between nomadism and the
requirements of territorial nationality allowed for rampant discrimination, despite the law
appearing neutral on its face.
More research on the process of registering the Bedouin during this crucial period is
needed to fully understand this process, but it is clear that a system based on settlement
and habitual residence and reliant on documentation was not helpful for Bedouin
attempting to establish Kuwaiti nationality. As well, a long history of problems between the
Bedouin and the British administration left many Bedouin with lacklustre views about
participating in registration activities. Some Bedouin may have seen no need for official
Kuwaiti nationality, though the Bedouin point of view of this registration process is
somewhat lacking. 737 Once again, the perspectives of the Bedouin are lacking. It is possible
that some Bedouin misunderstood the importance of the decisions being made by the
Kuwaiti government regarding their nationality status, or what these decisions would
mean for their children and grandchildren.
736F
As one descendant of a Bedouin family explained;
The appellant believes his paternal grandfather would have applied for
citizenship under the 1959 Citizenship Law. However, as there was a limited
period in which to do so and the grandfather was an illiterate nomad,
possibly with little appreciation of the significance of such legal
requirements, he cannot be certain of the actual situation. 738
737F
In short, the registration process favoured the urban population, those with
documentation, those who owned land or had settled, and those with family connections or
who came from certain tribes.
In Kuwait, however, lacking a nationality did not mean the Bedouin were to remain
unregistered. Quite to the contrary. Between 1960 and 1987, Bedouin in Kuwait who had
736
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 83.
737 Gilbert, Nomadic ,2014, 161. See also Country Information and Guidance: Kuwaiti Bidoon, Home Office, UK,
3 Feb 2014.
Refugee Appeal No. 74467, No. 74467, New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals Authority, (1 September
2004).
738
142
no nationality papers from another country were issued identity documents with the
official status of bidoon jinsiyya, or “without nationality” under a special administrative
process. 739 Importantly, this status did not fall under Kuwait’s nationality law, but was
instead an administrative designation. The registration process for issuing these
documents, those establishing bidoon status, appears to have been a great deal more
successful than the registration of nationality and many former Bedouin, now frequently
settled in shanty towns near urban areas, receiving these documents. The next section will
explore in greater detail the settlement of the Bedouin and how their settlement interacted
with their nationality status.
738F
The decades following the enactment of Kuwait’s nationality law would see a steady
tightening in registration procedures. In 1965, the government made issuance of a birth
certificate compulsory, meaning that it became almost impossible to avoid the bidoon
designation. 740 Bedouin children were now issued birth certificates certifying their birth in
Kuwait and, if applicable, their bidoon status. These documents would become their only
form of identification. 741 Meanwhile, in 1965, Kuwait conducted a census, but some bidoon
were excluded and, as a result, missed out on an opportunity to prove their ties to Kuwait
by showing birth or residence in Kuwait’s territory. 742
739F
740F
741F
According to Beaugrand, however, some bidoon were registered in the census, though this
has not resulted in their recognition as nationals. 743 Nevertheless, registration as part of a
census may be key to establishing nationality for some bidoon in the future. For the most
part, however, these registration processes began the transformation of the unregistered
population of now-settled Bedouin into the bidoon, as people received identity documents
establishing not their nationality, but their statelessness.
742F
Until the 1970s, the government of Kuwait was not overly concerned with the nonnaturalized Bedouin living in shanty towns outside of urban areas. They were mostly
outside Kuwait City and, where employed, were usually used as low-level members of the
military, police force, and as border guards or guards at the oil fields. As government jobs
became increasingly restricted to naturalized persons, the bidoon population was
increasingly restricted to the informal employment sector. In keeping with the creation of
tiers of nationality that had been so central to the colonial period, the Kuwaiti government
did not make all Bedouin bidoon. Bedouin fighters from certain tribes continued to serve in
the Kuwaiti military and, increasingly, as guards in the oil fields. The next two decades
would see a steady erosion in the rights and status of the bidoon.
739
Longva, Citizenship, 187. See also Al-Nakib, 12.
740
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 88.
741
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 129.
Amnesty International ‘The Withouts of Kuwait: Nationality for Stateless Bidun Now’ (September 16,
2013).
742
743
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 199.
143
During the 1960s, the Emir and his advisers decided to “naturalize” a certain number of
Bedouin from friendly tribes. Naturalization was done on an ad-hoc basis, making it a type
of extra-legal process with no appeals process or judicial review. 744 The selected Bedouin
received naturalization (bi-l-tajannus) by decree, as opposed to the status of “Kuwaitis at
birth” (bi-l-asl) under the nationality law. 745 There was no question that naturalization was
inferior to being an “original” Kuwaiti, a fact which would perpetuate the idea that Bedouin
were not really Kuwaiti in some fundamental way. Naturalized citizens could not vote for
15 years, they could not pass on their nationality to their children, and naturalization could
be revoked by the government at any time. 746 For the government, selecting which
Bedouin to make Kuwaiti nationals was a delicate decision, highly political at the time, and
remaining so today. 747 The political, cultural and historical factors that influenced the
implementation of this law will be discussed in the next section.
743F
744F
745F
746F
In 1965, the process of registering as an “original Kuwaiti” was closed. 748 As a result,
naturalization became the key process by which Bedouin in Kuwait could obtain a
nationality. In 1968, the government passed a law that all police officers had to be
nationals, shutting out all bidoon who did not have a Kuwaiti birth certificate. 749 In 1969,
the committee in charge of registrations was dismantled and registration would now occur
on an ad-hoc basis. At the same time, the rules for naturalization became more and more
restrictive; the law was amended seven times adding additional restrictions. 750
747F
748F
749F
In 1974, the government created a new police college that would not admit bidoon except
on a case by case basis. One of the few avenues for employment for bidoon was quickly
closing. 751 Many only had birth certificates but no other documentation. 752 As the bidoon
did not in any way agitate for greater representation, this status quo suited the
government. As a result of these factors, holders of the status of bidoon have transformed
750F
751F
744
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2010, 84.
745
Partrick, 56-57. See also Ismael, 118-119; Longva, Autocracy, 121.
Parolin, 97. Kuwait was not the only Gulf state to employ tiers of nationality. For example, Qatar created
two tiers of nationality with native citizens and naturalized persons with fewer rights. Partrick, 55-56. The
creation of classes such as bidoon, or those with no nationality, and ajam (which means persian), which has
become synonymous with naturalized nationals, has become the norm in Gulf States.
746
747
Longva, Citizenship, 188.
748
Lund-Johansen, 26.
J. Crystal, ‘Public Order and Authority: Policing Kuwait’ in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori (eds.) Monarchies and
Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (Tauris 2005), 176 (hereinafter Crystal).
749
750
Longva, Autocracy, 121. See also Longva, Citizenship, 185.
751
Crystal, 176.
752
Commins, 122, 185.
144
into a separate, distinct community, no longer primarily identified by their nomadic past,
but rather by their outsider status.
The naturalization program came to an end in 1980. Any families who had not been
included would now remain without a nationality. 753 Also in 1980, a rarely used provision
providing nationality to children who would otherwise be stateless was removed, ending
the only protection against statelessness in Kuwaiti law. This provision had only benefited
a small handful of people, but it coincided with the gradual reduction in bidoon rights. 754
Two new classifications were introduced into Kuwaiti law: that of “non-Kuwaitis” and that
of “undetermined nationality.” 755 In 1981, naturalization was limited to Muslims. 756 This
legacy of increasingly exclusionary laws would lead to the creation of a permanently
stateless population of former Bedouin and, in much smaller numbers, migrants, living on
the margins of Kuwaiti society.
752F
753F
754F
755F
In the 1980s, the toleration of the bidoon in Kuwait began to change. The regional security
situation and the constant threat Kuwait was under from its larger neighbours began to
rival the problem of internal power balances. As was described above, many bidoon in
Kuwait had long standing connections and loyalties to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and even Syria
and Jordan, but perhaps more importantly, were perceived as having these connections. 757
In fact, these ties were part of the reason some Bedouin tribes had been excluded from
naturalization in the first place. Yet now, the failure of the Kuwaiti government to
regularize the status of its bidoon population had become a security threat. Meanwhile, the
question of the status of the bidoon became increasingly political as activists agitated for
change.
756F
By 1985, during the Iran-Iraq war, the government declared all bidoon illegal residents,
cutting them off from all legal employment, schooling and welfare. 758 The government
expelled all remaining bidoon from the police force and military. 759 As Beaugrand puts it,
“the fact that the biduns stemmed from tribes, stretching into Iraq, that included both
Sunnis and Shiites...made the government particularly worried...” 760 Thousands of bidoon
757F
758F
759F
753
Longva, Autocracy, 122.
754
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 128.
C. Beaugrand, ‘Framing Nationality in the Migratory Context: The Elusive Category of Biduns in Kuwait’
(Author’s Manuscript) 6 Middle East Law and Governance 1 (2014) 10.
755
756
Longva, Autocracy, 121.
U. Fabietti, ‘Facing Change in Arabia: The Bedouin Community and the Notion of Development’ in Chatty
(ed.) Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century (Brill 2006) 573. See
also Janzen 3 (discussing similar views of Bedouin in Oman).
757
758
Lund-Johansen, 32. See also Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 124-125.
759
Crystal, 176. See also Lund-Johansen, 2, 32.
760
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 120.
145
were fired from their jobs in the army and oil fields. When bidoon attempted to apply for
naturalization, the Minister of the Interior stated that “90%” of bidoon applicants were
lying about qualifying. The government would sometimes deport individual bidoon by
dropping them off at the Iraqi border, evoking the Alien Residence Act. 761 In 1986, the
government restricted bidoon access to passports, then made it a federal offense not to
have a passport. Hostility against naturalization for the bidoon now rivals that of the
hostility against naturalizing immigrants. 762
760F
761F
The role of documentation and its power to legitimize, or de-legitimize, nationality claims
cannot be understated in the case of the bidoon. 763 Kuwait has issued security cards
granting five years of residence to registered bidoon, but though these cards prevent
deportation, they require that the individual state a “true nationality,” such as Saudi Arabia.
Most bidoon refuse to do so as this can lead to being branded as a foreigner for the
purposes of gaining birth certificates and other documents. 764 The government has even,
allegedly, taken to issuing fake foreign passports to bidoon. 765 Recently, the Kuwaiti
government has begun issuing all bidoon with a “security ID” dividing bidoons into those
considered to be security risks and those who may have their nationality status reviewed at
some unspecified point in the future. 766
762F
763F
764F
765F
Kuwait has not ratified the Statelessness Conventions, but in 1993 it set up a procedure for
the adjudication of cases of statelessness called the Central Committee. 767 This Committee
has decreased the bidoon population by about half, mostly through deportation to Iraq. 768
Some bidoon have been granted residency, while others have been given documents which
label them as foreign. Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti government has recently proposed a solution
for the bidoon to purchase a nationality for the bidoon in the Comoros or Sudan. 769
766F
767F
768F
Crystal, 178. See also Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and
Repression in Kuwait’ (2012).
761
762
Partrick, 57.
763
Crystal ,174-175.
Human Rights Watch, ‘Prisoners of the Past, Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness’ (13 June
2011). See also Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in
Kuwait’ (2012); Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 149.
764
Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in Kuwait’
(2012).
765
766
Lund-Johansen, 45-46.
767
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018,, 127.
768
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 130.
‘Are Sudanese passports the Bidoons’ solution?’ Al Jazeera (11 March 2018) at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/sudanese-passports-bidoons-solution-180311153502061.html
(Accessed July 2020).
769
146
As this section has shown, many bidoon missed the window of registration following the
enactment of Kuwait’s nationality law because they were not able to prove residence in
Kuwait before the 1920 Battle of Jahra. Those who were not granted naturalization were
subsequently locked out of a nationality by jus sanguinis. There is evidence of widespread
discrimination against certain Bedouin tribes, combined with a lack of clarity by what is
meant by “residence” for the Bedouin population at the time of decolonization. Below, this
dissertation will explore the political and social forces that drove Kuwait’s increasingly
restrictive nationality laws and the exclusion of some Bedouin tribes. The next section,
however, will look at Mali’s nationality law and how it was applied to the Tuareg.
147
The Tuareg Under Mali’s Nationality Law
The Committee wishes to particularly stress the risk of becoming stateless
for unregistered children of nomadic indigenous parents who frequently
move across the borders of different countries. 770
769F
In 1960, French Soudan, renamed Mali, became fully independent under the socialist
Modibo Keïta. 771 Mali became independent by proclamation. 772 Nationality was not
transferred by treaty provisions in Mali, 773 but were instead set by a transitional law. 774
Like in Kuwait, decolonization and the drafting of nationality laws took place over a
relatively short period of time. Malian nationality law was heavily influenced by French
nationality law. 775 This section will explore how Mali’s nationality laws developed and
were applied, or not applied, to the Tuareg. As the above section showed, many Tuareg
entered the decolonization period as nationals of French Soudan. Yet, as this section will
discuss, this nationality did not roll over into Malian nationality. In particular, this section
will show how Mali’s law came to contain powerful protections against statelessness,
including the principle of double birth, where some children born in Mali to non-nationals
also born in Mali are eligible for nationality. Yet, as this section will discuss, the law has not
protected the Tuareg from statelessness.
770F
771F
772F
773F
774F
Unlike in Kuwait, most West Africans entered decolonization as nationals of France, at least
on paper, but due to the weakness of the French état civil, most did not have proof of
nationality. As well, the laws on the état civil had not been applied equally to all Africans, so
while many urban and coastal groups had registered and begun voting, some rural
populations, including many Tuareg, had not. All ressortissants of French Soudan were now
eligible to become Malian nationals under the transitional laws. But this meant that even
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, ‘General Comment on Article 6 of the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ ACERWC/GC/02 (2014) adopted by the Committee at
its twenty-third Ordinary Session (07 - 16 April, 2014) 6, 29-30.
770
Diarrah, 37. See also Gaudio, 1988, 107; Crawford, 330. It should be noted that for 2 months in 1960, Mali
was to be part of a Federation with what would become Senegal. The Federation dissolved in August of 1960
under the Constitutional Law of 4 June. See also Decheix, 302.
771
Loi n. 60-14 du 20 juin 1960 « proclamant solennellement l’indépendance nationale de la fédération du
Mali » Journal Officiel de la Fédération du Mali (22 juin 1960) 383.
772
773
Donner, 281.
774 Ordonnance n. 55 du 24 novembre 1960 « relative à l’attribution de la nationalité malienne à tous les
ressortissants de la République du Mali » Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) 15 décembre 1960
p.986. Decheix, 302.
As Christophe Wondji puts it, “the first generations (of African leaders) were...inspired by the principles
and the methods of the European political philosophy,” including the philosophy of nationality and national
belonging. C. Wondji, Symbolismes Culturels Traditionnels et Indépendances Africaines (Institut d’histoire du
temps présent 1990) 1.
775
148
where registration been carried out, it was not clear who would qualify in border areas or
amongst nomadic and mobile populations, leaving the door open, as in Kuwait, to
discrimination.
Mali’s nationality law adopted many principles from French law, including the principle of
double birth, by which qualifying children born in Mali to parents who were themselves
born in Mali were automatically attributed nationality. 776 Nevertheless, it was not possible
to automatically transfer French nationality to Malian nationality without a major
registration program by the state. Even for those certain classes of nationals under
colonial-era laws who qualified for automatic transfer under the transitional laws, 777
registration in Tuareg areas was interrupted almost before it began by civil war. As stated
above, many Tuareg leaders entered the decolonization process intent on political
independence. Yet, despite the push by some Tuareg nobles and French politicians to
create a Sahara Français, many African governments supported existing borders during
decolonization under the doctrine of uti possidetis. 778 The political situation would come to
a head shortly after colonial independence, all but preventing large scale civil registration
in Tuareg areas.
775F
776F
777F
One of the first tasks of the Malian government was to replace French Community
nationality with Malian nationality. 779 Drafting a nationality law would be a critical part of
defining Mali’s “first body of nationals” and who would now be the nationals of foreign
states, including ones with close ties to Mali, such as Senegal. As the African Commission
put it, states at independence had to determine who would make up their “human capital”
and who would not. 780 Temporary provisions to create Mali’s first body of nationals were
passed in 1960. 781 Article 1 of the temporary Ordinance stated that all ressortissants of Mali
778F
779F
780F
Ordonnance n. 55 du 24 novembre 1960 « relative à l'attribution de la nationalité malienne à tous les
ressortissants de la République du Mali » Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) (15 Décembre
1960) 986.
776
Ordonnance n. 55 du 24 novembre 1960 « relative à l'attribution de la nationalité malienne à tous les
ressortissants de la République du Mali » Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) (15 Décembre
1960) 986. Provisions in French law for retaining French nationality may be found in Loi n. 60-752 du 28
juillet 1960 « portant modification de certaines dispositions du code de la nationalité ».
777
See for example Organization of African Unity, Resolution 16(1) (1964). See also Shaw, Boundaries, 1997,
478.
778
779
African Commission, 96-97.
780
African Commission, para 96. See also Diarrah, 86. See also Young, 5.
Ordonnance n. 55 du 24 novembre 1960 « relative à l'attribution de la nationalité malienne à tous les
ressortissants de la République du Mali » Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) (15 Décembre
1960) 986. Zatzepine, 20.
781
149
were now Malian nationals, 782 excepting French citizens and those with “French civil
status,” meaning those who had opted into the French civil code, and their spouses and
descendants. 783 It was not clear, however, what it meant to be a ressortissant of Mali, a
country that had only begun to exist months before and had been originally conceived of as
being in a federation with Senegal. Article 1 of the Ordinance went on to state that the exact
class of people to whom Article 1 would apply would be determined by a future law based
on descent or place of birth.
781F
782F
The law then went on to automatically grant Malian nationality to various specific classes
of persons holding French colonial nationality, unless Malian nationality was refused. 784
Qualifying persons included those holding French nationality under various colonial-era
laws, including under the Constitution of 1946. The law also covered the holders of French
nationality from the four communes in Senegal. The status of many other in Mali, however,
remained somewhat unclear. 785 Finally, under this Ordinance, the Malian government
could grant nationality to individuals who had been residents in Mali for two years. The
term “resident” was not clearly defined.
783F
784F
Registration should have been the process by which the Tuareg would be sorted into
Malian Tuareg and foreign Tuareg. Those Tuareg who held a nationality in French Soudan
should have received Malian nationality automatically, but Mali failed to put into place a
widespread civil registration process. The authorities in charge of what was now northern
Mali had been elevated by the French administrative system and were often not Tuareg
themselves. The centralization of the administrative state, with its focus on urban centres
and the settled population, made registration difficult among the Tuareg, who had been
used to separate administration by the French.
As Odinkalu puts it, “(t)he African political, educated and urban elite emerged as a new
class ripe with economic and social mobility, while uneducated, rural peoples remained
locked in extended postcolonial exclusion.” 786 Many Tuareg families, used to weak French
administrative structures and the relative lack of importance of internal colonial borders,
were accustomed to migrating and traveling back and forth across what were now
international borders, complicating the question of their residence. At the same time,
registration and nationality were associated with oppressive French rule, and now, with
rule from distant Bamako. Most importantly, however, Tuareg leaders found themselves
targeted as enemies of the state due to fears over Tuareg separatism. The question of
785F
Ordonnance n. 55 du 24 novembre 1960 « relative à l’attribution de la nationalité malienne à tous les
ressortissants de la République du Mali » Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) (15 Décembre
1960) 986.
782
Loi n. 60-752 du 28 juillet 1960 portant modification de certaines dispositions du code de la nationalité
(28 juillet 1960). See also Weis, 154; Decheix, 302.
783
784
Donner, 281.
785
Decheix, 303.
786
Odinkalu, 113. See also Heater, 133.
150
Tuareg nationality would soon become subsumed into the larger question of Tuareg
political independence.
Mali enacted a permanent nationality code in 1962. 787 It was updated in 1995 and replaced
by the Code des Personnes et de la Famille in 2011. 788 Article 68 of the 1962 Code contained
the following transitional provision:
786F
787F
(a)ll persons resident in Mali at the time of the enactment of the nationality code
are presumed nationals of Mali unless proven otherwise. Nationality certificates
should not be issued unless residence can be proven or local public officials such
as the chef d’arrondissement attest that the individual has the de facto status of
being Malian. 789
788F
Critically, the law relied heavily on the concept of residence, just as Kuwait’s nationality
law had done. Zatzepine argues that “residence” in article 68 meant habitual residence. 790
What this meant for nomadic Tuareg, however, was not clear. While many slaves and
haratin had settled and been granted land during the colonial period, as discussed above in
the section on the Tuareg in French Soudan, noble Tuareg remained largely nomadic and
split across borders, greatly complicating the question of their residence and/or their
treatment as nationals.
789F
This presumption in favour of nationality is more liberal than the laws of some other
African states though, in principle, the nationality laws of post-colonial Francophone Africa
commonly favoured recognition of nationality for those who had always behaved as
nationals and been accepted as nationals. 791 The Malian Circulaire d’application n. 331
defines “possession of the state of being Malian” as anyone who is constantly considered to
be Malian and was constantly treated as such by the authorities and public opinion. 792 It is
not clear how this clause might have been interpreted in the case of the Tuareg.
790F
791F
It is important to note that the chef d’arrondissement had been a middle-level functionary
under the French system and was often not Tuareg. The French administrative structure,
centralized, urban and agricultural-focused, had now been adopted by the Malian
Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962 as modified by the Loi No. 9570 of 25
August 1995 and replaced by the Loi 2011-087 of 30 December 2011. See also Cooper, 419.
787
Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962 as modified by the Loi No. 9570 of 25
August 1995 and replaced by the Loi 2011-087 of 30 December 2011.
788
Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962 as modified by the Loi No. 9570 of 25
August 1995 and replaced by the Loi 2011-087 of 30 December 2011. See also Cooper, 419 art. 68. See also
Decheix, 309.
789
790
Zatzepine, 20-21.
B. Manby, ‘Trends in Citizenship Law and Politics in Africa Since the Colonial Era’ in E. Isin and P. Nyers
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (Routledge 2014) 174.
791
792
Zatzepine, 21.
151
Constitution as the administrative system of Mali. While some functionaries in northern
Mali were drawn from the local population, it was not uncommon for southerners to be
sent to northern Mali as administrators. It is not at all clear to what extent the chef
d’arrondissement was the proper authority to determine Tuareg residence.
As it was, the question of Tuareg registration would be all but forgotten in coming armed
conflict over Tuareg independence. 1962 was the year that war broke out in northern Mali
between the Tuareg and the government, the effects of which were devastating on every
aspect of Tuareg life and which will be discussed at length below. It is likely that widescale
registration for many nomadic Tuareg was never attempted. 793
792F
Meanwhile, Tuareg leaders who had received a nationality from the French were to be
intensively persecuted by the Malian government during the civil war, rendering their
nationality largely ineffective and preventing a transfer of nationality for many noble
Tuareg. The government’s concerns over separatism is reflected in Art. 43(bis) of the
Malian nationality code, which provided for the denationalization by decree of “any Malian
national serving in or helping a foreign army or foreign public service provided the host
country is, with his help, engaged in hostilities against Mali.” 794 The extent to which noble
Tuareg were stripped of their French documents during the 1963 war is unknown and
awaits further study.
793F
Following the transitional provisions establishing Mali’s first body of nationals, the new
law adopted the principle of jus sanguinis and double birth for the future establishment of
Malian nationality. Article 8 of the 1962 Code begins: “Malians are all persons born in Mali
or abroad who...are legitimately born of a Malian father...” 795 The Malian Code contained
several important exceptions to jus sanguinis that made the law more liberal than many
nationality laws of the time, 796 including Kuwait or, as will be discussed below, Malaysia.
For example, Article 12 of the Malian Code provided nationality to “natural or legitimate
children born in Mali to a father or mother of African origin also born in Mali...;” limited
double birth that would extend Malian nationality to any families of African origin who had
not registered under the transitional provisions. 797
794F
795F
796F
According to Decheix, an expert on Mali’s early nationality laws, the provision on double
birth was retained over some objections because of questions over the nationality of
According to an interview with noted Mali specialist Arsène Brice Bado of the Centre de Recherche et
d’Action pour la Paix (CERAP) in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire in fall 2018.
793
794
My translation.
795
Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962, art. 8 (my translation).
796
Zatzepine, 143.
Code de Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962, art. 12 (my translation). See also Decheix,
305; Zatzepine, 32. For more on Mali’s nationality law, see H. Alexander, ‘Report on Citizenship Law: Mali’
(GlobalCit, European University Institute 2020.)
797
152
communities in border areas. 798 While racially discriminatory, this provision might have
provided protection against statelessness for some border communities. Nevertheless, in
addition to discriminating based on gender, the double jus soli provision granting
nationality to children “of African origin” was clearly racially discriminatory in keeping
with the pan-Africanism of the day. 799 This discrimination is not irrelevant to the Tuareg,
who as the next section will explore, below, have often been labelled as white by Malian
government officials and, as well, by members of their community. 800 As Lecocq notes,
even “the name of the new republic reflected the dominance of its core populations: the
Mande and Bambara.” 801 African origin is not defined, leaving it vague and open to political
interpretation.
797F
798F
799F
800F
While this dissertation could uncover no evidence of a Tuareg person being refused
nationality because of this provision in the law, its inclusion shows the importance of race
to the concept of being Malian. The concept of being of African origin, as opposed to being
of foreign origin, would come to play a large role in the Malian government’s general
policies towards the Tuareg and may be seen as a reflection of their thinking of who
belongs in the Malian state. 802 The issue of race would become a dominate feature of
inclusion and exclusion in northern Mali in the decades following independence, as will be
discussed at length below.
801F
The 1962 law also contained several provisions specifically to prevent statelessness,
provisions which remain in force today. 803 The law provided automatic nationality to
children born to unknown parents (foundlings). 804 The law also allowed children born to
foreigners to naturalize after five years under certain conditions. 805 As well, persons born
in Mali who had their habitual residence in Mali may, at the time of their majority, have
opted for Malian nationality. 806 As Decheix concluded, they were “modern law(s)
conforming to the principles of international human rights law inspired by the profound
802F
803F
804F
805F
798
Decheix, 305.
799
Decheix, 300. See also African Commission, paras. 110-113, 147.
800
For a general exploration of the issue of race in northern Mali, see Hall. Cooper, 414.
801
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 73.
802
Cooper, 419. See also Decheix ,305.
The Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962 as modified by the Loi No. 9570 of 25
August 1995 and replaced by the Loi 2011-087 of 30 December 2011. Also relevant are the Ordonnance No
02-062/P.RM of 7 June 2002 of the Code of the Protection of the Child, and the Loi No. 06-024 of 28 June 2006
on Civil Registration.
803
804
Zatzepine, 54.
The Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962 as modified by the Loi No. 9570 of 25
August 1995 and replaced by the Loi 2011-087 of 30 December 2011, art. 27.
805
806
Zatzepine, 56.
153
sentiments of the African and informed by the political concerns of the hour to realize the
union of the continent.” 807
806F
Following amendments in 1995, 808 the Malian government passed a new nationality code
in 2011, the Code des personnes et de la famille. 809 Among other changes, the Code replaced
the provision granting Malian nationality to children born to a parent “of African origin’
with a provision granting Malian nationality to children born to a parent with nationality in
another African country. 810 Arguably, this change, which occurred just prior to the
renewed conflict between the Tuareg and the Malian government, discussed below,
removed racially motivated language from Mali’s nationality law and reflected an
acknowledgement of the diversity of ethnicity that made up Mali, including the Tuareg. It
replaced racial language with language based on nationality.
807F
808F
809F
Under Malian law, the Certificate of Nationality is the foundation of Malian nationality
documentation. The Malian Nationality code of 1962 dedicated three articles to the
certificates of nationality and an entire title to the issue of adjudication. 811 As a matter of
daily use, the identity card, the Carte Nationale d’Identité (CNI), issued pursuant to a decree
in 1988, 812 is usually sufficient to establish nationality in most cases and it, or a carte
consulaire if abroad, is now obligatory. 813 In 2006, Mali rolled out a new law providing for a
universal ID number, called the “NINA" and obligatory for all Malian citizens, residents and
others on Malian territory and under its legal jurisdiction. 814 Some changes to help nomads
were also part of reformed to the laws on civil registration that were made in 2006. Article
1 of the 2006 law on civil registration specifically provided for mobile clinics to register
nomads. 815 NINA cards began to be issued in the period preceding the 2013 election and
810F
811F
812F
813F
814F
Decheix, 304, 314. The Malian nationality code was drafted by a group of judges, government officials,
union leaders and an adviser from Europe.
807
Among other liberalizing amendments, the 1995 law made it more difficult for persons residing abroad to
lose their Malian nationality. Law No. 95-098, Portant modification code de la nationalité (1995).
808
Loi n. 11-080 portant code des personnes et de la famille, Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.)
Spécial (31 Jan 2012) Titres IV, V (2011 Code).
809
Loi n. 11-080 portant code des personnes et de la famille, Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.)
Spécial (31 Jan 2012) Titres IV, V (2011 Code).
810
811
Zatzepine, 101. Title V regulates the issuance of nationality documents. See also Decheix, 309.
Décret n. 014/PG- RM du 09 janvier 1988 portant institution et règlementation de la délivrance de la carte
d’identité et de la carte consulaire.
812
813
Mali Décret N. 55-014/PG-RM du 9 Janvier 1988.
Loi no 06-040 du 11 août 2006 portant institution du numéro d’identification nationale des personnes
physiques et morales (2006).
814
815
Loi No. 06-024 du 28 juin 2006 régissant l’État civil (2006).
154
required a National ID Card. 816 Other forms of ID in Mali that are relevant to proving
nationality include the birth certificate, the Jugement supplétif d’acte de naissance, and the
Family Book, issued to the head of household.
815F
Despite these developments in the law, however, problems with civil registration would
continue into the post-colonial period to this day. In particular, ongoing cycles of conflict in
northern Mali meant that many Tuareg continued to be administered under military rule
and continue to be unregistered. Time spent in refugee camps abroad has not improved
Tuareg registration. According to the government, nomads are now registered using mobile
registration teams, though there is not much information on this project. 817
816F
The Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the government to go further by setting up
mobile registration clinics, noting there remained a large gap between registration of urban
children and children in rural areas. 818 As of yet, these recommendations have not been
implemented, though the 2011 law does allow for the creation of special birth registration
centres in nomadic areas. 819 According to interviews conducted as part of a recent study by
UNHCR, most registration centres in Tuareg regions in northern Mali are not
functioning. 820 In 2014, a UNICEF study showed that over 120,000 children in Gao and
Timbuktu regions had not been registered. 821
817F
818F
819F
820F
An argument may be made that the Tuareg are not de jure stateless, but are rather at risk of
statelessness, or of unknown nationality. Lack of civil registration is common in Africa,
particularly among rural populations. A report by the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights has shown that lack of registration is common throughout rural Africa, with
nomads like the Tuareg particularly at risk. 822 This lack of registration may amount to
statelessness in some cases. 823 African nations more generally tend to suffer from low birth
821F
822F
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mali: ‘NINA card, including date and circumstances of
its introduction; method used to collect data on future cardholders, including data collection period;
opportunity to correct or update card information, such as place of residence and occupation; procedure to
correct or update card information’ (2009-September 2016), 26 August 2016.
816
M. Offermann, « Les risques d'apatridie au Mali et pour les Maliens vivant à l’étranger en application des
législations et pratiques relatives à la nationalité, au Mali et dans les pays d’accueil de Maliens » (UNHCR
2020) 14, 33 (hereinafter Offermann).
817
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of the Reports Submitted by States Parties under
Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Mali, CRC/C/MLI/CO/2 3 May 2007.
818
Loi n. 11-080 portant code des personnes et de la famille, Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.)
Spécial (31 Jan 2012) Art. 84.
819
820
Offermann, 28.
821
Offermann, 29.
822
See generally African Commission.
In the West Africa region, as Manby points out, “(a)mong the undocumented and partially documented
there is an undoubtedly large number of people who would fit the definition of stateless person under
823
155
registration, particularly in rural areas. As Manby has argued, there is a “crisis of
nationality” in Africa. 824
823F
In Africa, those most affected by statelessness include the descendants of
colonial-era migrants, nomadic pastoralists, populations divided by arbitrary
colonial borders or affected by more recent transfers of sovereignty, and
those displaced by conflict. 825
824F
According to research compiled by various United Nations agencies, up to 90% of children
are not registered in rural areas in many parts of Africa. 826 According to UNICEF, Mali has a
50% birth registration rate, fairly average for African countries. 827 In Mali, UNICEF
estimates that only 50% of children are registered immediately, and only 80% of Malian
children are registered at all. 828 The Malian government conducted a mass registration
exercise in 2015 targeting returning refugees and IDPs with the assistance of international
organization PLAN, 829 yet nomads and rural populations in particular face real challenges
with registration in Mali.
825F
826F
827F
828F
Poverty, illiteracy and weak government structures all play a role in the lack of civil
registration among the Tuareg. Zatzepine, writing at the time, pointed out the problems
with providing proof amongst an illiterate population where much of the population does
not follow a formal calendar. 830 As well, cultural aspects of life in rural Africa, like the
Tuareg system of naming, makes registration difficult, as the Tuareg did not traditionally
use a family name. 831 Meanwhile, fraud and fake Malian documents continue to be a real
problem across Mali. 832
829F
830F
831F
Yet the statelessness of the Tuareg goes beyond a lack of documents. As Manby puts it,
writing of Africa more generally, “an undocumented person who is a member of the
international law.” B. Manby, ‘Who Belongs? Statelessness and Nationality in West Africa’ Migration Policy
Institute (7 April 2016) (hereinafter Manby, Belongs).
824
Manby, Belongs, 1-2, 18. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 330.
825
Manby, Belongs, 1-2. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 330.
African Commission para 186. The Commission estimates that as many as 20 million children in African
lack birth; registration. African Commission para. 4.
826
UNICEF, ‘Strengthening Birth Registration in Africa: Opportunities and Partnerships Technical Paper’
(2010) 3, 7.
827
828
UNICEF Mali, ‘Child Protection’ http://www.unicef.org/mali/3934_4097.html.
829 Reliefweb, ‘Thousands to receive birth certificates in Mali’ (18 Feb. 2015). See also OHCHR, ‘Birth
registration and the right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ (2013).
830
Zatzepine, 30.
831
Zatzepine, 32. See also Keenan, Resistance, 69.
832
Offermann, 32.
156
dominant ethnic or religious group and comes from a settled community and stable family
is far less likely to be refused when applying for a nationality document.” 833 The Tuareg
were also subjected to discriminatory policies during the colonial period and during the
decolonization period which arguably impacted their registration.
832F
Perhaps most importantly, however, the civil war that broke out in northern Mali in 1962
became an enormous factor, perhaps the key factor, in the statelessness of the Tuareg.
1962 began a continuous cycle of war, draught and state persecution that has left Tuareg
communities shattered and huge numbers of people living abroad. This dissertation argues
that lack of documents combined with civil war and widespread persecution have left many
Tuareg stateless or at risk of statelessness.
To understand why northern Mali devolved into civil war so soon after independence, it is
necessary to look at Malian government policies from the time and how they impacted the
Tuareg, which this dissertation will do, below. Before discussing the political and social
factors that lead the Tuareg into a military conflict with their government, however, the
next section will first analyse the nationality laws of Sabah, Malaysia.
833
Manby, Belongs, 1-2. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 314; Fripp, 2016, 320.
157
The Sama Dilaut Under the Nationality Laws of Sabah, Malaysia
Like both Kuwait and Mali, the Federation of Malaysia, and Sabah as a Federal State within
that Federation, needed to draft a nationality law at independence. Like in Kuwait and Mali,
the Malaysian government had inherited a patchwork of laws from the colonial period. As
in Kuwait, the process of drafting a law was heavily influenced by the British government.
Once again, a poor to non-existent civil registration meant that many local people entered
the decolonization period with no status even though they had technically qualified as
nationals under colonial law. This section will draw on academic and non-academic sources
to explore how Malaysia’s nationality laws were applied, or not applied, to the Sama Dilaut.
In 1946, in anticipation of independence and during the formation of the Federation of
Malaya (which at that time did not include the Borneo states), 834 the British proposed a
nationality law based on jus soli and 15 years of residence. 835 This proposal was rejected
by the Sultans because it would have automatically granted nationality to the Chinese
population, who the Sultans and many Malays considered to be foreign immigrants. 836 The
British did not want to leave the Chinese population without Malaysian nationality and the
Chinese population themselves wished to have the option. 837 Right from the start,
therefore, the issue of who would be nationals of the federation proved contentious. The
struggle to balance Malaysia’s various ethnicities, an important context to Malaysian
nationality that will be discussed at length below, would come to dominate Malaysian
politics and nationality policy.
833F
834F
835F
836F
The resulting compromise nationality law created a complex, layered nationality. As in
Kuwait, Malaysia would adopt the principle of tiers of nationality to grant different statuses
to different persons born in Malaysia. Instead of universal nationality, the 1948 Federation
of Malaya Agreement 838 created federal citizenship as a status derived from being a subject
of a Sultan of each particular state, making Malaysian citizenship a derivative status that
was dependent upon state nationality. Under the Agreement, most non-Malays would not
automatically be counted as the subjects of their Sultans but instead had to apply to be
837F
Sinnadurai, 313. See also Fernandez, 55; Lim Hong Hai, 101. The Federation of Malaya came into existence
in 1948.
834
835
Ting, 42. See also Clark and Pietsch, 161.
836
Sinnadurai, 313. See also K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan, 14; Lim Hong Hai, 103.
837
K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan, 14. See also Lim Hong Hai, 103.
838
Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, made between His late Majesty King George VI and Their
Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States.
158
naturalized. 839 In this way, Malaya would come to have two tiers of nationality, similar to
Kuwait, that of subjects of the Sultan and that of naturalized citizens.
838F
This left the Chinese and Indian populations on the peninsula in a precarious and
somewhat unclear position as to nationality. 840 In 1952, a committee was set up to address
the issue of nationality of non-Malays in the new federation, particularly the Chinese. 841
The eventual Federation of Malaya Agreement, 842 passed in 1952, opened up the
possibility of federal citizenship for non-Malays. 843 But the law was complicated and
poorly implemented. According to one historian, at the end of 1953, almost two million
non-Malays were still without nationality in the new Federation, including many
Chinese. 844
839F
840F
841F
842F
843F
As well as discrimination in the nationality law itself, non-Malays faced discrimination by
other laws. 845 These favourable laws and status for Malays would lead to riots in 1969 and
continue to be a bone of contention for ethnically Chinese and Indian Malaysians up to the
present day, contributing, among other things, to statelessness for Malaysians of Indian
descent. 846 Thus began a long history of statelessness and disputed nationality for those
labelled as immigrant populations in Malaysia, context to Malaysia’s nationality laws that
will be discussed at length below. 847 In this way, statelessness and exclusion from
nationality became embedded in Malaysian civic life. 848 The link between statelessness and
844F
845F
846F
847F
Ko Swan Sik, 314-316. See also Ting, 43; Z. Cowen, ‘The Emergence of a New Federation in Malaya’ 1
Tasmanian U. L.R. 53 (1958).
839
As Ko Swan Sik puts it, “(t)here was a constant need for reference to other laws, particularly the state
nationality laws, to determine whether a person was a citizen or not.” Ko Swan Sik, 316. See also Ting, 43;
Sinnadurai, 315; Hooker, 223.
840
841
Ting, 43. See also Sinnadurai, 314.
842
Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance (1952).
843
Ko Swan Sik, 317. See also Ting, 43; Sinnadurai, 314; K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan, 16.
844
Ting, 51.
Clark and Pietsch, 160. See also F. Holst, Ethnicization and Identity Construction in Malaysia (Routledge
2012) 45.
845
For an in-depth look at the link between statelessness and immigration in Malaysia, see generally R. Razali,
R. Nordin and T. Duraisingam, ‘Migration and Statelessness: Turning the Spotlight on Malaysia’ 23 Pertanika J.
Soc. Sci. and Hum. 19 (2015).
846
Ting, 42. See generally UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Submission by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation
Report - Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia’ (March 2013).
847
Besides the Sama Dilaut, three of Malaysia’s largest stateless populations today include Rohingya, Tamils
brought to Malaysia by the British, and the children of former refugees and migrants in Sabah. Allerton, Lives,
2014, 27. See also T. Duraisingam, ‘Chronology of Policies affecting potentially Stateless Persons and Refugees
848
159
the “immigrant” label would become a common one in Malaysia, including, later, in Sabah,
as civil society organizations have documented. 849
848F
In 1957, the new Federal Constitution finally created a federal nationality at birth,
removing the requirement that federal citizenship be derived from state nationality. 850
Article 14(1) contains the transitional provisions for the Peninsula. Like in Kuwait and
Mali, though less inclusive, these provisions creating Malaysia’s “first body of nationals”
were territorial and based on jus soli. They granted nationality to all persons born in
Malaysia before Malaysia Day (16 September 1963) who qualified as nationals under the
1948 Agreement. Also, nationality was granted to all persons born in Malaysia after Mereka
Day (31 August 1957) and before October 1962.
849F
For persons born after September 1962, nationality would be granted via jus sanguinis to
those with one parent who was either a national, a stateless person, or a legal permanent
resident. 851 Unlike in Kuwait and Mali, establishing nationality in Malaysia was dependent
on place of birth, not residence. As in Kuwait and Mali, however, determining place of birth
would prove difficult due to the lack of civil registration in rural Malaysia. Also, like Kuwait
and Mali, nationality thereafter is passed via jus sanguinis. 852
850F
851F
As in Kuwait and Mali, Malaysian nationality law was influenced both by western
nationality law, but also by Islamic principles. 853 Unlike Kuwait, however, there were
strong protections against statelessness written into the law, providing Malaysian
nationality to every person born on Malaysian territory who “is not born a citizen of any
other country...” 854 This stop-gap provision to prevent statelessness is arguably stronger
than the laws of either Kuwait or Mali, though Malaysia lacks the double jus soli provisions
of Mali’s law. The Malaysian Constitution also provided for a nationality for persons born in
852F
853F
in Malaysia’ Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/07, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion
(December 2016).
See generally Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (DHRRA) ‘Citizenship and Statelessness
Fact Sheet 2’ (January 2015).
849
Constitution of Malaysia, Art. 14, Second Schedule (1957). See also Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada, Malaysian nationality law, and the case of M. Navin, Goh Siu Lin, ‘In the Case of M. Navin, the Guiding
Criteria for Article 15A’ Association of Women Lawyers (18 April 2016). Malaysia’s federal nationality laws
do not allow for dual citizenship. Sinnadurai, 332.
850
851
Constitution of Malaysia, Art. 14, Second Schedule (1957).
852
Constitution of Malaysia, Art. 15, Second Schedule (1957).
Under Malaysian law, parents must be lawfully married in order for the mother to pass on Malaysian
nationality to her children.
853
854
Constitution of Malaysia, Second Schedule, Part II (1957).
160
Malaysia who would otherwise be stateless, but this provision has never been successfully
invoked. 855
854F
As in many countries, including Mali and Kuwait, the issue of nationality registration in the
decades following decolonization would become closely linked to the issue of voting. On the
advice of the Reid Commission, an independent, international commission tasked with
advising the new government on the Constitution, the first elections in Malaysia were
delayed two years to 1959 to give non-Malays who had not gained a nationality until the
enactment of the Constitution the chance to register. 856 Despite this precaution, many nonMalays were not registered as nationals by the time of elections and would remain
unregistered into the future. 857
855F
856F
During this formative period, the Borneo territories were joined with the rest of the
Malaysian Federation. The Cobbold Commission, a commission of inquiry, surveyed public
opinion in north Borneo and concluded that the majority of the population favoured joining
Malaysia. 858 In 1963, the Malaysia Act amended the Constitution to include Sabah,
Sarawak 859 and separate transitional laws were written to establish nationality in the
newly added states. 860 To preserve their semi-autonomy and prevent immigration from
what was now known as West, or Peninsular, Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak were given
independent control over immigration from other states. 861 This power over immigration
was the result of the Borneo states’ concerns over Malay domination. Such fears would
continue to colour the debate over nationality in Sabah, creating a complex debate over
ethnicity that will be discussed below.
857F
858F
859F
860F
The laws creating the first body of nationals in Sabah and Sarawak, however, were different
than those of Peninsular Malaysia. Most importantly, nationality in the Borneo states was
based, initially, on residence as well as on place of birth. Under the 1957 Constitution,
persons “ordinarily resident” for seven years prior to Malaysia Day in Sabah and Sarawak
were nationals of Malaysia if they were either born, registered or naturalized in the Borneo
territories and satisfied certain other requirements, including knowledge of Malay, English
Constitution of Malaysia, Second Schedule, Part 2I (1957). See also R. Razali, ‘Addressing Statelessness in
Malaysia: New Hopes and Remaining Challenges’ Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017/9 (Institute
on Statelessness and Inclusion 2017).
855
856
See also Lim Hong Hai, 107.
857
See also Lim Hong Hai, 103.
858
‘Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak’ (1962) (Cobbold Commission) (1962).
859
Singapore would end up not becoming part of the Federation.
860
See also Lim Hong Hai, 109. The Constitution was later amended to remove reference to Singapore.
See generally Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2002). See also Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) Children
in Sabah, Malaysia’ Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (2015) 3.
861
161
or “any native language currently in use in Sarawak.” 862 The provision was clearly intended
to ease registration in the Borneo territories, a region with less of a history with formal
registration in comparison to the Peninsular states.
861F
Once again, this law adopts a territorial approach based on “ordinary residence,” a concept
that is arguably vaguer than place of birth. While place of birth is a clearly defined event,
residence is a slippery concept that can be hard to prove, particularly for a nomadic or
mobile population like the Sama Dilaut. As with Kuwait and Mali, proving birth and/or
residence could be made difficult or easy, depending on who was applying. 863
862F
Under the Constitution, Sabahans had ten years within which to register as Malaysian
nationals. 864 The Federal Constitution provided for the creation of a national registration
department (NRD) to issue birth certificates and other documentation. 865 As in Kuwait and
Mali, however, while the laws for Sabah were facially inclusive, the vague language around
residence in Sabah left a great deal of room for interpretation in the application of the law
when it came to nomadic and border populations. According to Sather, and expert on the
Sama Dilaut, many Sama Dilaut could not prove they qualified for nationality under the
law. 866
863F
864F
865F
Of particular relevance to the Sama Dilaut has been the sponsorship program for noncitizens in Sabah, initiated at colonial independence, whereby temporary workers have to
obtain a Malaysian national as a sponsor in order to remain in Sabah. 867 While today this
program applies to any non-national working in Sabah, when the program began, many
Sama Dilaut were defined as enemy aliens, meaning that they had to register as temporary
workers in order to remain legally in the area. As a result, many Sama Dilaut were required
to find a guarantor from among the settled population, often Bajau peoples themselves, and
pay their guarantor a tax. 868 Carol Warren calls the modern version of this work permit
system, which is descended from the traditional patronage arrangements dating from the
pre-colonial period described in Part 2, to a type of indentured labour for the Sama Dilaut,
866F
867F
Malaysia Constitution, Art. 16(a) and Second Schedule Parts I-III (1957). See also Sinnadurai, 317; Asia
Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) Children in Sabah, Malaysia’
(2015) 3.
862
863
See generally Cheah Boon Kheng.
864
Sinnadurai, 317. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 87; Mathews, 474.
Constitution of Malaysia 1975, Second Schedule Parts I-III. For a history of IDs in Malaysia, see the
Malaysian National Registration Department website at
http://www.jpn.gov.my/en/maklumatkorporat/sejarah/.
865
866
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 87.
867
C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228.
868
C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 88.
162
former Filipino refugees and other marginalized undocumented persons, who must work
for their settled neighbours or face arrest. 869
868F
This program could be said to mark the beginning of formal statelessness for many Sama
Dilaut families because it was the beginning of their official classification as aliens rather
than as nationals. 870 The work permit system is yet another example of lack of
documentation being used as evidence of foreign status, a practice common in both Kuwait
and Mali, as shown above. In particular, it resembles the bidoon status given to many
former Bedouin in Kuwait, though it is not strictly a nationality status.
869F
Sather’s work provides what might be the clearest picture of Sama Dilaut registration. He
argues that the failure to register the Sama Dilaut in the region of Semporna town was due
to the “arbitrary” exclusion of nomadic families from registration. 871 A divide appears to
have emerged between more land-based populations and groups pursuing boat nomadism,
though more research is needed on this point. As with other nomads, the problems with
Sama Dilaut registration were clearly linked to their mobility and perceptions of that
mobility. While Sather labelled this division as “arbitrary” it clearly reflected a continuation
of colonial policies towards mobility and mobile peoples.
870F
Lack of registration created a “major division” at independence in Semporna between those
who were now nationals of Malaysia and those who were not, a division that corresponded
to a great degree with who remained nomadic as opposed to who were now settled and
had a fixed residence. 872 As with other nomads like the Bedouin and the Tuareg, other
factors likely contributed to the lack of registration among the Sama Dilaut. The Sama
Dilaut had mostly negative experiences with government registration, as seen by the efforts
of the BNBC to institute a boat licensing program. 873 At the same time, however, Sather
points out that the Sama Dilaut had become “accustomed to travel...across national
boundaries” and that they were not unfamiliar with the importance of registration to
facilitate this travel. 874 It is probably therefore incorrect to say the Sama Dilaut had no idea
of the importance of registration.
871F
872F
873F
Unlike many rural, land-based Sabahans, the Sama Dilaut did not have a recognized village
headman who could vouch for their residence. In other words, existing Sama Dilaut
869
C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228.
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 332. More research is needed on this topic, particularly in terms of if and how
the work permit system is applied to rural Sabahans who lack documents.
870
871
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 87.
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 87. Much of the information on the Sama Dilaut during this period comes from
Clifford Sather, who was an anthropologist studying the Bajau Laut/Sama Dilaut during that time.
872
873 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report: Universal Periodic
Review: Malaysia,’ (March 2013) 2.
874
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 87.
163
documentation and ties to northern Borneo were apparently discounted during the
registration process, though more research is needed into this period in Sama Dilaut
history. As in Kuwait and Mali, registration of the Sama Dilaut appears to have been
approached in an exclusionary and discriminatory manor.
Like in Kuwait and Mali, lack of identity documents would emerge as a major issue for
nomads, border populations and rural peoples, with many Sama Dilaut failing to register or
receive ID. 875 Over subsequent decades, as in Kuwait, registration procedures in Malaysia
have been tightened. 876 Many of those who did not register in the decade following
independence found themselves locked out by jus sanguinis. 877 Unlike in Kuwait and Mali,
there were few substantive changes to Malaysian or Sabahan nationality law during this
period, but the tightening of registration procedures would shut many out of a nationality.
Concerns over immigration, particularly from the Philippines, led to increasingly restrictive
enforcement of the law around the registration of nationality in Sabah, including an
increased focus on the use of IDs. Strict registration procedures have led to
intergenerational statelessness. 878
874F
875F
876F
877F
Starting in 1972, under the new National Registration Rules, nationals of Sabah were issued
a blue card with a number and an “H” to signify Sabah. At the same time, local chiefs were
empowered to issue “status” certificates as evidence towards nationality for those who did
not previously have ID cards. This allowed people from rural villages to prove their identity
by having someone in a position of authority vouch for their long term residence. 879 This
procedure, which resolved the nationality status of many rural Sabahans who were not
registered in the decade following independence, was ended in 1987. 880 This placed
registration in the hands of village chiefs, usually from the settled, coastal population. This
option was not available to most Sama Dilaut as in many cases they neither had a
878F
879F
875
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 87.
P. Blanche, Nomades de la mer, Vezos, Bajaus, Mokens (Ibis Press 2008) 78. See also J. Warren, Chartered,
1971, 26.
876
Lim Hong Hai, 107. Voter registration in Malaysia is governed by the Elections Act of 1958 (revised 1971).
See generally Malaysia Elections Act 1958 (Act 19, Ordinance No. 33 of 1958) (Akta Pilihan Raya 1958). See
also Sinnadurai 330. The Malaysian government has taken steps to resolve the issue for some groups, but has
left others, like the Indian population, in a state of uncertainty. In 1972, for example, the Malaysian
government attempted to resolve the issue of over 200,000 cases of ethnic Chinese who had not received
Malaysian nationality. Cheah Boon Kheng, 29. Yet today, many Malaysians of Indian descent await a similar
resolution.
877
Helen Brunt calls the situation of the Sama Dilaut a “classic example of protracted and intergenerational
statelessness.” H. Brunt, ‘Stateless at Sea’ in in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ed.) The World’s
Stateless Children (January 2017) 291.
878
K. Sadiq, ‘When States Prefer Non-Citizens Over Citizens: Conflict Over Illegal Immigration Into Malaysia’
49 Int’l Studies Quarterly 101 (2005) 155.
879
Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Inquiry (2012) 302 (hereinafter Royal Commission).
880
164
recognized village chief nor a recognized fixed residence in Sabah. 881 Once again,
registration favoured the settled, rural population who were treated as presumptive
nationals while nomads remained excluded.
880F
In 1990, the registration process was tightened again. The government began issuing
updated ICs with the code “12” for Sabah. Under the new procedures, applicants had to
produce both a birth certificate for themselves, as well as their parents’ ICs. 882 This made it
virtually impossible for the children of undocumented persons to obtain cards. In 2002,
these earlier cards were replaced with the MyKad, a so-called smart card containing
biometric data. 883 At this point, Malaysia’s documentation regime and reliance on jus
sanguinis locked any unregistered Sabahan families out of a nationality, including
unregistered Sama Dilaut.
881F
882F
Today, registration and issuance of identity documents, such as the MyKad, continues to be
handled by the National Registration Department (NRD) of Malaysia under the National
Registration Regulation of 1990. The identity documents to prove nationality in Malaysia
today are the MyKad and the birth certificate. A birth certificate is necessary to register as a
national with NRD. 884 But the current MyKad is much more than simply proof of
nationality; it combines a national identity card, a driver’s license, passport information,
health information, banking features and other functions. 885 The chip contains information
on the holder’s race, status as a Muslim, gender, voting status, thumbprints, criminal and
driving record, and health information. 886 Today, the application for a MyKad requires a
birth, adoption, or citizenship certificate, or the passport of the applicant, in addition to
identity documents of at least one parent or guardian. As a result, Malaysia now has one of
the most sophisticated and restrictive personal identity systems in the world. Lack of
documents is now itself viewed as evidence not only of foreign status, but of criminality.
883F
884F
885F
Previously, Sabah did not require rural people living in villages to prove their nationality in
order to access government services because they were assumed to be nationals, 887 so
886F
More research is needed on the implementation of this program as it pertains to marginalized minorities
like the Sama Dilaut.
881
882
Royal Commission, 303.
883
Royal Commission, 303.
See generally the website of the Malaysian NRD at http://www.jpn.gov.my/en/perkhidmatan/kanakkanak-bawah-12-tahun/.
884
885
Mathews, 474.
886
Mathews, 474.
In 1999, a NRD official stated in a local newspaper, The Sun, that out of 2.8 million people in Sabah, as
many as 2 million may lack birth certificates. Quoted in Sadiq, 86. See also Voice of the Children, ‘Birth
Registration, Briefing Paper for UPR, Malaysia’ (2013). See also F. Barlocco, Identity and the State in Malaysia
(Routledge 2014) 78 (hereinafter Barlocco).
887
165
many rural people did not need to be registered. 888 Today, the Malaysian government
recognizes the problem among rural communities, particularly since the introduction of the
MyKad and increased police scrutiny of the undocumented community, and has been
taking steps to improve documentation among rural people. The recent outreach of NRD
towards the rural, land-based highlights the extent to which the Sama Dilaut are actively
excluded by the Malaysian government, rather than being simply passively unregistered. 889
For example, NRD has set up mobile documentation clinics in rural areas, but such efforts
do not include the Sama Dilaut. 890 According to testimony given during the Royal
Commission of Inquiry, a registration exercise for the Sama Dilaut was last conducted in
the 1960s. 891 Some settled Sama/Bajau families were issued documents in the small village
of Banga-Banga at that time. Today, only about 3,000 out of the 5,000 current inhabitants of
Banga-Banga have documents. According to the Commission, the 2,000 Sama/Bajau
without documents in Banga-Banga consider themselves to be Malaysian, yet have been
unable to regularize their status. Meanwhile, in 2008, the government issued identity
documents to some stateless persons in Sabah, but this program made no attempt to assist
the Sama Dilaut. 892
887F
888F
889F
890F
891F
Accurate statistics of documentation among the Sama Dilaut community are unavailable,
but civil society groups have noted that the Sama Dilaut generally suffer from low levels of
documentation. 893 The Right 2 Identity Working Group stated that the Sama Dilaut are
often unregistered because their parents lack documentation, leading to inter-generational
statelessness. 894 The lack of identity documents has serious repercussions for the Sama
Dilaut (as it does for other stateless people in Sabah.) For example, Sama Dilaut children
cannot attend Malaysian government schools. 895
892F
893F
894F
888
Sadiq, 114.
For an example of NRD outreach to rural communities, see A. Joseph, ‘NRD mobile unit reduces number of
‘stateless people’’ Borneo Post (23 Sept. 2017).
889
Documentation remains a problem for many people living in remote, rural areas, thought the government
has shown willingness to fix the problem. See for example the situation of minority groups on the
Sarawak/Indonesian border at S. Then, ‘Still Stateless Despite the Sacrifices’ The Star (20 March 2016). See
also Daily Express, ‘Mobile court brings citizenship to villagers’ (20 May 2015).
890
Testimony of a Sama Dilaut village leader, in Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and
Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry
(2012) 219.
891
I. Ali, ‘Since Birth till Death, What is their Status? A Case Study of the Sea Bajau in Pulau Mabul, Semporna,’
1 Journal of Arts, Science and Commerce 156 (2010) 163 (hereinafter Ali).
892
See for example the work of the local NGO Right 2 Identity Newsletter, Sabah, Malaysia (June 2015) (no
longer available online).
893
894
Right 2 Identity Newsletter, June 2015.
895
Ali, 162, 163.
166
As in other parts of Malaysia and in Kuwait, lack of registration is often conflated with
foreign status in Sabah. A recent Al Jazeera documentary pointed out that stateless Sama
Dilaut are frequently deported to the Philippines, even though many Sama Dilaut families
settled in Sabah decades ago and have not been to the Philippines since seasonal
migrations ended during the colonial period, while others visit only infrequently for
extended family events like weddings and funerals. 896 As the issue of documentation and
statelessness in Sabah has been taken up as a human rights issue by civil society, the
government has begun promising to address it. 897 Yet Sabah continues rounding up
undocumented persons for detention or deportation and issuing different identity
documents to non-citizens (for example, red certificates to “non-citizens” as opposed to the
green certificates given to Malaysian citizens.) 898
895F
896F
897F
In this way, the current documentation regime in Sabah has increasingly come to resemble
that in Kuwait, where certain classes of stateless persons are granted documents labelling
them as such. These measures are often equally applied to the children of Filipino migrants
and the Sama Dilaut. Meanwhile, lack of nationality registration for minority groups
throughout Malaysia quickly become part of a larger political debate over national identity,
borders and immigration, factors which will be discussed in detail in the next section. 899
898F
Yet, while registration as Malaysian has slowly been tightened, producing statelessness for
many Sama Dilaut, Malaysia continues to have protections against statelessness written
into its nationality law, including a provision guaranteeing nationality at birth to persons
born in Malaysia who would be otherwise stateless. 900 Recent events, however, have
shown why this provision is not being used more effectively to prevent statelessness in
Malaysia. Beginning in 2010, a number of court cases have been brought to establish
Malaysian nationality for stateless children adopted by Malaysian parents. 901 Yet, the
procedures for establishing statelessness under Malaysian law are unclear. 902
899F
900F
901F
In 2017, a Federal Court in Malaysia granted the right of appeal to five stateless, adopted
children, including two stateless foundlings, who were petitioning for Malaysian nationality
Chan Tau Chou and L. Gooch, ‘Malaysia’s Invisible Children’ Al Jazeera (1 May 2015). I am indebted to
Helen Blunt for her comments on this point.
896
See for example, S. Sokail, ‘Sabah Draws Up Plans to Tackle Stateless Kids’ The Rakyat Post (9 March
2015).
897
898
Barlocco, 70.
899
Barlocco, 70.
900
Art. 15(a) Malaysian Constitution.
901 For an overview of these cases, see R. Razali, ‘Addressing Statelessness in Malaysia, New Hope and
Remaining Challenges’ Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017
9 (2017).
For an example of a press article discussing this problem, see Malaysian Insight, ‘Stateless Children’s Wait
for Citizenship Must End’ (4 June 2018).
902
167
under Article 15(a) of the Constitution. The court rejected the applications of the stateless
foundlings on the grounds that while they had proven they were born in Malaysia, they had
not proven they were stateless. 903 Some of the children were later granted citizenship
because they were able to furnish documents demonstrating that they did not have access
to another nationality. 904 Though it is difficult to speculate how such a precedent might be
applied in other cases, these cases show the potential pitfalls of applying Malaysian
nationality law to the problem of resolving statelessness. Such a solution will likely turn on
the ability to furnish proofs that nomadic groups like the Sama Dilaut do not have.
902F
903F
Meanwhile, Malaysia has not created a clear, national procedure by which cases of
contested nationality can be easily resolved, though the problem of statelessness in Sabah
continues to be much in the news and the government appears to be working towards a
solution. Though Malaysia’s law provides for nationality to be granted in “special
circumstances” where nationality is unclear or contested, this vague provision does
nothing to specify a mechanism or a set of standards by which Sama Dilaut families could
successfully navigate an established and fair process to obtain a nationality. 905
904F
Events in Sabah are evolving quickly, however, and calls for a resolution to statelessness in
Sabah keep getting louder and NRD has taken up several programs, including the
registration of children and people in rural areas, alongside attempts to resolve the status
of Sama Dilaut in the neighbouring Philippines as part of the Philippines National Action
Plan to end statelessness. 906 There is also talk of a tripartite agreement between Malaysia,
the Philippines and Indonesia to resolve the issue. 907 A recent Memorandum of
Understanding between Malaysia and Indonesia may help to resolve the status of border
populations in Sabah. 908 This exercise may finally provide a resolution to stateless Sama
Dilaut.
905F
906F
907F
For a summary of the case, see I. Lim, ‘Apex Court to Rule on Citizenship for Five Malaysian-Born Stateless
Persons’ Malay Mail (6 March 2018).
903
H. Kannan and Z. Mutalib, ‘Two of five stateless children to be granted citizenship’ New Straits Times (25
October 2018).
904
905
Razali, 9.
Recent press coverage of the issue includes, J. David, ‘Statelessness a long-standing issue in states’ Borneo
Post (16 Aug 2018); J. Santos, ‘Census records 60,000 stateless persons in Sabah’ Malaysian Insight (30 Jul
2018); K. Bong, ‘Minister gives special taskforce one year to clear ‘stateless’ student cases’ (19 Dec 2017); R.
Augustin, ‘How to reduce stateless numbers in Sabah’ (17 Apr 2018); E. Paulsen, ‘The plight of the stateless in
Malaysia’ FMT News (12 Feb 2018); S. Tawie, ‘Go deeper to register indigenous Sarawakians, NRD told’ Malay
Mail Online (10 Jan 2018); A. Joseph, ‘NRD mobile unit reduces number of “stateless people”’ (23 Sept. 2017);
T. Patrick, ‘Unwanted in the only place they can call home’ FMT News (14 Oct 2017); Sun Star Philippines,
‘CFSI validate Sama Badjaos status’ 2 Sept 2017 (on attempts to register the Sama Dilaut in the Philippines).
906
907
908
Daily Express, ‘Stateless: Three-nation pact soon’ 25 July 2018.
The Star, ‘Malaysia, Indonesia to tackle Sabah stateless issue’ 24 April 2019.
168
169
Conclusion
Statehood in itself might appear as a static concept antonymous with
nomadism... 909
908F
This section looked at the creation of nationality regimes, including laws and civil
registration procedures, in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This section uncovered a number of
important gaps in the nationality regimes in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, including the
implementation of nationality, for nomads. For many, “(t)he achievement of independence
did not automatically bring birth citizenship...” 910 As this section showed, while
statelessness may occur as the accidental or negligent result of badly drafted nationality
laws or gaps between nationality laws, it often contains at least an element of
deliberateness and/or discrimination. 911 This was clearly the case for many nomads.
During decolonization, the entire system of colonial law and registration was replaced, yet
discrimination against nomadic communities simply continued and, in some places,
arguably worsened.
909F
910F
This section has identified several serious gaps in both the nationality laws and their
application to nomads during the decolonization process and in the decades following.
First, borders divided nomads and transformed them into minorities. Decolonization
presented an opportunity to revisit colonial borders, but this opportunity was, in most
cases, not taken. Second, discrimination against nomads that began under colonization was
extended into the decolonization period, aided by a bias against nomadism inherent in
European nationality norms. The power to determine nationality often vested in the hands
of settled, urban rulers and not with nomad leaders. Third, jus sanguinis was often adopted,
locking many nomads out of a nationality and creating inter-generational statelessness.
Finally, the international community ignored the risk of statelessness as a result of the
decolonization process, instead focusing on consolidating states around colonial borders.
Nomads were Divided by Borders, Transforming them into Marginalized Minorities
As the Tuareg example showed most clearly, decolonization presented an opportunity to
revisit colonial-era borders, yet this opportunity was not taken. Instead, decolonization
entrenched existing borders, requiring nomads to establish their nationality in one state,
even when they had ties to multiple states. Many nomads were left as minorities living in
contested border zones. Often, they were seen as part of the problem with the border,
weakening state sovereignty.
909
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 63.
910
Heater, 132.
911
UNHCR, ‘This is Our Home: Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship’ (2017).
170
Porous administrative boundaries that had allowed nomadism to continue in places like
the Gulf, the Sulu Sea and Sahel became hard borders between sovereign, and sometimes
hostile, states. These states now had separate nationalities which put nomadic
communities in a position of having to choose.
Exclusive allegiance, a concept adopted from European nationality law, was difficult for
nomadic communities to satisfy. It imposed a requirement on cross-border populations
that they demonstrate their allegiance to one state to the exclusion of all others. This was
simply impossible for many nomads to do.
Binarity in questions of membership and citizenship is problematic because of the
complicated range of ways in which (indigenous) individuals in fact relate with
existing States, not least in navigating the effects of colonization. 912
911F
Border zones were often contested at decolonization and nomads had a history of shifting
allegiances or multiple allegiances that were viewed askance by government officials
anxious to solidify their territorial claims. The spectre of dual, multiple or even shifting
allegiances would plague questions of nomad legitimacy and belonging. The fact that
individuals can maintain a nationality while simultaneously also holding other allegiances,
including tribal or social allegiances, was treated, in the case of nomads, as a major problem
to determining their nationality.
Nationality Laws Based on Residence Discriminated Against Nomads
As this section described, there remains a serious conflict between nomadism as it is lived
and practiced and the requirements of European nationality, with its emphasis on fixed
residence, exclusivity and paper documents. European nationality laws, while appearing
neutral on their face, are actually biased against mobility and in favour of settlement. The
requirement that one must register as a national ran contrary to the ways in which many
nomads saw their alliances, as discussed in proceeding sections. 913
912F
While in some cases, there was genuine confusion over how to apply concepts like
residence to nomadic populations who were now crossing international borders, historical
claims by nomads to territory appear to have been largely ignored during decolonization.
For example, Tuareg drum groups were often associated with specific regions inside what
was now Mali, but Tuareg history was not employed to determine their nationality. Instead,
residence and place of birth were employed. The creation of new nation-states failed to
take into account how the system of European nationality law might not perfectly map onto
non-European communities.
The issuance of personal identification proving nationality was part of a system of
documents that was utterly foreign to many nomadic communities. Colonization had linked
land registration, title documents and nationality law together. Documents, which had been
912
Bloom, Members, 2017, 166.
913
Scott, 2009, x-xi.
171
unimportant in many nomad societies, now became critical. Older forms of proof described
in Part 2, like oral agreements, patronage agreements, the maintenance of water points or
grazing rights, were often ignored as insufficient to prove a nationality “link.” Proving
nationality therefore required proving settlement on land, either through title documents,
birth certificates, leases or other documentation that nomads often did not have. Few
efforts were made to take an accommodating position with regards to nomads. Even
nomads with documentary proof of residence were sometimes excluded, as the Bedouin
example showed. Other forms of proof that may have been easier for nomads to provide,
including oral testimony, were not used.
It is critical to note that there emerged a major difference in how states treated rural,
settled, unregistered populations and how they treated unregistered nomads. 914 Rural,
settled populations were usually granted the presumption of nationality in Kuwait, Mali
and Malaysia and often given the chance to register at a later date, as happened in Sabah
with many rural peoples under NRD. They were presumed nationals and their loyalty and
belonging were not questioned. Rather, their lack of registration was treated as a technical
matter and a problem of state capacity. For those who remained nomadic or settled at a
later period, the application of jus sanguinis nationality regimes in Kuwait and Malaysia
would mean they had missed the window of registration and were locked out of a
nationality.
913F
The initial registration period was followed by the slow transformation of many nomads
from unregistered persons with undetermined or contested nationality to active exclusion
and statelessness. While the post-colonial experience of many settled, rural people
included gradual registration as governments claimed the power of the rural vote, nomads
were actively excluded from this process. A closer look at the experience of nomads shows
that successive governments missed multiple opportunities to rectify nomadic
statelessness, taking a harder and harder line against nomad inclusion as the decades wore
on.
Negative colonial policies towards nomads affected registration in other ways as well
during the post-colonial period. Sometimes nomads themselves did not wish to register,
either because they did not see themselves as part of the post-colonial state that was now
being run by urban or settled rulers, often from a capital located far away, or because of the
history of violence and assimilation during the colonial period when registration was used
as a tool of assimilation and forced settlement.
The Power to Draft Laws, Register the Population and Issue Documents Had Vested with Urban
Elites, Opening the Door to Discrimination
Far from presenting post-colonial states with a blank slate, the patchwork and unequal
colonial system meant that colonized peoples entered the post-colonial period with very
different statuses and levels of political and economic power. For many nomads, the
This became true even in some jus soli countries. See for example Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘Born in
the Americas: The Promise and Practice of Nationality Laws in Brazil, Chile and Colombia’ (2017).
914
172
colonial period had been marked by a long decline in status and economic power that
would leave them in a poor position to assert their rights at decolonization. Vast powers to
include or exclude were handed to urban rulers with little accountability to nomadic or
other minority groups.
Registration was done quickly, with little input from nomadic groups, prioritizing settled
and urban populations, as colonial administrations had done in the past. While the goal of
decolonization did involve the enfranchisement and self-determination of many colonized
peoples, in many ways, colonial structures and processes were continued into the postcolonial period for nomads.
The vesting of power over nomads with settled, rather than nomadic, leaders opened the
door for discrimination. As Batchelor puts it, “(w)herever an administrative procedure
allows for discretionary granting of citizenship, such applicants cannot be considered
citizens until the application has been approved...” 915 As Gilbert points out, nomads often
face a very high burden of proof when registering with the government. 916 Kuwait adopted
tiers of nationality that allowed rulers to claim populations as subjects without granting
them many rights, a common strategy during the colonial period.
914F
915F
In Mali, discrimination meant that otherwise inclusive nationality laws were not used to
resolve Tuareg statelessness. Many Tuareg should have qualified for Malian nationality
automatically under transitional laws. Double jus soli for those “of African origin” provided
an ongoing, possible solution. Yet the outbreak of civil war combined with the targeting of
Tuareg leaders meant that many did not receive a nationality, but were instead forced into
exile or imprisoned.
Registration and Nationality Laws Became Steadily More Restrictive Over Time, Locking Nomads
in jus sanguinis Countries Out of a Nationality
Following the transitional laws to create the first body of nationals, Kuwait and Malaysia
adopted jus sanguinis. The adoption of jus sanguinis occurred even though the registration
process was far from complete in either country. While in many ways jus sanguinis was a
logical choice for many Muslim-majority countries, when imposed suddenly following a
highly discriminatory transitional period, it served to lock many unregistered minorities,
including many nomads, out of a nationality.
Rather than working to resolve the problem, discrimination against minorities, including
nomads, continued into a self-reinforcing cycle, where lack of registration was used as
evidence of foreign status. Access to nationality became ever more restrictive. Safeguards
against statelessness in Malaysia’s law were not applied, with Malaysia rather adopting the
view that lack of documents is proof of foreign status, not of statelessness. In Kuwait,
915
Batchelor, 1998, 171.
916 J. Gilbert and B. Begbie-Clench, ‘Mapping for Rights: Indigenous Peoples, Litigation and Legal
Empowerment’ 11 Erasmus L. R. 6 (June 2018) 6-8 (hereinafter Gilbert and Begbie-Clench).
173
increasingly restrictive laws created a legal category of stateless persons, the bidoon, and
then slowly restricted their rights, even as access to naturalization was slowly cut off.
The International Community Ignored the Problem of Nomad Inclusion
The United Nations and the former colonial powers were not concerned with nationality
and statelessness during decolonization, but were instead very focused on preventing
separatism and the breakup of existing colonial units. While much attention was played to
avoiding conflict over borders, somewhat remarkably given its importance, there was a
curious lack of attention placed on the possible creation of statelessness during
decolonization among the Bedouin, the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut.
In hindsight, the lack of attention on statelessness is surprising, as statelessness had been a
major problem in Europe in the early part of the 20th century. It appears to have been
widely assumed that transitional provisions based on residence and place of birth would
solve the problem, though more research on this critical period is needed. Documents from
the British administration in the Gulf region shows that the administration was aware that
transitional laws in some Gulf states may lead to statelessness and some nationality
questions received enormous attention, like the nationality of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia.
The question of nomad nationality, however, was often entirely overlooked by departing
colonial administrations. It may be that colonial beliefs that nomads cannot form states or
hold a nationality apart from membership in their tribes played a role in the lack of
attention paid to the chance of nomad statelessness, but more research is needed.
Importantly, as this section showed, colonial structures had clearly favoured settled and
urban populations and rulers, meaning that nomads already entered the post-colonial
period at a severe political disadvantage, divided by borders and lacking international
representation and clout. Even in the Tuareg example, colonial policy had split the Tuareg
amongst different states, weakened the noble class and greatly centralized power in the
urban and agricultural south of Mali, meaning that the recognition and naturalization of a
few Tuareg leaders ultimately did little to afford the Tuareg with a strong voice during
decolonization. Whatever the reason, the political aspirations of nomads were almost
entirely overlooked during decolonization.
In conclusion, in many ways, decolonization marked a deterioration, not an improvement,
in the status of nomads. It may be tempting to see the exclusion of many nomads as simply
an accident of the registration process due to understandable difficulties in the logistics of
registering large numbers of people, particularly mobile peoples in so-called remote areas
that were newly divided among sovereign states. This section weighs heavily against this
interpretation, though negligence, lack of interest from the nomadic population and
difficulties in accessing rural and mobile populations played their roles. While the
examination of how nationality laws in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia exposes rampant
discrimination against nomads, in some cases, however, the term discrimination is frankly
inadequate to describe the depths of the rights violations against nomads. The case of the
174
Tuareg goes far beyond what could reasonably be described as discrimination and crosses
into active persecution. 917
916F
What is missing from this section is an examination of the underlying factors that drove
many governments to leave their nomadic populations unregistered. While statelessness is
often undesirable for states, this is not always the case. In some cases, statelessness may be
a tool used by governments to exclude individuals or groups deemed undesirable to the
state in some way. 918 The next section will discuss the forces that drive statelessness and
exclusion for nomads in more detail, including an examination of how both nationality and
statelessness have been used by states to accomplish certain goals with respect to nomads.
917F
The next section will look at the economic, social and political context surrounding the
inclusion of nomads to show how larger forces shaped the implementation of nationality
law in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This context is critical to understanding why nomad
statelessness was not resolved in the decades following decolonization, even though
methods were available under the law to do so.
917
Azarya, 259-262.
918
Maury, 50. See also the Handbook, 2014, 3.
175
2.3
State-building and the Exclusion of Nomads
The desire of new territorial states to control and sedentarise (nomads) took
different ideological forms, from coercive administration to more lenient
incorporation. 919
918F
Introduction
The last section explored the nationality laws and policies of colonial and post-colonial
states, explaining how many nomads ended up unregistered and often stateless under the
laws and policies of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. It also documented how registration and
nationality were tightened to create inter-generational statelessness in some nomad
communities. But while the legal analysis of the last section touched upon the
discrimination and sometimes persecution suffered by many nomads during the postcolonial period, it did not explore the deeper drivers of this exclusion. It did not explore the
political, social and economic factors that drove the creation and implementation of more
restrictive nationality polices from decolonization to the present day.
The contested status of nomads and cases of statelessness among nomadic peoples could
have been resolved over the decades. Yet, for many nomads, this did not occur. Rather,
their statelessness became entrenched over multiple generations. Given that statelessness
is usually understood to be destabilizing and undesirable for states, 920 the question
becomes, why didn’t successive post-colonial administrations take steps to resolve the
status of nomads in the decades to follow?
919F
As this section will show, the reasons why nomad statelessness was not resolved can be
grouped into two interrelated post-colonial goals. The first goal was the perceived need to
unify post-colonial states around a founding myth and shared history. This was difficult to
do in the post-colonial context of multi-ethnic populations with diverse histories and
recently fixed, disputed borders. As minorities, many nomads found themselves the target
of discrimination. Yet discrimination against minorities is not the only factor at play.
Second, important economic transformations overtook many post-colonial states during
the 20th century. The ongoing statelessness of the Bedouin, Tuareg and Sama Dilaut is
closely linked to the discovery of natural resources and the growth of tourist parks in lands
occupied by nomads and the measures taken by states to exclusively control these
resources and parks. Forced settlement and the removal of nomads from their lands
therefore continued to be important goals during the post-colonial period.
919
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 44-45.
For an overview of some of the destabilizing and negative consequences of statelessness for Mali see H.
Alexander, ‘Statelessness and the Crisis in Northern Mali: Looking Beyond ‘Islamic Extremism’ as the Driver
of Conflict’ (unpublished paper 2016).
920
176
To accomplish these goals, post-colonial governments would adopt the rhetoric and
policies towards nomads of the colonial period. As anthropologist Dawn Chatty put it:
Administrators regard pastoral populations as sources of trouble, backward entities
that stand in the way of national progress. The only overall solution then suggested
is the enforced settlement of the pastoral populations... 921
920F
D. Chatty, ‘The Pastoral Family and the Truck,’ in Salzman (ed.) When Nomads Settle (Praeger 1980) 80.
See also Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 69.
921
177
National Unity and the Exclusion of Minorities as Drivers of Nomad Exclusion
All of us relate to states, the political units into which the world is divided, by
means of both law and emotion. 922
921F
This section will explore how the nationality laws describe in the last section were used by
the governments of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia to achieve national unity, a major problem
for post-colonial states, and the need in many states to balance power between different
political and ethnic groups. While as Part 2 explored, unifying the population in the
colonies was decidedly not a goal of colonization, it would become a major goal of postcolonial governments.
Many post-independence political leaders have consequently been faced with
the hard task of welding into a nation peoples diverse in language, ethnicity
and religion. 923
922F
This section explores some of the underlying factors that led to the drafting and
implementation of nationality laws. It accepts that crucial to understanding statelessness is
moving beyond an examination of,
strictly legal responses to...statelessness in the light of state resistance to
legal reform, discrimination, or other political factors (for example
institutional weakness, conflict, or political instability). 924
923F
During decolonization, the governments of newly formed states like Kuwait, Mali and
Malaysia began ambitious programs of state-building. Forging a common national identity
around a unified nationality was a key part of this project. As a result, places where colonial
administrators had used a more hands-off approach towards nomads would now be
subjected to aggressive centralization and assimilation. This section will explore how the
goal of national unity influenced ongoing discrimination against nomads in the granting of
nationality and the resolution of statelessness.
The status of nomads would also continue to be influenced by scholarship on nomadism. 925
Where relevant, this section will mention how scholarship on nomads and statehood also
influence nationality laws and policies.
924F
N. G. Schiller, ‘Transborder Citizenship: An Outcome of Legal Pluralism within Transnational Social Fields’
in F. von Benda-Beckmann, K. von Benda-Beckmann and A. Griffiths, Mobile People, Mobile Law: Expanding
Legal Relations in a Contracting World (Ashgate 2005) 30.
922
923
Heater, 133.
924
Staples, 173.
925 For a summary of some of these views, see E. Isin and P. Wood, ‘Citizenship and Identity’ in H. Gulalp,
Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the state (Routledge 2009) 64.
178
179
National Identity in Kuwait
The Red Fort at Jahra
(T)he history of the biduns is closely intertwined with that of the nascent
state... 926
925F
An aim, if never explicitly stated, of all Gulf governments in the years
following independence has been to forge a national identity and shared
history. 927
926F
The proceeding section outlined the exclusion of certain Bedouin tribes from Kuwaiti
nationality following the termination of the protectorate agreement, focusing on an
analysis of the law and its application to the Bedouin. But the above section did not explore
the root causes of this exclusion. While it touched upon some of the factors that
preoccupied the Kuwaiti government during this time, legal analysis of Kuwait’s laws and
an overview of its nationality policies cannot explain the discrimination that drove much of
this exclusion. This section will explore political, sociological and economic forces that
drove the implementation of Kuwait’s nationality laws. This section relies on both
academic sources and some non-academic sources, which are used to illuminate public
debate and government positions.
Forging a unified national identity was an urgent goal for the Al-Sabah family in light of
Kuwait’s precarious security situation. The divide between Kuwaiti nationals and nonnationals has become a driving force in Kuwaiti politics. 928 At the end of the protectorate
927F
926
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 4.
C. Zeineddin, ‘State-Relgion-Minorities Tensions in the Arab Gulf’ in M. Al-Zoby and B. Baskan (eds.) StateSociety Relations in the Arab Gulf States (Gerlach Press 2014) 147.
927
928
Longva, Autocracy, 117. See also Longva, Citizenship, 183.
180
agreement, security from external invasion would become one of the most important issues
for the Kuwaiti government. The issue of borders would plague Kuwait throughout the
20th century and complicate the question of Kuwaiti belonging. The legitimacy of the AlSabah family as the rulers of Kuwait would be frequently called into question now that they
could no longer rely on overt British support.
Part 2 highlighted the importance of the military abilities of the Bedouin in late 19th and
early 20th century Gulf politics. In particular, it looked at the role of the Bedouin in
supporting inland rulers like Ibn Saud. 929 The question of Bedouin loyalty would continue
to plague Gulf state rulers, even as the Emir of Kuwait continued to rely on Bedouin troops
to serve in Kuwait’s army. During this period, the perceived ties of many Bedouin to what
were now the governments of neighbouring states continued to call their loyalty into
question. It should be noted that the integration of the Bedouin into the current system of
territorial states in the Gulf has been a problem for governments across the region.
Speaking of the Bedouin in the region today more generally, Chatty explains that,
928F
(i)n spite of a lingering sentimentality toward the Bedouin that has deep historic
roots, the popular consensus over the past few decades has been that these tribes
are a major obstacle to social and economic development. 930
929F
Influencing the issue of Bedouin inclusion was the issue of Kuwait’s recently created
borders and its territorial expansion beyond Kuwait Town to include areas of desert
dominated by the Bedouin. 931 Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia had begun aggressively courting
the disaffected Bedouin populations, arguably in an attempt to concentrate Bedouin tribes,
and Bedouin power, in Saudi Arabia. 932 The existence of Kuwait seemed to be under threat.
With Kuwait’s borders little more than lines drawn on maps by the British, the nationality
of the Bedouin was deeply implicated in Kuwait’s security situation. 933 The supposed
militarism of the Bedouin, however, was also linked to perceived cultural differences been
Bedouin society and that of urban areas.
930F
931F
932F
The idea of Kuwait had long meant Kuwait Town and its urban, merchant population.
Lund-Johansen calls this the “urban-centred" conception of nationality. 934 Postindependence, this conception of Kuwait, the conception of a city-state, would have to
change. “Until independence in 1961, the term Kuwaitis was used to refer exclusively to the
933F
929
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 63.
930
Chatty, Pastoralists, 15.
931 Beaugrand calls Kuwaiti nationality law and national identity “hyper-territorialized.” Beaugrand,
Transnationalism, 2010, 121. K. E. O. Eldin, ‘Kuwait Primary (Tribal) Elections 1975-2008: An Evaluative
Study’ 38 British J. of Middle Eastern Studies 141 (2011).
932
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 65.
933
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 121.
934
Lund-Johansen, 21.
181
inhabitants of the town of Kuwait.” 935 Now, Kuwaiti identity as a territorial state
encompassing both desert and town needed to be created at decolonization, constructed
around an “imagined community located within a specific territory and with a specific
common history.” 936
934F
935F
Kuwaiti identity would come to be deeply influenced by a division in Kuwaiti society
between people of urban, settled descent, the Hathar, and people of Bedouin descent, the
Bedu. This section will explore how Kuwaiti nationality law and policy both grew out of the
Bedu/Hathar divide, but also reinforced it. As Part 2 showed, ideas about the supposed
tribal nature of nomadic societies permeate the distinction between Bedu and Hathar.
Wilkinson cites to Ibn Khaldun, a noted 18th century historian of the region:
Hadar is the organization of a central government system...(while) badw is not
Bedouin (nomads) but tribally organized society whose elite operates from oasis
settlement... 937
936F
In general, the term Bedu is now used across the Gulf region to refer to people who are
from the desert, whether or not they are settled (or are technically descended from
nomadic Bedouin tribes), versus the urban-dwelling Hathar. 938 Today, the term Bedu has
become a cultural identifier, rather than a reference to nomadism, but the association with
the nomadic Bedouin tribes of history remains strong. 939 As a result, the fact that all
Bedouin in Kuwait are now settled has not affected their identity as Bedu.
937F
938F
The term badu designates a socio-cultural category that refers less to an
economic, nomadic or sedentarised dimension than social values and behaviors:
badu share a set of images of themselves with regard to their active or real
common lineage, values and attributes, including commonality of interests, the
reciprocity of obligations, common residence that continues once settled and the
importance placed on marriages and alliances. 940
939F
“Bedu...conveys a sense of otherness...” 941 It distils certain common assumptions that tribal
societies, like nomadic societies, are naturally stateless, a view widely shared by European
940F
935
Longva, Citizenship, 186.
936
Longva, Citizenship, 180.
937
Wilkinson, 301, 313.
938 Chatty, Negotiating, 131. See also Chatty Persistence 2014 (discussing identity and the Bedouin in the
Arabian context.) “The opposition of bedu (desert dweller) to hadar (urban dweller) is specifically an Arab
cultural tradition.” Chatty, Persistence, 18.
939
Chatty, Persistence, 2014, 17.
940
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 70.
941
Fletcher, 52.
182
colonizers, as Part 2 discussed. Speaking of the Middle East, anthropologist Dawn Chatty
puts it thus:
Central governments, particularly in the Middle East, generally regard nonsedentary populations as tribes, forming states within a state, and constituting a
national problem. 942
941F
The association between Bedu and so-called tribalism has arguably influenced the
perception of the Bedu as somehow unsuited for nationality and the responsibilities of
voting. The Bedu vote has become increasingly associated with opposition to the
government and social and cultural backwardness. 943 The Hathar have opposed any
discussion of further naturalization. 944 The voting choices of the naturalized Bedu
population came under increased criticism and the idea of including more Bedu was now
an anathema to many Kuwaiti nationals. 945 Though being bidoon entitled the individual to
many of the same rights as naturalized Kuwaitis in the 1960s, this would change over the
decades as the entitlements of the bidoon were gradually reduced. 946 The tension between
the Bedu and Hathar elements of Kuwaiti society is now a prominent part of Kuwaiti life
and arguably impacts the views of the bidoon held by many Kuwaiti nationals.
942F
943F
944F
945F
Meanwhile, Bedouin history has long been romantically celebrated in many Gulf states,
even as the descendants of the Bedouin have been excluded from nationality in places like
Kuwait. Ibn Khaldun himself advocated for the superiority of the Bedouin lifestyle over that
of town dwelling. 947 A certain nostalgia therefore permeates Kuwaiti views of the Bedouin
today, even as the Bedu are looked upon as a social and political problem. The
administrative implementation of nationality in Kuwait therefore perpetuated and
reinforced a divide between Bedu and Hathar, a division implicit in Kuwait’s nationality
law, as discussed above, and a divide which continued long after the settlement of the
Bedouin and their assimilation into urban life. 948
946F
947F
942
Chatty, Truck, 80.
Chatty, Negotiating, 131. A. Jordan, The Making of a Modern Kingdom: Globalization and Change in Saudi
Arabia (Waveland Press 2011) 69. See also Chatty Pastoralists 5. Chatty points out that there has long been
tension between Bedu peoples and settled agriculturalists on the Arabian Peninsula. See also Janzen, 165; D.
Chatty, Adapting to Multinational Oil Exploration: The Mobile Pastoralists of Oman (University of HalleWittenberg 2002) 1–19 (Describing the forced settlement and marginalization of nomadic peoples in Oman
and French colonialism).
943
944
Partrick, 48. See also Longva, Citizenship, 186.
945
Longva, Citizenship, 186.
946
Lund-Johansen, 26.
M. Pribadi, ‘Ibn Khaldun’s Social Thought on Bedouin and Hadar’ 52 Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies
417 (2014) 424-431, citing the writings of Ibn Khaldun.
947
948
Partrick, 51.
183
In an attempt to create a founding myth around which Kuwaiti identity could coalesce, the
Kuwaiti government embraced the Battle of Jahra as the founding myth of Kuwaiti identity.
According to al-Nakib, the Battle of Jahra has been broadly recast in modern Kuwait as the
Hathar defending Kuwait Town against invading Bedouin, though not all Bedouin are
viewed by the government as playing the same role in this event. 949 Some tribes helped to
defend the town. It became crucial to Kuwaiti politics to provide these Bedouin with some
sort of official status.
948F
Today, however, this interdependence between Kuwait’s pre-oil sedentary and
nomadic worlds has been replaced with a popular rhetoric that identifies the badu
as antagonistic outsiders. The building of a fortified town wall (sur) in 1920 has
become emblematic of this supposed conflict between town and desert. 950
949F
The first body of Kuwaiti nationals were therefore defined by their settlement in Kuwait
Town and other coastal, urban areas before the Battle of Jahra, thereby granting full
membership only those families who had taken part in this foundation event, a group that
would come to be known as the Hathar population. 951 The Hathar now saw themselves as
“the people from within the wall,” while the Bedouin were from “beyond the wall.” 952
Kuwait’s nationality law both reflected the identity of Kuwait as a Hathar nation, while also
reinforcing that identity. But the increasingly educated and political Hathar population
would come to pose a threat to the Kuwaiti monarchy and drive the push to naturalize
some Bedouin.
950F
951F
In 1938, the Al-Sabah family created a parliament to represent the other powerful
merchant families that made up Kuwait’s Hathar elite. 953 While political parties in Kuwait
were banned, Parliament had some authority, particularly a say over legislation and the
appointment of ministers, and would play some role in the drafting and enacting of laws in
Kuwait. 954 Keeping a favourable balance of factions in Parliament would come to dominate
the Al-Sabah family’s policies for the coming decades. The ruling Al-Sabah family would
struggle to balance the influence of various populations within Kuwait, including internal
divisions between various religious and economic factions, between the Bedu and Hathar
population, and between nationals and immigrants. This balancing act would drive Kuwaiti
nationality policy. In the 1960s, the merchant elite in Kuwait City became increasingly
952F
953F
949
Al-Nakib, 9, 11.
950
Al-Nakib, 5, 8.
951
Partrick, 57.
952
Longva, Citizenship, 187.
Ismael, 73. For more information on the parliament, see generally National Assembly, ‘The Progress of
Democracy in the State of Kuwait’ (October 2011).
953
954 N. Brown, ‘Pushing Towards Party Politics? Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement’ (Carnegie
Endowment 2007).
184
liberal and westernized, attending universities abroad and agitating for a more democratic
government with a stronger parliament.
Nevertheless, the Al-Sabahs looked to their desert Bedouin allies with their so-called
traditional values to balance the educated, urban Hathar. An immediate goal of the AlSabah family was therefore to select a group of Bedouin, headed by sheikhs chosen for their
loyalty to the Emir, who would be assimilated into Kuwait to help balance the Hathar
population and serve in Kuwait’s military as naturalized Kuwaitis. 955 The Al-Sabah family
decided to naturalize one hundred thousand Kuwaiti Bedouin in exchange for their political
support. 956 These Bedouin were granted a second-tier status of naturalized Kuwaitis. 957
Naturalization would allow the Bedouin to vote and the Al-Sabah family assumed that the
Bedouin, who were politically conservative, would view their allegiance as being to the
person of the Emir and not to the Parliament. 958 They were not, however, recognized as
original Kuwaitis under the law, but were instead naturalized, as described above.
954F
955F
956F
957F
Naturalization favoured those Bedouin who had settled and joined the army and those with
established ties to the Al-Sabah family. 959 Naturalization would provide only limited rights
and access to services for these Bedouin without placing them on the same footing as
original Kuwaitis. 960 During the 1960s and 1970s, Bedouin in the military who were not
naturalized often qualified for many state benefits, meaning that their lack of naturalization
was not an issue beyond their lack of enfranchisement. 961 This lessened the value of
nationality to many Bedouin in the post-colonial period as social benefits were available
them. As the above section described, the process of naturalization was discriminatory,
extra-legal and arguably done in contravention of Kuwait’s nationality law. Meanwhile,
though often employed in low level jobs, many other Bedouin ended up without a
nationality status at all, excluded from Kuwait’s national identity even as they lived and
worked in Kuwait. This population, though similar to the naturalized Bedu in many
respects, became the bidoon.
958F
959F
960F
Longva, Citizenship, 187. See also Parolin 116; S. Yanai, The Political Transformation of Gulf Tribal States:
Elitism and the Social Contract in Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai: 1918-1970s (Sussex 2014) 223-225, 234.
955
G. Power, ‘The Difficult Development of Parliamentary Politics in the Gulf,’ in D. Held and K. Ulrichsen, The
Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (Routledge 2012) 33. See also Ismael, 125.
956
957
Salih, 144.
Longva, Citizenship, 180. See also Power, 33; H. al-Mughni and M. A. Tetreault, ‘Political Actors without the
Franchise,’ in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori (eds.) Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab
States of the Gulf (Tauris 2005) 218; Al-Nakib 7; Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 137; Neighboring
countries Saudia Arabia and Iraq also attempted to settle and assimilate their Bedouin populations around
this time. See Chatty, Pastoralists, 19-20.
958
959
Al-Nakib, 12.
960
Longva, Citizenship, 188.
961
Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Al-Nakib, 12-13.
185
To many Hathar, the Bedouin were incapable of understanding modern nationality and
civic participation. The Bedu were “something less than Kuwaiti” and not deserving of full
membership in the state. 962 Naturalization appeared to be a government handout and
political ploy, rather than the resolution of the status of a large section of Kuwait’s
population. 963 Many Hathar saw the newly naturalized Bedouin as having pledged
allegiance to the Al-Sabah family in exchange for handouts from the state, rather than as
loyal nationals. 964 Many members of the military, however, remained bidoon, a fact which
has caused what Longva called a “constant headache” for the government. 965 Yet, at the
same time, naturalization became increasingly untenable politically. As a result, Kuwait
ended up with a large number of bidoon serving in the military, but naturalizing too many
Bedouin was not politically possible and became less so over time. 966
961F
962F
963F
964F
965F
Attractive pay generated by the oil industry meant that some Bedouin living in Saudi
Arabia also went to work in Kuwait in the post-independence period. 967 These Bedouin
often had family connections to the recently settled Bedouin of Kuwait and were in some
cases invited to Kuwait by the government. As a result, the bidoon population became a
mixture of Bedouin who had settled near urban areas in Kuwait at different periods. During
this time, many of the social services available to bidoon began to be removed and the
bidoon were excluded from all but the lowest level jobs, often working in the informal
sector, and had limited access to education and welfare. 968 Because the bidoon were not
nationals, they could not own businesses, so jobs in the military became the main
employment option for the Bedouin, particularly those who were not naturalized. 969
966F
967F
968F
Meanwhile, Bedouin settling in urban areas to work in the military or oil fields were soon
joined by large numbers of immigrants. In the decades following the end of the
protectorate agreement with Britain, oil wealth began to bring a huge influx of foreigners to
Kuwait, both from within and without the region. This immigration happened throughout
all occupations, from educated professionals to domestic workers. 970 By 1965, Kuwaiti
969F
962
See generally Brown.
963
Al-Mughni and Tetreault, 218. See also Longva, Citizenship, 188.
964
Longva, Citizenship, 187.
965
Longva, Citizenship, 188.
966
Ismael, 121. See also Lund-Johansen, 27; Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 133-134.
967
Yizraeli, 177.
968
Partrick, 57.
969
Crystal, 171, 176. Country Information and Guidance: Kuwaiti Bidoon, Home Office, UK, 3 Feb 2014.
970
Carmichael, 122.
186
nationals were a minority in their own country. 971 Migrant workers came first from
Palestine and, later, from Southeast Asia.
970F
The immigrant label was also extended to Bedouin tribes who had not been naturalized,
even though they originated within the region. 972 At this point, Kuwait began to turn away
from pan-Arab nationalism that sought to unify all tribes in favour of a policy including
some tribes while labelling others as foreign. 973 Nomadism was now conflated with
immigration. 974 They Hathar increasingly viewed the bidoon as “trespassers” and
“foreigners.” 975 Beaugrand refers to those Bedouin families who would one day make the
bidoon population “near foreigners," 976 capturing their fuzzy status as somehow both
closely connected to Kuwait yet the residents of elsewhere. Today, in popular Kuwaiti
discourse, the term bidoon means simply foreigner, even when applied to bidoon of
Bedouin descent. 977 This has been aided by the fact that the category bidoon also includes a
small population of the children of foreign fathers and Kuwaiti mothers, as Kuwaiti women
cannot pass their nationality to their children. This latter category, however, is probably
less than 5% of the total bidoon population. 978 Nevertheless, it adds to the perception that
bidoon equals “foreign.”
971F
972F
973F
974F
975F
976F
977F
In this way, the Bedouin would come to occupy a space somewhere between Kuwaiti and
foreigner, a vagueness in status that the Kuwaiti government would never resolve. The
question of the exclusive allegiance of the Bedouin to the Kuwaiti government would
remain the subject of debate in Kuwait to the present day. Bedouin belonging is now
predicated almost entirely on the perceived loyalty to the Al-Sabah family of one’s tribe.
(I)t is only through the aid of tribalism that people can earn their ‘citizenship’,
residency, and jobs. Currently a sizable number of Bedouins have been denied the
right to citizenship. Without citizenship, they do not have free access to such basic
services as education, medical care and housing. It is only through the mediation
of tribal sheiks that citizenship can be earned. 979
978F
Ismael 117. Between 1965 and 1970, the Kuwaiti population increased by 62,000 and between 1970 and
1975 it increased by 38,000.
971
972
Longva, Citizenship, 183.
973
Ismael, 121-124. See also Longva, Citizenship, 183.
974
Longva, Citizenship, 182.
975
Longva, Citizenship, 187.
976
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018 4.
Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Lund-Johansen 1. I am indebted to Professor Alwuhaib for his insights
on this point.
977
978
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 140; Conversations with bidoon activists. Lund-Johansen, 1-2.
979
Salih, 143.
187
Bedouin were chosen for naturalization based on a combination of factors including
perceived tribal loyalty to the Al-Sabah family and the time and manner in which they
settled in the territory that is now Kuwait. 980 Yet it is important to note that many Bedouin
who would later come to serve in the military were not naturalized. Many Bedouin who
joined the military in later decades would remain bidoon, despite their service. 981 Rather,
historical ties to the Al-Sabah family, past military service at key moments in Kuwait’s
history, and ties to Kuwait’s territory were the most important factors driving
naturalization:
979F
980F
There are eight major tribal groups in Kuwait: al-‘Awazim (al-Awazems), alMutayri (al-Mutair), al-‘Ajman, al-Rashayda (al-Rashaida), al-‘Utaybi, al-‘Inzi, alZufayri, and al-Shammari. Al-‘Awazim is one of the oldest tribal groups that
settled in Kuwait. Its members live mostly along the coastal strip which extends to
Saudi Arabia, from where its parliamentary representatives come...Like al-‘Ajman,
al-Rashayda is also a famous tribal group in the Arabian Peninsula, due to the
fierce battles it fought with the Ottomans at the end of the nineteenth century. As
a result, many members of this tribe migrated to Egypt and Sudan...Al ‘Utaybi
tribe has played a dominant role in the Wahabi movement and in the conflicts
which erupted in the Peninsula during the formation of the third Saudi state...AlZufayri is one of the most influential tribes in the north western part of Kuwait,
and, in particular, they are located on the border areas between Iraq, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia (Hofrat al-Batin). Unlike other tribes, the settlement of al-Zufayri in
Kuwait’s urbanised areas came late and that is why many members of the tribe do
not have Kuwaiti citizenship...Al-Shammari was forced to migrate to Kuwait
following political conflicts in the Najd area... 982
981F
Certain tribes who are claimed to have played a role in defending Kuwait Town from Iraqi
and Saudi invaders are now prominent in Kuwaiti politics, including the al-Awazems, the
al-Mutair, the al-Ajman and the al-Rashaida. 983 By contrast, according to Human Rights
Watch, many stateless Bedouin who now hold the status of bidoon, or being without a
status in Kuwait, come from the al-Shammari and Aneza tribes. 984 Beaugrand claims that
the majority of the bidoon populations comes from what are sometimes referred to as the
982F
983F
980
I am indebted to Professor Al-Wuhaib for his comments on this point. Longva, Citizenship, 187.
981
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 108.
982
Salih, 144 (My italics). For more on this subject, see Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 62-68.
Middle East Online, ‘Kuwait splits between conflicts of sheikhs, and sheikhs of conflicts’ (June 7, 2011).
Note the spelling is different in different sources. This dissertation has preserved the spelling as written in
each source.
983
984
Human Rights Watch, ‘The Bedoons of Kuwait: Citizens without Citizenship’ (1995).
188
“northern Arabian tribes,” specifically the “Shammar, Dhatir and Anaza.” 985 As Beaugrand
puts it;
984F
Biduns claim their entitlement to first degree Kuwaiti nationality on the basis of a
pre-state understanding of sovereignty and territoriality, when political power
was associated with the control of inland tribes, together with the trade routes
they commanded and far-flung military resources they could mobilize so that
their immemorial roaming patterns and seasonal musabila (Bedouin’s seasonal
visits to the town markets for the sale and purchase of goods) is as good a proof of
their presence in the North Arabian region. 986
985F
Therefore, in addition to past service in the protection of Kuwait’s towns, the time at which
various tribes settled near urban areas and took up wage employment was also a key factor
in the extent to which they received a nationality. Over time, the identity of individual
Bedouin tribes settled in Kuwait but without nationality became subsumed into that of the
bidoon, a population of poor people living on the margins of Kuwaiti society. By the 1990s,
naturalized Bedouin made up 60% of Kuwaiti nationals. 987
986F
It should be noted that much of what is cited above continues to be contested history. The
intent of this section is not to plunge into the debate of where various Bedouin tribes come
from, or to provide a definitive history of Kuwait’s Bedouin tribes, but rather to explain
how the issue of Bedouin allegiance and origins came to be the deciding factor for their
nationality status. There appears to be some general agreement among sources that the alShammari, who are a powerful tribe in Iraq, the Al-Aneza, a powerful Syrian tribe with
connections to Iraq, and the Al-Zufayri tribe from northern Kuwait most frequently found
themselves without Kuwaiti nationality, though the government of Kuwait also claims that
many of the bidoon are actually faking their tribal origins, a fact which complicates efforts
to summarize Bedouin history. 988
987F
Some sources point to the fact that some bidoon have family origins in Syria and came to
Kuwait more recently, though it is not the purpose of this dissertation to take a view on the
extent to which individual bidoon families had ties to Kuwait Town before decolonization
or migrated to Kuwait in the post-independence period. 989 Beaugrand argues that many
988F
C. Beaugrand, ‘Framing Nationality in the Migratory Context: The Elusive Category of Biduns in Kuwait’
(Author’s Manuscript) 6 Middle East Law and Governance 1 (2014) 8. See also Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 4.
985
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 29. Statelessness and lesser forms of nationality that don’t include full
citizenship rights plague Bedouin populations across Arabia. See for example the Bedouin tribes in Lebanon,
where Chatty notes that today as many as two thirds of Bedouin in Lebanon may be without a nationality.
Chatty, Persistance, 11, 24.
986
987
Longva, Citizenship, 187.
988
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 10.
Beaugrand cites to a bidoon family who came from Syria to Kuwait in the 1970s. Beaugrand, Stateless,
2018, 191.
989
189
Bedouin who later came to settle in what is now Kuwait had what she calls “transnational”
ties to the region 990 including ties to Saudi Arabia, 991 but it is not clear what this means in
light of the recent nature of Kuwait’s colonial borders in the desert. Citing Rania Maktabi,
Beaugrand notes that some naturalized Bedouin were “Saudi and Iraqi.” 992 More
independent research would need to be done to establish the historical claims of individual
Bedouin families to Kuwaiti nationality under the laws at the time. Crucial would be an
interpretation of the term “settlement” under Kuwaiti law.
989F
990F
991F
In the 1980s, the Kuwaiti government became increasingly concerned that the bidoon
population was being infiltrated by what they called outside agitators, particularly agents
from Iraq. 993 This view was accompanied by new documentation requirements for the
bidoon, now for security reasons, and was accompanied by the termination of the
naturalization program, as discussed above. 994 The war in Iraq would be devastating for
the status of the bidoon, cementing the association between them and Iraq and elevating
them as a security risk to the state. Because many settled Bedu lived to the north of Kuwaiti
City near Al-Jahra, they were the first to flee during the invasion, further adding to the
perception that they were disloyal to Kuwait. 995 During the Iraqi occupation, the
Provisional Government contained many bidoon and the Iraqi authorities forced all bidoon
to register for the army or face execution. Many Bedu families who lived on the outskirts of
towns fled to Saudi Arabia where they had relatives. These facts combined to paint a
devastating picture of bidoon “loyalty.” 996 The invasion was the last straw for many Hathar
Kuwaitis, who now equated the bidoon with Iraqi supporters and other dangerous
foreigners. 997 After the restoration of the Al-Sabah family and the Kuwaiti government,
those bidoon who had fled abroad were prohibited from returning, 998 and many others
were fired from their jobs or required to inform on their neighbours. This occurred despite
992F
993F
994F
995F
996F
997F
990
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 62.
991
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 193-194.
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 86, citing R. Maktabi, ‘The Gulf Crisis (1990-91) and the Kuwaiti regime –
Legitimacy and Stability in a Rentier state’ (Master’s thesis, U. Oslo 1992).
992
993
Longva, Citizenship, 188.
994
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 150.
Longva, Citizenship, 188-191. Longva argues that this debate represents a continuation of the different
views of nationality by the Bedu and Hathar, where the Bedu see nationality as based on allegiance to the AlSabah family, while the Hathar see it as allegiance to the nation and territory of Kuwait. Longva, 192-193.
995
996
Longva, Citizenship, 189.
997
Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Lund-Johansen 33.
998
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 17.
190
a court ruling in 1998 that bidoon were stateless people and not aliens. 999 Being bidoon had
for many become synonymous with being Iraqi. 1000 These events would produce a toxic
situation for the bidoon, who were now issued papers claiming their origin as Iraqi. 1001
998F
999F
1000F
The problem of the bidoon, whose statelessness was wholly created by the Kuwaiti
government, would be recast as an issue of national security. 1002 The so-called solution,
however, did not involve naturalization but rather involved increasingly extreme schemes
to deport the bidoon. While Beaugrand points out that in actual fact, neither Iraq nor Saudi
Arabia have made direct claims of nationality on Kuwaiti bidoon, it was undeniable that
during the Iraq wars, the question of the status of Kuwaiti bidoon became a highly
politicized pressure point on Kuwait. 1003 During the war, some Iraqis may have entered the
bidoon population, possibility doubling it in size and further linking the concept of bidoon
to being from Iraq. 1004
1001F
1002F
1003F
With time, many naturalized Bedouin have achieved a lifestyle and standard of living
similar to the Hathar. 1005 For the bidoon, however, life had only gotten more difficult. 1006
As time went on, assistance programs for the bidoon began to be seen as expensive and fell
out of favour. 1007 As well, the Bedu stopped being such dependable allies for the Al-Sabah
family and now often vote with the opposition. 1008 At the same time, the government
increasingly equated the bidoon with migrants from other parts of Arabia, blurring the
distinction between nomads and economic migrants. Recasting the bidoon as immigrants
helped to legitimize their continued statelessness while political, economic and social
factors lessened the appeal of the resolution of their status. 1009 Recently, the government
has used denationalization as a way to punish naturalized former Bedouin (Bedu) accused
1004F
1005F
1006F
1007F
1008F
Crystal 176-178. See also Country Information and Guidance: Kuwaiti Bidoon, Home Office, UK, 3 Feb
2014. Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in Kuwait’
(2012); Lund-Johansen 34.
999
1000
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 152.
1001
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 33.
1002
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 168-169.
1003
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 31.
1004
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 114-115.
1005
Longva, Citizenship, 187.
Al-Nakib calls the naturalization and settlement of the Bedouin by the government “incoherent” and
“untenable in the long term.” Al-Nakib 7.
1006
1007
Ismael, 125-126.
1008
K. Diwan, ‘Kuwait: Too much politics, or not enough?’ Foreign Policy (10 Jan 2011).
1009
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 227.
191
of forgery during naturalization. 1010 Beaugrand hypothesizes that such acts are linked to
the modern tendency of what is often called tribal political groups to vote in opposition to
the government. 1011
1009F
1010F
For the purposes of the argument over the registration of the bidoon as without a status,
the existence of Kuwait’s borders is treated as an unchanging fact rather than something
that developed over time, during a period of external influence, and overlaid an earlier
system of belonging and membership that was not exclusively territorial in nature. The
complexities and fluid nature of the relationship between town and desert described in
Part 2 were reduced to a dichotomy of territorial insiders and outsiders that has now
ossified. Ironically, in adopting and defending the territorial concept of the state, the socalled foreign status of the bidoon is now used as a moral justification for itself, part of what
defines Kuwaiti nationality. 1012
1011F
As the next section will discuss, below, while the question of national unity and the
inclusion of minority groups, including the Bedouin, was a major factor driving Kuwait’s
nationality policy, other important factors were at work that are crucial to understanding
Bedouin exclusion. The statelessness of the bidoon was taking place against the backdrop of
a dramatic regional struggle for oil that would dramatically raise the importance of the
question of the loyalty and belonging of the so-called Bedu population and control over
what had been Bedouin lands. First, the next section will turn back to the Mali example to
explore how nationality identity and the push for national unity influenced Malian
nationality law and the status of the Tuareg.
1010
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 30-31.
1011
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 31.
1012
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 69.
192
National Identity in Mali
Mali’s original flag with the Kanaga figure of the Dogon people, associated with the Négritude
movement.
Exclusion can be a way of affirming the boundaries of the nation when
loyalty or unity is most needed by political elites. 1013
1012F
As the above section showed, Mali’s nationality law contained considerable protections
against inter-generational statelessness, including the use of double-birth. Yet, many
Malian Tuareg today lack documents to prove their nationality. This section will look at the
civil war in northern Mali to help explain why Mali’s nationality law has not prevented
Tuareg statelessness. This section will look at how the Malian government pursued the goal
of national unity in northern Mali in order to fend of what it perceived as a serious threat of
Tuareg separatism. The sources for this section are primarily academic, but U.N. and World
Bank reports are used where needed to provide current information. In person interviews
were also conducted with experts to provide information that is otherwise lacking.
For the Malian government, national unity would come to be one of the major goals of
the post-independence period. 1014 As in many Sahel countries, the fight to prevent
Tuareg succession would have an impact on how Mali’s nationality law was applied to
the Tuareg.
1013F
(In Africa, p)olitical elites have battled over nationality as a specific tool to restrict
the scope of contestation and render powerful opponents illegitimate by virtue of
non-national status. 1015
1014F
Like Kuwait, Mali was a diverse region without a common religion, culture or history, a
creation of colonial borders. Like with the Bedouin, concerns over territorial sovereignty
1013
Gibney, 2014, 55.
L. Smith, Making Citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, Gender and National Identity in Ethiopia (Cambridge UP
2013) 23 (hereinafter L. Smith).
1014
1015
L. Smith, 4.
193
would fuel Tuareg exclusion. 1016 As this section will show, the inclusion of the Tuareg into
the Malian state would present the biggest challenge to Mali’s post-colonial integrity. The
experience of the Tuareg in Mali is an example of how statelessness can be both the cause,
and the result, of conflicts over colonial-era borders. 1017 In particular, this section will
focus on how forced settlement and assimilation of the Tuareg minority fuelled separatism
and a debate over Tuareg nationality. Ryser calls decolonization a “failure” in Africa
because it created conflict between indigenous groups and their states over land and
resources. 1018
1015F
1016F
1017F
Since independence from France, there have been four major Tuareg uprisings resulting in
the mass expulsion and repression of the Tuareg: the first in the early 1960s, the second in
the early 1990s, the third in 2006 and most recently in 2012, which has led to the current
vacuum of Malian state authority in northern Mali. The conflicts have involved the three
northern provinces of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, close to 500,000 km squared. 1019
1018F
As the above section explained, as in Kuwait, the colonial powers had elevated settled,
urban rulers over nomadic leaders in Mali. At independence, the new government, located
in Bamako far to the south, had to find solutions for the “problem” of their nomadic, Sahel
populations. 1020 The Malian government in many ways inherited the struggles of the
French administration to bring nomadism in line with the needs of the territorial state. The
need to integrate northern Mali would dominate Malian politics to the present day.
1019F
Like Kuwait, the belonging of the Tuareg would come to be reframed as an issue not of
nationality and belonging, but of national security, with devastating consequences.
(T)he practice of African pastoralism...has always transcended State borders but
must now take into account of constraints linked to migrations, terrorism, organized
crime, insecurity... 1021
1020F
In Kuwait, the “problem” of nomadic populations was solved through the nationality law,
by creating a series of tiers of belonging and a special class of stateless persons. As this
section will show, the Tuareg qualified for nationality under Malian law, either
automatically at independence, or subsequently through double birth, yet persecution has
1016
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 69-70.
1017
African Commission, para 24.
R. Ryser, Indigenous Nations and Modern States; The Political Emergence of Nations Challenging State
Power (Routledge 2012) 157, 199.
1018
1019
Diarrah, 85-86.
1020 The Malian government is not alone in Africa in regarding nomads as a threat to their statehood. “Mutual
distrust” characterizes the relationship between many nomads and governments. J. Ginat and A. Khazanov,
Changing Nomads in a Changing World (Sussex 1998) 1-2 (hereinafter Ginat and Khazanov).
African Commission, para 30. See also S. Straus, ‘Mali and Its Sahelian Neighbors’ (World Development
Report, World Bank 2011).
1021
194
led to their statelessness. 1022 Instead of being registered as nationals, the Tuareg were
subjected almost immediately following colonial independence with a period of violent
repression and, in the case of the northern Kidal region, military rule. As Lecocq puts it, the
outcome of independence:
1021F
...was not a Malian state, but a state harbouring at least two nascent national
ideas, if not more: the Malian nation and the Tamasheq nation. 1023
1022F
Unlike the bidoon, who hold an official, government-issued status of “no status,” most
Tuareg qualified under Mali’s nationality law but remained unregistered. 1024 But unlike
many other rural people in Mali who may lack documents but whose belonging as part of
Mali is unquestioned, many Tuareg were not simply unregistered due to weak state
structures, instead, their nationality became the subject of a bitter debate over the
sovereignty of northern Mali and the place of the Tuareg in Malian society.
1023F
Mali, like many young states in Africa, has a weak sense of national unity and
national identity. Geography ...undermines (its) national unity...(p)olitical and
economic power is strongly centered on the urban elites in (the) south of the
country. 1025
1024F
The fact that many Tuareg are unregistered does not, on its own, mean that the Tuareg are
stateless. As Mark Manly points out, “lack of birth registration is not sufficient to render a
person stateless.” 1026 Nor does economic and political marginalization, 1027 nor minority
status, on their own, necessarily produce statelessness. As this section will show, however,
the violence directed against Tuareg communities by the Malian government, coupled with
government rhetoric of Tuareg being foreigners, means that most Tuareg have lived in
what is essentially a military sub-state in northern Mali, treated as alien occupiers and
subversives. Tuareg exclusion therefore extends far beyond the lack of documents
experienced by many rural Africans.
1025F
1026F
Based on expert interviews, September 2018 M. Bado of CERAP (available on request), it is likely that
many Tuareg families have never been registered as nationals of Mali.
1022
1023
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 29.
1024 According to an interview with noted Mali specialist Arsène Brice Bado of the Centre de Recherche et
d’Action pour la Paix (CERAP) in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, the majority of Tuareg today are not registered as
Malian nationals and it is likely many families have never been registered since decolonization, though
statistics are not available. Interview COI September 2018 (available on request).
1025
Stewart, 23, 25-26.
1026
Manly, 2014, 107.
1027
Keenan, Lesser Gods, 10.
195
The quest for Malian unity began even before the French left. Leopold Sédar Senghor had
worried that what he called the myth of nationalism was being transmitted to Africa. 1028
1027F
Until relatively late in the colonial game, the proposition that there was a
Nigerian, Algerian or Congolese ‘nation’ would have been treated as utterly
ludicrous. 1029
1028F
Needing to unify disparate and diverse regions, African leaders in the 1960s were
incentivized to formulate a cohesive national identity, a process that often led to the
exclusion of minority groups. But Senghor saw a single national identity as at odds with the
African sense of a local patrie and the diversity that marked many post-colonial African
states. 1030 As noted in Part 2, the French had done nothing to construct a sense of national
identity in French Soudan, opting instead to create further divisions by administrating
separately the nomadic and settled portions of Sahel society. National identity therefore
had to be constructed at independence by the Mali government, which favoured a southern,
black African identity, often expressed through the writings of the Négritude
movement. 1031
1029F
1030F
Already, as Part 2 discussed, the policies of the French had heavily favoured the settled
population. 1032 The Malian state inherited the colonial structures of the French, including
the centralized, urban-based administrative divisions of territory and French policies on
schooling, voting, registration and other aspects of civic life, policies that, as Part 2 showed,
favoured the sedentary population. 1033 As Part 2 showed, the French had also reoriented
economic and political power in the region towards the south of the country and away from
the Sahara caravan trade.
1031F
1032F
Mali also faced several new problems with which the French had been wholly unconcerned,
including the need to shore up its new borders and to develop national unity and a unified
national identity, as well as an independent economy. 1034 As Part 2 showed, none of these
issues were of importance to the French, but they would assume primary importance in
Mali. Race and culture would play a large part in the construction of this unified Malian
identity. Branding minorities as foreign colonizers would become a way to exclude socalled problematic individuals or groups, including the Tuareg. The Malian government has
1033F
Cooper, 330, 350 footnote 61, quoting Senghor; Congrès constitutif du parti de la fédération africaine
‘Proceedings’ Afrique Nouvelle (3 July 1959).
1028
1029
Young, 6, 18.
1030
Cooper, 349, quoting Senghor.
1031
Cooper, 166. See also Stewart, 9; Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 4.
1032
Diarrah, 86.
1033
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 271.
Mali inherited a weak economy from the French, who had done little to build infrastructure outside of
urban centers. Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 74.
1034
196
often presented the Tuareg as being too closely connected to the French government, as
being white and as being foreign. 1035
1034F
The process of registration of the Tuareg first began as the AOF was being dissolved into
individual states, with borders being drawn through the heart of the Tuareg region. The
failure of the Sahara français and the OCRS struck a blow against a separate, or quasiindependent Tuareg state. The fact that the Tuareg were split across multiple states meant
that they would now be a tiny minority not only in Mali as a whole, but also in northern
Mali. Less than 5 percent of the total Malian population today is of Tuareg descent. 1036 As a
result, government policies on the Tuareg would now be decided by non-Tuareg.
1035F
Malian politics after independence can be divided into two very distinct periods: the
socialist policies of Modibo Keïta from 1960-1968 and the dictatorship of General Moussa
Traore from 1968-1991. 1037 The early stages of creating the Malian state took place from
1958 to 1960. 1038 1958 saw the proclamation of the Soudanese republic, which was to
become Mali. The rapidity of events took many Tuareg by surprise. Instead of a separate,
Tuareg state, all of northern Mali now became part of the VIth administrative region of
Mali, which encompassed the Sahara, Sahel and all points north, with the capital at Gao. By
1959, all of the French administrators had been replaced by Malians.
1036F
1037F
At the start, it seemed as if northern Mali was to take part in its own governance. The first
civil servants appointed were familiar with the north. 1039 In 1960, the first Malian military
units posted in the north were made up of a mixture of men from the south and the
north. 1040 It seemed as though the Malian state were making an effort to incorporate the
Tuareg into Mali, in spite of their resistance to Keïta’s one party state. 1041
1038F
1039F
1040F
Yet these moves papered over the deep divisions between the government and the Tuareg.
As Hama Ag Sid Ahmed, representative to Europe of the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad,
put it,
1035
Panter-Brick, 73.
Keenan, a noted anthropologist working for decades with the Tuareg, estimates the number of Tuareg in
Mali today at 675,000 people. Keenan Lesser Gods 1-2. Northern Mali is sparsely populated, and ninety
percent of the population of Mali live in the south. Stewart 16. See also Chipman 28; Gaudio, 1988, 149;
Minority Rights Group International, ‘World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Mali: Overview’
(May 2013).
1036
1037
Diarrah, 25.
1038
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 285.
1039
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 301.
1040
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 302.
Bourgeot, Résistances, 268 (Discussing the problems facing the administration of the Tuareg within one
party states.)
1041
197
the ex-French Sudan became independent under the name of Republic of Mali. Its
borders were drawn since the beginning of colonization as we know, the new
Malian state extended her sovereignty into our territory by the simple logic of the
colonial system. 1042
1041F
The Tuareg region was now divided between five separate sovereign states, each
demanding exclusive loyalty to a distant power centre controlled by others. The centre of
power for the Tuareg was now located not in Timbuktu or Agadez, but far to the south in
Bamako. 1043 The separated sovereign states would come to have increasingly difficult
relationships to one another and their borders would become potential sources of conflict.
The need to control territory defines many African conflicts between minority groups and
the state. 1044
1042F
1043F
(T)he geography and politics of the greater colonial project led to states that have
persistent border disputes with neighbors...and human refugee and migration
flows. 1045
1044F
The “nationalist leadership” of the new states sought legitimacy and security;
strengthening their borders was a priority. 1046 Neighbouring Algeria was also employing
forced settlement of the Tuareg as a means to control their disputed southern border,
further cutting Malian Tuareg off from their extended families. 1047 In Mali, according to the
African Commission;
1045F
1046F
the principle of the sanctity of borders is used by all the nation states to deny the
nomads the right to associate with their kin who find themselves in different
nation states. One example is that of people who live in Kidal in Mali, which is
1,500 kilometers from the capital city of Bamako. The nearest city for the
residents of Kidal is the town of Tinzawaren in Algeria. But because of the sanctity
of borders, nomads who have no identity cards or travel documents suffer
harassment when they cross borders to acquire the basic necessities. They are
often searched, beaten, imprisoned and bribes are often solicited from them, and
failure to pay leads to the loss of resources purchased. 1048
1047F
1042
Quoted in Gaudio, 1988, 187.
1043
Claudot-Hawad, 655. See also Manby, Struggles, 3.
D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola, ‘Managing Competing State and Ethnic Claims’ in D. Rothchild and V.
Olorunsola (eds.), State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Westview P. 1983) 11.
1044
1045
L. Smith, 21.
1046
Young, 5. In this, Mali is similar to other west African nations. Rothchild and Olorunsola, 1.
Azarya, 261. Algeria forcibly settled most of the Tuareg following independence, also developing the
tourist infrastructure of southern Algeria, creating jobs. The Tuareg resisted these efforts.
1047
1048
Report of the ACHPR Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, 39.
198
Armed conflict, however, was not the first reaction of the Malian government to the Tuareg.
Like the French before them, the Keïta government put in place policies of assimilation to
settle the Tuareg, which it saw as key to economic development, stability and the
conversion of the Tuareg from a problem to productive members of the Malian state.
Keïta’s government wanted to solidify Mali’s borders by limiting cross border grazing,
emancipating the Tuareg slave classes, giving land to the sedentary population, and
developing agriculture in the region. 1049 In short, they wished to finish the project begun
by the French.
1048F
In the north, the Keïta regime was “convinced” that agriculture was possible in the Sahel,
but that the Tuareg were too “lazy” and the French too apathetic to make it work. 1050 The
Malian government officially adopted a policy of assimilation towards the Tuareg. Diby
Sillas Diarra, Mali’s administrator in the north, is quoted by Boilley as saying,
“sedentarisation of the nomad is our objective (in the north).” 1051
1049F
1050F
Settlement of the Tuareg was explicitly encouraged by the Malian government, but it was
also a side effect of its broader economic programs. Borders split grazing areas and
restricted seasonal migration, encouraging settlement, and Mali’s agricultural development
schemes led to overgrazing, contributing to drought and making pastoralism more
difficult. 1052 Like the French before them, the Malian government also used schooling and
access to services as tools of assimilation. Education under the Keïta regime became an
obligation for all Tuareg children, following the French system already so unpopular with
the Tuareg, and was used as a way to promote socialist ideas. 1053
1051F
1052F
The Tamasheq language was banned and children were taught songs and stories that
focused exclusively on southern Malian culture. 1054 Tuareg culture was presented as
backward and children were encouraged to reject nomadism. Many children were
completely cut off from their parents, unable to return home even during vacation because
of the distances involved. Tuareg children who had been traumatized by the events of the
rebellion would not forget these early experiences with the Malian state. 1055 Throughout
1053F
1054F
Hall, 319. The Tuareg were not the only pastoral nomads to suffer under these policies; in southern Mali,
nomadic Fulbe peoples were prohibited from crossing the border with Cote d’Ivoire to sell their cattle in the
lucrative Ivorian cattle market and had their cattle confiscated by the Keïta government, causing the mass
relocation of Fulbe to northern Cote d’Ivoire. Diallo, 37.
1049
1050
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 153-154.
1051
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 360.
1052 A. Khazanov, ‘Pastoralists in the Contemporary World: The Problem of Survival’ in J. Ginat and A.
Khazanov (eds.), Changing Nomads in a Changing World (Sussex 1998) 9-12 (hereinafter Khazanov,
Pastoralists).
1053
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 351.
1054
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 157-158.
1055
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 357-360.
199
the 1960s, the Tuareg would resist government schooling. 1056 In 1967, for example, three
Tuareg chiefs were executed in Kidal for failing to bring the children of their clans to
school.
1055F
In this way, the conversion of the local economy to agriculture may be seen less as an
attempt to transform the economy to something more “productive,” but rather an attempt
to assimilate the Tuareg into the majority lifestyle of the region, which was settled,
subsistence agriculture employing a traditional system of land tenure. While Diarra made
some progress in promoting agriculture, however, ultimately, he would be frustrated in his
efforts by the economic realities of the Sahel environment, as the French had been before
him. 1057 The drive to assimilate the Tuareg, however, would continue long after Diarra’s
departure.
1056F
Another way the Keïta government encouraged assimilation was by breaking the authority
of the Tuareg nomadic noble class, as the French had tried to do before them. As discussed
above in Part 2, Tuareg society was based around a class system that allowed the noble
class to focus on nomadism and military protection. Camels had been used by the Tuareg
nobility to fight Malian troops and conduct the caravan trade, activities that the
government wished to discourage. 1058 The Tuareg nobility were associated in the minds of
many Malians with slavery and devastating raids on crops and villages.
1057F
The socialist government rejected the traditional hierarchy of the Tuareg chiefs and sought
to abolish the Tuareg class structure, employing much more aggressive policies than the
relatively hands-off approached developed by the French. 1059 Settlement became more and
more necessary to the noble class, as those noble families who settled in towns had greater
access to political power and became more wealthy, while those pursing pastoralism
became more and more impoverished and cut off from any say in their affairs. 1060
Administrators were appointed without consulting the local population and were chosen
almost exclusively from among the southern population. 1061
1058F
1059F
1060F
Freeing the slaves was also a major priority for the Keïta regime, one that would greatly
increase the size and, therefore, political power of the sedentary population. Both Malian
political parties vigorously sought the support of the Tuareg slave population following
independence. 1062 Former slaves were granted land and cattle from their former masters’
1061F
1056
Azarya, 260.
1057
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 156.
1058
Bourgeot, Résistances, 226-231.
1059
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 310-317, 355.
1060
Bernus, 169.
1061
Diarrah, 86-87. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 349.
1062
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 110.
200
herds. In the first elections following independence, the newly liberated population
enthusiastically embraced voting. 1063 Like the French before them, the Malian government
saw freeing the slaves both as a humanitarian project of liberation and as part of an effort
to transform Tuareg society and weaken the power of the nomadic nobility, further
accelerating the assimilation of the Tuareg.
1062F
This program of assimilation was met with stiff resistance by the Tuareg, as had previous
programs by the French. But the Keïta regime was far more focused on incorporating and
assimilating its northern territories into the Malian state than the French had been. As
Lecocq points out, speaking of Tuareg treatment by the Malian government:
(A) lack of understanding of nomad social and political organization from the
side of sedentary peoples leads to the belief that nomads are by definition
unruly anarchists averse to organization and control. 1064
1063F
The first post-independence elections were scheduled for 1964, but the project of
assimilating the Tuareg into the Malian state would not last that long. 1065
1064F
Even as it was attempting to assimilate the Tuareg, the new Malian state saw sedition
everywhere in the north. Persons suspected of sedition could be placed in prison without
trial for acts against the public order. 1066 The Milice populaire and Brigades de vigilance,
volunteer cadres mainly of Songhai people, were used to uncover supposed Tuareg sedition
and subversive activities. Arab and Tuareg groups came under state surveillance.
1065F
Influential Tuaregs who had supported independence of the northern regions came under
government suspicion, such as Mohammed Makhmoud ould Cheikh, M. Wafy, the founder
of the Arab-Berber association, and the chief of the Kel Antsar, Mohammed Ali ag Attaher,
who fled to Morocco. 1067 Keïta justified these laws by saying that the Malian state was
young and diverse, and “the idea of the State is not yet formed.” 1068 Nation building,
economic development and humanitarian concerns therefore justified the use of draconian
measures against the Tuareg.
1066F
1067F
The Tuareg developed a “profound resentment” towards southern leaders. 1069 Malian
nationalism and anti-colonialism were seen by the Tuareg as southern chauvinism. For the
1068F
1063
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 110.
1064
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 90.
1065
Hall, 275.
The government passed Ordonnance 32 of 28 March 1959, criminalizing acts of discrimination of a racial,
“regionalist” or religious nature with punishments of 5-10 years in prison.
1066
1067
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 304. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 191.
1068
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 303.
1069
Diarrah, 86.
201
Malian government, the Tuareg were seen as “troublemakers,” distinct from the national
identity of Mali, which was black African and engaged in slavery and pseudocolonialism. 1070 In Mali and Niger, the Tuareg were increasingly treated as outsiders in
their own country due to the growing perception, often promoted by Tuareg leaders
themselves, of a sharp cultural and racial divide between “white, northern” nomads and
“black, southern” agriculturalists. 1071 As anthropologist Baz Lecocq put it,
1069F
1070F
The Tuareg were thought of (by the government) as white, feudal, racist, proslavery, bellicose and lazy savage nomads, who were used as the vanguard of
French neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist projects in the mineral-rich
Sahara. 1072
1071F
As a result, there developed a racial and ethnic nature to the Malian conflict, as well as
discrimination against the Tuareg’s mobile way of life. Today, the government continues to
classify people from northern Mali according to lifestyle first, (nomadic or sedentary) and
ethnicity or religion second. 1073
1072F
At first, the Tuareg tried to work within the Malian state. Some Tuareg leaders joined the
Malian government. 1074 They argued for greater representation of Tuareg at both the
regional and national level. But Tuareg were largely overlooked for posts in the
government, despite the existence of an educated elite with a long history of governing
alongside the French. 1075 Malian officials evidenced a long-running antipathy to nomads in
general and the Tuareg in particular. 1076 Lecocq describes the Malian government’s
attitude towards the Tuareg during this period as “paranoid” over separatism and
revolt. 1077
1073F
1074F
1075F
1076F
Like the French before them, the Malian government got involved in the appointment of the
new Amanokal of the Kel Adagh Tuareg, appointing a member of the ruling family who
promised to be pro-Mali, echoing French meddling in the Tuareg leadership. 1078 Quickly,
the relationship between prominent Tuareg and the Malian government deteriorated.
Those Tuareg arguing for autonomy or independence, such as Muhammad ‘Ali and Ould al1077F
1070
Pezard and Shurkin, 9. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 89.
1071
Bourgeot, Résistances, 406. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002 89.
1072
Lecocq, Desert, 89.
M. Tiessa-Farma Maiga, Le Mali : de la sècheresse a la rébellion nomade : Chronique et analyse d’un double
phénomène du contre-développement en Afrique sahélienne (L’Harmattan 1997) 98-108.
1073
1074
Hall, 311-313.
1075
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 138-139.
1076
Hall, 318.
1077
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 173-174.
1078
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 146-149.
202
Shaykh, were imprisoned. 1079 The “problem of the north” was presented as a security
issue, rather than an issue of state legitimacy, minority rights or civic participation. 1080
1078F
1079F
In the first years of independence, during the socialist regime, sedentarization
policies were part of the nation building process through which all Malian
‘citizens’ had to be assimilated... 1081
1080F
In 1962, an incident between a Tuareg noble and two Malian soldiers in the Kidal region
would become the catalyst for a local uprising. 1082 The brutal government response would
engulf the entire Kidal province in violence, which the Tuareg called the Alfellaga, causing
an exodus of thousands of Tuareg and the end to any real cooperation between nomadic
Tuareg and the Malian state during the Keïta regime. 1083 As many as 5,000 Tuareg from
Kidal left for Algeria to escape this scorched earth campaign. 1084 Tuareg rebels were put to
death and the civilian population was treated with cruelty. 1085
1081F
1082F
1083F
1084F
Eventually, the government replaced the Arab, Songhai and Tuareg troops in Kidal with
soldiers from the south who had no ties to the region, mostly Bambara who had never been
north before. These forces were under the control of captains who had fought throughout
the French Empire, equipped with modern weapons and used to dealing with much more
serious uprisings. 1086 During the conflict, the government declared the border with Algeria
to be a “no-go” zone, and every person found there was automatically considered to be a
rebel. 1087 To starve out the Tuareg fighters, wells were poisoned, herds killed and Tuareg
civilians killed or forcibly removed from the area. 1088 Tuareg notables and leaders were
1085F
1086F
1087F
1079
Hall, 314.
1080
Stewart, 25.
1081
Randall and Giuffrida, 436.
Diarrah 86. See also Stewart 32; Bourgeot, Résistances, 233. Two Malian soldiers (a Songhai and a
Tuareg) attempted to arrest one of the sons of Alla, a famous Tuareg noble who had fought the French. The
Tuareg youth escaped. The police reacted strongly to this incident, canvassing the area to arrest Alla’s son
and his friends, targeting the civilian population. In response to this, a small, fractured band of rebels formed,
mostly Arabs, but with some Tuareg. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 318-334.
1082
1083 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 1. Lecocq notes the use of “(m)igration as a passive form of resistance” to describe
Tuareg departures both before the during the Alfellaga. Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 82.
1084
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 210.
1085
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 340.
1086
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 329.
1087
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 209-211.
1088
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 330. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 217.
203
executed. 1089 Tuareg rebels were tortured and publicly humiliated, led through the streets
as captives with their veils removed. 1090
1088F
1089F
While effective in smothering the rebellion, these tactics alienated the nomadic population
and caused a great deal of civilian suffering. 1091 The conflict also ended what little
cooperation there had been between the Tuareg and the Malian government. Both sides
now saw the other as an enemy. 1092
1090F
1091F
The government declared the conflict over in 1964 as Tuareg resistance collapsed. 1093 But
for the northern population of Tuareg in Kel Adagh in particular, the consequences of the
rebellion were severe and long lasting. The brutal government response caused the exodus
of thousands of Malian Tuareg to neighbouring Algeria and Libya, where many had
relatives. 1094 The social structure of Tuareg life in Kidal had been destroyed and almost a
thousand people had been killed, as well as a million pastoral animals. 1095 The Kidal region
was proclaimed a “military zone” under military rule and banned to outsiders until the end
of the 1980s. 1096
1092F
1093F
1094F
1095F
The experience of being refugees abroad permanently changed the Tuareg, particularly
those who would be born abroad with no Malian identity documents or ties to the Malian
state. 1097 Young men moved to larger towns in Algeria, or even travelled further afield
looking for paid work, abandoning pastoralism. Other Tuareg were confined to refugee
camps, ending their seasonal migration. 1098 Captain Diby Sillas Diarra was appointed as the
1096F
1097F
1089
Stewart, 33.
1090
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 214-215.
1091
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 331.
The impact of drought and environmental degradation on conflict in Mali cannot be ignored, though the
relative importance of these factors towards fueling the 1962 conflict are beyond the scope of this paper.
Here, it is simply argued that concerns over Tuareg separatism and Tuareg rejection of assimilation and
forced settlement played a large role in fueling the conflict. Ginat and Khazanov, 4. See also Tiessa-Farma
Maiga, 190-193.
1092
1093
Hall, 320.
1094
Diarrah, 86. See also Gaudio, 1988, 188; Pezard and Shurkin, 8; Hall, 320; Bourgeot, Sahara, 233.
1095
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 344.
1096
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 307, 345, 352-355.
1097 Information on documentation for Tuareg refugees from this period is difficult to find. More field research
on this point is needed. For an overview of how displacement can lead to statelessness, see generally M.
Bermudez, ‘Accessing documents, preventing statelessness’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The
Worlds’ Stateless Children 226. See also G. Gyulai, ‘The long-overlooked mystery of refugee children’s
nationality’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The Worlds’ Stateless Children 242, for a discussion of
statelessness among refugee children.
1098
Bourgeot, Résistances, 267.
204
head of the military, administration, and political party Union Soudanaise-RDA in Kidal.
The government closed the borders to seasonal migration further limited Tuareg mobility,
particularly long-distance mobility. 1099
1098F
Since 1964, successive Malian governments have consistently portrayed the northern
conflict as one over national unity and territorial sovereignty, rather than of discrimination.
The Malian government has consistently held the view that Tuareg succession is a threat to
the Malian state such that it justifies the treatment of the Tuareg as a security risk, rather
than as nationals of Mali with rights. As the government put it,
This problem (the conflict between the government and the Tuareg) is
extremely complex and touches the very essence of national unity and
territorial integrity, but it is poorly understood abroad, where it is
misinterpreted as a war between Whites and Blacks, between Muslims and
non-Muslims, or between sedentary and nomadic populations. Needless to
say, this is an oversimplified view, which betrays great ignorance of Mali’s
situation, with some critics going so far as to talk of attempted genocide of
one community by the other. 1100
1099F
In 1968, the Keïta government was overthrown in a coup, replaced by the military
dictatorship of Moussa Traoré. 1101 The coup was “enthusiastically” celebrated by many
Tuareg. 1102 Initially, relations between the Tuareg and the Malian state improved, as
Traoré proclaimed a time of “national reconciliation” and promised to improve relations.
The socialist program was abandoned, including forced settlement and the government’s
program to abolish the Tuareg class system. 1103 The Amanokals were restored to power
and influence within the local government. Some Tuaregs again took part in the political
life of the country, claiming posts in the National Assembly. 1104
1100F
1101F
1102F
1103F
But while the repression of the north relaxed, true reform did not occur. The region of Kidal
remained under military rule, outsiders were banned, and the majority of administrative
posts continued to be occupied by southerners. The surveillance of nomads continued and
no Tuaregs were appointed to the military. Over time, the regime of Traoré became
increasingly dictatorial throughout Mali, bringing an end to political participation across
1099
Azarya, 260. The Algerian government also closed its borders.
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Fourteenth periodic reports of States parties due in 2001,
Addendum MALI* (CERD/C/407/Add.2) page 11.
1100
1101
Diarrah, 62-64; 68-69. See also Gaudio, 1988, 110; Stewart, 23.
1102
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 86.
1103
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 164.
1104
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 364-367.
205
the country. In 1974, the new Malian Constitution retained one party rule in Mali under the
Union démocratique du peuple malien (UDPM). 1105
1104F
But most importantly for the Tuareg, the dictatorship of Traoré coincided with one of the
worst droughts to hit the Sahel in modern times. Drought would drive many Tuareg to
relocate to areas that were now in other countries, greatly increasing the risk of
statelessness even for those families who were registered with the state. While cyclical
drought was a part of life in the Sahel, and the 1910-1915 drought had been arguably
worse than that of the early 1970s, never had the Tuareg been so ill prepared. Years of
harmful government policies, poor land management and overgrazing combined with
natural fluctuations in rainfall to decimate the region, killing thousands of Tuareg and
driving thousands more abroad. International assistance for the drought mostly ended up
diverted into the pockets of politicians. 1106
1105F
The government saw pastoralism as to blame for the drought and introduced measures to
further restrict nomadism, including limiting nomad access to water and parcelling land for
agriculture. 1107 Many nomads responded to the drought by settling in camps, where they
were provided with assistance but unable to practice nomadism. Once again, international
organizations encouraged settlement and agriculture, believing that pastoralism was
unsustainable. 1108
1106F
1107F
The above history of the post-colonial period demonstrates that while most Tuareg likely
qualified for Malian nationality, widespread discrimination and persecution, coupled with
mass displacement, made civil registration all but impossible for many Tuareg families.
Many others may have seen registering as Malian nationals in a negative light. It may be
tempting to see the lack of registration among the Tuareg in Mali as simply a symptom of
weak state structures and lack of registration, but as the above sequence of events
demonstrates, the exclusion of the Tuareg extends far beyond mere lack of registration.
While many rural Africans may lack documentation, they are often presumed to be
nationals by their governments. In the case of the Tuareg, they were treated not as
nationals, but as a security threat, almost from the moment of independence. Today, Tuareg
who lack documents and were displaced to camps have no way to prove their origins in
Mali.
The experience of living settled in refugee and displaced persons camps also forever
changed Tuareg society in very consequential ways. First, it meant a generation of Tuareg
1105
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 367.
1106
Bernus, 172. See also Diarrah, 86-87; Gaudio, 1988, 188; Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 368, 376, 379.
1107 Stewart, 33. See also Gaudio, 1988, 111, 250-255; Khazanov, Pastoralists, 15-16; Bourgeot, Résistances,
215; Gremont, 138.
Khazanov, Pastoralists, 7, 13. See also Bemus 174-175; Azarya, 262. Boilley argues this was misguided, as
pastoralism is ideally suited to land management in arid climates, allowing flexibility and migration during a
drought. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 27, 377. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to debate whether or
not pastoralism causes drought, but it should be noted that many experts now agree it does not.
1108
206
were growing up abroad without exposure to nomadism. Second, the exodus of Tuareg
abroad from both conflict and drought created a diaspora of Tuareg in other countries.
Many were likely without Malian identity documents. 1109 Tuareg children born Algerian
camps were not only unable to register as Malian nationals, but learned other languages
and become adapted to sedentary ways. This and other diasporas in Libya and beyond
would become the root of the modern Tuareg independence movement, linking Tuareg
separatism in the mind of successive Malian governments with Mali’s neighbours to the
north. 1110
1108F
1109F
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the 1990s, many Tuareg sought to return to
northern Mali in the hopes of a fresh start. 1111 The issue of return for Malian and Nigerien
Tuareg became more and more important during the 1980s, as Tuareg in camps in Libya
and Algeria agitated to return. But the framing of the time the Tuareg had spent in areas
that were now other countries only fuelled the view that they were not Malian. As the cycle
of drought continued to drive the Tuareg to spend periods of time abroad, the Malian
government continued to treat them as foreigners. A less serious drought occurred from
1984-1986, and again thousands of Tuareg left northern Mali for camps and cities in
Algeria. Over this period, continued contact between Malian Tuareg and the Algerian and
Libyan governments fuelled security concerns in Bamako. The cross-border movements
and increasing militarization of the Tuareg seemed to justify Bamako’s concerns of
separatism.
1110F
Yet the Malian Tuareg were not universally welcomed in Algeria. In 1986, the Algerian
government, fed up with the constant stream of Malian Tuaregs into Algeria, expelled
thousands of Tuareg back to Mali. 1112 Forced into trucks and driven to the border by the
Algerian government, the Tuareg were stopped by the Malian authorities who refused to let
any Tuareg enter Mali who could not prove his or her Malian nationality. Without papers to
prove their Malian nationality, the forcibly returned Tuareg settled in towns at the border
or in the “no man’s land” between the two countries. 1113 In 1987, the new president of
Niger offered an “amnesty” and allowed some Tuareg with ties to what had become
northern Niger to return from Libya and Algeria, but there was no similar offer from Traoré
in Mali. 1114 This is one example of the effect that a chronic lack of registration was having
1111F
1112F
1113F
1109
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 386-390.
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 395. Bourgeot 267-268, 359 (Discussing the formation of a Tuareg diaspora
in Algeria and Libya).
1110
1111
Diarrah, 87.
1112
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 382, 392.
1113
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 392-394.
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 442. The goodwill between the Nigerien Tuareg and the Tuareg would later
be shattered by the affair of Tchin Tabaraden, where the Nigerien government attacked Tuareg civilians
following a security incident at a prison, causing mass displacement of Nigerien Tuareg back to Libya and
1114
207
on the Tuareg, who were increasingly being treated as a stateless population by both
governments.
In 1990, 300 Tuareg families were repatriated to Mali from Algeria, fed by promises of
reintegration. Instead, they were placed in squalid camps controlled by the army with no
possibility of leaving or moving around the countryside. Men and boys from the camps
were regularly arrested and tortured by the Malian security forces, mistrusted because of
their time in Algeria and Libya, where some Tuareg fighters had been granted Libyan
nationality. 1115 The military rounded up Tuareg men and boys in villages and beat them in
public. 1116 Caravans of Tuaregs returning from Niger were turned back or attacked. The
returning Tuareg also faced a dismal economic climate, as the returning Tuareg had no
access to land for agriculture and few other job prospects in northern Mali.
1114F
1115F
The decimation of the pastoral lifestyle had also decimated the Tuareg economy. During
this time, a new challenge appeared for the Malian government: the drug trade. The Tuareg,
who continued to trade across what was now the Algerian border, trade that was now
illegal, increasingly became seen as the cause of drug trafficking. 1117 By the early 1990s,
many Tuareg in Mali remained in camps, cut off from their traditional migrations and
prohibited from legally crossing into Algeria, targeted by the police and facing few viable
job prospects. The situation that the Tuareg found themselves in at the beginning of the
1990s was one of exclusion, expulsion, disenfranchisement, forced settlement and poverty.
1116F
Once again, Tuareg grievances would erupt into violence against the Malian government,
but this time, the rebellion would be much better organized and armed. In 1991, Traoré
was overthrown after demonstrations and political unrest, replaced first by a transitional
government headed by Amadou Toumani Touré, then by an elected, civilian government in
1992. 1118 For the first time since 1967, it seemed like meaningful change for Mali’s Tuareg
was possible. When change did not occur, the Tuareg once again took up arms, led by a
younger generation who had been trained by the Algerian and Libyan military. In 1991, the
Front de Liberation de l’Azaouad (FLA) was formed by unhappy Tuareg, many of whom had
fought for Gaddafi against Chad and had military training, and some of whom had Libyan
nationality. 1119 This generation of Tuareg had grown up with the stories of the 1962-1963
1117F
1118F
Algeria. This incident was watched with concern by Malian Tuareg and continues to be an important incident
for the Malian Tuareg independence movement. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 451.
1115
Azarya, 261.
1116
In one incident, the military executed ten light skinned men and women in Gao. Azarya, 261.
Pezard and Shurkin, 2-5. The extent to which the Tuareg are to blame for drug trafficking is contested.
The point of this section is to show how the Tuareg are perceived as a security threat and cause of the drug
trade by the Malian authorities.
1117
1118
Stewart, 24.
Stewart, 34. See also Hall, 320. The Tuareg independence movement has a wing in Niger as well.
Bourgeot, Résistances, 362-363.
1119
208
rebellion and aftermath. Once again, the rebellion began in Kidal, the province most
subjected to government repression and closest to the Tuareg refugee camps in Algeria,
Niger and Libya. The Tuareg diaspora, unable to gain any acceptance in Mali or even the
promise of return, now dreamed of a national, independent homeland, to be called the
Azawad. 1120
1119F
This war was far better organized and armed than the 1962 conflict. 1121 The goal was an
independent state that would encompass the entire Tuareg region. “By the 1990s, the
Tuareg image of their state had gone from one based on blood ties to one based on
bounded territory. The Tuareg have adopted the western conception of the nation
state.” 1122 At the root of the independence movement was the feeling among many Tuareg
that the Malian government had been treating them not only as foreigners but as enemies
for decades, that incorporation within Mali had failed, and that independence was the only
way to gain their rights. 1123 As Hama Ag Sid Ahmed, representative to Europe of the
Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad, put it, “the ex-French Sudan became independent under
the name of Republic of Mali. Its borders were drawn since the beginning of colonization as
we know, the new Malian state extended her sovereignty into our territory by the simple
logic of the colonial system.” 1124
1120F
1121F
1122F
1123F
Once again, the government response was swift and indiscriminate, attacking civilians and
rebels alike. 1125 Ironically, due to an entire generation of Tuareg growing up in camps and
cities abroad, many Tuareg fighters now had real, tangible ties to Algeria and Libya, fueling
Malian government concerns over an invasion from the north. The chronic lack of
documentation among the Tuareg was now weaponized against them. The Malian
government arrested Tuareg civilians for lacking identity cards, which was used as proof of
their foreign status. 1126
1124F
1125F
In Bamako, the government employed familiar rhetoric to label the Tuareg, rebels and
civilians alike, as outsiders and un-Malian and characterized the war as one between white
slavers and black former slaves in rhetoric designed to incite hatred against the Tuareg and
Arabs. 1127 The Songhai civilian population once again formed civilian militias, such as the
Ganda Koy movement, to protect their villages from Tuareg rebels. Increasingly, the conflict
1126F
1120
Stewart, 31-32.
1121
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 396.
1122
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 228.
1123
Gaudio, 1988, 189.
1124
Quoted in Gremont ,141.
1125
Gaudio, 1988, 183, 186. See also Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 457.
Gaudio, 1988, 183. Once again, more information is needed on the state of documentation among the
Tuareg today.
1126
1127
Stewart, 34.
209
became a local civil war between agriculturalists and former and existing nomadic Tuareg,
many of whom had returned from abroad. 1128 The Malian government capitalized on the
rhetoric of foreign, “white,” nomadic invaders attacking villages.
1127F
Once again, the conflict led to widespread displacement. During the 1990s, more than
20,000 refugees, both nomadic and sedentary, fled northern Mali. 1129 By the end of the
conflict, there were more than 60,000 refugees in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and
Niger. 1130 By the mid-1990s, parts of the Niger Bend in the Sahel had been entirely cleared
of Tuareg. 1131
1128F
1129F
1130F
This time, the war got global media attention and pressure was put on all sides to negotiate.
The war ended with the Tamanrasset Accords in January 1991, where the government
promised greater autonomy and better development projects for the north. The Accords
stipulated the immediate cessation of hostilities, the demilitarization of the regions of Gao,
Kidal and Timbuktu, semi-independence with increased autonomy in the administration,
economy and culture with elections at the Préfet, Sous-préfet and Maire levels, and greater
government investment in northern Mali. 1132
1131F
But the Accords did not address the underlying problems that led to the conflict, such as
lack of genuine development in the region, particularly development that could
accommodate pastoralism, discrimination against the Tuareg, particularly those returned
from abroad, anti-pastoralist programs and environmental degradation. 1133 Perhaps most
importantly, the Accords also did not address the problem of the border and the question
of Tuareg sovereignty and land ownership, though it did provide for more regional
cooperation and for greater political and social contact across the Sahara. 1134
1132F
1133F
The agreement that followed the Accords, the National Pact of 1992, provided a roadmap to
incorporation of the Tuareg within Mali, but did not address the underlying problem of the
division of the Tuareg between countries and their historical claims to their lands. Efforts
were made towards semi-independence for the north, however. Most importantly, the Pact
made “internal security,” meaning the police, the responsibility of the regional, instead of
national, administration. Of vital importance, the northern regions could also enact their
Hall, 320. See also J. McDougall, ‘Frontiers, Borderlands, and Saharan/World History’ in J. McDougall and J.
Scheele (eds.), Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa (Indiana UP 2012) 141 (hereinafter
McDougall); Gremont, 141; Diarra,h 87.
1128
A. Giuffrida, ‘Tuareg Networks: An Integrated Approach to Mobility and Stasis’ in Ines Kohl and Anja
Fischer, (eds.) Tuareg Society within a Globalized World : Saharan Life in Transition (Tauris 2010) 25.
1129
1130
Gaudio, 1988, 194.
1131
Hall, 320.
1132
Diarrah, 87. See also Gaudio, 1988, 115-117, 190-191.
1133
Diarra,h 120, 131.
1134
Diarrah, 99-104. See also Gaudio, 1988, 121; Stewart, 35.
210
own bilateral agreements with neighbouring states to facilitate cross border movement
and more interaction with Tuareg in Niger and Algeria. The newly created assemblies
would be “democratically elected” and represent the commune, the arrondissement, the
cercle and the region, as well as an assembly for the three northern regions together,
reflecting their commonalities. 1135
1134F
To outside observers like the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
National Pact to implement the peace accords was a positive development: “(s)een in the
light of the previous massive suppression of the human rights of the Tuareg, the National
Pact is a positive development that gives the Tuareg areas decentralized powers and allows
for Tuareg participation and representation." 1136 It ultimately failed, however, in part
because it was not fully implemented, 1137 but also because it refused to grapple with the
deep problems of Tuareg belonging and the history of forced settlement and political and
cultural fragmentation that had left deep scars on northern communities. The Pact took few
steps cultural unification of the Tuareg across borders. Possible solutions that would
weaken the primacy of nation-state integrity, such as through specially created, semiautonomous zone, were ignored.
1135F
1136F
Today, the Tuareg have not received an official designation of being without Malian
nationality, as the bidoon in Kuwait have, but many Tuareg are treated as an undocumented
population that poses a security risk to Mali, despite their extensive history in northern
Mali that was documented in Part 2. A lack of registration and decades of living in refugee
camps have left many Tuareg stateless or at risk. Behind the hostility between the Tuareg
and the Malian government lies the simmering and unresolved issue of Tuareg selfdetermination, the history of colonial borders and contested territory and the potential
devolution of some sovereignty to a semi-independent state. The question of ownership of
the Sahara, which had been of only strategic importance to the French, has become an issue
of control of potentially valuable mineral and oil resources. The possibility of succession
has led successive Malian governments to regard the Tuareg as a security threat and a
Décret No 92-121/p-CTSP2, Pacte National, Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple et les
Mouvements et Fronts unifies de l’Azawad (11 Avril 1992). See also Boilley Les Touaregs 1999 528-529. Very
importantly for Tuareg inclusion, the Pact reserved four seats for representatives of the north in the Malian
National Assembly, and two seats for Malians abroad. Boilley notes that this would be an important step for
the northern who in the past, “had little participated in legislative elections.” Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999,
528-529.
1135
The new Constitution drafted as part of the peace agreement reaffirmed universal suffrage for all nationals in
keeping with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human
and Peoples’ Rights. Art. 70 left the matter of nationality to laws passed by the National Assembly. La
Constitution de la République du Mali du 25/02/1992 Mali : Code des personnes et de la famille, Loi No. 11080/AN-RM, 2 December 2011.
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary session, ‘Report of the ACHPR
Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/ Communities’ (2005) 47.
1136
1137
Gaudio, 1988, 192-193.
211
threat to Mali’s territorial sovereignty and the issue of separatism has only grown more
contentious with the passage of time.
As the next sections will show, the debate over Tuareg inclusion would be impacted by the
potential for mineral wealth in northern Mali and, in particular, the discovery of oil and
uranium in neighbouring countries. These discoveries would transform the Sahara and
Sahel from areas useful to the French colonialists mainly for strategic reasons to valuable
regions in their own right, elevating the importance of Tuareg claims to their lands. The
next section will examine these factors in more detail and how they affect Tuareg
nationality and registration, but first, the next section will look at national unity in Malaysia
and how it affected Sama Dilaut inclusion and registration during decolonization.
212
National Identity in Sabah, Malaysia
The Sultan of Sulu, with representative of the BNBC, 1899
(I)n Malaysia, statelessness as an issue is always embroiled in wider moral
and political arguments...in many contexts, statelessness is not just an issue
of legal identification but is embroiled in contentious politics of national and
regional belonging. 1138
1137F
This section will look at how the push for nationality unity in Malaysia affected the
implementation of Malaysian nationality law. Forging a single, national identity in Malaysia
has not been helped by its diverse geography, where different groups live long distances
from one another in a federation spanning territorial non-contiguous states 1139 with very
different histories 1140 that were united mostly by their trade ties and intermittent and
uneven domination by Britain. 1141 Several former colonies, like Hong Kong, Singapore and
Brunei, are not included in Malaysia. 1142
1138F
1139F
1140F
1141F
Like the Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut found themselves divided by an international border in a
contested border zone, where their mobility appears to tie them to the Philippines. Unlike
in Kuwait and Mali, the Sama Dilaut are a small part of a larger debate over ethnicity and
nationality in Sabah. Like in Kuwait and Mali, however, concerns over nationality unity and
ethnic balance would greatly influence how the Sama Dilaut are perceived. This section
C. Allerton, ‘Contested Statelessness in Sabah, Malaysia: Irregularity and the Politics of Recognition’ 15 J.
of Imm. and Ref. Studies 250 (2017).
1138
1139
Clark and Pietsch, 160.
1140
Sinnadurai, 309-310. See also South Asia Defence And Strategic Year Book, Colonel Harjeet Singh 219.
1141
K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan 11.
1142
Singapore was originally included in the Federation, but left in 1956.
213
uses primarily academic sources, but non-profit reports and news articles are occasionally
used to provide more information or to highlight public debate.
In the decades following Malaysian federation, as the Sama Dilaut found themselves
unregistered and subjected to exclusionary government policies, including deportation, the
border between the Philippines and Sabah remained a sensitive point of contention
between the two states. The linked issues of nationality and borders has only gained in
prominence in Southeast Asia over the decades, as evidenced by what Alice Nah calls,
...the remarkable steadfastness of ASEAN states in holding onto a Westphalian
notion of state sovereignty, in particular, when constructing immigration control
regimes. 1143
1142F
In order to understand how the Sama Dilaut fit into the larger political and social debate
over nationality in Sabah, it is important to understand how national identity and
nationality in Malaysia are entwined. It is also important to show how these
preoccupations are linked to the issue of territorial sovereignty and borders. Malaysia
today is usually described as being made up of three ethnic groups: Malays and other
“indigenous” peoples, and two “immigrant” populations: Chinese and Indians. 1144 Yet, as
this section will show, this division does not reflect the complexity of identity in Sabah,
where non-Malay groups worry about Malay dominance in politics and cultural life. 1145
The categorization of the Malaysian population as being made up of Malays, other
indigenous groups and so-called immigrant populations is something of an
oversimplification and obscures the very real differences between the Borneo states and
Peninsular Malaysia. 1146
1143F
1144F
1145F
The question of Malaysian national identity would come to be of the first importance for
successive Malaysian governments, a key part of holding the federation together. In this
way, Malaysia closely resembles Mali, where colonial borders have bound vastly different
cultures together, while separating groups with historical affinity, making the forging of a
unified national identity a big challenge for the government. As in Mali, the spectre of the
A. Nah, ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty and Immigration Control: The Hierarchy of Rights for Migrant Workers
in Malaysia’ 40 Asian J. of Social Science 486 (2012) 487 (hereinafter Nah). See also J. Clifton, G. Acciaioli, H.
Brunt, W. Dressler, M. Fabinyi, and S. Singh, ‘Statelessness and Conservation: Exploring the Implications of an
International Governance Agenda’ 19 Tilburg L.R. 81 (2014) 85 (hereinafter Clifton, Acciaioli, Brunt, Dressler,
Fabinyi and Singh).
1143
1144
Lim Hong Hai, 102.
1145
Saleeby, 158. See also Sinnadurai, 312; see generally Cheah Boon Kheng.
Malay as an ethnic group is defined by law. “‘Malay’ is defined by law as a person who professes the
religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and; (a) was before
Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the
Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or; (b) is the issue of
such a person...” Constitution of Malaysia art. 160(2). See also W. Guinee, ‘Race, Ethnicity, and Ethnic
Relations: A Malaysian Case Study: A Curriculum Project for the Fulbright-Hays Seminar Abroad: Malaysia
and Singapore’ Westminster College (2005).
1146
214
breakup of the Federation hangs over the question of nationality. As Young, Bussink and
Hasan put it, “(t)he common status of the myriad peoples of the country is Malaysian
citizenship, but it takes more than this shared status to transcend the separate identities of
diverse cultures.” 1147 Immigration, Islamification and relations with neighbouring states,
particularly the Philippines, would therefore become intertwined preoccupations for both
the governments of Sabah and Malaysia. 1148
1146F
1147F
As this section will show, the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut must be seen in part through
the lens of the wider context of the struggle to forge a unified, Malaysian identity. Unlike
the Tuareg, the contested nationality of the Sama Dilaut is not by itself a major political
issue in Sabah, but is rather part of a larger debate over national integration and the
relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines. This section explores how Malaysia,
and Sabah within Malaysia, sought to forge a unified national identity, and how this goal
influenced nationality law and policy, to explain why a country with protections against
statelessness written into its Constitution could contain such a large population of stateless
people. 1149
1148F
It should be noted that unlike in Kuwait, the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut is part of a
much larger problem of statelessness in Malaysia. UNHCR estimates that there may be as
many as 40,000 stateless people in Malaysia. 1150 Much of the debate over national unity in
Malaysia has centred on Peninsular Malaysia and the incorporation of the ethnic-Chinese
population. But while this debate may seem remote from the Sama Dilaut, it has indirectly
influenced nationality policy in Sabah and, as this section will show, the inclusion and
exclusion of the Sama Dilaut. Most importantly, the struggle to end statelessness in
Malaysia is closely tied to the issue of Malay ethnic dominance and the identity of Malaysia
as an ethnic nation. Today, the main debate over national identity in Sabah revolves around
the problem of immigration from the Philippines and the dominance of Malays in politics.
The issues of national unity and territorial unity would become entwined, with serious
implications for the Sama Dilaut.
1149F
1147
Young, Bussink and Hasan, 11.
1148 Donner, 32-33. See also Verzijl, 23; Brownlie, Principles, 388-394; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 33, 50; I.
Kerno, ‘Nationality, including Statelessness: Analysis of Changes in Nationality Legislation of States since
1930’ International Law Commission, A/CN.4/67 (1953); Handbook 2014 11. For a discussion of the
intersection between immigration and statelessness in Malaysia, see R. Razali, R. Nordin and T. Duraisingam
‘Migration and Statelessness: Turning the Spotlight on Malaysia’ 23 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. and Hum. 19 (2015).
See also Maury, 51.
UNHCR, ‘Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia’ 3rd cycle (July
2018) 2.
1149
UNHCR, ‘Global Appeal 2014-2015: Malaysia’ (2013). See also the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion,
‘The World’s Stateless’ (December 2014). It should be noted that this number includes only Malaysians of
Indian descent and does not count many other populations, including the Sama Dilaut. The actual number is
probably therefore higher.
1150
215
Like in many post-colonial states, including Kuwait and Mali, issues of sovereignty and
national identity would come to be linked together in the eyes of many Malaysian
politicians and government agencies. 1151 These concerns would influence how Malaysia’s
nationality laws were drafted, but also how they were applied. As described above in Part
2, Malaysia went through a series of federal groupings, entering into its present form in
1965 with the addition of the Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak to the peninsular states,
and subtracting Singapore. 1152 Brunei has remained independent.
1150F
1151F
The departure of the British Empire as a unifying force brought to the forefront the
sensitive and related issues of Malaysian nationality and the inclusion of the Borneo
territories. Their inclusion in Malaysia in 1963 was the result of political negotiations very
much tied to Malay concerns over nationality and ethnic balance. 1153 Worsening fears of
the breakup of the Federation, both Indonesia and the Philippines claim the former British
North Borneo (Sabah) based on claims of sovereignty described in Part 2, above, and based
on the region’s history, including the zone of influence of the Sultanate of Sulu.
1152F
Islamification, the dominance of Malay, and border security in a way which would greatly
influence the belonging and perceived legitimacy of the Sama Dilaut. The current
complexities of ethnicity in Malaysia, including in Sabah, can be seen in the ongoing
struggles over the census, introduced by the British in 1871 in what was then known as the
“Straits Settlements” of Peninsular Malaysia and subsequently used across Peninsular
Malaysia and the Borneo territories. 1154 The concept of classification by race in the sense of
physical characteristics or ethnic groupings was arguably brought to Malaysia by the
British and did not fit the societal and cultural divisions in Malaysia, complicating later
government efforts to define the concept of “Malay" and that of other indigenous
groups. 1155 Originally, the census classified peoples by nationality, but later the British
started employing the term “race” in line with their own thinking about the classification of
peoples. 1156 Early censuses included the indigenous peoples of Borneo in the category of
“Malay”. 1157 These categories, however, did not reflect the enormous diversity of the pre1153F
1154F
1155F
1156F
1151
See generally Lim Hong Hai.
1152
Sinnadurai, 309-310.
1153
Hirschman, 559. See also Sinnadurai, 311.
Over the course of the late 19th century and early 20th century, the British expanded census taking to
include all the territories in Peninsular Malaysia. By the 1930s, the census had expanded to include the
Borneo territories. Hirschman, 559.
1154
Chea Boon Kheng, ‘Malaysia: The Making of a Nation’ (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2002). The
issue of race and ethnicity is extremely sensitive and contested in Malaysia. This section simply attempts to
summarize the views held on the subject by experts.
1155
1156
Hirschman, 566-568.
Hirschman, 563. See also Y. Maunati, ‘Networking the Pan-Dayak’ in W. Mee and J. Mee Questioning
Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 97, discussing the use of the term Dayak to apply to
Borneo’s “non-Malay natives.”
1157
216
colonial population, which had already incorporated various peoples from all over the
region, including previous immigrants from China and Arabia. Classifications of people by
race ignored the fact that Malaysians themselves thought more in terms of religious
affiliation. 1158
1157F
Like in many British colonies, the census created ethnic classifications in Malaysia,
introducing ethnicity as a vital feature of politics. While nationality remained undefined
during the colonial period in North Borneo, the census provides important information on
the number of people under British jurisdiction at that time and their supposed ethnicities.
Since the 1891 census, the term Bajau had been applied by the British to the inhabitants
occupying the coastal areas of North Borneo and Sarawak, though details on the
breakdown of the population are not available. 1159 Malaysian identity became based on the
creation of a majority-Malay nation, or bangsa, yet defining the concept of being Malay
would prove contentious. 1160 As with northern Mali, the inclusion of Sabah in the
Malaysian Federation raised issues of ethnic minority status for Sabah’s religions and
ethnicities.
1158F
1159F
The inclusion of the Borneo states in Malaysia was done, in part, to balance the ethnic
makeup of the country. To balance the majority Chinese population of Singapore, which
was originally to be included in Malaysia, the resulting Federation of Malaysia incorporated
the Borneo territories in 1963. 1161 The addition of Sabah and Sarawak was therefore
always couched in terms of increasing the so-called “non-immigrant” population of
Malaysia. This political compromise glossed over the very real ethnic, historical and
cultural difference between the Peninsula and northern Borneo. While most Malays are
Muslim, non-Malay groups in Sabah and Sarawak are frequently Christian or animist.
1160F
Before the establishment of the Sultanate of Brunei and the spread of Islam, the peoples
living in Borneo did not appear to classify themselves along anything that could be
described as ethnic lines, nor did all indigenous peoples in Borneo adopt Islam. 1162 During
the late colonial period, Kadazan, Dusun and Murut nationalism in Borneo emerged and the
Borneo states have periodically pushed for more independence from Kuala Lumpur, citing
how their histories and cultures are very different from that of Peninsular Malaysia. 1163 As
Part 2 showed, many of the peoples of coastal Sabah share a common history, way of life
and ethnicity with those of the southern Philippines, part of the ancient Sultanate of Sulu.
In this way, the border region in the Sulu Sea resembles post-colonial border regions in
1161F
1162F
1158
Hooker, 21. See also Hirschman, 565.
Nagatsu and Kazufumi, Pirates, Sea Nomads or Protectors of Islam? A Note on ‘Bajau’ Identifications in the
Malaysian Context (Kyoto University 2001) 216.
1159
1160
Nagatsu and Kazufumi, 218-219.
1161
Singapore would depart the Federation in 1965.
1162
Barlocco, 35. It should be noted that the origins of the concept of race in Malaysia are contested.
1163
Barlocco, 43.
217
places like Kuwait and northern Mali in that it has been very difficult to draw a hard, firm
line between overlapping, diverse and mobile communities.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, saw western-style nationality laws
as the key to forging a common national identity in a country where 50 percent of the
population was non-Malay. Yet he simultaneously sought to preserve Malay identity as the
core of Malaysian identity. 1164 In 1969, Malaysia began a policy of granting special
privileges to a class of nationals called the bumiputra, or “sons of the soil." 1165 These
special provisions, enacted under the New Economic Policy of Prime Minister Mahathir,
included favourable educational and trade quotas, areas of reserved land, and special
licenses, all designed to raise the standard of living of Malays and other so-called
indigenous groups. The creation of the bumiputera category was specifically designed to
bond Malays with the so-called “native” populations of the Borneo territories. 1166 Many
Sabahans have come to associate closely with Malays and often still consider themselves to
be bumiputra.
1163F
1164F
1165F
But the grouping of some groups living in the Borneo states with Malays has been
contentious. This is in part due to the history of ethnicity in the region, which was
complicated by multiple cycles of immigration and emigration in an area dominated by the
long-distance, seafaring trade by Arab, European and Chinese traders, as described in Part
2. 1167 Despite the border, there remains a great deal of continuity between the peoples of
what are now Sabah, Sarawak, Kalimantan and the southern Philippines. 1168 Immigrants to
Sabah and Sarawak from the Philippines in particular are often ethnically similar to
Malaysia’s Malay population. 1169 As a result, any increase in the Bajau/Sama population is
perceived as increasing the Muslim population of Sabah.
1166F
1167F
1168F
As Young puts it,
1164
See generally Cheah Boon Kheng.
A History of Malaysia 341. See also Clark and Pietsch 162. Programs included quotas, promotion of Malay
language education and a special bank for bumiputera, as well as land reform. See Goh Beng Lan, ‘Dilemma of
Progressive Politics in Malaysia: Islamic Orthodoxy versus Human Rights’ in W. Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning
Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 302-306, 342.
1165
1166
Hooker, 227.
Sinnadurai, 311. See also T. Harrisson, ‘The Prehistory of Borneo’ 13 Asian Perspectives 17 (1970) 38.
Indonesia also contains a large Malay population. J. Kahn, ‘Islam and Capitalism in the Frontiers and
Borderlands’ in W. Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 49.
See also K. Young, ‘Malay Social Imaginaries: Nationalist and Other Collective Identities in Indonesia’ in W.
Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 61.
1167
1168
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 21-23.
1169
Barlocco, 50.
218
the Malay nationalist project came to rely on the idea of the Malay bangsa, or
‘race-nation’, as a foundation of its political and territorial claims. 1170
1169F
The effects of Malaysia’s attempts to build a legal system on the concept of an ethno-state
created considerable tensions throughout the country. In 1969, riots broke out in
Peninsular Malaysia over special privileges given to holders of the bumiputra category. 1171
Elections in Sabah were postponed due to the violence on the Peninsula. 1172 As a result of
the contradictions of the bumiputra category and the difficulties in creating a Malaysian
ethno-state, modern Malaysian governments have attempted to recreate Malaysian
nationality as based on nationalism and a common experience with British laws and system
of government.
1170F
1171F
The application of the term bumiputra to various groups in Malaysia would never really be
resolved. For example, aboriginal, non-Malay peoples of Peninsular Malaysia were not
included in the bumiputra category. 1173 Meanwhile, non-Malays in the Borneo states, such
as the Bajau/Sama, Kadazan and Dusun groups, were included in the bumiputra
category. 1174 As a result, the “aboriginal” peoples of peninsular Malaysia are treated under
a different set of laws from the “indigenous” peoples of Borneo. This came to have real
implications under Malaysia’s laws.
1172F
1173F
For example, bumiputra and aboriginal peoples, defined under the law, were counted
separately in the census. 1175 Aboriginal groups, as distinct from the rights of bumiputra, are
protected by the Aboriginal Peoples’ Act of 1954. 1176 The Act provides for the recognition
of aboriginal sovereignty over land and for compensation for any takings by the
government. It also ensures the right of aboriginal children to an education. This Act and
various judicial decisions have helped to protect the rights of aboriginal peoples in
Peninsular Malaysia, particularly their land rights. 1177
1174F
1175F
1176F
1170
Young, 61.
1171
Cheah Boon Kheng, 102. See also Holst, 45.
1172
Goh Beng Lan, 298.
1173
Hirschman, 563. See also Hooker, 23. Aboriginal peoples in Malaysia and are .5% of the population.
Barlocco, 34. See also Holst, 33; Lim Hong Hai, 102. In Sabah and Sarawak, non-Malay ethnicities, such as
the Kadazan/Dusan and Iban peoples, make up about 30% of the population. R. Bulan, ‘Native Title in
Malaysia: A “Complementary” Sui Generis Proprietary Right under the Federal Constitution’ 11 Australian
Indigenous L. R. 54 (2007) 55.
1174
1175
Young, Bussin and Hasan, 17. See also Clark and Pietsch, 162; Hirschman, 562-564.
Malaysia Aboriginal Peoples Act (1954) (revised 1974), Malaysia Act, 134. Aboriginal is defined in
Malaysia’s Constitution as limited to Aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula. Constitution of Malaysia
(1957) art. 160(2).
1176
For a general overview, see generally Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities
and Indigenous Peoples at http://minorityrights.org/minorities/orang-asli/ (accessed July 2020).
1177
219
In Sabah and Sarawak, by contrast, the rights of indigenous minorities were instead
protected in theory by their inclusion in the bumiputra category during the period it was in
effect, but these protections are often not actualized for non-Malay minorities like the Sama
Dilaut.
In Sabah, there is no enumeration of the native groups in the Constitution,
although there are at least 38 known groups...A native community is defined as
any group or body of persons the majority of who are natives, and who live under
the jurisdiction of the local authority or under the jurisdiction of a native chief or
headman. 1178
1177F
“Native” rights in Malaysia are also protected under the common law and the state laws of
Sabah and Sarawak. Courts in Malaysia have cited indigenous rights cases in Australia,
Canada and the United States when upholding the land rights of the Iban, for example, as a
“native” group. 1179 A recognition of native title has given certain indigenous groups in the
Borneo territories the ability to claim ownership of their lands in the courts. Establishing
itself as a native group of Borneo under the law, therefore, arguably brings certain rights,
including the right to claim native title to land. The process of qualifying as a “native”
group, however, is unclear and has never, as far as this dissertation could ascertain, been
applied to the Sama Dilaut, though more research is needed.
1178F
The government banned discussion of ethnic classifications in Malaysia following violent
riots in the 1960s, but the sensitivity over the subject continues. 1180 In 2000, the census
listed over 65 percent of the population as bumiputera, whereas the rest fell into immigrant
categories, raising the question of whether Malaysia would become a majority-immigrant
country, a concern that is not dissimilar from those described in the Kuwait example,
above. 1181 According to the Malaysian government, in 2010, the Malay population was a
little over 50% of Malaysia’s total population, while non-Malay bumiputra made up an
additional 11%. 1182
1179F
1180F
1181F
The above history of ethnicity in Malaysia is an important factor in Malaysia’s immigration
policies and the current debate over immigration to Sabah. The issue of immigration is
critical for the Sama Dilaut, as they have come to be classed as an immigrant group, due to
their association with the border and the Philippines. Until the 1930s, immigration to
1178
Bulan, 55. See also Interpretation (Definition of Native) Ordinance (1958).
For example, in Nyawai v Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd, the Sarawak government recognized native
land rights against the rights of logging companies in Sarawak. See generally D. Sanders, ‘Indigenous Land
Rights in Malaysia: Nor Nyawai & 3 Ors v Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors’ 5(14) Indigenous Law
Bulletin 21 (2002).
1179
1180
Hooker, 234.
Daniel Goh, Matilda Gabrielpillai, Philip Holden, Gaik Cheng Khoo, Race and Multiculturalism in Malaysia
and Singapore (Routledge 2009) 10. See generally Cheah Boon Kheng. See also Clark and Pietsch, 162 .
1181
1182
The aboriginal population totals less than one percent of the population.
220
Malaysia was unrestricted by law. The British encouraged it to provide labour for the
timber industry. 1183 Seasonal migration and trade were transformed into immigration by
the enforcement of borders, with immigrants now relocating to Sabah for wage
employment, rather than taking part in a fluid trade economy.
1182F
As in Kuwait and Mali, cross-border mobility began to be regarded not as an economic
good, but as a threat. The discovery of oil off the coast of Sabah also transformed the nature
of the economy away from one based on trade into one based on a fixed resource.
Economic migration would continue through the 20th century, as Malaysia, and
particularly Sabah, remained stable and relatively prosperous whilst the Philippines and
Indonesia went through several periods of civil unrest. But migration now took the form of
migrant workers who came to fill lower level jobs in the economy. While ethnically similar
to people living in coastal Sabah, both migrants and boat nomads like the Sama Dilaut were
now reclassified as immigrants.
Most irregular migrants come to Sabah by boat, traversing clandestinely the maritime
border between Sabah and the Philippines, which is made up of numerous small and
difficult to police islands. 1184 As a result, migration is now linked to clandestine border
crossings and boat migration, which are also associated with the Sama Dilaut. Irregular
migration to Sabah from the Philippines therefore exacerbates the climate of tension
between Malaysia and the Philippines, 1185 and makes the resolution of the status of
stateless persons in Sabah more difficult.
1183F
1184F
In the middle of the twentieth century, immigration to Sabah also increased following the
armed insurrection of Moro rebels in what was now the southern Philippines. 1186 During
the Philippine civil war, “large numbers” of Bajau, Sama, Tausug and Suluk refugees,
including sea nomads, fled to Sabah. 1187 These groups had always been accustomed to
relocating in times of strife, but now this relocation occurred across and international
border, rather than within the loose, diffuse zone controlled by the Sulu Sultanate. 1188
1185F
1186F
1187F
In general, Filipino immigrant and refugee families in Sabah lack documents and are locked
out of Malaysian nationality by jus sanguinis, making their status in Sabah similar to that of
1183
Clark and Pietsch, 168.
A. Kassim and R. Haji Mat Zin, ‘Policy on Irregular Migrants in Malaysia: An Analysis of its Implementation
and Effectiveness’ (Philippine Institute for Development Studies 2011) 53 (hereinafter Kassim and Zin).
1184
1185
Razali, Nordin and Duraisingam, 27.
1186
Fernandez, 54. See also Razali, Nordin and Duraisingam, 24.
1187
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 38. Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or Protocol.
1188
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 54. See also J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 67, 83, 87.
221
the Sama Dilaut. 1189 Filipino immigrants to Sabah are now often spoken of in the same
terms as the stateless members of the ethnic Indian population and stateless sea nomads.
All three are categorized as part of the problem of so-called “stateless immigrants” in
Malaysia. 1190
1188F
1189F
The refugees were accepted into Malaysia under a negotiated agreement whereby they
were not formally recognized or granted permanent asylum, 1191 but instead granted a
special pass by UNHCR and a temporary work visa, with the understanding that they would
later return to the Philippines. 1192 Instead, this population would remain in Malaysia long
term, creating tension between the two countries and increasing in the Sama-Bajau
population in Sabah. Despite recent economic troubles, Malaysia remains a destination
country for migrant workers, fuelled by the gap in wealth and political stability between
Malaysia and its less developed neighbours. 1193 These workers were not driving a lucrative
trade economy, as the migrants of the Sulu Sultanate had been, but were instead filling lowlevel jobs, often in the informal economy. 1194
1190F
1191F
1192F
1193F
In the mid-1980s, there were as many as 500,000 immigrants in Sabah performing a range
of wage-earning jobs across the economy. 1195 Armed conflict and poverty in neighbouring
states would also fuel immigration to Sabah, increasing the perception of immigration as a
burden. The public perception in Sabah is that certain coastal towns are “overwhelmingly”
made up of irregular immigrants from the Philippines and Indonesia of similar ethnicity as
Peninsular Malays, increasing the Malay and Muslim population of Sabah. 1196 In 1991, the
1194F
1195F
UNHCR ‘Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia’ (March 2009) 78.
1189
1190
Sadiq, 106.
The children of many refugees from the Philippines are stateless in Malaysia today as their parents had
only a temporary refugee card, many of which were not eligible for renewal as of 1986. Brunt Vulnerability
28, footnote 35. Refugee status for people from the Philippines was revoked in 2001.
1191
See also H. Brunt ‘Stateless Stakeholders, Seen but not heard? The Case of the Sama Dilaut in Sabah,
Malaysia’ (MA Dissertation: University of Sussex 2013) 23 (hereinafter Brunt Stakeholders). Kaur 82-83. See
also the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Submission by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report:
Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia,’ (March 2013) Malaysia is now home to as many as 80,000 Filipino
refugees from the war in the 1970s, most of whom only received temporary documents in place of asylum
under the 1951 Convention.
1192
1193 Clark and Pietsch, 158. See also J. Kahn, ‘Islam and Capitalism in the Frontiers and Borderlands’ in W. Mee
and J. Kahn (eds.) Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 28.
See for example M. Filmore, ‘Living Stateless (Di Ambang)’ Youtube (6 September 2016) (accessed July
2020).
1194
1195
Nah, 490-491.
1196
Sadiq, 106. These concerns are also present in Sarawak. Barlocco 52; Nagatsu and Kazufumi, 220.
222
government introduced the Comprehensive Policy on the Recruitment of Foreign Workers
to regulate immigration. 1197
1196F
In the 1980s, the government also sought to change the ethnic classifications in the Borneo
States. It began to employ the term pribumi in the census for all indigenous groups in Sabah
and Sarawak, a term also used in Indonesia. This prompted a backlash in Sabah, as it
appeared to include Indonesian and Filipino immigrants. 1198 In 1991, the government
introduced the Comprehensive Policy on the Recruitment of Foreign Workers to regulate
immigration. 1199
1197F
1198F
Meanwhile, as Nagatsu notes in a review of Malaysian textbooks in the 1980s and 1990s,
Sama/Bajau peoples began to be presented by politicians as an immigrant group from
Johor, though they were still included as bumiputra under the law. This appears to have left
the Sama Dilaut in a grey zone of identity, sometimes classed as foreigners and sometimes
as indigenous peoples. Today, Malaysia, and Sabah in particular, have tight immigration
regimes and the concept of “infiltration” by foreigners is a cornerstone of media
reports. 1200
1199F
In the 1990s, the Malaysia government attempted to do away with racial classifications and
instead introduced the national identity of “Bangsa Malaysia” 1201 and in 2010, “1Malaysia,”
asking Malaysian nationals to see themselves first as Malaysian nationals and only secondly
as members of a racial, ethnic or religious group. 1202 Malaysia also adopted “Vision 2020”
in 1991, with nine national challenges for transforming Malaysia into a “self-sufficient”
economy; challenge number one was to establish a unified Malaysian national identity. 1203
This program, however, has not been popular with Malays, who fear a decline of Malay
culture. 1204
1200F
1201F
1202F
1203F
As in Mali, some of the security functions of the state have been deputized to civil groups. In
an echo of the Ganda Koy movement in Mali, in 1972, the Malaysian government authorized
a paramilitary force, the Malaysian Volunteer Corps (RELA), to crackdown on
1197
Nah, 491.
1198
Barlocco, 56-57.
1199
Nah, 491.
1200
Clark and Pietsch, 170.
1201
Hirschman, 566. See also Hooker, 233.
1202
Barlocco, 53, 79.
1203
Hooker, 260.
Cheah Boon Kheng, 240. See also Goh Gabrielpillai Holden, Gaik Cheng Khoo 10. See also Hwok-Aun Le,
‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia and South Africa: Contrasting Structures, Continuing Pursuits’ 50 Journal of
Asian and African Studies 615, 616 (2015) for a discussion of the current state of Malay and bumiputra
affirmative action policy.
1204
223
undocumented persons and introduced corporal punishment for unauthorized entry into
Malaysia. 1205 These measures have not decreased the number of migrants to Malaysia, but
have made life extremely difficult for irregular migrants, asylum-seekers, undocumented
persons and those who overstay their visas.
1204F
Yet, like Kuwait, Malaysia still requires a certain amount of managed immigration for its
growing economy. Malaysia today has the highest dependency on foreign labour in the
region, an issue which on its own has increasingly come to be seen as a security threat by
the government, as it has been in Kuwait. In this way, Malaysia resembles Kuwait, where an
influx of low wage workers has changed mobility from a social good to an unfortunate and
mistrusted necessity. Malaysia is therefore caught between the “competing policy
objectives” of controlling their borders, fostering economic growth, and managing
demographic change. 1206 As a result, “(n)arratives of Malaysia being infiltrated by aliens, or
uninvited guests, within the territorial borders of the sovereign states are common in
Malaysia’s government-controlled media...” 1207
1205F
1206F
The competing interests of cheap labour and national security have led the government in
Sabah to alternately fast-track temporary work visas, while at the same time conducting
mass deportations, leading to a complex and contradictory immigration policy. 1208 On the
one hand, the government conducted several exercises to regularize immigrants, beginning
in 1985 and conducted every few years. 1209 These have been followed by crackdowns and
deportations. The goal of this policy appears to be maintaining a cheap labour force of the
right size without permanently affecting Sabah’s demographics. Foreign workers are now
routinely deported during economic downturns, such as in 1997 and 2009, or in response
to security incidents. 1210 With time, these exercises have become increasingly linked to
maritime security and border control. In 1992, the government of Malaysia instituted an
operation, Ops Nyah 2, or "Op. Get Rid 2", to track down and deport irregular migrants. 1211
This program was conducted in conjunction with increased border monitoring as part of
Ops Nyah 1. Irregular migrants caught under the program were sent to immigration
detention, where men were sometimes punished by, for example, caning, in preparation for
1207F
1208F
1209F
1210F
1205
Nah, 499-500.
A. Frank, ‘Negotiation Borders: Everyday Corruption and Immigration Policing in Malaysia’ (International
Students Association Working Paper 2014) 2.
1206
1207
Clark and Pietsch, 170.
1208
Holst, 133.
1209
Kassim and Zin, 21.
Nah, 491-492, 498-499. See also Kassim and Zin, 16. Recently, the crackdowns have taken place as part of
Esscom operations, discussed below. See for example, Borneo Post, ‘Esscom ops against illegal immigrants in
Kudat’ (15 May 2015) (accessed July 2020).
1210
1211
Kassim and Zin, 21.
224
being deported. 1212 The militarization of the maritime border in Sabah is similar in many
ways to that of the Kidal province in northern Mali.
1211F
Concerns over national identity, immigration and voting is also related to religion.
Immigration from the Philippines and Indonesia is often viewed by non-Malays in Sabah as
increasing the Muslim population at their expense, particularly immigration of Muslim
Moro peoples. 1213 As well, despite immigration controls, Sabah receives internal migration
from the Peninsula, leading to concerns over a perceived “Malay-ification” or “Islamification” of Sabah. 1214 Immigration from the Philippines includes a large number of
Sama/Bajau and Suluk peoples, groups who also live in coastal Sabah. This mirrors the
migration that has been occurring in the region for hundreds of years, as described in Part
2, but in modern Sabah, such migration has been re-categorized as dangerous immigration.
1212F
1213F
As in Mali and Kuwait, the issue of voting and the issue of national identity are intimately
entwined. The issue of “phantom voters” and persons improperly removed from the rolls
became a periodic political issue in Malaysia. 1215 In Sabah, the problem of irregular
migration is blamed for demographic change and “rigged” voting due to the issuance of fake
and fraudulent documents to immigrants. So contentious has the situation become that the
Malaysian Royal Commission of Inquiry tasked with looking into the question of fraudulent
documents issued to irregular migrants called it “an all-consuming nightmare.” 1216 As a
result, the issuance of ID documents in Sabah is extremely political, complicating attempts
to resolve statelessness, including among the Sama Dilaut, who are viewed as an immigrant
community.
1214F
1215F
In this way, the conflation with nomadism and immigration resembles the rhetoric in
Kuwait against the bidoon, where previously nomadic populations are unable to prove their
indigenous status because of more recent immigration and a lack of documents with which
to establish their claims. In Sabah, statelessness itself has therefore become a reinforcing
cycle, both fuelling and resulting from the conflation of immigration, nomadism and
regional, historical migration.
Like in Kuwait and Mali, the government has also pushed assimilation of the Sama Dilaut.
Since independence, many Sama Dilaut have settled as part of coercive settlement
programs, which include linking government services and access, including the right to a
nationality, to settlement. For example, when Sama Dilaut began settling near Semporna
Kassim and Zin, 22. See also K. Navallo, Filipino Migrants in Sabah: Marginalized Citizens in the Midst of
Interstate Disputes (Kyoto U. Masters Thesis 2013) 10 (hereinafter Navallo).
1212
1213
Hooker, 23.
1214
Barlocco, 52.
For example, as many as 300,000 non-Malays may have been removed from the electoral rolls during the
1974 and 1990 elections. See also Lim Hong Hai, 115-116.
1215
1216 Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 3.
225
Town around independence, the “water village" was connected to the mainland by a
government-built bridge, encouraging further settlement. By 1969 the sedentary
population of this settlement had doubled. 1217
1216F
The Sabah government also pursued deliberate settlement programs, for example,
relocating Bajau families from outer islands to the mainland and concentrating them in
towns. 1218 Settlement since independence, therefore, has simply been a continuation of
colonial policy regarding sea nomads, with settlement and economic development seen as
dependent upon one another. Development schemes have been instrumental in moving the
Sama Dilaut into a more settled way of life, assimilating them into the larger population of
settled Bajau peoples.
1217F
Conversion to Islam has been a part of assimilation as well. 1219 For example, settled Sama
Dilaut communities sometimes construct village prayer houses, visual markers of their
conversion. 1220 As in Mali, settlement has helped many Sama Dilaut establish a fixed
residence, which was vital in the decade following independence to gaining a nationality.
Because of the law’s reliance on jus sanguinis and the need to produce one’s parents’
identity documents, however, settlement is no longer the path to a nationality that it once
was.
1218F
1219F
This section has outlined some of the ways in which the quest to forge a unified national
identity has driven nomad statelessness, even in places where nomads should qualify for a
nationality under the law. The next section will discuss another factor driving the failure of
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia to resolve nomad statelessness: the discovery of natural
resources on nomad lands and the development of nomad lands for tourism. The next
section will explore how the concept of terra nullius has been re-purposed for modern use,
by linking the perceived natural statelessness of nomads to their inability to claim land,
leaving their lands open to seizure by the government. The extreme wealth now located
under many nomad territories means that granting a nationality to nomads risks
empowering them to claim their lands away from the government.
1217
C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228.
1218
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 27.
1219
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 40.
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 40. Sama Dilaut were banned from Islam until independence. See also Sather,
Adaptation, 1997, 76.
1220
226
Natural Resources as a Driver of Nomad Exclusion
Indigenous communities have in so many cases been pushed out of their
traditional areas to give way for the economic interests of other more dominant
groups and to large scale development initiatives that tend to destroy their lives
and cultures rather than improve their situation. 1221
1220F
This section will explore how the discovery of oil, natural gas, minerals and other natural
resources has fuelled the unwillingness of states to resolve nomad statelessness in Kuwait,
Mali and Malaysia. While not originally a topic of concern for this dissertation, a strong
correlation was noted during the research phase of this project between nomad
statelessness, the seizure of nomad lands by the state and natural resource extraction in all
three examples. Experts on nomads have also noted that natural resource extraction and
the creation of national parks requires exclusive control of land that is incompatible with
potential ownership claims by nomads and former nomads, leading to the clearing of
nomads from their lands. 1222 This section will rely on a mixture of academic sources
alongside non-academic sources that provide factual information on natural resource
extraction, or that illuminate the opinions of government, media and other key actors.
1221F
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of
Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/2003, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 4
February 2010, para. 247, quoting Report of the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous
Populations/Committees (2005) 20 (hereinafter Endorois).
1221
See generally Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 3, discussing the problems nomads often face in proving
exclusive occupation of land.
1222
227
Kuwait, Oil and Bedouin Land Rights
Approximate location of Kuwait oil fields in relation to its borders (author’s map)
The sovereign state is now busy projecting its power to its outermost territorial
borders and mopping up zones of weak or no sovereignty. The need for the
natural resources of the ‘tribal zone’ and the desire to ensure the security and the
productivity of the periphery has led, everywhere, to strategies of
‘engulfment’... 1223
1222F
This section will look at the ways in which oil extraction fuelled Bedouin statelessness in
Kuwait. As this section will explore, Kuwait’s nationality laws were enacted and enforced in
an age of massive oil development in the desert. In particular, this section will describe
how the Kuwait government came to claim the desert for its exclusive use. It will also
examine how oil transformed the regional economy from one based on trade and, in part,
on nomadism to one based on oil extraction by the central government, located in Kuwait
City, in areas that were once the domain of Bedouin tribes. This shift, it is argued,
encouraged the settlement of the Bedouin in urban areas and turned mobility from an asset
into a “problem” for the Kuwaiti government. As Toth puts it;
Scott, 2009, xxi, 6. Scott discusses the threat posed by nomads in the “periphery” to the settled,
centralized governments in Asia and Europe since their founding days, noting that nomads and other peoples
in the periphery often opted out of state control and, with it, taxation and forced labor. Scott, 2009, 5-6.
1223
228
Bedouin have had to deal with droughts and economic fluctuations for centuries.
However, the rise of states in the region, with their need to regularize such things
as borders, laws, the monopoly on power, economic control and the allegiance of
its citizens, brought new challenges to nomadic populations. 1224
1223F
When oil was first discovered in Kuwait, it was treated as the exclusive domain of the
Kuwaiti government. Even though the desert was most closely associated with Bedouin
groups during the colonial period when oil was discovered, the centralization of power in
the hands of the Al-Sabah family meant that under the logic of territorial sovereignty, the
oil now belonged to the Kuwaiti government. The shift to an oil economy also drove the
decline of pastoralism as a key part of the economy, as well as the decline in long-distance
trade, while exploding the wealth of Kuwait City to unimaginable heights. 1225 Maintaining
the integrity of the border and eliminating competing claims to the deserts around Kuwait
City was therefore a key goal of the Kuwaiti government. The drive to exclusively control
oil production was a major factor behind the Kuwait government’s push to relocate the
Bedouin off their lands and settle them in urban areas, as described above.
1224F
Once oil was discovered, the wealth of the Arabian Peninsula went from being based on a
movable resource, camels, to a fixed resource, oil. This increased the need for hard borders
and decreased the usefulness of nomadism to the governments of both Kuwait and
Iraq. 1226 The goal of setting hard borders to establish exclusive and total control over
Kuwait’s oil reserves would also push government settlement policies to end nomadism
and remove nomads from their lands. 1227 It would encourage the government to move
former nomads away from the desert and into urban areas, often employing them as
guards for oil wells. These policies would convert the Bedouin population to shanty
dwellers on the margins of urban society. 1228 At the same time, Kuwait became rentier
state, where financial support from the proceeds of the oil was limited to nationals. This
drove a conversation over who deserved Kuwait’s oil wealth.
1225F
1226F
1227F
The historic relationship of the bidoon to land is highly contested. Unbiased information is
difficult to obtain. The point of this section is not to make absolute statements about any
historical claims to territory descendants of the Bedouin in Kuwait may have, 1229 but
rather to explore the ways in which control of oil, like national unity, is a motivation behind
Kuwait’s nationality policy. Instead of entering into a debate on disputed history as to who
owns Kuwait’s deserts, this section will instead explore how the politicization of the origins
1228F
1224
Toth, Tribes, 166.
1225
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 70.
1226
Commins, 160.
1227
Crystal, 175.
1228
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 91-93.
Maps drawn by European explorers show tribal areas, but as these cannot be evaluated for their accuracy,
they are included in the Annex simply as approximations of where various tribes were located.
1229
229
of the bidoon relates to the control of the source of the wealth that fuels the welfare state:
the oil fields.
As the above sections of this dissertation showed, solving the status of the bidoon in Kuwait
is a matter of government will. Yet, there is very real resistance to expanding the Kuwaiti
welfare state to include the bidoon, particularly in an age of declining oil revenues. 1230
Beaugrand estimates that the “cost” of naturalizing the bidoon population may be as high as
600 million KD. 1231 Underlying this debate is the assumption that former Bedouin who are
now bidoon have no legitimate claims to Kuwait’s oil wealth. Their statelessness is
therefore an important part of their perceived illegitimacy, despite the fact that Kuwait’s
oil, unlike its pearls, originates not in Kuwait harbour, but in the desert.
1229F
1230F
Oil was discovered in Kuwait during the colonial period, but would not become the linchpin
of Kuwaiti politics until after WWII. In 1909, the Emir signed an exclusive agreement with
Britain for oil exploration. 1232 There appears to have been no Bedouin input or
consultation with regards to this agreement. 1233 Lands that the Bedouin had used for
centuries were now being given to the British for oil exploration by the Emir of Kuwait City,
thanks to his territorial sovereignty over the desert. The Bedouin were looked at not
through the lens of their possible rights, but rather through the lens of their usefulness, or
hindrance, in achieving the goal of centralized oil exploration.
1231F
1232F
The claims of the Emir to the desert were helped by European theories on nomads,
described above, whereby nomad lands were empty desert; terra nullius. The Kuwaiti
government was not alone in this approach in the region, with Gulf governments adopting
the logic of the territorial, centralized state to lay claim to vast oil fields under the desert.
For example, Dawn Chatty discusses the concept of oil fields as terra nullius and how this
affected the Bedouin in Oman. 1234 In Kuwait, instead of being part of the oil exploration
arrangements with the British, loyal Bedouin were settled in government housing in urban
areas and employed by the state as Kuwaiti soldiers and as workers in the oil fields. 1235 It
was as low-level employees of the petro-state, not owners, that the former Bedouin would
make themselves most useful to the state.
1233F
1234F
“The state provides such hefty welfare benefits to citizens that politicians have told me that giving
citizenship rights to even a small proportion of the Bidun, in a country with around 1.2 million citizens, could
bankrupt the government.” B. Wille, ‘Kuwait’s Plan to Pawn Off its “Stateless”’ Al Nahar/Human Rights Watch
(March 26, 2015) (accessed July 2020). See also Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 160-166.
1230
1231
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 165.
1232
Casey, 21.
Information on Bedouin participation in this decision, if any, would be an important subject of future
research.
1233
Chatty, Negotiating, 138-141. See also Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 195. Gilbert notes that the development of
oil often causes competition between nomads and governments.
1234
1235
Kasaba, 5-6. See also Carmichael, 122.
230
Beginning in the 1940s, and accelerating in the 1960s, Bedouin from the desert began to
settle in shanty towns around Kuwait’s growing urban areas in order to access jobs in the
military and police, often the only jobs available to them now that long distance trade was
curtailed. 1236 At first, this settlement was informal and ad hoc, a response, in part, to the
limits on nomadism created by the new borders, as well as to rapid modernization created
by the discovery of oil. The government, however, also promoted the informal settlement of
the Bedouin as a way to fill needed low level jobs in the police and military. Urban Hathar
Kuwaitis were given posts in the new government in exchange for their loyalty to the ruling
Al-Sabah family, 1237 but wealthy and middle-class Kuwaitis did not want low level jobs in
the military or as border guards in remote areas, so these jobs were filled with
Bedouin. 1238
1235F
1236F
1237F
Many bidoon were relegated to temporary shanty towns on the outskirts of urban areas
while naturalized Kuwaitis were settled in special neighbourhoods constructed by the
government and continued to be given social benefits. 1239 When the Kuwaiti government
decided to naturalize a portion of the Bedouin population, it began a massive housing
construction program, in place from the mid-1960s to 1980, razing informal shanty towns
and semi-nomadic settlements and replacing them with western-style housing projects. 1240
These state-built housing projects came to resemble ghettos. 1241 Today, many naturalized
Bedu are associated with shanty towns and government housing. 1242 Both the shantytowns and housing projects were located far from the wealthy inner cities where the
Hathar lived. The government justified the segregation of the Bedouin population by
claiming that the desert peoples needed to remain close to the desert. 1243 A result of these
housing projects and movement restrictions on the Bedouin has been the mass settlement
of former Bedouin and, by consequence, their removal from their lands.
1238F
1239F
1240F
1241F
1242F
Control of oil was also a major driver of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, highlighting for the
entire world the sensitive nature of Kuwait’s desert border. Kuwait also faces an ongoing
border dispute with Saudi Arabia. 1244 Oil production and transportation required exclusive
1243F
For an overview of what some have alluded was an influx of Bedouin during the 1950s and 1960s see
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 90-91. See also Al-Nakib, 16-17. Al-Dekhayel, 144. See also Beaugrand,
Transnationalism, 2010, 23.
1236
1237
By the 1970s, over 70% of the urban Kuwaiti population was employed by the government. Ismael, 121.
1238
Longva, Citizenship, 184.
1239
Yanai, 234. Longva, Citizenship, 184.
1240
Al-Dekhayel, 145. See also Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 162; Al-Nakib, 1.
1241
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 164-165.
1242
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 99-100.
1243
Al-Nakib, 19.
1244
U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘Kuwait’ (July 8, 2013).
231
government control over large wells in the desert, as well as infrastructure to transport
and ship the oil from the coast. At the end of the British period, Iraq ended up with limited
access to the coast. This would become a constant source of strain between the two
countries, as coastal access was now vital for oil export. 1245 Kuwait would need to maintain
both these things in order to continue to control its oil profits.
1244F
As the above sections discussed, the migrations of the Bedouin and the resulting lack of
clarity around the arbitrary border between the three countries became a source of anxiety
for the Kuwaiti government. Bedouin loyalty and ongoing migrations were increasingly
presented as a security issue. 1246 In the 1960s, Kuwait’s borders were still somewhat fluid,
border posts few and far between, and Bedouin could continue their traditional way of life,
albeit with increasing difficulty. 1247 Shoring up the borders against Saudi and Iraqi
expansionism became a major issue for the Kuwaiti government and settlement of the
Bedouin, while claiming Bedouin lands, became a key facet of that effort. 1248 As Toth puts
it, writing of the region more generally, “areas where ownership of the land or sovereignty
was in question became hotly contested.” 1249 Solving the so-called problem of the Bedouin
became seen as key to maintaining Kuwaiti control over its oil fields. Settlement for
employment in the army and oil industry was arguably seen as an ideal solution, both to fill
those jobs, but also to decrease border crossings and marginalize the camel trade. This
settlement and employment also took place during a period of drought, when pastoralism
was particularly difficult. Beaugrand argues, however, that many Bedouin viewed these
jobs as temporary and not indicative of a permanent abandonment of nomadism. 1250
1245F
1246F
1247F
1248F
1249F
Aggressive oil extraction in Kuwait coincided with the increasingly negative view of
nomadism throughout the region as bad for the desert environment. 1251 With Kuwait and
1250F
1245
Carmichael 129.
1246
Longva, Citizenship, 51.
1247
Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Fletcher, 59.
Casey, 21. G Power, ‘The Difficult Development of Parliamentary Politics in the Gulf,’ in D. Held and K.
Ulrichsen, The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (Routledge 2012) 32-33.
Beaugrand Transnationalism 2010 110-111 (noting the influence of drought and modernization on
settlement, while arguing that settlement was also a priority of the Kuwaiti government).
1248
1249
Toth, Control, 60.
1250
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 70-71.
Chatty, Pastoralists, 16, 228-240 (where she highlights the example of wild animal reintroduction
programs in Oman and Syria). Chatty notes the link between policies applied in the Gulf region and those
applied to African pastoralists, discussed below in the Tuareg case study. Chatty and Colchester also place the
settlement of nomads as part of conservation in the wider context of the displacement of indigenous peoples
for conservation. D. Chatty and M. Colchester, ‘Introduction’ in D. Chatty and M. Colchester (eds.) Conservation
and Mobile Indigenous Peoples: Displacement, Forced Settlement and Sustainable Development (Berghan Books
2002) 1-15.
1251
232
other Arabian states now pumping millions of barrels of oil and building large
infrastructure projects, including pipelines, 1252 the international community and Gulf State
governments focus on environmentalism must be questioned. But the views of outside
experts about environmental harm provided another rationale to Gulf State governments
to settle nomads. 1253 While the extent to which Kuwaiti settlement policies were
influenced by international anti-pastoralism policies is unknown, it was frequently evoked
in other Gulf states. 1254 More research on the role of anti-pastoral policies in Kuwait is
needed.
1251F
1252F
1253F
The contested history of the bidoon makes it difficult to trace the history of seizure of
Bedouin lands by the Kuwaiti government. As are result, much more research is needed
into this issue. Yet, as this section has shown in general terms, the enormous importance of
oil has led the Kuwaiti government to take aggressive measures to protect its borders and
exclusively control its oil wells, centralizing control in the hands of the government.
Adopting the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty and terra nullius in the desert has
allowed the government to centralize control of both oil production and transportation.
Once the domain of Bedouin tribes, oil producing regions around Kuwait City and Jahra are
now under exclusive government control. Meanwhile, the wealth from oil extraction has
made nomadism superfluous to Kuwait’s economy. Today, the former Bedouin population
in Kuwait are regarded as a security threat and a potential burden to the state. Their
ongoing statelessness, therefore, appears to serve important Kuwaiti government interests,
though more research is needed.
While agriculture was not a priority of the Gulf States for economic reasons, Dawn Chatty notes that in other
Gulf states, forced settlement of Bedouin tribes was encouraged after independence in order to promote
agriculture, despite the dubious environmental effects. Chatty, Persistance, 23.
Information on Kuwait’s oil infrastructure can be found at www.kpc.com.kw, the website of the Kuwaiti
Petroleum Corporation.
1252
Bocco, 302. Riccardo Bocco notes that the “Arab intelligentsia,” members of urban elites, who also pushed
for settlement of the Bedouin were often as foreign to nomadism as western scholars and viewed it as
backward. Bocco, 302-303. Government policy encouraging Bedouin settlement was therefore aligned with
international development policy.
1253
1254
More research is needed on this issue.
233
Minerals, Agriculture and Tuareg Land Rights in Mali
Possible locations of minerals in Mali in relation to its borders, author’s map
It may well turn out that Europe’s most enduring legacy to Africa is the state. 1255
1254F
While the mineral wealth in Tuareg areas cannot be fully established due to the ongoing
conflict, like in Kuwait, possible mineral wealth in the Sahara has long fuelled the Malian
government’s intention to retain control over these areas. While not as much of a driving
force in Malian politics as in Kuwaiti politics, natural resource extraction, particularly
mining leases, play an important role in the Malian government’s drive to retain control
over its Sahel territory.
Malian land use policy in the north began as a continuation of colonial policy, with the
promotion of agriculture the central focus. French attempts to retain some control of the
region, particularly to establish mineral exploration rights, however, remained a
consideration for the Malian government. As the above sections showed, following
independence, Keïta’s government moved swiftly to consolidate territory and jump-start
A. Mazrui, ‘Francophone Nations and English-Speaking States: Imperial Ethnicity and African Political
Formations’ in D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (eds.), State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas
(Westview P. 1983) 25.
1255
234
the economy according to socialist models. Unlike in Kuwait, the original focus of Malian
government was on developing land in the fertile Niger Bend region for agriculture.
The Sahara regions, however, had already been identified by the French as having potential
mineral wealth that would attract the attention of future governments. At first, Keïta’s
socialist agriculture programs targeted nomadism as a barrier to agriculture, expanding
similar French efforts. 1256
1255F
The modernisation of the economy could only be successful if the mentality of the
rural population could be transformed from a backward traditional outlook on
production and society to a modern rational one. If this process was successful
economic production would rise automatically, or so the regime thought. 1257
1256F
As the decades went by, however, lucrative mining contracts in neighbouring Niger and
Algeria raised the stakes for ownership of the desert. As time passed, uranium mining and
oil exploration in neighbouring countries renewed fears that potential Sahara wealth was
at stake if Tuareg succession was successful.
Land use policies in northern Mali adopted the principle that the nomadic Tuareg did not
own their lands. The socialist Keïta government saw the Sahel territories as belonging
collectively to the state with the Tuareg granted the right to use, not own, the land.
Meanwhile, agricultural peoples were seen as the proper and natural owners of land and
the holders of private, individual title. 1258 As the above section discussed, Keïta put into
place an ambitious program of modernization specifically favouring agriculture. 1259 The
Malian government declared much non-agricultural land, which included pastoral land, to
be of communal use. The administration set up agricultural collectives and “agricultural
brigades.” 1260 In an instant, the Tuareg were told they had no right to lands they had
occupied for generations.
1257F
1258F
1259F
As the northern Kidal province remained under military rule due to the 1962 conflict, the
region to the south near the Niger river, where the Tuareg were heavily mixed with settled
Songhai and other groups, saw the aggressive introduction of programs to promote
For example, the regime reintroduced travel permits that had been used by the French to restrict
migration. Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 81.
1256
1257
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 78.
1258
Gremont, 137.
C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘The Transfer of Economic Power in French-Speaking West Africa’ in P. Gifford and
W. Louis, Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980 (Yale UP 1988) 105.
1259
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 160-162. “The successive obstacles brought about the formation of a ‘nomad
commons’ that paradoxically evolved into a ‘nomad’s land’ without either nomads or land.” Bourgeot,
Résistances, 407.
1260
235
agriculture at the expense of pastoralism. 1261 The state organized rural cooperatives. 1262
Government offices were created to supply rural farmers with credit and equipment. As in
Kuwait, the Malian government, encouraged by international agencies, also sought to
enforce several environmental preservation schemes that linked pastoralism to
environmental decay.
1260F
1261F
One of the ways in which the Keïta regime supported agriculture in the Niger Bend was by
digging more wells. Between 1961 and 1969, sixteen new wells and pumping stations were
established, mostly without input from the Tuareg as to their location or management.
These wells were open to both the Tuareg and sedentary population, despite being located
on the same sites as traditional water sources used by the Tuareg. New wells encouraged
the spread of agriculture northward. In 1960, a law had been passed to limit agriculture
from encroaching on Tuareg grazing in an attempt to preserve pastoral rights, but this law
was not enforced and more and more land came under production during the Keïta
period. 1263 The failure of the Malian government to support pastoralism would become one
of the continuing flash-points in tensions between the Tuareg and the government.
1262F
The Malian state also took an active role to encourage agriculture amongst the Tuareg.
Toward the end of the Keïta regime, the government organized agricultural fairs for the
Tuareg, though this project found success only amongst a small population of ex-slaves
already accustomed to agriculture. The transport of cattle to Algeria and Niger for sale was
banned if it did not take place as part of state sponsored programs. 1264 The Tuareg did not
understand the purpose of these controls and refused to cooperate. The main outcome of
the Malian government’s attempts to “modernize” the economy of the north was to make
seasonal migration and trade more difficult and clandestine. Such meddling by the state in
their affairs further alienated the Tuareg, but the state did not give the Tuareg and outlet to
air their complaints or participate in the process of setting policy or making decisions over
resources and programs, seeing every attempt by the Tuareg to air their grievances as a
sign of sedition. 1265
1263F
1264F
All of these policies had disastrous effects on the Tuareg’s ability to pursue pastoralism just
at the time when the introduction of the Malian Franc led to an economic crisis throughout
the country. 1266 Such policies brought suffering throughout Mali, but particularly to the
pastoralists who were without government subsidies like other sectors. As a result of these
1265F
1261
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 350.
Diarrah, 39-42. « La priorité était accordée à l’agriculture qui devait être le pilier de développement
économique du Mali. » Diarrah, 42.
1262
1263
Bernus, 166-167.
Organizations like SOMIEX (the Malian society for imports and exports. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 361.
The banning of the caravans also took place on the Algerian side of the border. Keenan, Resisting, 93.
1264
1265
Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 310.
1266
Diarrah, 39-42, 47-48. See also Gauido, 245-248; Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 316.
236
policies, throughout the period following independence, settlement of the Tuareg
accelerated. 1267
1266F
Despite government support for agriculture across Mali, output remained frustratingly low,
and eventually surpassed by mineral exploitation and manufacturing. 1268 As agricultural
output in the Niger Bend fell behind expectations, increasingly the Sahara revealed itself to
contain a wealth of mineral riches. 1269 Throughout the post-independence period, the
Malian government would fight to retain control of the potentially lucrative Sahara,
viewing Tuareg agitation for rights as dangerous separatism, French imperialism or
collusion with Algeria and Libya. This cycle of mistrust continues to dominate Tuareg-Mali
relations to this day and is arguably the biggest barrier to Tuareg inclusion within the
Malian state.
1267F
1268F
During the French period, however, there were already signs that the real wealth of the
Sahel lay not in agriculture but in mining. Mining for salt and gold, as Part 2 showed, was
always a major occupation of the Sahel and Sahara. As discussed above, civil war broke out
in northern Mali in 1962, putting an end to many of the government’s programs in that
region. The armed conflict and continued insecurity also inhibited the same sort of mineral
exploration that was taking place in the Sahara in neighbouring countries like Niger. But if
the vast resources discovered in neighbouring Algeria and Niger were any hint of what may
be contained beneath the Malian Sahara, it is likely that Tuareg lands in northern Mali may
turn out to be very valuable.
(O)il was struck in Algeria, near the Libyan border, in the northernmost part of
the Tamasheq world. Five months later, the largest oil well in Algeria until
present started spouting its riches at Hassi Messaoud...Various metals and other
minerals were discovered in the Hoggar Mountains of Southern Algeria, and
phosphor and iron ore were located in Mauritania. 1270
1269F
Mineral riches like uranium 1271 in Niger would soon be added to the Sahel’s output.
1270F
While gold, cotton and livestock are currently Mali’s biggest exports, unproven oil and
other mineral deposits in the north are increasingly attracting attention. 1272 In 1987, the
1271F
Azarya, 260. See also Bernus, 168. Similar anti-nomad policies were put into place in southern Algeria.
Keenan, Lesser Gods, 923. See also Bourgeot, Résistances, 166-168, 179-180 (discussing the effect of
development projects on the Tuareg.)
1267
1268
Coquery-Vidrovitch, 111-112.
1269
Claudot-Hawad, 673.
1270
Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 49.
1271 In Niger, uranium mining, and the government’s desire to maintain control over the mines, dominated the
relationship between the Tuareg and government beginning in 1975. Claudot-Hawad, 665.
See for example USA International Business Publications ‘Mali Mineral & Mining Sector Investment and
Business Guide’ (2007) 44 and J. Whaley, ‘Mali: A Country on the Cusp?’ 5 GeoExpro, 4 (2008).
1272
237
UN and the Malian government did a study of minerals in the northern Sahel region. This
report was not made public until 1991. According to the report, northern Mali contains
large deposits of gold, iron, magnesium, copper, zinc, uranium, phosphates, salt, gypsum
and oil and tar sands, 1273 including the potentially lucrative Taoudeni Oil and Gas Basin in
the far north of the country. 1274 In next door Niger, near Agadez, the former location of the
Ayar Sultanate discussed in Part 2, uranium mining has become a major source of wealth
for the Nigerien government. 1275
1272F
1273F
1274F
Any potential mineral or oil wealth in northern Mali is speculative and it is not the purpose
of this dissertation to make claims on whether or not there is mineral or oil wealth there,
but only to point out that there is speculation in the natural resources industry about
northern Mali’s potential, speculation that arguably fuels tensions over the sovereignty of
northern Mali. 1276 The possibility of vast wealth in the Malian Sahel and Sahara has greatly
raised the stakes for the Malian government to win the civil war against Tuareg separatists
and retain control of the region.
1275F
Meanwhile, land use in the Sahel has only become more contentious in the 1980s and
1990s. The process of sedentarisation of the Tuareg has continued. 1277 The return of the
Tuareg to Mali since the 1990s has led to increased pressure on available land. The
repatriation of refugees was used to promote Tuareg settlement, but it exacerbated
questions of land ownership for returned Tuareg. 1278 The international community has
also played a part in the settlement of these returnees, adding to the pressures on available
land. 1279
1276F
1277F
1278F
The exact number of refugee returns to Mali is unknown, but UNHCR estimated that
between 1995 and 1996, between 50,000 and 80,000 refugees returned to Mali, increasing
1273
Diarrah, 264.
1274
OECD Sahel and West Africa Club, ‘Vulnerabilities and factors of insecurity in the Sahel’ (August 2010) 4.
See the World Nuclear Association, Uranium in Niger at http://www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.aspx (accessed July 2020).
1275
Kennan discusses the relationship between oil and uranium exploration, the Tuareg, and the government
of Niger in Keenan, Resisting, 214-217.
1276
“Increasingly forced to switch from nomadic to urban lifestyles over the last few decades, lots of Tuareg in
the Sahara and Sahel are being squeezed into sedentarization.” Kohl and Fischer ‘Tuareg Moving Global: An
Introduction’ in Kohl and Fischer (eds.) Tuareg Society within a Globalized World: Saharan Life in Transition
(Tauris 2010).
1277
Randall and Guiffrida, 438-439, 454. Whether this settlement would have occurred without displacement
is unclear.
1278
For example, UNHCR and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) created 638 returnee
settlements centered around wells and boreholes in northern Mali in the late 1990s. Randall and Guiffrida,
439. In neighboring Niger, nomads were encouraged to settle in order to claim land. C. Oxby, ‘Will the 2010
‘Code Pastoral’ Help Herders in Central Niger? Land Rights and Land Use Strategies in the Grasslands of
Abalak and Dakoro Departments’ 15 Nomadic Peoples 53 (2011) 53.
1279
238
the urban population and placing stress on land availability and employment
prospects. 1280 Refugee returns brought out differences between the returned Tuareg,
accustomed to living in camps and towns, and those who had remained in northern Mali in
very difficult circumstances, continuing to practice seasonal migration when possible. 1281
Younger Tuareg often found themselves caught between the ideals of pastoral life and the
allures of a more settled existence like that experienced abroad. The 1990s saw the effects
of decades of Tuareg settlement, a change in lifestyle that would have wide-ranging
environment, social and political affects. In particular, it continued to raise the stakes for
land ownership in northern Mali.
1279F
1280F
In the 1990s, settlement and land ownership would also be linked to registration and
voting, meaning that returned and settled Tuareg, if registered, could influence Malian
elections. Art 8 of the new Constitution, passed as part of the peace agreement, required
that all voters have been resident in their arrondissement or commune for six months in
order to vote. 1282 Land ownership was linked to residence and, therefore, to voter
registration. A 1998 land apportionment exercise by the government heavily favoured
settled communities, who could prove long standing tenure to the land, which in turn
increased the electoral representation of the settled population. 1283 Settlement became
increasingly the best way to claim territory in northern Mali and establish residence in
order to register to vote.
1281F
1282F
This created a strong link between settlement, land ownership and voting that would fuel
Malian politics in the north until the present day. The linkage of residence to voting rights
fuelled another wave of settlement amongst the nomads as they attempted to establish
their right to Malian identity cards and land deeds. 1284 The land registration program
brought them into further conflict with the Songhai population, who had long-standing
claims to much of the land in the Niger Bend. The cycle of voting based on registration,
which was in turn based on land ownership or occupation, led to strain on the already poor
relationship between the recently settled Tuareg and longer-settled communities.
1283F
Meanwhile, the government’s policy of treating Tuareg lands as communal lands owned by
the state continued throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This idea, that Tuareg lands
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, ‘U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee
Survey 1997 - Mali,’ (1 January 1997). About 30,000 received assistance from UNHCR; the rest repatriated
spontaneously.
1280
1281
Giuffrida, 32.
1282
Diarrah, 159.
1283 The rush to register land ownership in Mali was not confined to the north. The 1990s and 2000s saw a
rapid increase in the number of land title documents filed with the government across Mali as people in rural
areas scrambled to claim land. M. Djire, ‘Land Registration in Mali; No Land Ownership for Farmers?’ (144
I.I.E.D. 2007). (Though this study focuses on land ownership near Bamako, the increase in ownership can be
seen throughout Mali.
1284
Gremont, 143.
239
were commons, or terra nullius, had a long history that could be traced to colonial
scholarship, as was discussed in the above section on nationality law during colonization..
In addition to early policies claiming Tuareg lands as commons, the armed conflict caused
Tuareg lands to revert to the state, meaning that pastoralism was now to be done on state
owned or communal land over which the Tuareg would have little control. 1285 This
interpretation of Tuareg land use as being not one of ownership but of communal use on
land owned by others was rooted in the philosophy of land use and statehood described
above.
1284F
In addition, even those land tenure systems recognizing pastoralists’ rights to
natural resources (in Mali and the Niger), differently value agricultural and
pastoralist land use. Accordingly, pastoralists only enjoy usufruct rights of
pastoral resources under the condition that they respect private (agricultural)
land. Pastoralists’ access to natural resources thus remains tenuous and subject to
agricultural requirements. In several coastal States, in addition, ideas of
indigeneity (autochtonie) have become virulent, posing indigenous against
settlers or autochtones against allogènes. The indigenous are generally the local
farming communities, while migrant farmers and all herders are considered as
settlers or strangers. It has become a widespread practice to negate strangers any
secure access to natural resources such as land, and in some cases even to jobs,
education and infrastructure. These beliefs exacerbate the social and economic
marginalization of pastoralists, and further restrict their access to resources. 1286
1285F
In 2001, the Malian government, like many others in the region, belatedly acknowledged
the importance of pastoralism in Mali. The government enacted the Pastoral Charter to
establish important rights of pastoral people to land, paving the way for a more nomadicfriendly land policy in the north. But like many such Charters across the region, the policies
would not lead to meaningful change in how land was owned and allotted in the Sahel. 1287
1286F
As in the Gulf region, the international community and development agencies played a role
in the decline of pastoralism and the loss of Tuareg land rights. Settlement continued to be
promoted by international and regional organizations, despite some initiatives to protect
pastoralism, such as the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting
Regulation (2003). 1288 Support would include the creation of pastoral development
programs and the inclusion of herders in regional and national policy making and conflict
1287F
1285
Badi, 85.
1286
Leonhardt, 8.
Boureima, 115-116. In 2003, various pastoral associations and NGOs in West Africa, including in Mali the
Association des Organisations Professionnelles Paysannes, the Fédération des Éleveurs pour le Bétail et la
Viande au Mali (also known as the Fédération Nationale Groupement Interprofessionnel de la Filière Bétail
Viande au Mali), as well as the Federation Amadane and the peacebuilding organization Tassaght, and the
regional organization Réseau Billital Maroobé, sought to improve conditions for pastoral nomads in West
Africa.
1287
1288
ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting Regulation (2003).
240
resolution mechanisms. The ECOWAS Protocol also provides some support to “facilitate”
cross-border transhumance. 1289 The ECOWAS Protocol also finds additional support from
the N’Djamena Declaration on the contribution of pastoral livestock herding to the security
and development of the Sahara-Sahelian areas and the African Union Commission,
Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture, Policy Framework for Pastoralism in
Africa. 1290 Mali and Niger also passed a protocol to regulate cross-border pastoralism. 1291
Such regional attempts to improve nomad rights, however, fall short of fully protecting
their property rights.
1288F
1289F
1290F
There has also been limited international attention on the link between pastoral land
rights, civil registration and nationality. Importantly, the 1998 Protocol mandates that
pastoralists have identity documents, but it does not provide a mechanism by which
herders can prove their eligibility. 1292 The enactment of these declarations and protocols,
however, continues to treat pastoralists as wards of the state, rather than as nationals with
rights. They have not led to changes in the behaviours of states like Mali towards their
pastoral populations. Full political equality would remain elusive for the Tuareg during this
time. The unresolved status of the Tuareg in Mali fuelled a new round of minor conflict in
the 2000s, but increasingly, this violence was between local communities of herders and
farmers. 1293 The war between the Malian government and the Tuareg was quickly turning
into a war over land ownership.
1291F
1292F
As in Kuwait, concerns over the environmental impact of pastoralism injected a new
element of negativity into nomad-state relations. Throughout this period, the Malian
government, international actors and the local, settled community continued to blame
environmental degradation on pastoralism. The government’s support for agriculture and
land ownership based on productive use of the land are in line with former French policy
and with government policies concerning nomadic pastoralists all over the world. 1294 In
1987, a UN report stated that nomads should be forced to give up their traditional lifestyle
and encouraged to pursue agriculture when pastoralism becomes a threat to the
1293F
1289
ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting Regulation (2003), Article 2.
S. Beyene, ‘Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist
Communities’ (Fort Hare U. October 2010).
1290
Protocole d’accord en matière de transit du bétail entre la République du Niger et la République du Mali
(Bamako 1988).
1291
Twenty-first conference of heads of states, Decision A/DEC.5/10/98 Relating to the regulations on
Transhumance between ECOWAS Member States, Abuja, (31st October 1998), Article 12. “Herdsmen must be
in possession of identify papers duly issued by the competent authorities in their countries of origin. They
must be able upon demand, to show proof of the identity and permanent residence of the owner(s) of the
herd...”
1292
1293 Gremont, 142. United States Department of State, ‘2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Mali,’ (8 April 2011). See also Stewart, 5.
Khazanov, Pastoralists, 15. Khazanov lists the forced settlement of nomads in Russia in 1930-1931 and in
Iran under the Shah, as well as the forced relocation and settlement of nomads in Somalia in 1974.
1294
241
environment. 1295 Northern Mali has suffered heavily from climate change, with a 30%
decrease in rainfall since 1998. 1296 and the Sahara is expanding south at a rate of 30 miles a
year. 1297 Both the Malian government and the international aid community have pushed
for the settlement of the Tuareg as a way to prevent desertification. 1298 Even the Pastoral
Charter contained language linking pastoralism to environmental degradation. 1299
1294F
1295F
1296F
1297F
1298F
It is beyond the scope of this paper as to whether and to what extent pastoralism is bad for
the environment or causes desertification in the Sahel. Proponents of pastoralism argue
restrictions on mobility have limited the Tuareg’s ability to adapt to cyclical drought,
intensifying desertification. The hard borders restricting Tuareg movement cannot be
adjusted for the expansion of the Sahara. This has taken away the Tuaregs’ ability to
manage their territories as necessary to minimize drought. Over farming has added to the
problem. 1300 As well, Tuareg settlement has created a strain on arable land, bringing the
Tuareg into greater conflict with their settled neighbours.
1299F
Only recently have opinions about the environmental sustainability of nomadic pastoralism
in the Sahel shifted in favour of nomadism. Ironically, the settlement of the Tuareg, so long
a goal of both the colonial and the post-colonial government as well as held up as good land
stewardship by international NGOs, is now fuelling a conflict over land in an increasingly
arid environment. With modern research into the negative effects of intensive agriculture
on the Sahel, the government of Mali has recently created some programs to assist the
Tuareg, including husbandry cooperatives, fixed prices for the sale of animals, and
employment projects for settled, urban Tuareg to adopt wage labour. But all of these
programs seek to control pastoralism or provide for a transition to a non-pastoral lifestyle.
Recent attempts by the Malian government to reduce Tuareg dependence on foreign aid by
the Malian government by encouraging pastoralism have been too little, too late to halt
settlement. 1301 As long as pastoralism is seen as backward by both governments and
international actors, it will be discouraged by government policy, leading to more
settlement.
1300F
1295
1296
United Nations, ‘Our Common Future’ Sec. 5.2 (1987) paras. 95-96.
Stewart, 28-29.
1297
Stewart, 29.
1298
Khazanov, Pastoralists, 7, 13. Boilley,, Les Touaregs, 1999 315.
Article 7, while supporting the right of pastoral communities to practice traditional pastoralism, including
nomadism within Mali and, where possible by bilateral agreement, between Mali and neighboring countries,
clearly states that; “the exercise of pastoral activities is subject to the obligation to preserve the
environment.” Charte Pastorale du Mali, Loi N. 01-004 of 27 Feb. 2001. Oxby argues that a similar initiative in
Niger, the Charte Pastorale, was too late and too ineffective to stop sedentarization. Oxby, 53.
1299
J. McDougall, ‘Frontiers, Borderlands, and Saharan/World History’ in J. McDougall and J. Scheele (eds.)
Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa (Indiana UP 2012) 84-85.
1300
1301
Diarrah, 275-285.
242
Meanwhile, the marginalization and exclusion of the Tuareg from both land ownership and
political participation has meant that government policy continues to be set by urban
Malians and agricultural interests. The continued disenfranchisement and lack of
registration and political opportunities of pastoral peoples like the Tuareg makes it difficult
for them to be heard by their governments, and even more challenging to create propastoral policies. 1302 This has created a cycle of settlement, land overuse and conflict. The
linking of registration, voting and legitimacy to settlement and land ownership has only
fuelled further settlement and reduced the voices and political power of pastoral nomads
like the Tuareg. The failure of decades of forced and coercive settlement policies will not be
easily undone in the Sahel, and the lack of a political solution between the Tuareg and the
Malian government only makes the problem worse.
1301F
As this section has shown, Malian land use policy is deeply connected to Tuareg nationality,
registration and voting. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, Malian land use policy
continued to favour settlement, agriculture and the seizure and communal use of Tuareg
lands in the Niger Bend region, even as these policies put a strain on the available land for
farming. The link between land ownership and voting led some Tuareg to abandon
nomadism in an attempt to prove title to their lands. The experience of living as refugees in
camps distanced many younger Tuareg from nomadism, while international development
programs targeted nomadism as bad for the environment. With little political clout, it was
hard for Tuareg communities to challenge these policies. Meanwhile, potential mineral and
oil wealth in the Sahara fuelled continued Malian government concerns over separatism in
the north of Mali, leading to continued crackdowns on northern Tuareg.
1302
Diarrah, 285.
243
Malaysia, Oil, Tourism and Sama Dilaut Ocean Rights
Above: Approximate location of offshore oil blocks in relation to the border, author’s map
Below: Tun Mustapha Marine Park
Like in Kuwait and Mali, concerns over the integrity of Sabah’s ocean borders would be
fuelled by the discovery of massive amounts of natural resources, specifically oil, under the
oceans that were once the domain of the Sama Dilaut and other fishing communities. While
the status of the Sama Dilaut is a much lower profile issue in Malaysia than that of the
bidoon in Kuwait or Tuareg in Mali, as this section will show, concerns over sovereignty
244
and natural resources in Malaysia, including the establishment of tourist parks, had
arguably a great deal of indirect influence on the status of the Sama Dilaut.
The settlement of the Sama Dilaut has been continuing since the colonial period. According
to Sather, by 1965, the population of nomadic Sama Dilaut had declined to about 660 in the
Semporna district. 1303 In 1967, James Warren noted the rapid abandonment of boat
nomadism by the Sama Dilaut. 1304 According to Carol Warren, by 1969, the sedentary
population of Sama Dilaut at Semporna had doubled, and ten years later, only 25 to 30 boat
dwelling families remained. 1305
1302F
1303F
1304F
Sama Dilaut nationality may appear to be unrelated to bigger questions about the inclusion
of Sabah in Malaysia and the ownership of Sabah’s vast oil reserves and tourist parks, but
in reality, Sama Dilaut nationality and legitimacy are directly impacted by the quest to
exclusively control natural resources in Sabah. As the section on nomads before
colonization showed, the Sama Dilaut occupy the Sulu Sea, now a sensitive maritime border
zone and the location of the majority of Malaysia’s oil and some of its most lucrative tourist
parks. Ocean areas once occupied by the Sama Dilaut is now some of the most valuable in
the world. 1306 Like in Kuwait and Mali, the presence of natural resources has greatly raised
the stakes for border security and Malaysia’s sovereignty over the oceans around
Sabah. 1307 This section will explore how the discovery of oil and the creation of tourist
parks in were once Sama Dilaut fishing zones has influenced Sama Dilaut belonging and
how questions of sovereignty, borders and ocean rights have helped perpetuate their
statelessness.
1305F
1306F
While during the colonial period described in Part 2 north Borneo was considered to be a
remote part of the British Empire, a place where the BNBC struggled to make money, today,
Sabah’s offshore oil is a key driver of Malaysia’s economy. As described above, under a
closely related European theory to that of terra nullius, the oceans around Sabah are
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 28. The number of nomadic families is difficult to determine, in part because
nomadism is difficult to quantify. Sather and Warren are in agreement, however, that boat nomadism greatly
declined in the region following independence. I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this point.
1303
J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, ix. Though according to some accounts, there may be as many as 5,000-7,000
Sama Dilaut still living a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle in Sabah today. The number of Sama Dilaut who
continue to practice some form of boat nomadism, however, is unknown. I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her
comments on this issue.
1304
C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 28. Sather points out that the
number of settled Bajau also increased due to the influx of refugees from the Philippines. In Indonesia, many
Sama Dilaut families were similarly settled in villages in the 1950s to crack down on piracy, leading to
poverty and overfishing. C. Majors and J. Swiecicka, ‘Missing the boat?’ Inside Indonesia (June 24, 2007). See
also L. Lenhart, ‘Orang Suku Laut Communities at Risk: Effects of Modernization on the Resource Base,
Livelihood and Culture of the ‘Sea Tribe People’ of the Riau Islands (Indonesia),’ 5 Nomadic Peoples 67 (2002).
1305
See generally Wright. See also Fernandez, 55; G. Poling, ‘The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the
Limits of Maritime Dispute’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2013); Hooker, 221-222.
1306
1307
Kassim and Zin, 110.
245
considered to be mar liberum and are exclusively under the centralized control of the
Malaysian government. The federal government has strengthened its control over the
Borneo territories in recent decades by coming to dominate their finances and controlling
their oil. 1308
1307F
Currently, the federal government is focusing heavily on exploration in Sabah and Sarawak,
with oil fields pushing up against the maritime boundaries with Brunei and the Philippines,
who, in turn, have their own off-shore wells. 1309 Important deep-water oil discoveries off
the coast of Sabah continue to be made. As well, the region continues to be vital to oil
refining and export. 2017 saw the building of an important new refinery. 1310 Western
Sabah houses the Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal (SOGT), the Sabah-Sarawak Integrated Oil
and Gas Project, and the Sabah-Sarawak Gas Pipeline. 1311 Altogether, Sabah and Sarawak
are crucial to Malaysia’s economy.
1308F
1309F
1310F
Yet, as Part 2 explored, the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia was not without
controversy, and regionalism remains a strong part of identity in Sabah and Sarawak.
Sabah has been the site of several independence movements, including a Communist
insurgency in the 1960s, and more recently under Chief Minister Donald Stephens. 1312
Tensions over separatism, however, have never risen to the level of armed conflict as they
have in Mali.
1311F
Like northern Mali, several attempts have been made over the years to secure some
independence for the Borneo states. This autonomy has been considerably weakened as oil
has slowly come to dominate Malaysia’s economy. Until the discovery of oil, Sabah and
Sarawak maintained a degree of financial independence, suffering through the decline of
the timber industry in the 1960s and beginning to develop tourism as an alternative. 1313
But as oil production took off, Sabah grew in economic importance to Malaysia. Starting in
the 2000s, oil and gas surpassed tin, palm oil, rubber, fishing, and other, more traditional
economic drivers in Sabah as the dominant export, becoming a large part of Malaysia’s total
GDP. 1314
1312F
1313F
1308
Goh Beng Lan, 340.
1309
See maps, below.
US Energy Information Administration, ‘Malaysia: International Energy Data and Analysis’ at
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=MYS (July 2020).
1310
US Energy Information Administration, ‘Malaysia: International Energy Data and Analysis’ at
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=MYS (July 2020).
1311
Singh, 222. See also Cheah Boon Kheng, 102. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to chronicle the
history of separatism in Sabah, but simply to point out that the legitimacy of Sabah’s inclusion into Malaysia
has frequently been called into question.
1312
1313
Andaya, 335. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 27.
1314
Singh, 218.
246
Thanks to oil and gas from across Malaysia, of which Sabah is crucial both for production
and refining, 1315 the Malaysian economy went through a boom, becoming a major world
producer of oil and gas and a regional manufacturing and tech hub. But the economic
growth has benefited different groups to different extents. Despite being the location of
much of Malaysia’s oil wealth, the Borneo states have a lower GDP than Peninsular
Malaysia. 1316 In particular, minorities like the Sama Dilaut and aboriginal peoples have
been the most left out of this economic growth.
1314F
1315F
As a result of the need to maintain exclusive, federal control of the oil, Sabah and Sarawak’s
semi-independent status has become more fiction than fact. By law, the federal government
of Malaysia is responsible for “health, education, finance, external affairs, internal security
and civil and criminal law” and the state governments responsible for land regulation and
use, education, civil service. In reality, Sabah has little say when it comes to oil exploration.
While Sabah and Sarawak continue to set their own immigration policy, over time, the two
states have slowly become more incorporated into the federation economically. 1317 The
federal government has in recent decades come to exert more control over Sabah’s affairs,
particularly on the issues of border control and oil exploration. 1318
1316F
1317F
Importantly, though each state has its own constitution, finances are very centralized and
oil production and revenue are controlled at the federal level. 1319 The oil and gas revenue
is almost wholly controlled by Petronas, Malaysia’s national oil company, and the federal
government. 1320 Yet, though Sabah produces almost one third of Malaysia’s oil and gas, it
receives only five percent of royalties. 1321 Out of this, almost no money goes to the Sama
Dilaut.
1318F
1319F
1320F
Along with internal tensions, however, Sabah and Sarawak’s somewhat arbitrary inclusion
within Malaysia have fuelled a series of border and sovereignty disputes with her
neighbours. In this way, the situation in Sabah is similar to that of Kuwait, though Sabah
has not been subjected to a sustained invasion by a neighbouring state the way Kuwait was
1315
1316
US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, ‘Malaysia - Oil and Gas’ (June 18, 2017).
Young, Bussink and Hasan, 3, 283. See also Hooker, 243.
1317 Young, Bussink and Hasan, 17, 18. The special rights granted to Sabah and Sarawak to restrict
immigration from the rest of Malaysia are not without controversy. Malaysia Today, ‘The Real Purpose of
Sarawak and Sabah’s Immigration Controls’ (7 April 2014).
1318
Andaya, 335.
Malaysia’s national oil company, Petronas, controls all of Malaysia’s oil and is owned by the federal
government. Control of Malaysia’s oil and gas industry was transferred from the states to the federal
government in 1974. Sabah and Sarawak receive 5% royalty payment. E. Lee, ‘Scope for Improvement:
Malaysia’s Oil and Gas Sector’ (Research for Social Advancement 2013) i-ii. See also Lim Hong Hai 101; Astro
Awani, ‘Najib assures Sabah of more revenue from oil, gas resources" (15 Nov. 2014); Hooker, 226.
1319
1320
Hooker, 250.
1321
Hooker, 251.
247
by Iraq. Nevertheless, tensions over the border and control of oil would come to drive
much of the region’s politics and, as this section will show, influence how the Malaysian
government has approached the subject of nationality for the Sama Dilaut.
As Part 2 explored, the border between Sabah and the Philippines divided the Sultanate of
Sulu. Because the original border demarcations were based on a disputed colonial-era
treaty, the issue of the border cannot be easily solved as long as the legitimacy of the treaty
is called into question. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, each state has an
“exclusive economic zone” 200 nautical miles off its coast, including islands, a critical
provision for claiming oil exploration rights. 1322 Yet, if the original treaty is not valid, the
placement of the border is called into question, along with these oil rights.
1321F
At federation, oil production had not yet assumed its central role in Malaysia’s economy.
The biggest concern over the sovereignty of Borneo was the threat of communist influence,
not the prospect of oil rights. The Philippines and Indonesia strongly objected to the plans
for federation. In Indonesia, Sukarno began a somewhat limited military campaign to
“crush Malaysia.” Meanwhile, the Philippines began a long, diplomatic campaign to regain
what it claimed were parts of the historical Sultanate of Sulu. 1323
1322F
This prompted unresolved tensions over the border as the Philippines cut off diplomatic
relations with Malaysia, complicating any attempts to resolve the border dispute or
questions of nationality. The issue of Sabah’s sovereignty has not been helped by the fact
that the Malaysian government continues to pay an annual fee to the Sultan of Sulu, based
on the original agreement signed with the BNBC. 1324 The dispute with the Philippines over
the placement of the border should be viewed not as an isolated issue, but as part of
broader anxieties over Malaysia’s sovereignty in the region. 1325
1323F
1324F
More recently, in 2002, Indonesia took one of its claims to the International Court of Justice.
The Philippines tried to do the same, but Malaysia would not cooperate. 1326 Tensions
1325F
1322
UN Convention Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (1982), with 168 states parties.
1323
Hooker, 219. See generally Cheah Boon Kheng.
Once again, the purpose of this section is not to take a side in the border dispute, but rather to point out
that the dispute exists, is very important to both sides, and is long-standing.
1324
Another related conflict that does not directly impact the Sama Dilaut, but adds to the general anxiety
over the integrity of Sabah’s maritime borders, is the dispute over the Celebes Sea between Malaysia and
Indonesia, where the two countries have, for example, granted competing contracts to Shell Oil. This dispute
is relevant to the Orang Laut living off the coast of Riau, in a closely related example of disputed borders
impacting a nomadic “sea gypsy” community. L. Lenhart, ‘Orang Suku Laut Ethnicity and Acculturation’
(Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde Deel 153, 4de Afl. 1997) 577-604, 581. See also US US Energy
Information Administration, ‘Malaysia’ at http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=MYS. For
a summary of the relevance of oil to the border dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia, see generally
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia
v. Malaysia) (Merits) Judgment of 17 December 2002.
1325
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipandan
(Indonesia v. Malaysia) (Merits) Judgment of 17 December 2002. See also R. Haller-Tros, ‘The Territorial
1326
248
between Malaysia and the Philippines over the maritime border would prove particularly
relevant to the status of the Sama Dilaut.
While unlike in Kuwait and Mali, border tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines
have not led to war, they have stoked Malaysian fears about the possibility of a military
incursion into Sabah by factions from the Philippines. The actual validity of the supposed
threat is unclear and beyond the scope of this dissertation, but Malaysia has, at times,
accused the Philippines of being behind incursions by armed groups, first in 1968 and
again in 2013. 1327
1326F
The extent to which the government of the Philippines is involved in these invasions is a
matter of debate, but these incidents have kept the problem of the border an issue of major
concern for the Malaysian government. As this section will show, this has led to the
securitization of the border region that is similar to that of northern Mali. It has driven the
Malaysian government to aggressively police and control its maritime border as a security,
rather than a civilian, zone.
One important background issue to the debate over ownership of Sabah’s natural resources
is the economic imbalance between Malaysia and the Philippines. While Brunei and
Malaysia have forged ahead with exploration, the Philippines has been slow to grant oil and
gas concessions and remains a net energy importer, though the government is trying to
change this. 1328 Like in northern Mali, security issues in the Southern Philippines have
created an environment that is unfriendly to oil exploration, making it difficult for oil
companies to establish their claims and conduct business. 1329
1327F
1328F
As a result of all of the factors discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, there is now a
perception in the Malaysian government that the Philippines regards Sabah as part of the
Philippines, that conflict with the Philippines would impede oil exploration, and that this
threat of conflict, in turn, impedes a bilateral solution between the two countries on issues
Dispute Between Indonesia and Malaysia Over Pulau Sipadan’ (IBRU Boundary and Territory Briefing 1995);
Hooker 222. Both Indonesia and the Philippines claimed title to areas of north Borneo based on pre-colonial
claims, as well as the numerous treaties of the colonial period.
There have also been acts labeled as terrorism by the Malaysian government, carried out by Moro rebels
in Sabah, including kidnappings and murder. Ferandez, 55. For a brief history of the 1968 incident, see Al
Jazeera, ‘Remembering the “Jabidah massacre”’ 18 March 2013 (accessed July 2020).
1327
Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy, ‘Frequently Asked Questions. See also US Energy
Information Administration, ‘Philippines: International Energy Data and Analysis’. The extent of oil and gas
reserves under the Sulu Sea is unknown. US Dept of State, ‘Limits in the Seas: No. 142 Philippines’ (2014). See
also Manila Standard Today, ‘Total, Mitra Ready Sulu Sea Oil Drilling’ (8 March 2015); Government of the
Philippines, ‘Petroleum Potential of the Sulu Sea Region, Philippines’; Coordinating Committee for Geoscience
Programs in East and Southeast Asia, ‘Petroleum Potential of West Palawan Basins and Sulu Sea Region’. Note
that some oil companies have pulled out, citing insufficient deposits. Philippine Commodities Digest ‘Very
Thin Prospects for Philippine Oil and Gas Exploration,’ (21 Jan 2013).
1328
E. Watkins, ‘ExxonMobil seeks Philippines military security for Sulu Sea site’ Oil and Gas Journal (January
25, 2010).
1329
249
like border security and immigration. 1330 Today there is no Philippines consulate in Sabah
due to the ongoing tensions, which impedes any solution to the question of nationality for
various groups in Sabah. 1331
1329F
1330F
The simmering border dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines as to the sovereignty
of north Borneo must therefore be viewed through the prism of oil and gas exploration and,
in particular, the requirement that governments exclusively and centrally control the
territory where oil and gas is located. 1332 This dispute has had an important impact on the
issue of migration to Sabah from the Philippines, as the Philippines continues to produce a
large number of immigrants and refugees in Sabah, many of whom have not been able to
gain Malaysian nationality. 1333 The Sama Dilaut occupy and uncomfortable place in this
dispute, as their seasonal migrations have become the object of scrutiny by both
governments and their fishing practices are often presented as violating the ocean security
zone the Malaysian government is attempting to create around Sabah.
1331F
1332F
Yet, as Part 2 showed, it is precisely the historic fishing zones of the Sama Dilaut that are
now under the exclusive ownership of the Malaysian government and which contain much
of Sabah’s most valuable natural resources. As with the Tuareg and the Bedouin, the idea
that the Sama Dilaut or other local peoples might have some ownership claims to the
oceans off the coast of Sabah is not a topic that is ever entertained by the Malaysian
government, as far as this dissertation has been able to ascertain. As noted above, while
Aboriginal groups on Peninsular Malaysia have had some success asserting their land
rights, the Sama Dilaut have not had similar success asserting their maritime rights.
Today, as discussed above, there is the entrenched view by many officials that all Sama
Dilaut are from the Philippines. 1334 The insistence that the Sama Dilaut are not from Sabah
has led to all denial of any rights they might have to their traditional fishing zones in
Sabah’s waters. Undeniably, however, much of Malaysia’s oil deposits, wells and
infrastructure are located in what were once Sama Dilaut fishing and migration zones. Yet
today, oil and natural gas from offshore of Sabah is almost entirely controlled by Kuala
Lumpur. As with Kuwait, there seems to have never been a serious conversation in
Malaysia over whether or not the local inhabitants of coastal Sabah should have any
ownership stake in Malaysia’s oil.
1333F
Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 256.
1330
1331
Navallo, 4.
P. Ghosh, ‘It’s Not Just China Vs. Everybody Else: Bizarre, Ancient Conflict in Southeast Asia Between
Philippines and Malaysia Intensifies’ IBT (March 7, 2013).
1332
Allerton, Lives, 2014, 5. Indonesian residents, however, would need to register within five years under the
pre-2006 law.
1333
1334
Brunt, Vulnerability, 35-36.
250
The need to secure offshore oil and gas production has led to a clampdown on maritime
activities that are seen as at odds with security, such as small-scale fishing. Beginning in
1992, the Malaysian government instituted an ongoing program of border surveillance and
security in the oceans around Sabah, a program which came to sharply curtail Sama Dilaut
fishing access. 1335 Border control activities are tightly conducted by the military and police.
The creation of the Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal has led to the loss of fishing zones for local
fisherman, including Sama Dilaut fishermen. The government has banned fishing within a
200km zone around the Terminal, citing security concerns. 1336 Any small-scale fishing is
often blamed on so-called foreigners who are intruding into Malaysian waters. 1337 This
feeds the perception that Sama Dilaut fishermen are outsiders with no fishing rights in the
area.
1334F
1335F
1336F
But the Malaysian government has not only taken the view that the Sama Dilaut are
foreigners without any rights to the oceans around Sabah. It has sometimes adopted the
more extreme view that in the past, the Sama Dilaut have no land rights at all because they
are nomads. The government has therefore adopted the common position that nomads do
not own, but merely wander over, their lands. As a result, most conversations on Sama
Dilaut fishing rights that do occur centre on access, not ownership.
In a closely related issue, the government has also claimed that the Sama Dilaut were
without a nationality due to their nomadism. In litigation before the International Court of
Justice with Indonesia, speaking of the pre-colonial period, the Malaysian government drew
a careful distinction between “wandering...sea gypsies” who were “effectively beyond the
jurisdiction of any of the States in the region, including the Sultan of Sulu...” and other,
settled Bajau groups, who were subjects of the Sultans and, later, nationals of their
countries. 1338
1337F
This sort of language echoes the opinions of many colonial administrators of not only the
BNBC, but also the Sahel and the Persian Gulf region, as discussed in Part 2. The idea that
the Sama Dilaut did belong anywhere and could not own land because of their nomadism, a
view that had come up repeatedly during the colonial period in Kuwait and Mali as well,
conveniently reinforces the view that the Sama Dilaut have no historical right to ownership
1335
Kassim and Zin, 21-22.
1336 Daily Express, ‘Fishermen Lament Loss of 200km Zone’ (5 April 2011). For more on the Terminal, see the
Sipitang Oil and Gas website.
1337
See for example Daily Express, ‘Encroachments into Oil Platforms at Alarming Levels’ (20 August 2015).
“Indonesia tries to minimize the significance of these (Bajau) local communities by presenting the Bajaus
as a single group of sea gypsies, wandering up and down the whole east coast and effectively beyond the
jurisdiction of any of the States in the region, including the Sultan of Sulu. It is true that there were Bajau
communities along the coast, but these were distinct groups, not a single wandering tribe of nomads. The
Bajaus of Darvel Bay had their own leaders and were based on the islands and reefs of the locality. They had a
cemetery at Omadal, which still exists. Local leaders were appointed or confirmed by the Sultan of Sulu; they
were often themselves Sulu by birth.” International Court of Justice, ‘Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia): Reply of Malaysia’ (2 March 2001) 10.
1338
251
of their traditional fishing grounds, as well as the view that they have no right to a
nationality.
Statelessness has been devastating on the Sama Dilaut on many fronts, 1339 but perhaps no
more so than the denial of any ownership or right to occupy their traditional fishing zones.
In addition to being unable to access most government services, they suffer from the
constant threat of deportation as part of the undocumented population in a highly
militarized border zone where the government of Malaysia has asserted exclusive title over
most of the ocean. In this way, the move by the Malaysian government to seize exclusive
ownership of oil fields resembles that of Kuwait, where the government exclusively
controls the land and any competing claims are entirely ignored. Like in Mali, the border
zone in Sabah is highly militarized.
1338F
As with the Tuareg and Bedouin, the governments of Malaysia and Sabah frequently argue
that Sama Dilaut nomads are detrimental to the environment. Yet, the settlement of
nomads in Malaysia often takes place alongside government-sponsored logging, which has
produced deforestation on a massive scale, oil exploration and large-scale fishing, all of
which have serious environmental consequences. 1340 While the Malaysian government
pumps thousands of barrels of oil through pipelines in the area, Sama Dilaut communities
are often accused of being,
1339F
associated with illegal and destructive practices such as blast fishing, cyanide
fishing, coral mining, and the harvesting of protected species..., as well as overexploiting individual fisheries to the point of collapse. 1341
1340F
The Sama Dilaut allegedly account for a ‘disproportionate amount” of small-scale,
“artisanal” fishing in the Celebes Sea, but their actual impact on the natural environment is
disputed and unclear. 1342
1341F
1339
Brunt, Vulnerability, 3. See also Navallo, 4.
Y. Lyons, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas in the SCS and the Protection of the Marine Environment, Part 1, A Review
of the Context and a Profile of Offshore Activites’ Center for International Law, National University of
Singapore (2011). See also Andaya 306-307, 322. See also Goh Beng Lan, ‘Dilemma of Progressive Politics in
Malaysia: Islamic Orthodoxy versus Human Rights’ in W. Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning Modernity in Indonesia
and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 306-307.
1340
See generally J. Clifton and C. Majors ‘Culture, Conservation and Conflict: Perspectives on Maritime
Conservation Among the Bajau of Southeast Asia’ 25 Society & Natural Resources (2012) (hereinafter Clifton
and Majors). See also J. Clifton ‘Achieving congruence between conservation and community: the Bajau ethnic
group and marine management within the Wakatobi and south-east Asia’ in J. Clifton, R. Unsworth and D.
Smith (eds.) Marine Research and Conservation in the Coral Triangle: The Wakatobi National Park (Nova
2010).
1341
1342
See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012.
252
According to Clifton and Majors, Sama Dilaut subsistence fishers practice a complex system
of fish stock management, closely following seasonal fish spawning cycles. 1343 Many Sama
Dilaut are subsistence fishers who take only what they need to support their families. 1344
Meanwhile, the competition of large scale commercial fishing, much of which is licensed by
the government, 1345 means many Sama Dilaut have adopted engines, nets and other
modern fishing aids that have greatly increased their take. 1346 It could be argued, as Clifton
and Majors suggest, that it has been the settlement of Sama Dilaut families, rather than
their traditional fishing practices, that have negatively impacted the environment,
particularly in an environment where large-scale commercial fishing is tolerated and even
promoted. 1347
1342F
1343F
1344F
1345F
1346F
More so than in Kuwait and Mali, the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut also goes hand in
hand with the creation of tourist parks exclusively owned by the government from which
they are excluded. 1348 For nomads like the Sama Dilaut who have no legal standing to
challenge their removal, such government development projects continue apace and the
Sama Dilaut have little say over them. 1349 Malaysia is looking at the creation of the Tun
Mustapha Park, the largest of its kind in Malaysia, at the northern tip of Sabah. 1350 This
park will not only further limit small scale fishing, but will also greatly increase tourism in
the region, a priority for the Sabah government. One study found that the tourism potential
of the park outweighed even the value of potential untapped oil reserves in the area. 1351
While the creation of the park calls for the involvement of the local community, the Sama
Dilaut are not being included. 1352
1347F
1348F
1349F
1350F
1351F
1343
See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012.
1344
See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012.
World Wildlife Fund Malaysia, ‘Assessment of Coastal Fisheries in the Malaysian-Sabah portion of the
Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion’ (August 2001).
1345
1346
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 79-80.
1347
See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012.
1348
See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012.
The Sama Dilaut are not the only sea nomad group to face fishing restrictions. See for example the Moken
and the establishment of pearl fishing and subsequent issuance of licenses in Burma, and failure to issue
licenses to the Moken. White, 1981, 70-71, 108.
1349
R. Jumin and K. Kassem, ‘Ecosystem-based Management in a proposed marine protected area: Tun
Mustapha Park’ (World Wildlife Fund Malaysia 2011). Also see the creation of the Tun Sakaran Marine Park
off Semporna in 2004. I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this point.
1350
1351
1352
Coral Triangle Initiative, ‘Valuation Study of the Proposed Tun Mustapha Park’ (17 March 2011).
Clifton et al., 86. See also Brunt, Stakeholders, 43.
253
In Part Ten of their report on the creation of Semporna Islands Park, the Semporna Islands
Project argues that,
(t)he high percentage of non-Malaysian citizens living in the proposed park
should not be seen as an obstacle. The questions of citizenship can be addressed
later, but in the meantime, it is important to establish the park and introduce
management strategies for resource use and other activities...The nomadic Sama
Dilaut have a unique lifestyle and have been using the area for hundreds of years.
They should be allowed into some parts of the park, where they will be required
to comply with all regulations concerning resource use. 1353
1352F
Nevertheless, as the report itself points out,
(t)he Semporna Islands Park will be a special case because it will include State
Land, land with Native Titles and land claimed under Customary Rights. The
situation is complicated by the fact that there are a number of unresolved land
claims, so it is not yet certain who owns what. 1354
1353F
The government must first establish legal title to the land, which means resolving
ownership under Malaysia’s Native Titles laws, mentioned above. But this will be difficult
to do for the Sama Dilaut, as their nationality is not established and, therefore, they have no
way of establishing their title to areas in the park. Meanwhile, as the above quotes
demonstrate, their right to enter and use their traditional territories is presented not as a
right, but instead as largess by the government.
Perhaps the entire counter-intuitive logic of the government position towards the Sama
Dilaut is captured in this paragraph:
The Sama Dilaut should be considered a special case because they are an
indigenous people with a unique wandering lifestyle who have been using the
area for hundreds of years. Their lack of official citizenship should not be seen as
a reason for excluding them from the park. However, it is important to maintain a
status quo. Those who have consistently used the area could be allowed to
continue to do so, but measures should be taken to ensure that the park does not
become a magnet for the many others who might be attracted to the area. 1355
1354F
These quotations show that the Sama Dilaut are viewed less as nationals of Sabah whose
opinions must be consulted and whose rights to land must be upheld and more as outsiders
without legal standing or rights. At the same time, the paragraph begins by acknowledging
the Sama Dilaut’s long standing presence in the region as “indigenous peoples.” In
particular, while it notes the indigenous status of the Sama Dilaut, it in no way makes
Semporna Islands Project, ‘Management Plan for the Semporna Islands Park (Draft: 1-2001) Part 10:
Legal Aspects and Regulations’ 133 (hereinafter Semporna Islands Project).
1353
1354
Semporna Islands Project, 135, 137.
1355
Semporna Islands Project, 137.
254
reference to any claims of title this might give them to the oceans which are here assumed
to belong exclusively to the government.
In this way, the treatment of the Sama Dilaut mirrors that of other indigenous and
aboriginal peoples in Sabah, such as the Batek people, who have been confined by the
government to a small area of so-called communal land next to a national park. 1356 The
point of these observations is not to question the creation of a marine park, but rather to
point out, as Clifton et al. have done, that nomadic peoples cannot have a say in massive
government projects regarding their lands unless their rights as nationals are respected. In
such cases, the issue of indigenous status is often used or manipulated in ways that deny
title to nomads. 1357
1355F
1356F
1356 K. Dickerman and J. Delano, ‘The eroding life for the Batek of Kuala Koh, Malaysia’s last hunter-gatherers’
(November 29, 2019).
See generally Clifton et al. The Sama Dilaut are not the only group of sea nomads who have felt the effects
of ocean conservation projects without consultation due to their statelessness and perceived lack of
ownership of the oceans which they have occupied for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. See generally E.
Cohen, ‘Tourism and Land Grab in the Aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami’ 11 Scandinavian Journal of
Hospitality and Tourism 224 (2011).
1357
255
Conclusion
It is clear from the examples that the presence of statelessness has been bad for the states
of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, yet these states have only allowed statelessness to become
more entrenched for many of the nomadic populations. The question then becomes, given
the negative impact of statelessness on all parties, why haven’t states like Kuwait, Mali and
Malaysia taken steps to end statelessness or resolve basic questions of inclusion and
belonging?
This question cannot be answered simply by a legal analysis. As a result, this section looked
beyond the law at political, social and economic factors that drive nomad exclusion in
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. It would seem that rushing to clarify the nationality status of the
population would be a key state goal following decolonization, but as this section has
shown, there were often competing concerns that led governments to ignore or even
perpetuate the problem of statelessness for nomads and former nomads.
This section in particular focused on two important state goals of the post-colonial period:
forging national unity and exclusively controlling land and natural resources. Nationality,
along with border security, civil registration and immigration controls, became crucial
tools to achieve these two goals. As a result, this section focused on what nationality means
to states and how both nationality and statelessness can sometimes be useful to states.
In post-colonial countries like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, hostility towards nomadism led
to nomads being excluded from registration as nationals because (1) nomads were
increasingly seen as detrimental to national unity and/or the balance of power between
various political factions, (2) nomad lands were now seen as too valuable for anything
apart from exclusive state ownership, and (3) borders placed nomads at the edge of the
newly created countries where contested borders raised the risk of separatism and foreign
invasion.
As a result, nomads faced relentless discrimination that took a number of forms, including
statelessness but also assimilation. Nomadism itself was often redefined as crime or
terrorism. Successive governments failed to resolve the status of many nomadic
populations in the decades following decolonization, locking nomads in limbo. In the case
of the Tuareg, state policies around nationality and inclusion have driven armed conflict
and the collapse of northern Mali into a failed state.
One major conclusion of this dissertation is that while the failure of governments to grant a
nationality to nomads in states like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia was caused in part by lack of
administrative state capacity, when examined more closely, failure to register nomads and
resolve their status also demonstrates a lack of political will, a “moral disengagement.” 1358
A bias against nomadism as being somehow incompatible or detrimental to states
1357F
Galaty, 158. See also K. Belton, ‘Statelessness: A Matter of Human Rights’ in R. Howard-Hassmann and M.
Walton-Roberts, The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept (U. Penn 2015) 35.
1358
256
continued from colonization into post-colonial politics. The continuity between colonial
and post-colonial policy towards nomads is striking. 1359
1358F
As the examples showed, governments continued to forcibly settle nomads and attempt to
shift local economies away from pastoralism and mobile, small-scale fishing. Settlement, as
the examples showed, was often accompanied by registration, while those groups who
remained nomadic found themselves increasingly unregistered and shut out of a
nationality. This continued bias against nomads did not occur in a vacuum, but was part of
a larger, global push against nomads not only by governments but also western institutions
and academia. The view that nomads cannot participate in civic life or own land became
somewhat entrenched in the social sciences during the 20th century, adopted by
international aid organizations and post-colonial governments alike. 1360
1359F
Nomads and National Unity
As this section showed, the states of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia often continued colonial
policy towards nomads. But they also had extra challenges and goals that extended well
beyond the concerns of colonial governments. While the colonizing powers had begun to
develop the idea of cultural nationalism and ethnic groups, these ideas arguably exploded
in importance during the post-colonial era of fragile new states. The desire for a unified
national identity to support state sovereignty and unity would drive post-colonial politics
in countries like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This would lead these post-colonial
governments to promote policies that excluded or assimilated minorities, including
nomads.
Governments created national origin myths, such as the Battle of Jahra, to support the
theory of romantic nationality as a basis for nationality. Ethnicity came to be widely
employed to justify the territorial state and used as a basis for nationality. In Mali, subSaharan African identity was supported by nationality law, re-imagining post-colonial Mali
as a reincarnation of ancient Malian civilization. There was little room in these constructs
for nomadic minorities like the Sama Dilaut, the Tuareg and many Bedouin tribes.
Importantly, however, settled nomads were often registered as nationals during the
transitional periods, meaning that nomadic minorities as nomads, rather than as ethnic,
linguistic or religious groups, were most vulnerable to statelessness or receiving a lesser
nationality status. Other factors besides mobility sometimes played a role in statelessness,
This continuation of colonial policy has also been documented by other scholars in other countries. Aukot
describes how colonial authorities labeled pastoral nomads in Kenya as a “problem.” E. Aukot, ‘Am I stateless
because I’m a nomad?’ 32 Forced Migration Review 18 (2009) 18.
1359
For examples of expert opinions on nomad land use and statehood from the modern period, see for
example E. Marx, ‘The Tribe as Unit of Subsistence: Nomadic Pastoralism in the Middle East’ 79 Am.
Anthropologist 346 (2009) 351, 344, 355 (arguing that nomads “secure” and “hold” territory); T. Myers
‘Defended Territories and No-man’s-lands’ 78 Am. Anthro. 354 (1975) (arguing that the presence of boundary
markings proves nomad land ownership). A good summary of the literature in this debate can be found in
Nadasdy’s 2002 article on land claims in Canada. P Nadasdy, ‘”Property” and Aboriginal Land Claims in the
Canadian Subarctic: Some Theoretical Considerations’ 104 Am. Anthro. 247 (2002). See also Moretti, 38.
1360
257
however, such as in the case of the Bedouin nomads, where tribal affiliation often made the
difference between statelessness and receiving a lesser nationality status. But even in
Kuwait, mobility was the key factor in determining who was not considered to be an
original Kuwaiti and led to the cultural distinction between Bedu and Hathar.
The theory of Romantic nationalism, first introduced above, became a powerful
government tool during the post-colonial period. In particular, the European idea of a
“national homeland” was widely adopted in the post-colonial context, as can be seen in the
examples of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. 1361 As Manby puts it, speaking of the African
context, “(a)lthough the laws drafted for the new African states for the most part eschewed
in their language the racism of the colonial era, nervousness about the loyalty of certain
groups of residents - those most easily asserted to be not ‘from’ the territory - nonetheless
shaped the ways in which they were drafted and above all applied.” 1362 The idea of a
national homeland was actively promoted despite the relatively recent origins of modern
borders of post-colonial states. 1363
1360F
1361F
1362F
Over time, the conversation over nomad origins evolved to increasingly portray them not
as nomads, but as immigrants or foreigners, a portrayal which was used to justify their
continued exclusion. Where immigration posed a risk to national unity, nomadism and
cross-border movement was increasingly conflated with immigration. Many nomads began
the post-colonial period in a state of contested or undetermined nationality, but would
become stateless over time, as governments missed multiple opportunities to resolve their
status and the very lack of registration and documents became evidence of their foreign, or
outsider status.
National identity in the post-colonial context was therefore the deliberate creation of postcolonial governments who use it to foster unity and prevent separatism or claims by
neighbouring states. 1364 In the African context, for example, “fear of fissiparous politics and
potential state fragmentation creating an overwhelming emphasis on ‘national unity..."’ 1365
As Manby puts it in the African context, “(a)mong the most difficult challenges of nationbuilding tasked to the newly independent African States of the 1960s was the
1363F
1364F
1361
1362
See Tendayi Bloom’s analysis in Bloom, Members, 2017, 155.
Manby, Trends, 175.
“National myths often perpetuate the idea that imagined communities are very old, based on the idea that
nations have a long history in a given place, when in fact they are much more recent.” A. Jones, Human
Geography: The Basics (Routledge 2012) 65-66 (discussing the theories of Benedict Anderson.)
1363
1364 Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 30. See also A. Smith, 22-23 (discussing how a sacred land or
homeland is often used to justify nationalism); Donner, 127; Weis, 3; Verzijl, 7; Miller, 19, 68; Maury, 11-12.
Smith explains; “(b)ut the earth in question cannot be just anywhere; it is not any stretch of land. It is, and
must be, the ‘historic’ land, the ‘homeland’...” A. Smith, 9. See also Bloom, Members, 2017, 153 (speaking of
indigenous belonging in the context of settler states).
1365 S. Dorman, ‘Citizenship in Africa’ in E. Isin and P. Nyers, (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship
Studies (Routledge 2014) 162.
258
determination of who could claim membership of these polities: the definition of who was a
citizen.” 1366
1365F
Post-colonial governments struggled to create an organizing principle to justify their
somewhat arbitrary borders and unify diverse populations. As this section showed, jus
sanguinis was sometimes applied in post-colonial states to lock immigrants out of a
nationality, even in diverse states with contested borders. This process happened rapidly
after decolonization to the bewilderment of many border populations.
As the examples showed, it was arguably used to cement loyalty to the centralized state at
the expense of regional, or cross-border forms of social organization. This was devastating
for nomads, who frequently found themselves straddling borders and, due to the theory of
exclusive allegiance, forced to settle in one state in order to satisfy the requirements of
nationality. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the original rational for jus sanguinis as
way to maintain cultural cohesion in the face of immigration has given way to its use as a
tool to deny a nationality to unwanted minorities.
In the cases of the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut, there is an ethnic and religious dimension to
their claimed outsider status and discriminatory application of nationality law and
registration procedure. For the Bedouin, discrimination occurred along tribal lines, though
even Bedouin granted a nationality ended up with a lessor status and fewer rights.
Discrimination against nomadism as a way of life appears to be a primary motivator for
nomad statelessness and is well documented in all the examples cited.
The rationale for jus sanguinis is that a population centred on a homeland has a special
connection to that land and the right to exclude outsiders. But it was unclear in the 1960s,
for example, what it meant for there to be a Malaysian nation centred on a Malaysian
homeland. Malaysia was a new construction put together out of colonial administrative
units, splitting older empires and joining territorial areas that had historical ties, but were
not contiguous. As Part 2 discussed, post-colonial governments in Kuwait, Mali and
Malaysia therefore began appealing to romantic nationalism in an attempt to unify postcolonial states based on arbitrary borders. Jus sanguinis was arguably an important tool to
shape post-colonial populations.
It is important to note that in some ways, jus sanguinis reflected local modes of belonging
that had existed prior to colonization. It brought in elements of belonging that were
common in Islamic legal systems and local custom prior to the colonial period, principles
that could have been helpful to nomads. But because the creation of a first body of
nationals had been based on territorial considerations and exclusive belonging, jus
sanguinis laws in actual fact failed to promote continuity with the systems of belonging of
before and simply perpetuated the rupture with pre-colonial, nomadic systems of
belonging. In fact, jus sanguinis simply served to lock many nomads out of a nationality
once the initial period for registration had closed. Jus sanguinis was applied in many postcolonial states despite the fact that the underlying rational for jus sanguinis, outlined above,
1366
Manby, Trends, 172.
259
the need to protect the indigenous, cultural nation from immigrant populations, was not
applicable in many post-colonial contexts and instead, jus sanguinis was frequently used to
exclude minorities who had been present in the region for centuries.
Nomads and Natural Resources
Though not originally a topic of this dissertation, the correlation between land use issues,
the seizure of nomad lands by the state, and nomad statelessness could not be ignored.
Control of nomad lands and the natural resources therein has emerged as a major cause of
the disenfranchisement of nomads and former nomads through the denial of the claims to
land. 1367 Critically, however, as the examples showed, the granting of nationality has not
resulting in protections for nomad lands. Rather, civil registration has often been used as a
tool to remove nomads from their lands to make way for eminent domain. In other cases,
nomad statelessness has correlated closely with their forced removal from land.
1366F
As the section on nomads and natural resources showed, in the decades following
decolonization, oil, natural gas, and minerals would only become more valuable, while
international tourism would push the creation of national parks in so-called remote areas
inhabited by nomads in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This discouraged states from solving
the problem of the nationality status of nomads, as doing so would arguably justify nomad
claims to land, call into question the placement of borders and potentially provide a
platform for separatism. The push to claim natural resources has caused conflict and
refugee flows in Kuwait, Mali and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia. 1368
1367F
The exclusion of nomads occurred during a period of radical economic transformation that
greatly weakened the role nomads played in the regional economy and corresponded with
a massive decrease in mobility in parts of the world that had once been typified by mobile
lifestyles. As a result of resource extraction, nomad lands, rather than nomad livelihoods,
became vital to the economic security of the emerging states in the post-colonial period.
Nomads increasingly found nomadism to be economically superfluous to the broader state
economy.
Meanwhile, oil, gas, gold, tourism and other uses for land exploded in value. States began to
see border control as a greater good than the economic boost that used to be brought by
regional trade. As Manby points out in the African context, statelessness, migration,
colonial policy, conflict and “land expropriation” are “linked” in many parts of Africa. 1369
Lands deemed valueless during the colonial period, existing as the furthermost outposts of
vast empires and, as a result, somewhat overlooked by distant colonial governments, were
1368F
For other examples of nomad land seizures, see the eviction of the San from the Central Kalahari Game
Reserve in Botswana in 2006. F. Ogbuitepu, ‘Realising indigenous peoples’ rights: The case of the Kalahari
Bushmen of Botswana’ (Consultancy Africa Intelligence 2011).
1367
UNHCR points to refugees as being one of the main populations at risk of statelessness. UNHCR, ‘Ensuring
Birth Registration for the Prevention of Statelessness: Action 7,’ (Good Practices Paper 2014).
1368
1369
Manby, Trends, 172.
260
now central to the economy of post-colonial states, the generators of extreme wealth and in
need of protection from neighbouring states, criminal migrants and other threats.
While nomadic trade could accommodate a wide variety of land uses, from farming to
pastoralism to fishing, resource extraction requires centralized control and massive, stateowned infrastructure. Likewise, tourism requires state control. Nomadism went from an
activity which generated wealth from areas not suitable for agriculture to a hindrance to
massive state-owned programs for resource extraction and security. 1370Any potential land
claims by nomads or former nomads are not even raised as possible topics for discussion.
Nomads and former nomads are instead branded as illegal foreign immigrants and a
security threat. “Investing in mechanisms that enable the conversion or reversion of risky
people to the status of foreigner simplifies the equation of state security...” 1371
1369F
1370F
As the examples showed, efforts to settle nomads often went hand-in-hand with removing
them from land. Nationality was often used coercively to force nomads to abandon their
lands and settle in urban housing projects or towns in exchange for a status. 1372 This
occurred in Kuwait, where many Bedouin were encouraged to relocate to urban housing
projects, clearing desert areas and providing the state with a workforce. In Mali, many
Tuareg were forcibly settled as part of a push towards increased agriculture. In Sabah,
many Sama Dilaut were encouraged to settle in coastal towns.
1371F
Sometimes, cooperative populations would be granted a nationality, often limited in scope,
in exchange for their assimilation. This was the case for some Bedouin in Kuwait and some
urban Tuareg and Sama Dilaut. As the Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant
Pastoralists pointed out, the nationalization of nomadic lands has been a widespread,
global problem. 1373 As a result, there has been little incentive for governments to resolve
the undetermined status of nomads by granting them a nationality, which might trigger
land ownership claims and/or claims for territorial autonomy.
1372F
Not only would such programs become regular practice for post-colonial governments,
they have also been supported by international organizations as part of economic
modernization. Views of state formation, nationality policy, legitimacy and control in the
modern period would be merged with environmental and land management theories that
disfavoured pastoralism and nomadism in favour of settlement. 1374 As Dawn Chatty puts it,
1373F
Scott, 2009, 11. See also Chatty, Adapting, 15. See also Clifton et al., 83 (Discussing the impact of the
creation of the Coral Triangle Initiative, a massive conservation zone, on Sama Dilaut statelessness.) See also
Accialioli et al., 240-244.
1370
A. Macklin, ‘The Securitization of Dual Citizenship’ in T. Faist and P. Kivisto, Dual Citizenship in Global
Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship (Palgrave MacMillan 2007) 42.
1371
1372
Bloom, Members, 2017, 167-168.
Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists, La Granja, Segovia, Spain (14 September
2007).
1373
As discussed above, nomadism and nomadic land use and social structures became the subject of
extensive anthropological study during the 20th century. See for example Sack 27, 56-57, 66 (discussing
1374
261
“(d)evelopment plans aimed at nomadic pastoral populations in the Arabian Peninsula and
Fertile Crescent have meant, as a rule, projects to settle them.” 1375 In many ways, these
programs mirrored those of colonial administrations as discussed in Part 2, and often used
the same tactics to achieve similar goals. They have been continued, for example in
northern Mali, where EU aid has now been tied to border security and an end to crossborder movements.
1374F
Nomads and Border Control
Nomadism is most recently associated with a particular threat: terrorism. 1376
1375F
A new factor that was less present during the colonial period, but helped to shape
nationality enforcement in the post-colonial period, was borders. Many nomads were now
living in contested border zones. 1377 The post-colonial period arguably represents the
largest case of succession of states in modern history, a widely acknowledged risk factor
for statelessness as it involved the breakup of large colonial units into smaller states and
the creation of numerous border disputes worldwide which raise the risk of
statelessness. 1378
1376F
1377F
Borders, which had either been politically unimportant or non-existent during the colonial
period, were suddenly held out as inviolate, splitting many nomadic groups who had ended
up in border regions. As well, mobile modes of life did not fit within the centralized political
structure being imposed on previously fluid regions, a structure that was heavily territorial
in nature, comprised of circles and arrondissements in the case of French colonies, and was
set up, at least in part, to restrain mobility. As Part 2 showed, the goal of establishing
exclusive, territorial sovereignty, clear borders and the exclusive allegiance of the
population would be inherited by post-colonial states, when they would become even more
important. 1379
1378F
territoriality); Khazanov, Outside, 10, 228-231 (discussing nomadic statehood); Jackson and Smith,
‘Ownership or Tenure? A Case Study,’ in M. Relaki and D. Catapoti (eds.) An Archeology of Land Ownership
(Taylor and Francis 2013) 154 (using the term land tenue for nomads); J. Nicolaisen and I. Nicolaisen The
Pastoral Tuareg; Ecology, culture and society, Volume Two (Thames and Hudson 1997) 204 (on Tuareg land
ownership); Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 106-107; Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 132 (discussing Tuareg land use);
Chatty, Pastoralists, 81.
1375
Chatty, Pastoralists, 1.
1376
N. McDonell, The Civilization of Perpetual Movement: Nomads in the Modern World (Hurst 2016).
See for example Manly, 2014, 108, citing ‘UNHCR, Action to Address Statelessness: A Strategy Note’
(March 2010) para 35.
1377
See the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the
Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa, (May 2017).
1378
“History, tradition, and, above all, the circumstances under which the state is created and its legitimacy is
maintained – all contribute to the way citizenship is conceptualized and put into practice.” Longva,
Citizenship, 197. See also Kasaba, 5-6.
1379
262
As was pointed out in above, nomads often came to inhabit the border zone between states,
as colonial borders were drawn through areas the European empires found less useful to
them at the time. Large cities on the coasts or located within fertile, farming regions,
became the capitals of post-colonial states. So-called remote areas away from cities and
agricultural regions remained marginalized. The defence of borders would become, if
anything, of even greater concern to post-colonial governments over time. For nomads, it
meant that for the first time, they would clearly and unequivocally have to fall under the
exclusive sovereignty and assert exclusive belonging to one state, even in cases where their
territories and traditional trading relationships spanned what were now multiple states
and multiple governments.
Some experts speak of cross-border movement as a modern phenomenon, 1380 but this was
not the case in nomadic regions and trade-based societies. Yet due to the securitization of
many borders, nomadism is now presented as an anomaly and a threat. Governments have
equated nomadism in northern Mali and coastal Sabah in particular with crime, terrorism,
people smuggling and insecurity, branding the regional trade that is the economic
contribution of nomadism as a threat to national security. As a result, populations who
remain nomadic find themselves increasing cast not as unregistered, rural nationals of the
state, but as criminals not deserving of nationality because they are a danger to the
state. 1381 As a result, the exclusion of nomads goes far beyond that of many rural,
unregistered populations.
1379F
1380F
Nationality policy in the modern era has become linked to controlling cross-border
movement. As Pilgram notes in the EU context, “security concerns...and issues of
immigration control play a part in the design of citizenship regimes.” 1382 With time, nomad
mobility was increasingly inflated with migration, supporting the idea that nomads were
not part of the population of the state, but were instead criminal transients. “Militarisation
and criminalisation are defensive responses which states use to reassert their sovereignty
in the face of transnational migrations.” 1383 Nomads became increasingly criminalized as
stateless persons and alleged foreigners.
1381F
1382F
Responses to nomadism in the post-colonial context in the decades following
decolonization therefore often fell on a spectrum between “benign neglect”, where
governments indirectly encouraged settlement as part of forced school attendance or to
facilitate the collection of taxes, and “radical government intervention,” where pastoral
lands were perceived as ripe for agricultural and resource development and forced
1380
Benhabib, 23.
1381
For a discussion of statelessness resulting from perceived risks to the state, see Gibney, 2014, 54.
Pilgram, 9. See also P. Cole, ‘Introduction: ‘Border Crossings’ - The Dimensions of Membership’ in G.
Calder, P. Cole and J. Seglow (eds.) Citizenship Acquisition and National Belonging: Migration, Membership and
the Liberal Democratic State (Palgrave 2010) 4.
1382
1383
Benhabib, 24.
263
removal, deportation or forced settlement are the stated goals of the government. 1384
Forced settlement was often used in tandem with the relocation of settled peoples to
formally nomadic areas, a process that Scott calls “internal colonization.” 1385 Galaty calls
such programs “moral disengagement of governments from the plight of the pastoral
populace...” 1386 While nomad settlement was also the result of globalization, urbanization
and technological change, as the examples showed, states also pursued deliberate policies
of exclusion and failed to take steps to resolve nomad statelessness in order to accomplish
or further state goals.
1383F
1384F
1385F
Finally, as the case of the Bedouin shows with particular intensity that nationality has often
not been a panacea for nomads, particularly when that nationality is decidedly second
class. Nationality has been frequently used as a tool for the assimilation of nomads and, in
particular, their forced settlement. This mirrors the ways in which registration during the
colonial period was used as a tool of assimilation. As Lindsey Kingston points out, a
“legalistic focus” can often ignore the “subtle realities” of nationality. 1387 In this case, the
problems with nationality for nomads surpass the subtle. Instead of ensuring rights,
nationality has been used as a tool to achieve state goals like forced settlement and the
removal of nomads from land. This issue touches on the question of “functioning
citizenship” for nomads, because nationality was often used not as a tool of empowerment,
but as a weapon of assimilation and the destruction of nomadic culture. Granting a
nationality to nomads has often resulted in their assimilation and the loss of nomadism as a
way of life.
1386F
1384 J. Galaty, ‘The Maasai Group-Ranch: Politics and Development in an African Pastoral Society,’ in Salzman
(ed.) When Nomads Settle (Praeger 1980) 158 (discussing the government occupation and development of
pastoral lands in the African and Middle Eastern contexts).
Scott, 2009, 12. See also Minority Rights Group International, ‘State of the World’s Minorities and
Indigenous Peoples’ (2016) 25. (on the disastrous consequences of forced relocation and settlement on
indigenous and minority groups.)
1385
1386
Galaty, 158.
1387 Kingston, Worthy, 17-18. See generally Kingston, Stateless, 2014; Conklin, 196-202; Batchelor, 1998, 158;
Handbook, 2014 5; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 20.
264
2.4
The Bedouin, the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut Today
This section will summarize the nationality and statelessness of nomads today, exploring
their general human rights and their ability to access rights and services such as health
care, education and work. Some sources for this section are academic in nature, but nongovernmental reports, policy documents and news articles will be used to provide
statistics, up to date information or to explore the opinions of governments and other key
actors.
The Bidoon Today
Today, arguably no Bedouin nomads remain in Kuwait, though statistics on the Bedouin are
hard to establish. 1388 While all Bedouin in Kuwait are settled, however, many maintain
multiple residences, often in several different countries. 1389
1387F
1388F
For the former Bedouin, life is now very difficult.
The living conditions of most Bedouin are substandard at best. Both Jahra and
Sulabiya outside Kuwait City are highly populated with Bedouin living in small
concrete and aluminium structures, barely resembling a home. Furnishings are
limited, and many families sleep in one room on mats on the floor. 1390
1389F
The Kuwaiti government is increasingly concerned not only with the political issue of the
bidoon population, but also with the growth of so-called “tribal,” or Bedu, politics of the
naturalized population. 1391 The voting patterns of the Bedu have become an issue of major
1390F
Al-Nakib 1. Chatty notes that statistics on the remaining Bedouin in Arabia as a whole are difficult to
establish. Chatty, Persistance, 17 (citing Syria and Lebanon.) Beaugrand notes that nomadism continues in
northern Arabia. Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 69.
1388
Thanks to Dawn Chatty for her comments on this issue. See also Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 31.
See also Al-Nakib, 1.
1389
F. Diane, ‘Nameless, Faceless, Stateless: Bedouin of Kuwait Struggle for Identity’ The Arab American News
(January 5, 2011).
1390
F. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (Columbia UP 2014) 163,
166-167, 172. Kuwaiti politics is also dominated by concerns over the Shi’a population, but this is not as
relevant to the bidoon as the issue of Bedu politics.
1391
265
concern. 1392 The Kuwaiti government views the Bedu population, even those now long
settled and holding a nationality, with a degree of suspicion. 1393
1391F
1392F
Meanwhile, the government has yet to resolve the problem of the bidoon. At the present
time, Kuwaiti nationals remain a minority in their own country. 1394 Because the Bedu in
general are often equated with dangerous tribalism, 1395 the idea of enfranchising more
Bedu people is vigorously opposed by many Hathar. 1396 In 2000, under increased
international pressure, the government made a limited attempt to register some
bidoon. 1397 These efforts, however, ended up being mostly for show. Bidoon were required
to prove residence going back to 1965, which was impossible for most families. 1398 Those
who were able to register were issued not with a nationality, but with a “security card,” or
“green card,” attesting to their statelessness. 1399 The issue of whether or not bidoon are
“genuine Kuwaitis” has become so contentious that at one point the government proposed
genetic testing, a plan which was later abandoned as impossible. 1400
1393F
1394F
1395F
1396F
1397F
1398F
1399F
By branding the bidoon as foreigners, the Kuwaiti government has essentially removed the
moral justification for granting nationality to the bidoon and tried to transform the debate
from one over nomad inclusion to one over immigrant rights. Under these circumstances,
talk of eliminating statelessness through the nationalization of the bidoon is seen not as
rectifying a historical and legal gap, but as rewarding illegal immigration. The lack of clarity
over the historical role played by the Bedouin in Kuwait’s history continues to influence
how they are perceived and Kuwaiti politics continues to blur the distinction between
Negative and contradictory views of the Bedouin are not limited to Kuwait, but persist across the Arabian
peninsula states as governments have used forced settlement, exclusion, and neglect to assimilate or remove
so-called troublesome Bedouin communities. H. Gilbert, 2011, 8 (overview of the ways in which various
governments in the region have treated the Bedouin).
1392
Longva, Citizenship, 193. See also Donner, 137; Van Panhuys, 35; Verwhilgen, 53; Van Waas, Nationality,
32; Boll, 44-48.
1393
1394 See for example G. Okruhlik ‘The Identity Politics of Kuwait’s Election’ (Brookings Insitute Feb 8, 2012)
(accessed July 2020). Dawn Chatty’s notes commonalities among government responses to the Bedouin and
Bedu accross the region. Chatty, Pastoralists, 165-166.
Wehrey, 185, discussing government efforts to shut down tribal primaries. See also J. Etheridge, ‘Kuwaiti
tribes turn parliament to own advantage’ Financial Times (2 Feb. 2009).
1395
1396
See generally Okruhlik, 2012.
A. Shiblak, ‘Arabia’s Bidoon’ in B. Blitz and M. Lynch, Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship: A
Comparative Study (Oxford Brookes 2009) 89.
1397
Crystal 178. Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in
Kuwait (2012).
1398
Human Rights Watch, ‘Prisoners of the Past: Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness’ (June 13,
2011).
1399
1400
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 154.
266
nomad and immigrant. Today, the notion that bidoon are foreigners is firmly established in
the minds of Kuwaiti nationals and is largely accepted. 1401 Many bidoon, however, argue
they are original members of the Kuwaiti body politic and should receive a nationality,
while the government continues to reject this contention. 1402
1400F
1401F
As discussed above, the Kuwaiti government argues that many bidoon are immigrants who
have come to Kuwait in recent decades as economic migrants, people who are a security
risk due to their alleged ties to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other Arab states. As well, the
government increasingly views the bidoon community as a potential source of radical
Islamic terrorism, a new factor in the presentation of the bidoon. 1403 Ironically, over the
decades that many bidoon families have been permanently settled in Kuwait, the bidoon
have only seen the rhetoric against them as outsiders become more entrenched. In 2009, a
prominent Kuwaiti politician said that “true” Kuwaitis are the descendants of those who
lived inside the walls of Kuwait City and surrounding villages, not Bedu from the
desert. 1404
1402F
1403F
There is a misconception in Kuwaiti discourse today that the stateless or bidun
are people who came from somewhere else (Syria, Jordan, Iraq) and destroyed
their original nationality papers. 1405
1404F
As stated above, it is not the aim to argue over the origins of the Bedu who make up the
majority of Kuwait’s bidoon population. The costs of maintaining a stateless population
within its borders remains high. The number of bidoon in Kuwait may be as high as
100,000. The point of this section is to expose how current Kuwaiti policies have failed to
come up with a solution for the bidoon. In trying to limit access to nationality and balance
various interest groups by excluding those deemed to be problematic, the Kuwaiti
government has arguably further divided the population and worsened the very security
problems it was seeking to avoid.
The primary structural division — Kuwaiti versus non-Kuwaiti — splintered into
additional and equally problematic oppositions: Kuwaiti men versus Kuwaiti
women and their rights; bedu versus hathar; citizen versus bidoun; Muslims versus
Christians; and, let’s be honest, Sunni versus Shi‘a, too. 1406
1405F
The effect of statelessness on the lives of the Kuwaiti bidoon population has been
devastating. Bidoon status prevents many people from accessing their basic human
1401
Crystal, 180.
1402
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 29.
C. Beaugrand, ‘Biduns in the Face of Radicalization in Kuwait’ The Arab Gulf States Institute in
Washington (2015).
1403
1404
Al-Nakib, quoting Mohammed al-Juwaihel, 11.
1405
Al-Nakib, 13. See also Crystal, 174-175. But see, contra, Longva, Citizenship, 188.
1406
M. al-Nakib, ‘Unity Without Islamism in Kuwait’ Arab Times (July 1, 2015).
267
rights. 1407 Many live in poverty on the margins of Kuwaiti society with few services and
little ability to improve their circumstances. 1408 Bidoon cannot work except in the black
market, they cannot in many cases attend school or access state run health care. 1409
1406F
1407F
1408F
Repeated government promises to resolve the situation of the bidoon expose the difficulties
the bidoon community have had in advocating for their inclusion in Kuwaiti society. 1410 In
2011, bidoon began organizing for their rights, demonstrating against the Kuwaiti
government. The government so far has responded to riots with repression, tear gas and
arrests. 1411 The government points to the alleged high rate of crimes committed by bidoon
as a justification for viewing them as a security threat, though as Beaugrand points out, the
government frequently cites to the very “illegal” nature of the bidoon presence in Kuwait as
evidence of their criminality. 1412 The government also continues to cite their supposed ties
to Iraq and Saudi Arabia as evidence of their links to terrorism, criminality and foreign
invasion. 1413 In general, the issue of the bidoon in Kuwait is usually presented by the
government as being a security issue, akin to irregular migration. 1414 The rights of the
bidoon are now treated as part of the larger issue of migrant rights by both the Kuwaiti
government and the international community. 1415
1409F
1410F
1411F
1412F
1413F
1414F
In 2013, the government of Kuwait promised to grant a nationality to as many as 4,000
bidoon, but as of yet, few bidoon have benefited from this or other promised naturalization
proposals. 1416 The government has set up a central body to resolve the status of the bidoon,
the Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status, but as of yet, little progress has been
1415F
1407
Crystal, 176.
Z. Albarazi and L. van Waas, ‘Kuwait clamps down as stateless Bidoons call for citizenship’ (Tilburg
University 2014).
1408
Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in Kuwait’
(2012). For examples of the sorts of jobs occupied by bidoon, see Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 166167. For the experience of one bidoon, see Refugee Appeal No. 74467, No. 74467, New Zealand: Refugee
Status Appeals Authority, (1 September 2004).
1409
Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in Kuwait’
(2012).
1410
Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in Kuwait’
(2012). See also Lund-Johansen 1. Lund-Johansen discusses the reasons why it took so long for bidoon in
Kuwait to speak up about their status, citing fear, poverty, stigma, lack of unity, and lack of education.
1411
1412
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 191.
1413
Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 194.
1414
United Kingdom Home Office, ‘Country Information and Guidance Kuwaiti Bidoon’ (3 February 2014).
1415
1416
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 190.
S. Reynolds ‘Kuwait’s Stateless: Not Giving Up the Fight’ (Refugees International March 19 2014).
268
made. 1417 Only small numbers of applicants become naturalized Kuwaiti citizens each year
because Kuwaiti law limits the number of citizens that can be naturalized annually to 2000
and Kuwait usually does not meet even this low target. 1418 Most recently, the government
has pursued the idea of deporting the bidoon to the Comoros Islands. 1419
1416F
1417F
1418F
Nationality for the Bedouin has always been approached as a gift bestowed by the ruling
family on useful Bedouin in order to foster cohesion, balance out competing power-centres
amongst the Kuwaiti population, and cement loyalty to the Al-Sabah family, rather than as a
right under the law, as it is for so-called “original” Kuwaitis. This is a highly instrumentalist
approach to nationality. The passing of many decades has not weakened the historical
narrative that the nomadic origins of the Kuwaiti Bedu population justify their treatment as
foreigners.
Human Rights Watch, ‘Prisoners of the Past, Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness,’ (13 June
2011).
1417
Human Rights Watch, ‘Prisoners of the Past, Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness’ (13 June
2011).
1418
1419
Gulf News, ‘Kuwait Courts Comoros to Settle Bidoon Issue’ (1 June 2016).
269
The Tuareg Today
The involvement of some pastoralists in armed conflicts such as in northern
Mali has led to an emerging narrative of pastoralism as a security issue
(World Bank, 2014) or even the unhelpful perception that pastoralists are
terrorists (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). Such discourse feeds into the
existing stigmatization of pastoralists as the dangerous ‘Other’ and obstructs
efforts at establishing peaceful and productive relationships between
pastoralists and other groups. 1420
1419F
Unlike in Kuwait, many Tuareg remain nomadic or semi-nomadic. In 2009, there were
approximately 14.5 million nomads in Mali, including Tuareg, Arabs, Fulani and Moors. 1421
Crossing international borders continues to be difficult for the Tuareg. Despite liberal laws
supporting pastoralism, such as the Pastoral Charter, many Tuareg struggle to continue
their way of life.
1420F
While Malian legislation on international transhumance is fairly liberal,
Malian pastoralists face problems when attempting to cross international
borders. One of the major problems concerns the harassment of pastoralists
and the levying of informal taxes by the security forces. 1422
1421F
The basic questions of Tuareg inclusion and separatism are still unaddressed. In 2011, a
fresh round of fighting broke out in northern Mali, this time involving well-trained Tuareg
troops returning from Libya. Gaddafi had from time to time indicated his possible support
for an independent Tuareg state and Libya had become the de facto base of the
independence movement. 1423
1422F
In 2011, Gaddafi’s fall led approximately 2,000-4,000 heavily armed, well trained Tuareg
fighters to return to Mali, finding only squalid camps, simmering resentment on the part of
the non-Tuareg population, and few job prospects. The new rebellion benefited from the
training and weapons of the Libyan army and quickly advanced against poorly equipped
Malian troops. By 2012, the Tuareg resistance had managed to take over several key cities,
including Gao, and appeared to be pushing southward. Outrage at the Malian government’s
failure to equip and support its troops led to a coup in 2012, ushering a period of instability
1420
Leonhardt, 9.
République du Mali, ‘4eme recensement général de la population et de l’habitat de Mali’ (2009, published
2011).
1421
1422
Leonhardt, 46.
1423
Keenan, Resisting, 219, 226-227.
270
that led to Mali being suspended from the African Union and asking for French military
support. 1424
1423F
By 2012, the Tuareg resistance movement had been taken over by foreign funded Islamic
organizations, many with roots in Algeria and Libya. 1425 The connection between the
rebellion and Algeria and Libya fuels southern suspicions that the Tuareg rebels are foreign
agents. 1426 Throughout this period, the Malian government’s view that the Tuareg
constituted a national “problem” and a security threat only strengthened. Now, instead of a
breakaway province, the government feared a Tuareg takeover.
1424F
1425F
With French support, the Malian army drove the rebellion back, but returned to treating
northern Mali as a police state occupied by hostile foreigners. 1427 The recent upsurge in
drug trafficking by Colombian cartels through Mali has only fed the view that the Tuareg
are bad for security. 1428 The imposition of conservative Islamic law in northern Mali
radically altered life for people living there and caused yet more displacement. 1429
1426F
1427F
1428F
Many Tuareg see their future in Mali as bleak, and the peace in neighbouring Niger as
fragile. The issue of cross-border movement, and the attendant pressures on land and
resources, continues to be a point of contention. 1430 Government policy is oriented towards
preventing Tuareg returns, forcing or coercing settlement and denying Tuareg land
ownership.
1429F
UNHCR estimates that hundreds of thousands of people are refugees in neighbouring
countries, while tens of thousands more are internally displaced within Mali. In 2012,
UNHCR noted that lack of documentation is a major issue for Tuareg refugees. 1431 In
refugee camps, UNHCR has been conducting camp registrations and issuing families with
refugee cards, yet serious gaps persist. In Libya,
1430F
1424
Stewart, 37-38.
1425
Pezard and Shurkin, 1, 6.
1426
Pezard and Shurkin, 6-7.
1427 Integrated Regional Information Networks, ‘Can Niger offer Mali lessons on the Tuareg?’ (11 April 2013)
(accessed July 2020).
Vulnerabilities 5. See also Bourgeot, Sahara, 45; A. Donini and G. Scalettaris, ‘Planning from the Future:
Component 2: The Contemporary Humanitarian Landscape: Malaise, Blockages and Game Changers; Case
Study: Regional Humanitarian Challenges in the Sahel’ (Kings College London, Feinstein International Center,
Humanitarian Policy Group April 2016) 4.
1428
Integrated Regional Information Networks, ‘Burkina Faso-Mali: We cannot live under the law of
strangers,’ (3 October 2012) (accessed July 2020).
1429
1430
See generally Kohl, Ines, and Fischer.
1431 Integrated Regional Information Networks, ‘Libyan minority rights at a crossroads,’ (24 May 2012)
(accessed July 2020), noting the statelessness of Tuareg who arrived in Libya in the last 50 years.
271
(t)he UNHCR identified as many as 25,000 primarily nomadic Tuareg in the
southwest who had been living in the country for several decades but held no
citizenship documentation. The UNHCR estimated the number of potentially
stateless Tuareg and Tebu (another nomadic group) during the year as high as
100,000 and that approximately an additional 50,000 persons were at risk of
becoming stateless. 1432
1431F
As refugee children in Mauritania do not receive birth certificates, lack of documentation
among Malian refugees in Mauritania is only being compounded. 1433
1432F
As well as struggling to obtain civil documents outside of Mali, Tuareg refugees struggle to
return. In 2014 and 2016, bilateral treaties were signed between Mali and Niger,
Mauritania and Burkina Faso for the return of Malian refugees to Mali. 1434 In 2013, UNHCR
facilitated the return of 2,000 Tuareg refugees to Mali, issuing them with travel documents
and facilitating their registration with the Malian authorities. 1435 But as of 2015-2016,
UNHCR was still struggling to promote safe return for refugees to northern Mali. 1436 Some
Malian Tuareg have been able to return, but the situation in northern Mali remains so
unstable, many are not ready to go back. 1437
1433F
1434F
1435F
1436F
As a result, is likely that for many Tuareg returnees, UNHCR refugee cards are the only
official documentation they have. UNHCR notes that the rates of documentation of returned
refugees is unknown. More research is needed to uncover the extent of Tuareg
documentation, or lack of documentation, today. 1438 Mali has recently created a
1437F
US Department of State, ‘US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Libya’ (2013). As a
recent IDMC report notes, better data is needed. IDMC, ‘2016 Africa Report on Internal Displacement’
(December 2016).
1432
1433
1434
UNHCR, ‘Global Report 2013, Mauritania’ (2013) 2.
Offermann, 58.
It is important to note that much of the information on Tuareg civic participation and civil registration
comes from UNHCR. UNHCR, ‘Global Report 2013, Mauritania’ (2013) 1 (accessed July 2020).
1435
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Mali Situation: UNHCR Regional Update, December 2015 – February
2016,’ (February 2016).
1436
UNHCR Niger Factsheet (March 2014) (accessed July 2020). See also Refugees Deeply, ‘In Limbo: Malian
Refugees in Burkina Faso’ (20 April 2016) (accessed July 2020).
1437
A. Donini and G. Scalettaris ‘Planning from the Future: Component 2: The Contemporary Humanitarian
Landscape: Malaise, Blockages and Game Changers; Case Study: Regional Humanitarian Challenges in the
Sahel’ (Feinstein International Center April 2016) 27 (noting that lack of documentation makes it difficult for
UNHCR to identify and categorize beneficiaries.) See also, Manby, Citizenship, 2018; Z. Albarazi and L. van
Waas, ‘Statelessness and Displacement Scoping Paper’ (Norwegian Refugee Council and Tilburg University)
21, quoting the Norwegian Refugee Council Mali office. The dispossession and exclusion of Tuareg in northern
Mali, along with their lack of documentation, is only part of a larger, regional problem of stateless nomads
living throughout West and North Africa, an extensive human rights violation that is only now being
1438
272
commission to study the issue of statelessness in Mali, 1439 but violence in northern Mali
makes a survey of Tuareg documentation extremely unlikely. As the UNHCR Mali office put
it in a report,
1438F
L’identification des personnes apatridies, ainsi que les causes et les
conséquences de la problématique reste un inconnu pour le HCR et le
Gouvernement malien. Le processus de la documentation des Maliens de la
diaspora reste imprécis et méconnu. (The identification of stateless people,
as well as the causes and consequences of the problem remain unknown for
UNHCR and the Malian government. The process of documentation for
Malians and the diaspora remains imprecise and badly known.) 1440
1439F
The implications of the lack of documents and contested nationality of many Tuareg in Mali
are very serious and go right to the heart of Malian politics and statehood. As one UN aid
worker pointed out:
The fact that displaced people and refugees will not be able to vote (in the 2013
election) will play into the hands of separatists who do not recognise the Malian
state. In the worst-case scenario, the National Movement for the Liberation of
Azawad will be able to claim that a low voting rate in the north is proof that the
region does not recognise the Malian state. 1441
1440F
UNHCR attempted to arrange for out-of-country voting for Malian refugees, including
Tuareg, but the program was not implemented by the Malian government. 1442 According to
UNHCR, out of about 173,000 refugees in neighbouring countries, only 10,300 were on the
voter registries, and only about 1,220 actually voted. 1443
1441F
1442F
To vote, eligible refugees needed to present a biometric ID card (NINA card)
with their details. They also needed documentation showing their names and
photographs on the electoral lists. Many had one or the other, but not
both. 1444
1443F
publicized. L. van Waas, ‘Tilburg University, Statelessness Program, The Stateless Tebu of Libya?’ No.
010/2013 (May 2013).
Mali, Décision No. 2014-0191/MJDH-SG, Création d’un comité interministériel sur l’apatridie (17
November 2014.)
1439
1440
UNHCR, ‘Mali: Population Planning Group’ Global Focus Webpage (2016).
A. Smith, ‘Mali Election: thousands of displaced people face exclusion from vote’ The Guardian (26 July
2013).
1441
H. Caux, ‘UNHCR helps prepare for refugees to vote in Mali elections, voices concerns over voter
registration’ UNHCR (23 July 2013).
1442
1443
See generally Caux, 2013.
1444
See generally Caux, 2013.
273
Many were not able to vote in 2018 as a result. 1445 As one UNHCR staff member pointed
out, voting was “a sign of renewal, a sign of reconciliation,” 1446 but it is also a sign of the
potential political power of the Tuareg as a group and what role they may play in Malian
politics. Voting is also a sign of political inclusion and a way to prove membership in Mali.
Malian Arabs and Tuaregs felt deeply ambivalent about voting in Mali’s elections in 2013,
though many saw voter registration as a way to get vital documents.
1444F
1445F
Some of those who have registered told Al Jazeera that their real motive is to
acquire Malian national ID cards that would hopefully facilitate their
movement across the border and within Mali and help them revisit their
families back home. 1447
1446F
The issues of voting, registration, land ownership and the right to cross the border are
therefore entwined, part of the larger debate over Tuareg inclusion, as can be seen by
controversy over the electoral rolls in the election of 2018. 1448
1447F
Currently, northern Mali resembles a failed state, the project of Tuareg incorporation into
Mali remains a failure, but there is little hope of a political solution for the time being. What
had started as a poorly organized uprising in the newly independent Mali of the early
1960s had morphed into an international war over territory between Algeria, Mali and
Libya, with the Tuareg caught in the middle. 1449 The status of the Tuareg therefore must be
seen in the context of armed conflict, separatism and refugee flows, while the basic
question of whether there should be a Tuareg state remains unaddressed. 1450
1448F
1449F
The militarization of specific areas — northern Mali and the Lake Chad region in
particular — is seen as further testing the social contract between the population
and ineffective and distant governments and as a challenge for humanitarian
access. 1451
1450F
UN News Service, ‘Ahead of polls, UN urges Mali officials to expedite electoral procedures for refugees’
(23 July 2013). Interviews, fall 2019, Abidjan.
1445
1446
Caux, 2013.
1447 M. Vall, ‘Anger in refugee camp ahead of Mali vote: Refugees on Mauritanian border with Mali are angry as
they have yet to get IDs ahead of crucial elections’ (Al Jazeera 14 August 2013). Tuareg and other nomads also
lack of registration and identity documents in Libya. Integrated Regional Information Networks, ‘Libyan
minority rights at a crossroads,’ (24 May 2012). Many Tuareg in Libya do not possess a family booklet or any
other identity documentation. See also Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless
Persons, ‘Libya: Nationality, Registration and Documents’ (December 2014) 11.
L’essor, « Le ministre Ag Erlaf à propos du processus électoral : « il n’y a qu’un seul fichier pour les
élections générales de 2018 » » Maliweb (25 July 2018) (accessed July 2020).
1448
1449
Human Rights Watch, ‘Mali: New Abuses by Tuareg Rebels, Soldiers,’ (7 June 2013).
1450
Manby, Citizenship, 116.
1451
Donini and Scalettaris, 19.
274
Meanwhile, European states have fed the view that the issue of Tuareg belonging is one of
border security. Ending migration and drug trafficking are the primary goals in the
region. 1452 This has completely side-lined the underlying question, unresolved since
colonial independence in the middle of the 20th century, of whether or not the Tuareg
require their own state, or whether a different political solution can be found. 1453
1451F
1452F
“Azawad is a dream,” as a Tuareg man from Niger once put it. 1454 Understanding the
exclusion of the Tuareg in Mali requires an acknowledgement that the question of Tuareg
nationality ultimately revolves around the question of Tuareg separatism. 1455 Today, many
Songhai believe they are the original owners of the Niger Bend region, while the Tuareg are
so-called foreigners from north Africa, a viewpoint which has only been encouraged by
successive Malian governments. 1456 “It appears that the Malian government considers the
recognition of indigenous peoples as a threat for the national unity.” 1457
1453F
1454F
1455F
1456F
1452
Donini and Scalettaris, 20.
1453
L. Senghor, ‘Balkanization ou Federation?’ in Afrique Nouvelle (December 1956.)
Integrated Regional Information Networks, ‘Separatists and Skeptics: refugees divided on future of
northern Mali,’ (19 May 2014).
1454
The 2015 Agreement of Peace and Reconciliation has again opened up the possibility of peace in northern
Mali. But the agreement has been criticized as vague on specifics about how to insure greater political
participation by the north in the Malian government.
1455
1456
Bourgeot, Résistances, 356.
L. Ag Aly, ‘The rights of the indigenous peoples to self determination: Attempts to address the violation of
human rights with specific reference to Mali’ (2010) 42.
1457
275
The Sama Dilaut Today
Today, the Sama Dilaut continue to suffer from movement restrictions, lack of
documentation and the presumption that they are naturally stateless. 1458 As non-nationals
the Sama Dilaut have been subjected to a number of development and modernization
programs encouraging settlement and circumscribing their movement without recourse to
the courts to challenge such programs or without laws protecting them as a group. 1459
National parks are created around their traditional ocean regions without their input and
without compensation, while their culture and languages go without protection. As a result,
statelessness contributes to the destruction of Sama Dilaut culture and way of life.
Nowhere is the conflict over the status of the Sama Dilaut as an indigenous group and the
government of Malaysia more apparent than in the creation of national maritime parks.
1457F
1458F
Yet, there is evidence that granting a nationality to the Sama Dilaut might accelerate
assimilation and settlement. 1460 In Indonesia, other sea nomad groups are recognized as
nationals of Indonesia and have been relocated to settlements by the government, often
unsuccessfully. 1461 The aboriginal peoples on the peninsula have also been the targets of
an aggressive settlement program as part of the government’s stated goals of economic
development, environmental protection and land reform, though they are recognized as
nationals of Malaysia. 1462 Sarawak’s nomadic peoples have also seen forced settlement
with devastating health and cultural consequences, even when they have been recognized
as native peoples. 1463 As a result, it is not clear that nationality would help to prevent this
assimilation.
1459F
1460F
1461F
1462F
For a recent overview of movement restrictions as applied to the Sama Dilaut, see N. Stacey, G. Acciaioli, J.
Clifton, D. Steenbergen ‘Impacts of marine protected areas on livelihoods and food security of the Bajau as an
indigenous migratory people in maritime Southeast Asia’ (2017).
1458
1459
See generally Clifton and Majors.
1460
See generally Clifton and Majors.
G. Acciaoli (2001) ‘Archipelagic culture’ as an exclusionary government discourse in Indonesia, The Asia
Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 2:1, 1-23, 4. See also Brunt, Vulnerability, 11. Chou estimates that as much as
nineteen percent of the population of Orang Laut in Indonesia has been supposedly voluntarily relocated to
settled villages by the Indonesian government in the 1990s, out of a population of 5,000. Chou Orang i, 14,
107, 138. The government Of Indonesia has called sea nomadism “a misery” and has pushed for the
settlement of Orang Suku Laut. L. Lenhart, ‘Orang Suku Laut Communities at Risk: Effects of Modernization on
the Resource Base, Livelihood and Culture of the ‘Sea Tribe People’ of the Riau Islands (Indonesia),’ 5
Nomadic Peoples 67 (2002) 77-79.
1461
1462 Hooker, 244. See also Andaya, 306; Goh Beng Lan, ‘Dilemma of Progressive Politics in Malaysia: Islamic
Orthodoxy versus Human Rights’ in W. Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus
Press 2012) 306-307. Aboriginal peoples include the Semang and Senoi peoples.
1463
Goh Beng Lan, 307-308. See also Hooker, 245.
276
Importantly, however, some aboriginal peoples in Malaysia have used their status as
nationals to successfully advocate for their rights and resist coercive settlement and
government land grabs, 1464 tactics which are not available to the stateless Sama Dilaut.
While the aboriginal population in Peninsular Malaysia have been successful in claiming
ownership of their traditional lands as an aboriginal group, the Sama Dilaut are denied all
legitimate ownership of their traditional waters. 1465 Likewise, many groups in Sabah and
Sarawak, such as the Ibans, are recognized as nationals and have the right to own land,
though these rights are constantly under pressure from logging companies and national
infrastructure projects, such as dams. 1466 Despite enormous challenges, nationality for
some of Malaysia’s nomads and indigenous peoples has led to greater access to their rights,
especially through the courts, even as it has accelerated assimilation for others. 1467 What is
clear is that a nationality for the Sama Dilaut must not come in exchange for their
settlement and relinquishment of fishing rights.
1463F
1464F
1465F
1466F
The current population of Sama Dilaut is unknown, but in 2002, anthropologist Clifford
Sather published an article in the journal Nomadic Peoples stating that there were probably
only a few thousand Sama Dilaut still practicing nomadism around Sabah. 1468 Today, most
of the remaining boat nomads in Sabah are semi-nomadic, though exact statistics are not
available, and it is difficult to define nomadism precisely. Publishing in the late 1990s,
Sather believed there may have been fewer than 5,000 boat nomads left in Malaysia, living
alongside a much larger settled and semi-settled population. 1469 Today, Helen Brunt
estimates that "true nomadism” among the Sama Dilaut today is rare, though the numbers
are unknown. 1470
1467F
1468F
1469F
Most Sama Dilaut today are either settled or semi-settled, spending at least a portion of
each year on islands such as Pulau Bum Bum or in pile-house villages, such as Bangau
Bangau village off the coast of Semporna town. 1471 The link between statelessness, forced
settlement and so-called development programs for the Sama Dilaut is similar to those
documented for the Tuareg and Bedouin, above. Meanwhile, like many post-colonial states,
1470F
1464
Hooker, 245.
1465 As Duraisingam points out, many aboriginal peoples lack birth certificates and are at risk of statelessness.
As a group, however, the Malaysian government has consistently recognized the aboriginal peoples as native
to Malaysia, in contrast with the Sama Dilaut, who are often treated as foreign. Duraisingam, 3.
1466
Hooker, 247.
1467
For a survey of native and aboriginal land rights court cases in Malaysia, see generally Bulan.
1468
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 23.
1469
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 3.
Brunt, Stakeholders, 27. Because the Sama Dilaut are stateless, their numbers are unknown, reflecting a
broader problem with quantifying both nomadic and stateless people discussed above in the introduction. I
am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this topic.
1470
1471
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 23. See also Ali, 159.
277
the governments of Malaysia and Sabah have struggled to unite disparate groups into a
single nationality, fuelling concerns over territorial unity and sovereignty and confusing
the issue over what it means to be indigenous to Sabah. 1472
1471F
Closely related to the militarization and centralized control of the ocean in Sabah’s border
regions, the securitization of immigration and registration in coastal Sabah means that
undocumented persons are treated as a security threat. In this way, the current situation of
the Sama Dilaut, while less extreme, resembles that of the Tuareg. As discussed above, the
association of the Sama Dilaut with alleged criminality, piracy and backwardness was a
hallmark of the colonial period. It has become a mainstay of Malaysian government policy
towards the Sama Dilaut. 1473 As in both Kuwait and Mali, lack of documents is now used as
evidence that the Sama Dilaut are themselves somehow illegal, rather than as evidence of
the failure of previous registration efforts and government policies. This occurs even when
the government sometimes acknowledges the part played by the Sama Dilaut in Sabah’s
cultural history. In echoes of the Kuwaiti government’s nostalgia for Bedouin history, the
statelessness of the Sama Dilaut persists even as they are marketed as a tourist
attraction.1474
1472F
As with the Bedouin and Tuareg, it is not so much that the Sama Dilaut are actually believed
to have no historic ties to the area that is now Sabah’s territorial sea, but rather that the
Sama Dilaut “do not have a homeland” in Malaysia. 1475 The idea of nomads as being
incapable of forming or taking part in territorial states, an idea adopted from the western
tradition as explained in Part 2, exerts a strong influence over discourse on the Sama Dilaut
in Sabah. As a result, the Sama Dilaut are simultaneously presented as a traditional group
for tourism purposes and as foreigners for the purposes of nationality.
As Acciaoli puts it, discussing the Indonesian context, the Sama Dilaut are “a people whose
continuing lifestyle on the water puts them in opposition to state priorities...”1476 As the
Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network puts it, “(t)he Sama Dilaut...are arguably some of the
most marginalized people in Malaysia...” and “a classic example of a protracted and inter-
Brunt, Stakeholders, 38. See also the Malaysia Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of
Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) Children in Sabah’ (2015) 4.
1472
1473
Eklof, 157.
For example, the Regatta Lepa promotes the “traditional” boat culture of the Bajau Laut sea gypsies. See
for example http://www.pulaumabul.com/regatta-lepa/ (accessed July 2020).
1474
1475
C. Majors and J. Swiecicka, ‘Missing the boat?’ Inside Indonesia (July 24 2007) (accessed July 2020).
G. Acciaoli, ‘”Archipelagic culture” as an exclusionary government discourse in Indonesia’ 2 Asia Pacific
Journal of Anthropology 1 (2001) 5 (Discussing state policy in Indonesia).
1476
278
generational statelessness situation.”1477 Undocumented Sama Dilaut today live in fear of
various government authorities, afraid of being arrested, detained or even deported. 1478
Despite their historical connections with the wider Sulu-Sulawesi region...many
Sama Dilaut now find themselves stateless and living in areas where resource use,
extraction and access are restricted by legislation. 1479
The experience of the Sama Dilaut in the decades following colonial independence has been
one of forced settlement, exclusion, marginalization and statelessness. They now form part
of an undifferentiated group of people of undocumented, or non-national, status, including
refugees and irregular migrants from the Philippines, living on the margins of Sabah
society.1480
Many land Bajau and other inhabitants of Sabah have negative views of the Sama Dilaut as
illegal immigrants, pagans and criminals.1481 As this section has argued, these perceptions,
which have greatly impacted the enactment and implementation of nationality in Sabah,
stem from the wider political context, where ownership of the ocean border zone is hotly
contested and extremely sensitive. The traditional migrations of the Sama Dilaut and their
association with the Philippines are causes for suspicion for the Malaysian government, as
well as the potential claims to territory that might be made by the Sama Dilaut themselves,
appears to threaten the Malaysian government’s absolutely ownership of the territorial
waters around Sabah.
In the Malaysian context, the Sama Dilaut are simultaneously a traditional people of north
Borneo and dangerous, illegal foreigners closely related to the influx of migrants from the
Philippines. Government hostility to the Sama Dilaut is closely related to the control over
territorial seas containing oil and natural gas that make up much of Malaysia’s wealth and
how the presence of sea-faring groups raises concerns over border security and the
sovereignty of the oceans. In particular, the situation of the Sama Dilaut exposes how the
question of indigenous status can be manipulated to perpetuate statelessness.
The typical position of the government can be seen by this quote from a local newspaper
“The Star”:
Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) Children in Sabah,
Malaysia’ (2015) 2.
1477
I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this point. See also H. Chiew, ‘Bajau Laut: Once sea
nomads, now stateless’ Malaysiakini (17 May 2019).
1478
1479
Brunt, Stakeholders, 30.
Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) Children in Sabah,
Malaysia’ (2015) 3.
1480
1481
Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 83, 87.
279
Another census on the Palau people or sea gypsies of Semporna will be done in
August amid allegations they act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of cross border criminals,
such as kidnappers.1482
Such statements echo the treatment of the Sama Dilaut and other seafaring, mobile peoples
as pirates by colonial authorities. As put by the former head of the Eastern Sabah Security
Command (ESSCom) (which was created in response to the 2013 incursion from the
Philippines); “(Sabah) is our birthplace, and that of our children. We do not want Sabah to
be colonised, destabilized and its sovereignty challenged by outside elements...”1483
In the words of one participant in a workshop in Sabah on the issue of conservation, “The
Sama Dilaut are not original people of Sabah. They are from the Philippines...They must
learn about religion, education and living in a house.” 1484 In the eyes of many Malaysians,
the Sama Dilaut are not an indigenous, native or aboriginal population, but rather a
“marginal group" of “questionable origin.”1485 This view persists despite the fact that the
Sama Dilaut are often held out as one of the traditional ethnic groups for tourist purposes
and presented as indigenous to outsiders.1486
Today, the rhetoric against the Sama Dilaut as criminals and outsiders feeds the perception
that despite their long-standing ties in the region, they are undeserving of nationality. The
Sama Dilaut are looked down upon as a so-called pariah people, despite their recent
attempts to assimilate by settling and converting to Islam. 1487 Indeed, as Sather points out,
the land-based peoples of Borneo were forever trying to explain the Sama Dilaut, giving
rise to several origin myths of the Sama Dilaut as a group who had been cast out of Islam
and regular society.1488
In 2015, Al Jazeera’s 101 East released a documentary on stateless children in Sabah,
including the Sama Dilaut. They focused on “water villages” settled by both Sama Dilaut and
Filipino migrants. “The authorities call some of these villages ‘black areas’ – hotspots for
drug dealers, insurgents and armed intrusion. Police have stepped-up operations to flush
1482
See for example The Star Online, ‘ESSCOM to hold another census’ (11 July 2015) (accessed July 2020).
1483 ESSCOM Times, ‘Unity Among ESSZone Coastal Communities Vital (28 Sept 2015). See also The Star,
‘ESSCom Keeping a Close Watch on Sabah’s Sea Gypsies’ (4 Feb 2015).
1484
Brunt, quoting a workshop participant, 37.
1485
Ali 157.
See for example the Malaysia government tourism website at http://blog.tourism.gov.my/the-regattalepa-colourful-and-excitement/ (accessed July 2020).
1486
1487
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 25, 35. See generally Clifton and Majors.
1488
Sather, Commodity, 2002, 36-37.
280
out illegal migrants, smuggling and drug dealing in recent months.”1489 The Sama Dilaut are
often mentioned in the same sentence in the media as pirates, criminals and Islamist
separatists...1490 Stateless Sama Dilaut are often blamed for any acts of cross border
criminality.1491 ESSCOM, the Sabah security agency, has taken a census of “water villages”
in ten Sabah districts in preparation for their relocation in order to cut down on crime and
improve security.1492 According to the census, “58%” of the water village population in
Sandakan are “aliens.” The debate around whether or not Sama Dilaut should receive
documents therefore centres round whether or not they originate from Malaysia or not,1493
an unhelpful framing in a region of recent, contested borders and a long history of
mobility.1494 This debate can be seen in local media, which frequently presents the Sama
Dilaut as coming from the Philippines, mis-characterizing the history explained in Part
2.1495
Recently, the issue of Sama Dilaut statelessness has become more prominent in Sabah.
Some NGOs have focused on the human rights of the Sama Dilaut. A review of current news
articles shows the diametrically opposed views of the Sama Dilaut as Malaysians whose
rights are being denied, often the view of non-profits and civil society groups, versus as
foreign infiltrators and criminals seeking to take advantage of Sabah’s weak civil
registration, often the view presented by various government agencies. 1496 At the time of
writing, UNHCR and various local civil society groups in the Philippines are looking at the
nationality status of Sama Dilaut settled in the Philippines. 1497 Information on the
movements of nomadic Sama Dilaut between the two countries, however, has been
impeded by armed conflict.
Today, immigration to Sabah has become one of the most contentious political issues in
Malaysia and has become a primary national security concern. For example, immigration to
Al Jazeera, ‘Meet Sabah’s Invisible Children’ (1 May 2015). See also New Internationalist, ‘Sabah’s
Invisible Children’ (8 May 2015) (accessed July 2020).
1489
J. Langenheim, ‘Blast Fishing in Borneo: bombs are quick, but they kill the coral reefs" The Guardian (1
July 2014) (accessed July 2020).
1490
1491
Brunt, Vulnerability, 36.
Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 357-358.
1492
1493
Ali, 162.
1494
Ali, 162.
Qin Xie, ‘Last of the sea gypsies: Fascinating images of the nomadic Borneo tribe who spend their lives on
the water’ (8 Feb. 2016) (accessed July 2020).
1495
1496 The Star Online, ‘Look into the Plight of the Sama Dilaut Urges NGO’ (7 July 2015) (accessed July 2020).
See also The Malay Mail Online, ‘Poor and Stateless: Sabah’s 50,000 undocumented children denied access to
education, health care’ (30 April 2015).
1497
SunStar Philippines, ‘CFSI validate Sama Badjaos status’ (2 Sept. 2017) (accessed 2020).
281
Sabah is managed by a separate federal agency from the rest of Malaysia, the National
Security Council of the Prime Minister’s Office, rather than the Department of Immigration.
Policy on irregular migration is managed by the Special Task Force for Sabah and
Labuan.1498 These moves have taken immigration out of the usual sphere of governmental
authority and placed it firmly within the orbit of the state security services.
The issues of irregular migration and border security have also become closely related to
that of documentation. In order to stay longer in Malaysia and avoid punishment,
imprisonment and deportation, some migrants allegedly purchase fake documents.1499 The
issue has been heavily reported in the media and, as a result, irregular migration has come
to be closely linked in the minds of many Malaysians to the issue of fake or fraudulent
identity documents.1500 Malaysia has strict visa requirements, particularly under the
Immigration Act of 2002, and often does not issue enough visas to meet demands. The laws
include harsh measures such as automatic deportation for pregnant workers, laws that
make life for temporary workers in Malaysia very precarious. This creates a market for
fake documents, though the actual extent of the problem is unknown.1501
For many Malaysians, however, the use of fake and fraudulent documents by some
migrants has led to the association of immigrants with criminals, so-called infiltrators,
terrorism and voter fraud.1502 In 2001, a court in Sabah nullified the 1999 election in Likas
neighbourhood due to alleged irregularities in the rolls and “phantom voters.”1503 The
association between a lack of documents, criminality, terrorism and voter fraud in Sabah
mirrors concerns in Kuwait and Mali, discussed above. 1504
In 2008, in an attempt to resolve the status of stateless persons in Sabah the government
issued temporary “green MyKads” to people with Malaysian birth certificates who did not
qualify for the “blue MyKad” given to nationals. The program was poorly administrated and
highly controversial, as it essentially branded stateless people with Malaysian birth
certificates as non-nationals with only temporary status.1505 This program bares a certain
1498
Kassim and Zin, 20.
1499
Kassim and Zin, 107.
1500
See for example The Star, ‘RCI Report: Who are the Illegals?’ (4 December 2014).
1501
Clark and Pietsch, 170.
1502 Sadiq, 108-109, 116-117. See also the ongoing debate over security, the MyKad and Islamic terrorism in
Sabah. Carruthers 2.
See also Lim Hong Hai, 116. See also Harris Mohd Salleh v. The Returning Officer, Ismail Majin & Ors (And
Another Petition) (2001) 3 CLJ 161.
1503
Oakeshott, 37-371. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to go too deeply into the connection
between statelessness and insecurity.
1504
Ali, 163. See also Malaysia Today, ‘Thousands register for green MyKad’ 19 Nov. 2008, at
http://www.malaysia-today.net/thousands-register-for-green-mykad/.
1505
282
resemblance to that of the bidoon in Kuwait. Most Sama Dilaut were left out of this
program, however, as it required a birth certificate.1506
So controversial has the matter of irregular migration and fake documents become, that the
Malaysian government convened a Royal Commission of Inquiry in 2012, tasked with
determining if any irregular migrants had been fraudulently issued IDs and, if so, if any had
voted.1507 The Commission also examined allegations that the population of Sabah has
increased at three times the rate of neighbouring Sarawak, and whether or not this was
part of a deliberate government program to shift the demographics in Sabah. In the press,
this alleged program to change the demographics of Sabah by increasing the Muslim
population is called “Project IC” or “Project Mahathir,” after the former Prime Minister Tun
Dr Mohamad Mahathir.1508 Many non-Malay Sabahans claim that fraudulent documents are
being sold to Filipino and other Muslim immigrants to increase Sabah’s Muslim population
and, by extension, the clout of the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO). 1509
While the Royal Commission did not find that NRD officers had acted inappropriately, nor
did they find evidence of a larger political project to affect voting in Sabah, they did
conclude that some IDs had been issued to non-citizens, usually because of incorrect
information given by village chiefs as to a person’s identity and ignorance of the proper
procedures by some NRD employees.1510 The report, while modest in its conclusions, is a
valuable record of public and local government opinion on immigration and documentation
in Sabah.
The report records the views held by local government officials in Sabah, who testified, for
example, that parts of Sabah are now majority Filipino and that “squatter communities”
were “hotbeds for illegal activities” and “bad for the environment.”1511 The view of
immigrants in the report is overwhelmingly negative, and again and again, Sabahans and
local officials link immigrants to criminality, environmental degradation and poor border
security. Recently, calls for a revamped ID card for nationals have gotten louder in Sabah,
with the Sabah4Sabahan movement.1512 In particular, these movements have grown in non-
1506
Ali, 163.
Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012). See also Holst 135.
1507
A. Carruthers, ‘Sabah ICs for Sabahans: Will it Help?’ Yusof Ishak Institute (2016) 4 (hereinafter
Carruthers).
1508
1509
Sadiq, 102. See also Brunt, Vulnerability, 2-3.
Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 305-308.
1510
Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 261-278, 314.
1511
1512
Carruthers, 5.
283
Muslim communities.1513 A counter-terrorism program begun in 2016 has again raised the
“perennial” issue of whether or not the government should issue new ICs, and if so, to
whom.1514 In 2019, Malaysia and Indonesia announced a new initiative to tackle the
statelessness of migrants and border populations.1515 It is not yet clear how this policy will
affect the Sama Dilaut.
Civil registration has also become a focus for international and regional organizations. On
the topic of birth registration, Malaysia has joined other governments in the region and the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific to “Get Everyone
in the Picture” by improving civil registration, including birth registration.1516 In
neighbouring Philippines, Bajau communities have recently benefited from birth
registration drives,1517 yet this has not been the case for the Sama Dilaut in Malaysia Even
as the region pushes for greater cooperation and trade and freedom of movement has
increased for certain segments of society, such as foreign workers who qualify under the
“smart card” program between Singapore and Indonesia, there has been a corresponding
increase in restrictions and reduction on mobility for “sea nomads,” irregular migrants and
other undesirable groups.1518
It is not the aim of this section is not to plunge into the debate on fake ICs in Sabah, but
merely to provide the context in which the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut is taking place.
IC fraud has been cited as increasing security threats to Sabah, including encroachment by
factions within the Philippines and potential Islamic terrorism.1519 The issue of Filipino
migrants in Sabah is particularly contentious, due, in part, to the ongoing border and
sovereignty dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines. But another view in Sabah is
that Filipinos are actually being encouraged by the federal government to come to Sabah to
increase the Muslim population.1520
1513
Carruthers, 6.
1514
Carruthers, 1.
See for example The Star ‘Malaysia, Indonesia to tackle Sabah stateless issue’ (24 Apr 2019) (accessed
July 2020).
1515
See the webpage of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ‘Get
Everyone in the Picture at http://www.unescap.org/news/governments-agree-steps-get-every-one-picture
(accessed July 2020).
1516
See for example the Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘Badjaos recognized through pilot birth registration’ (17
December 2019) (accessed July 2020). See also R. Lacuata, ‘Unlisted no more: Sama Bajaus in Zamboanga City
get birth certificates’ ABS-CBN News (10 Dec. 2019) (accessed July 2020).
1517
1518
Chao Riau, 251.
1519
Sadiq, 102.
1520
Navallo, 5.
284
These somewhat contradictory positions illustrate the opinions in Sabah today over the
role of immigrants in society. On the one hand, Filipino immigrants share a similar culture,
religion and history with many Sabahans. But on the other hand, local communities, fuelled
by media coverage, fear the social and economic impacts of continued immigration. These
concerns influence the question of Sama Dilaut belonging, as the Sama Dilaut are today
grouped by the media, local officials and many Sabahans, and even civil society groups, as
part of a larger problem of undocumented immigrants.
Statelessness has affected the lives of the Sama Dilaut in many ways. Stateless Sama Dilaut
children continue to lose out in terms of access to education and health care. 1521 Some of
the Borneo Child Aid Society’s learning centres for Sama Dilaut children have been closed
under protest of resources being spent on so-called non-Malaysian children.1522 When
Sama Dilaut do have documents, these are often regarded as forgeries, meaning that even
many Sama Dilaut with documents cannot claim their rights. While lack of registration and
documents among the rural poor in Sabah is presented as a technical problem that is the
responsibility of NRD to solve, rather than as a security or fraud issue, for the Sama Dilaut,
lack of registration is treated as a security issue.1523
Perhaps unsurprisingly after years of struggle for recognition and negative treatment by
successive governments dating to the colonial period, there is a great deal of mistrust and
confusion among the Sama Dilaut regarding registration. 1524 The arbitrary exclusion of
people from registration by NRD in the Borneo states continues to be a problem today, with
many activists calling for clearer rules and a more rigorous system. The Sama Dilaut are
often the victims of document scams in their desperation to obtain documents, paying
money to swindlers for documents that turn out to be fake, which are then used as further
evidence of Sama Dilaut criminality. 1525
Today, the Sama Dilaut are trapped in a cycle of marginalization and illegality whereby
their traditional lifestyle, migrations, fishing and culture are all branded as ipso facto illegal
and criminal by the state. Meanwhile, as pointed out above, statelessness enables the
government to restrict Sama Dilaut fishing and keep them out of tourist parks and oil fields,
impeding Sama Dilaut access to their traditional livelihoods and encouraging yet more
Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) children in Sabah,
Malaysia’ (23 March 2015).
1521
1522
Brunt, Vulnerability, 35.
NRD is using mobile registration clinics and the internet to get poor, disabled and sick people registered.
See for example the Borneo Post, ‘70,000 Late Registration Cases in Sabah’ (18 August 2013) (accessed July
2020).
1523
A. Unis, ‘Government Urged to Solve the Sama Dilaut Identity Issue, Says Analyst" Astro Awani (18 Sept
2013) (accessed July 2020). I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this issue.
1524
1525
Brunt, Vulnerability, 4.
285
settlement in what may be viewed as a continuation of colonial era policy towards the
Sama Dilaut.1526
1526
Ali 158.
286
Nomads Today
Part 2 ends with a discussion of the situation of nomads today. Statelessness and contested
nationality have had a devastating effect on the practice of nomadism. As the examples in
this dissertation explored, while a tiny minority of nomads continue to migrate across what
are now international borders, most nomads are now settled. This settlement took place
due to a number of interlocking factors, yet there can be no doubt that aggressive
government policy played a large part. Those who remain nomadic either within or
between countries face rampant exclusion and statelessness, alongside massive human
rights violations. Many nomads cannot access or own their lands, register or access
services. They face deportation, fines and imprisonment. Nomadism has been re-branded
by governments as dangerous criminal activity or terrorism. “To be stateless is, as we have
seen, typically to be dis-empowered.”1527
For those nomads who remain mobile, what cross-border movement continues today is
usually limited, or has been significantly transformed, by modern border restrictions. The
government has outlawed economically necessary migrations, which are now labelled
illegal. The fact that nomads and former nomads are undocumented is often used as
evidence of both their criminality and their foreign status.1528 As a result, modern nomads
are usually labelled as criminal foreigners by their states, rather than as nationals with
rights.1529 A large part of the problem is arguably that many states do not see the
nationality of nomads in human rights terms. Rather, as the examples showed, states see
the removal and regulation of nomads as an issue of national security and border control,
areas of competency that state sovereignty reserves exclusively for states.
Birth registration and the issuance of identification documents remains uneven in many
countries like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, heavily favouring settled, urban populations.1530
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that states increase birth
registration particularly for nomads, though, for example, mobile registration clinics.1531 As
the above section showed, however, rampant discrimination against nomads forms a
powerful barrier to nomads accessing many civil documentation programs.
1527
Gibney, 2014, 53. See also Arendt, 1976, 278.
1528
This issue is discussed in Handbook, 2014, 7.
While Part 2 focused on three case studies, this has been widely documented in other contexts. See
generally F. Caselliy, M. Morelli and D. Rohnerx, ‘The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars’, 130 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 267 (2015). See also M. Klar, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Holt
2002). See also D. Chatty, ‘Multinational Oil Exploitation and Social Investment: Mobile Pastoralists in the
Sultanate of Oman’ in D. Chatty (ed.) Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st
Century (Brill 2006) 496-516; Fabietti, 57.
1529
1530
1531
UNICEF, ‘Every Child’s Birth Right: Inequalities and Trends in Birth Registration’ (2013).
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Algeria, para 36, quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 161.
287
Evidence that nomads may have a legitimate claim to nationality is ignored or even erased.
When nomads interact with officials of the state, a presumption of non-nationality is
usually applied to nomads and former nomads. This occurs even in places like Sabah,
where the Sama Dilaut are simultaneously labelled criminals and foreigners while also
being celebrated as part of Sabah’s traditional culture. In fact, using nomads to claim land
or for tourism while denying them legitimacy for nationality and rights is present in all
three examples. The re-branding of nomads as foreign often goes hand in hand with claims
by governments of exclusive sovereignty over nomad lands.1532 As It is not clear the extent
to which nomad statelessness is driven by the desire of governments to exclusively control
nomad lands, but there is a strong correlation.
Today, nomadism continues to be characterized as problematic for the environment, such
as when the Sama Dilaut are criticized for blast fishing, even as state governments pump
millions of barrels of oil nearby and large fishing companies employ drag net fishing. While
the examples, above, did not delve into a great deal of detail about the environmental
impact of mass settlement programs and the conversion to a wage economy, disturbing
evidence exists that such programs, far from being for nomads’ own good, have actually
devastated sensitive, pastoral and fishing environments. In the case of the creation of Tun
Mustapha Park in Malaysia, one can see the preoccupation with nomads as being somehow
bad for the environment, pitting nomad rights against environmental protection. 1533
It is also important to note the negative role played by some academic discourse on the
subject of nomadism, which has frequently labelled the nomadic way of life as a problem or
barrier to development.1534 Rather than pushing for nomadic rights, most international
efforts in the 1960s and 1970s were actually geared towards eliminating nomadism as a
problem for post-colonial states, either on developmental, environmental or political
grounds. Current discourse too often focuses on the supposed links between nomadism,
Van Genugten et al., 2014, 102. The authors cite the example of Batwa living in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
1532
While this dissertation has focused on three specific examples, the environmental impact of international
development programs targeting nomads have been the subject of frequent, recent study. See for example C.
Hesse, « La création de richesses grâce à la variabilité de l’environnement: l’économie du pastoralisme dans
les zones arides d’Afrique orientale » in Pasteurs Nomades et Transhumants Autochtones (L’Harmattan 2010)
31. See also Hesse, 37-39.
1533
C. VerEecke, Nigeria’s Experiment with a National Program for Nomadic Education, (Ohio State U. 1989) 1,
(discussing the “problem” of nomad education in Nigeria); D. Morris and J. Francombe, ‘The Ngisipet and
trachoma prevention: Solving the Latrine Problem in Nomadic Tribes,’ (Community Eye Health 2007)
(discussing the “problem” of sanitation among nomads); A. Meir, ‘Delivering Essential Services to Arid Zone
Nomads,’ 4 Desert Development 132 (1985) (discussing the “problem” of delivering western development aid
to nomads); A. Meir, ‘Nomads, Development and Health: Delivering Public Health Services to the Bedouin in
Israel,’ 69 Geografiska Annaler 115 (1987) (discussing the “problem” of delivering health services to nomads
in Israel). See contra, J. Simel, « Le pastoralisme et les défis du changement climatique » in M. Jensen, Pasteurs
Nomades et Transhumants Autochtones (L’Harmattan 2010) 65, where, speaking of African pastoralists, he
states, « (b)eaucoup de personnes faisant partie de la société dominante actuelle, soit l’élite politique et les
décideurs, voient les pasteurs d’Afrique comme l’incarnation d’une société primitive qui s’oppose au
changement et au développement. »
1534
288
terrorism, smuggling and criminality. The impact of western development agencies,
including increased settlement and, in some cases, severe environmental degradation, were
highlighted, above, in all three examples.
The question of indigenous status for the former Bedouin, Tuareg and Sama Dilaut has
become weaponized, as the nomadic and mobile lifestyle is often used to justify the claim
that nomads and former nomads are immigrants and not indigenous. This has allowed
states to place them within the context of irregular migration to justify their continued
exclusion. In this way, modern debates over nomad nationality often mirror debates
stretching back to the colonial period, when a bias developed against nomads and, in some
places like the Sahel and the Sulu Sultanate, even prior to the colonial period. This bias
continued through the post-colonial period and continues to influence nomad-state
relations to this day.
Finally, nationality can bring important human rights protections for nomadic
communities, but it can also be used as yet another tool in the state toolbox to encourage
settlement and assimilation. For many nomads, receiving a nationality from the
government often meant giving up their rights to land, an exchange that hardly comports
with the modern view of the right to a nationality. It is therefore important that any
solution for nomad statelessness comports with their human rights and provides them
with solutions to upholding further rights.1535
For example, the granting of nationality will not resolve the issue of nomad education, but
it will provide nomads with a platform from which to advocate for culturally appropriate
schooling or the legalization of nomad livelihoods, economically necessary movement or
the use and protection of traditional lands, either through voting, legislation and/or the
courts.1536 Stateless nomads may not only be unable to attend school, but lose all authority
over the curriculum, meaning that schooling ends up being a weapon of assimilation, as it
was in Mali during the Keïta regime.1537
The question of nomad land rights, however, will likely remain a thorny one for many
nomadic groups, even where nationality is established and achieved. While Kingston is
right in pointing out that “legal status alone will not cure the social ills affecting the world’s
de jure stateless populations,”1538 nationality remains vital and irreplaceable for both
1535
Van Waas, Nationality, 218.
See for example the use of strategic litigation in obtaining Roma school desegregation. Open Society
Justice Initiative, ‘Strategic Litigation Impacts: Roma School Desegregation’ (Open Society Foundations 2016).
See also S. Pedersen, ‘The Coastal Sami of Norway and their rights to traditional marine livelihood’ 3 Arctic
Review on Law and Politics 51 (2012) 60.
1536
For more on the link between statelessness, assimilation and settlement of nomads and schooling, see H.
Alexander, ‘The Open Sky or a Brick and Mortar School? Statelessness, Education and Nomadic Children’ in
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ed.) The World’s Stateless Children (January 2017).
1537
1538
Kingston, Stateless, 133.
289
individuals and groups to enforce their rights and participate in the political process of
their states.
290
Conclusion: Some Root Causes of Nomad Statelessness
(I)n a world on the move, a fundamental openness is needed to what people
contribute to the communities in which they live and work. Citizenship or
nationality of a state…has thus become the basis for equal protection, solidarity and
a democratic voice in the norms by which citizens feel bound.1539
This dissertation explored three example groups to uncover some of the root causes of
nomad statelessness. While three examples cannot possible uncover all of the myriad
causes of nomad statelessness, they highlighted some important similarities in how
governments apply, or do not apply, nationality to nomads, as well as some of the driving
factors behind nomad statelessness. The examples explored above highlight the spectrum
of exclusion and discrimination faced by many nomads, including many important
differences between various groups, while also showing how similar are the circumstances
of many nomads today.
Perhaps the most significant cause of nomad statelessness uncovered by the above analysis
is the fact that the western system of nationality is inherently biased against mobility and,
therefore, does not fit well with nomadism. Heavily reliant on concepts like habitual
residence and exclusive allegiance, the system of nationality laws, borders and ID cards is a
poor match for the nomadic way of life. This bias against mobility and nomadism as a way
of life has left the door open to rampant discrimination against nomads.
Part 2 began with an overview of the three nomad groups used as examples. It explored the
nomadic way of life. It explained how nomads related to the pre-colonial kingdoms with
whom they had close relations. It showed that far from being outsiders, nomads were
important allies, competitors and subjects of pre-colonial kingdoms. It also showed the
importance of land to nomadic societies, demonstrating that nomads frequently had
sovereignty and control over their territories.
Part 2 went on to discuss the colonial period when nationality law was first developed in
Europe and applied, to a limited extent, in the colonies. Nationality laws were developed in
Europe during the feudal period. These laws almost universally privileged settlement,
exclusive land use and exclusive, centralized systems of government. Colonial
administrators gave little thought as to how European concepts like permanent residence
would be applied to nomads.
Colonization brought a number of structural changes that were very negative for many
nomads, of which nationality was one. During the colonial period, nomads were seen as
naturally stateless. The colonial period marked a long period of decline for nomads, with
colonial policy centralizing the state around urban centres and concentrating power with
settled rulers, even as it mythologized and romanticized some nomads. The colonial period
also divided many nomadic areas by borders, placing nomads at the periphery of colonies
1539
Hirsch Ballin, 2014, 65.
291
and setting the stage for their political division at decolonization. Nomads were often
administrated under separate systems from settled communities, and often placed under
military rule. While this may have appeared to give nomads more independence, it set the
stage for their supposed outsider status at decolonization.
The settlement of nomads became a major goal of many colonial administrators, fostering
distrust and resentment among many nomadic communities and beginning a period, which
continues to the present day, where registration and government services were linked to
settlement and assimilation. Critically, the power to issue documents and determine status
within a colony often vested with settled rulers, who became the governments of the postcolonial period. During colonization, nomads suffered a sharp decline in status.
At decolonization, the separation of colonies into individual states was accomplished
quickly and nomads found themselves divided by hard borders, living in what would now
become border zones. These contested border zones of foggy sovereignty would quickly
become flash points between governments, with nomads caught in the middle.
Decolonization also brought a sudden acceleration of the roll out of nationality law in
regions where nomads lived. The government in many of these new countries were the
same urban elites who had been handed vast powers under the colonial system. Nomads
were now placed under their jurisdiction, even in places like northern Mali, where many
Tuareg rulers wished to be independent.
While transitional nationality laws to create the first body of nationals in post-colonial
states appeared neutral on their face, in reality, vagueness as to the meaning of key terms
like habitual residence and the recent nature of many borders allowed for rampant
discrimination against nomads. The suddenness of this process of imposing European legal
systems on the colonies cannot be overstated. Within a decade, previous systems of
belonging, such as kinship and trade ties, were replaced by a system that focused
exclusively on residence and place of birth. Documents and registration became critical.
Importantly, nomads were often not granted the presumption of nationality, like other
rural peoples, but rather the presumption of foreign status, or even, in the most severe
cases, the presumption of statelessness.
Following this arbitrary and discriminatory transitional period, often lasting only a few
years, jus sanguinis was instituted in some countries. This was done even though the
borders of most post-colonial states were new and/or set by disputed, colonial-era treaties.
In majority Muslim countries, this use of jus sanguinis made cultural and political sense, but
following an arbitrary, discriminatory and incomplete transitional period, jus sanguinis
actually functioned to lock many minority groups out of a nationality, including many
nomads. Even in countries where the law provided for protections from strict jus sanguinis,
these protections were not applied to nomads due to ongoing discrimination.
For the Tuareg, inclusive nationality laws and prior nationality under the French system
should have prevent statelessness, but armed conflict and separatism has inhibited a
solution. The case of the Tuareg showed that questions over nationality and statehood can
sometimes devolve into armed conflict for nomads. The treatment of the Tuareg as enemies
292
of the state has meant that the Tuareg have not, in many cases, been able to take advantage
of civil registration and legal systems.
In the decades following decolonization, states missed multiple opportunities to regularize
the status of nomads, opting instead to pass ever stricter laws to exclude foreigners, a
category of persons that came to include many nomads and former nomads. This occurred
in tandem with the discovery of massive natural resources in “empty” nomad lands. While
causation cannot be established, there is high correlation between nomads being moved off
their lands and either statelessness or the granting of lesser nationality status.
One important observation of Part 2 is the fact that continued discrimination against
nomads, including in the granting of nationality, coincided closely with their relocation off
their lands. Many nomad lands have now been found to contain valuable natural resources
which were seized for the exclusive use of the state. While more research is needed, the
correlation between nomad statelessness, eminent domain over nomad lands, and
nationality in exchange for the abandonment of nomad lands to the state, either for oil and
mineral exploration or for national parks, should all warrant further investigation.
Instead of resolving nomad statelessness, many governments have simply re-branded
nomads as foreigners. The difference between mobility as a way of life and immigration
became increasingly blurred. Civil registration requirements have been tightened for
nomads, even as states took steps to provide documents to their unregistered rural
populations who are settled. Today, statelessness serves not as proof of the failure of state
civil registration policies, but instead as proof that nomads are criminals and lawbreakers.
Finally, it is important to note that Part 2 uncovered a serious problem with governments
using civil registration as a tool of assimilation. In working to end nomad statelessness, it is
therefore important to acknowledge that nationality should always be a human right and a
tool of empowerment, not a gift to be bestowed, or a weapon to coerce, assimilate or
exclude problem groups. Nor is nationality a bargaining chip to be exchanged for
settlement or the relinquishment of claims to land. The forced and coerced settlement of
nomads described throughout the examples, a process that was often done in exchange for
nationality and/or registration, points to the problems with focusing only on the fact of
statelessness among nomads, without accepting the inherent biases baked into the system.
Part 2 identified some of the root causes of nomad statelessness: (1) the creation of nomad
statelessness during colonization and the failure to resolve the statelessness of nomads at
decolonization or, in the case of the Tuareg, the failure to roll-over colonial-era nationality,
(2) the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones (3) discrimination
against nomads in the granting of nationality, (4) a bias against nomads that is inherent in
nationality laws due to an over-reliance on residence, proof of place of birth and
documentation.
Part 2 also examined why nomad statelessness persists to the present day, including (5)
the application of strict jus sanguinis in some countries that locked nomads into intergenerational statelessness, (6) the settlement and assimilation of nomads in order to seize
their lands and (7) the link between nomad statelessness and armed conflict in some cases.
293
Part 3 will examine the extent to which international law provides a solution to nomad
statelessness. Part 3 will not be an exhaustive expiration of every aspect of international
law that may be relative to nomads, but will instead focus on several key areas. To choose
these areas of international law, Part 3 will explore some of the international legal
frameworks that appear most relevant to the causes of nomad statelessness identified
above. It will also examine the international law frameworks currently being promoted by
UNHCR in the global campaign to end statelessness.
These frameworks are: (1) the application of the right to a nationality during the
succession of states, (2) the prohibitions in international law against discrimination against
minorities in the granting of nationality, (3) the extent to which international law limits the
use of jus sanguinis to protect against statelessness, and (4) the recognition of statelessness
under the law and the laws to resolve it. In so doing, this dissertation acknowledges that
there are other international frameworks that may be useful to resolving nomad
statelessness, such as the refugee framework and the indigenous rights framework, which
will not be discussed in detail here, but which might form the basis for future study.
294
Part 3: Nomad Statelessness and International Law
Introduction
I do not think that the issue of statelessness can be addressed simply by
throwing money at it, because it is self-inflicted, because it is man-made,
because of deep-seated stereotyping, because of discrimination, because of
deep-seated pigeon-holing of those individuals who belong and those who do
not belong.1540
During the latter half of the 20th century, as the unregistered status of many Bedouin,
Tuareg and Sama Dilaut slowly ossified into inter-generational statelessness, there were
revolutionary developments in the international laws of nationality and the concept of
nationality as a human right. Part 3 will analyse if international law, properly applied,
provides a solution to the gaps identified in Part 2. To do so, Part 3 will look at a series of
Pathways created by combining different facets of existing international law. It should be
noted that this exploration is not exhaustive, as many potentially useful areas of
international law are not included, such as the refugee protection regime or an exhaustive
examination of indigenous rights. But it is hoped that this dissertation will serve as a
jumping off point for further inquiry.
Gap (1) was the failure to resolve the statelessness of nomads at decolonization and, in the
case of the Tuareg, the failure to “roll-over” colonial-era nationality where possible,
creating inter-generational statelessness. It will be the subject of Pathway I, which looks at
international law on the right to a nationality and the prohibitions against statelessness
during the succession of states. It will also look at the closely related right to birth
registration. As Part 2 showed, decolonization was a major cause of nomad statelessness in
the 1960s and 1970s. Pathway I will examine to what extent, if any, international law can
resolve cases of inter-generational statelessness among nomads that arose out of the
decolonization process.
Successions of states continue to occur, often as a result of the breaking up of former
colonies.1541 Pathway I will also look at to what extent international law may help to
prevent the creation of nomad statelessness during the succession of states. To do so,
Pathway I will apply international standards as they exist today, as well as emerging
normative developments, to the prevention of statelessness among nomads during state
An interview with Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of
the Child, in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘The Worlds Stateless Children’ 137.
1540
1541
For example, see the separation of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011.
295
succession. To do so, Pathway I will apply the modern international law framework to the
gaps identified in Part 2.
Gap (2) is the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones, Gap (3) is
discrimination against nomads from the colonial period to the modern day, and Gap (4) is a
bias against nomads that is inherent in nationality laws due to an over-reliance on
residence, proof of place of birth and documentation. Pathway II will explore the
international laws prohibiting discrimination in both nationality law and in the registration
of nationality to see if they prevent and resolve nomad statelessness.
Gap (5) the subsequent application of strict jus sanguinis in some countries that locked
nomads into inter-generational statelessness. Pathway III will examine how intergenerational statelessness may be solved through the identification of stateless persons
examining in particular how the implementation of strict jus sanguinis is qualified and
limited by states in international law, particularly under the Statelessness Conventions. It
will examine to what extent the identification of stateless persons may form part of a
solution for nomads under international law.
Gap (6) is the usefulness of both nationality and statelessness to assimilate nomads and
seize their lands, which may be providing an incentive to keep nomads stateless or register
them as nationals only in exchange for their lands, and Gap (7) is the link between nomad
statelessness and armed conflict in some cases. Part 3 will conclude by examining the
extent to which international law protects nomads against assimilation and sedentarisation
and addresses the link between armed conflict and statelessness . Part 3 does not take an
exhaustive look at these issues. It instead represents a jumping off point, rather than a
destination, in the search for solutions for nomad belonging.
One facet of nomad statelessness that was not explored in depth by Part 2 is the opinions
and views of nomads themselves on nationality. Due to decades of bad experiences with
coercive nationality and statelessness, but also bad experiences with the international
community and even human rights discourse itself, there is an understandable lack of trust
between many nomads and external actors, including at the regional and international
levels.1542 While this dissertation focuses mostly on the views, policies and solutions
offered by governments and the international community, true solutions will only come
from close cooperation with nomads themselves. As Ekuru Aukot, a member of the Ateker
nation with Kenyan nationality, asks:
What benefits accrue to me from having a nationality since I move through
porous borders, de-linked from government machinery? When I come across
government agents such as the police, they are more often than not the
instruments of persecution. As a nomadic pastoralist, I owe my first
While this dissertation has focused on three examples, it could be expanded to include many more. See
Bloom, Citizenship, 2018, 116, where she discusses the Haudenosaunee of North America. There are many
others. It is hoped that this dissertation will be a jumping-off point for future research.
1542
296
allegiance to the Ateker nation in all its manifestations across four
countries.1543
1543
E. Aukot, ‘Am I stateless because I’m a nomad?’ 32 Forced Migration Review 18 (2009).
297
The International Norms Relating to Nationality
It is generally accepted today that nationality is an inherent right of all human
beings.1544
Part 3 will begin in this section with a brief overview of the regulation of nationality in the
international sphere and the development of the right to a nationality under international
law. As discussed in the section on sources above, Part 3 will focus on treaty law, but it will
also canvass the development of international law more generally, highlighting among
others draft conventions and declarations, as well as case law, the dicta of courts, the
findings of committees and the opinions of experts. For more on sources, see the section on
sources in Part 1.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, nationality was widely thought to be under the almost
exclusive purview of sovereign states, part of state sovereignty, as discussed in Part 2. It
was therefore largely exempted from the realm of international law, unless as stipulated by
treaty. According to influential nineteenth and twentieth century positivist thinkers such as
Austin, Westlake and Hart, nationality was a matter for states to decide owing to their
absolute sovereignty over domestic matters within their territory. The influence of this
conception of nationality in the international sphere can be seen throughout the
development of international law of nationality in the early 20th century.1545 Asked in 1923
whether the League of Nations was competent to settle a nationality dispute between
France and England, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated authoritatively
that nationality was solely within the competence of sovereign states. 1546
The 20th century saw the emergence of a framework of norms limiting state sovereignty
over nationality in certain cases. This process occurred in tandem with the development of
nationality as an area of law and with the decolonization process, described above in Part
2. The Permanent Court of Justice and the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, addressed the issue of how to resolve conflicts between
states over nationality. 1547 International and regional courts played an increasing role in
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Girls Jean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgment
of September 8, 2005 para. 138, quoting Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984, Series A No. 4, para. 35
(hereinafter Jean and Bosico).
1544
1545
Edwards, 16. For more on nationality in international law, see de Groot and Vonk. See also Part 2, above.
1546
Permanent Court of International Justice, Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees (1923).
League of Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, 13 April
1930, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, 89, No. 4137. The Convention was ratified by only 20 states
and the League of Nations ceased operations in 1946. See also Brownlie, Principles, 383-394; Fransman, 16;
Shaw, 2008, 258, 659; Brownlie, Nationality, 285-289; Batchelor, 1998, 156; Van Waas, Nationality, 37.
1547
298
the regulation of nationality between states. In the early 20th century, states were limited
in their right to impose nationality by tribunals such as the American-Mexican Mixed
Claims Commission, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice.1548 The limits on imposing nationality, however, were mainly presented by
these tribunals as necessary to preserve state sovereignty because nationality decisions by
states often impacted other states. International law had a duty to prevent states from
infringing on the sovereignty of one another.1549
The Codification of International Law Conference held at The Hague in 1930 under the
auspices of the League of Nations, early in the decolonization process, marked an important
attempt to regulate nationality in the international sphere. 1550 Importantly, the Convention
in Article 1 reserved the rights of states to determine their nationals and, therefore,
supported state sovereignty over nationality. It resulted in the Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws by the League of Nations which
codified norms on the nationality of children and married women.1551
In 1955, the International Court of Justice handed down an opinion in the Nottebohm case
on nationalities where the individual did not have an adequate “link,” or who was not
“closely connected,” to the state.1552 This case marked a departure from the absolute right
1548 See for example cases before the American-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission; Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 4
(1955). Verzijl, 21, 23-24; Maury, 20.
1549
Van Waas, Nationality, 35. See also Weis, 65; Lauterpacht, 6; Verzijl, 20; Maury, 20.
Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930). See also
Donner, 45; Van Waas, Nationality, 37; Weis, 26; Maury, 9-10, 74; Brownlie, Nationality, 387.
1550
1551
League of Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, 13 April
1930, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, p. 89, No. 4137. The Convention was ratified by only 20
states and the League of Nations ceased operations in 1946.
(N)ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said
to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly
by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of
the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. International Court of Justice, Nottebohm
Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (6 April 1955) 23.
1552
It is in no way argued, however, that the Court’s definition of nationality is universally accepted or definitive,
merely to point out that the court in Nottebohm also endorsed the concept of settlement in territory as the
foundation of the nationality link. Nottebohm has been highly criticized by international scholars as vague,
unsupported by state practice, and incomplete. See for example Slone, 2009, 1 (calling the language of
Nottebohm “quixotic”). See also J. Mervyn, ‘The Nottebohm Case’ 5 Int. and Comp. L. Q. 230 (1956) 239
(criticising the definition of nationality in Nottebohm, particularly as to its effects on jus sanguinis nationals
living abroad); J. Kuntz, ‘The Nottebohm Case (Second Phase)’ 54 Am. J. of Int. L. 536 (1960) 538-539 (for a
summary of the numerous articles criticising Nottebohm, concluding that the case is “controversial”). But see
contra Brownlie, Principles, 416 and Brownlie, Nationality, 349-350 (arguing that the court’s formulation
relying on a “social fact of attachment” is merely the distillation of general principles already in existence,
299
of states to determine nationality, at least when it came to the obligations of other states to
respect that nationality.1553 Yet Nottebohm also clearly, if indirectly, emphasized the
territorial nature of nationality, with its focus on a state’s “population” and on links like
birth, residence and descent from a national. 1554 As Part 2 explored, descent from a national
was also an expression of the territorial conception of nationality because it granted
nationality to the first couple generations derived from the national homeland. 1555 The
emphasis on territorial “links” in Nottebohm show the continuing emphasis in international
law on the feudal conception of nationality, where nationality is linked to settlement, as
discussed above in Part 2. As a result, under international law, as under municipal law,
“mere physical presence” over the short term is not enough to create a “link.” 1556
Once again, Part 2 briefly summarized the development of nationality in Europe and its
application in the colonies, exploring how nationality arose out of the feudal system in
Europe and was rooted in the concepts of territoriality and settlement on land. 1557
Throughout the Pathways explored below, echoes of feudalism and the territorial
conception of nationality, see in Nottebohm, will continue to impact the international laws
of nationality and the ways in which they may be applied to nomads.
Traditionally, as Part 2 explored, exclusive allegiance was also a founding principle of
nationality, with dual nationality often regarded as big a problem as statelessness. With
Nottebohm, territoriality and exclusivity were recognized by the Court. As a result,
international law supports the territorial approach to nationality discussed at length in
such as those used for functional nationality); Donner, 59; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 31-36, 42; K. Deaux
‘Social Identity’ Encyclopedia of Women and Gender Vols. 1 and 2 (2001).
De Groot and Vonk 42, 52. See also Handbook, 2014; L. Beckman, ‘Is Residence Special? Democracy in the
Age of Migration and Human Mobility’ in L. Beckman and E. Erman (eds.) Territories of Citizenship (Palgrave
2012) 21-22; Shaw, 2008, 647-648; Brubaker, 35; Koessler, 61; Kymlicka, 174; Shachar, 13; Van Panhuys,
195; Courbe, 23; Maury, 28-29.
1553
In his book on international law, Shaw defines nationality thus: “(s)ince every state possesses sovereignty
and jurisdictional powers and since every state must consist of a collection of individual human beings, it is
essential that a link between the two be legally established. That link connecting the state and the people it
includes in its territory is provided by the concept of nationality.” Shaw, 2008, 659. See also Stilz, 188;
Shachar, 49-50; Weissbrodt, 26-27.
1554
For more examples of the territorial concept of a “link” see Florence Strunsky Mergé vs. The Italian Republic,
Case No. 3, Decision No. 55 and Mazzonis Case, Decision No. 56 (10 June 1955) XIV 249-251 before the IranUS Claims Tribunal. See also A. Edwards, ‘The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human
rights: procedural and substantive aspects’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness
under International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 11.
1555
See Part 2, State Building and the Exclusion of Nomads, Conclusion, Nomads and National Unity, above.
1556
Verwhilgen, 62. See also Maury, 14.
1557
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 93.
300
Part 2. This approach, however, has more recently been tempered by a universal right to a
nationality for everyone, including nomads.
The Right to a Nationality Today
Contemporaneously with the development of nationality as one of the most important
features of modern life, international law today acknowledges the critical role nationality
plays in the life of the individual as part of an emerging body of human rights law. 1558 The
right to a nationality today finds support in a large number of international treaties, in the
decisions of international tribunals and in universal principles of law. 1559The right to a
nationality limits state sovereignty in critical ways, placing a burden on the state system as
a whole to eliminate statelessness. Of foremost importance to the development of a right to
a nationality for individuals was the, non-binding, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which guarantees the right to a nationality in Article 15, stating; “everyone has the
right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.”1560 It is important to note that this right is presented as
absolute. It is not qualified by reference to territory, settlement, residence, birth or other
factors. Yet, it also does not establish to what extent and under what circumstances
particular states have a duty to grant nationality.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is binding on States
Parties1561, mandates that; “every child has the right to acquire a nationality” without
qualification. Other international treaties that support the right to a nationality include the
Convention on the Rights of the Child,1562 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
The International Law Commission has noted the role played by the evolution of human rights law in
establishing the right to a nationality. International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on nationality of natural
persons in relation to the succession of States with commentaries, 1999’ Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its fifty-first session, 24 (hereinafter Draft Articles). See also Jault-Seseke, 43;
Edwards, 38-41.
1558
1559
For a summary, see the Handbook, 2014, 9. See also Pilgram, 2.
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 (III) A (Paris 1948) Art. 15. See also
Lauterpacht, 412; Donner, 191; Van Waas, Nationality, 58.
1560
1561
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, 23 March 1976, No.
14668. The Covenant has 173 states parties. For a list of signatories and reservations, see the United Nations
Treaty Collection website at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en.
1562
Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989, adopted and opened for signature,
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2
September 1990, in accordance with article 4949(1), 1577 United Nations Treaty Series 3, with 196 states
parties (hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child).
301
Racial Discrimination.1563 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples1564 also
supports the right to a nationality for indigenous peoples, though it lacks the binding
nature of the treaties listed above.
Regional treaties establishing the right to a nationality, including those relevant to the right
to a nationality in the Gulf region and the Sahel, include the Arab Charter on Human Rights
of 2004,1565 Article 29. The right to a nationality finds further support in the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,1566 Article 6, and the Covenant on the Rights
of the Child in Islam, Article 7.1567 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights1568
guarantees the right to freedom of movement and to enter and exit one’s country in Article
12, rights adjacent to nationality.
Other regional treaties and declarations include the American Convention on Human
Rights,1569 Article 20, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of
1948,1570 Article 19. In Europe, regional treaties include the Strasbourg Convention of 1963
on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality, 1571 the 1973 Convention to Reduce the
Number of Cases of Statelessness in Europe, and the European Convention on Nationality of
1997.1572 Treaty bodies and courts have opined upon the meaning of international and
1563
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, New York, 7 March
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, 195, with 182 states parties.
1564
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 13 September 2007. Adopted
by UN General Assembly by 144 states.
1565
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 15 September 1994, with 22 states parties.
1566
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) (Adopted by the African Member States of
the Organization of African Unity, 11 July 1990), adopted by 48 member states.
1567
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, June 2005,
OIC/9-IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep.
1568
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), with 54 states parties.
1569
American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San José, Costa Rica", 18 July 1978, UNTS 1144, 123,
with 25 states parties.
1570
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) (Adopted at the Ninth International
Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, 2 May 1948)
1571 Council of Europe, European Treaty Series-No. 43, Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple
Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, Strasbourg, 6.V.1963.
1572
Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality, ETS No.166, 01/03/2000 with 10 ratifications.
302
regional treaties, such as by stating that states have a general duty not to adopt laws that
create statelessness,1573 or by prohibiting the discriminatory withdrawal of nationality.1574
The Statelessness Conventions, binding on states parties,1575 also discussed above in the
Introduction, support the right to a nationality, and provide a pathway to a solution for the
problems of many stateless people and a framework to prevent statelessness. The
Statelessness Conventions may therefore be seen as adding more specificity to the right to
a nationality by mandating the conditions under which nationality is established in some
circumstances and by creating a duty on the part of states to identify, prevent and resolve
statelessness.1576
Soft law has also played an important role in guiding state practice. Procedural guidance
also plays a role in guiding state practice in ensuring the right to a nationality. Perhaps the
most important guidance on statelessness to come out in recent years is the UNHCR
Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons, which provides guidance for identifying
stateless persons in a migratory situation.1577 It marks a vital step in bringing rigor to the
identification of statelessness as a formal category under international law. The lack of a
rigorous identification process can impede solutions where identification is critical.
It should be noted, however, that there is no international tribunal tasked with adjudicating
cases of statelessness, as would have been created by Article 11 of the 1954 Draft
Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness. As a result, identification of
statelessness falls to national governments, with guidance from UNHCR. The Handbook
also provides important guidance and protections for stateless migrants. It asserts, for
example, that unlawful presence in a state should not be grounds for states to deny access
to a statelessness determination.1578
Therefore, while the right to a nationality is commonly recognized as a universal right,
there remains a lack of specificity as to the content of this right. As the Pathways below will
Jean and Bosico. The Inter-American Court stated that; “(s)tates have the obligation not to adopt practices
or laws concerning the granting of nationality, the application of which fosters an increase in the number of
stateless persons.”
1573
Human Rights Council, Twenty-fifth session, ‘Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality’
Report of the Secretary-General (19 December 2013.)
1574
1575
For a list of signatories and reservations, see the United Nations Treaty Collection website at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-4&chapter=5&clang=_en for the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness with 75 states parties and
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en for the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons with
94 states parties.
1576
1961 Convention.
1577
Handbook, 2014, 17.
1578
Handbook, 2014, 28.
303
also show, much soft law has failed to be adopted by states. While international law
mandates the prevention of statelessness, 1579 as Van Waas points out, the provisions in the
Statelessness Conventions stop “short of prescribing obligations that will decisively
eliminate statelessness in all circumstances.”1580 For example, de-naturalization was widely
acknowledged to be a threat to the rights of neighbouring states in the wake of the Second
World War, but though limited, it has not, even today, been completely prohibited. 1581
There is also no specific prohibition on a government of one state imposing the nationality
of another state on a minority group in order to resolve statelessness, as the government of
Kuwait is attempting to do. Such a “solution” would arguably violate human rights law, 1582
but international human rights law lacks specificity in this and several other crucial areas.
The lack of specificity in the right to a nationality for nomads will be highlighted at length
in the Pathways, below.
The Right to Registration at Birth
The previous section provided an overview of the right to a nationality in international law.
There is another area of laws and procedures that is crucial to preventing statelessness,
that of civil registration.
Civil registration is defined as the continuous, permanent, compulsory and universal
recording of the occurrence and characteristics of vital events pertaining to the
population, as provided through decree or regulation in accordance with the legal
requirements in each country.1583
Civil registration provides evidence of nationality, for example, by proving birth within the
territory of the state, descent from a national, marriage to a national, habitual residence or
other evidence required for nationality. Other forms of registration, such as documents like
land deeds, leases, bank records and other documents may also be used as evidence
towards meeting the criteria for nationality in some cases, particularly by showing
residence in the state.
1579
Statelessness Conventions. See also Maury, 20; Brownlie, Relations, 386.
Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 75-76. She goes on to point out that such a provision was suggested
by the Draft Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness, but was not adopted in the existing
Conventions.
1580
Weis, 32, 45. See also Verzijl, 19; Maury, 20. Arendt discussed the problem at length in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, first published in 1951. Arendt, 1976 ,278-279. See also Fripp, 2016, 12; U.N. Ad Hoc
Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, ‘A Study of Statelessness’ United Nations, August 1949, Lake
Success - New York, 1 August 1949, E/1112; E/1112/Add.1; Lauterpacht, 384; European Court of Human
Rights, K2 v UK, First Section Decision, 42381/13 (2017) (finding that it was not a violation of a defendant’s
human rights to strip UK nationality from a defendant that had another nationality.)
1581
1582
Donner, 141.
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, Statistical Papers, ‘Principles and
Recommendations for a Vital Statistics System, Revision 3’ Series M No. 19/Rev.3 (2014) 65.
1583
304
Birth registration is now required by states in international law. The right to birth
registration is guaranteed in Article 24, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Committee
on the Rights of the Child also mandate birth registration. 1584 Under current international
law, however, the right to civil registration is limited to registration at birth. 1585 The nonbinding Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals is to “provide legal identity for all,
including birth registration” by 2030,1586 but international law has not expanded on the
types of civil documentation states are required to provide.
The International Commitments of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia
The examples of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia were selected to provide insights into the
statelessness of nomads more generally, therefore Part 3 will not limit itself to those
international and regional treaties ratified by the three countries used as examples. The
purpose of this section is instead to explore if international law, writ large, can provide
solutions to common causes of nomad statelessness. Nevertheless, ratification of key
treaties by particular states is relevant to show the various ways in which international law
has, or has not, been adopted and implemented by states in dealing with nomads and the
extent to which it has already been used to provide solutions. This section will list the key
international treaties ratified by the countries used as examples in this dissertation.
Kuwait has ratified several key international treaties that are helpful to ending
statelessness, though it has not ratified the Statelessness Conventions. 1587 Kuwait is a party
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.1588 Yet, as Part 2 showed, inter-generational statelessness persists in
“The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the
right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and
their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 7.
1584
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 24, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March
1976, in accordance with Article 49. See also Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Birth
registration and the right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law: Report of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Human Rights Council Twenty-seventh
session, A/HRC/27/22 (17 June 2014).
Fransman, 43. Though see the Convention on the Issue of a Certificate of Nationality, ICCS Convention No.
28 (1999), which has been signed by a handful of European countries.
1585
See the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals website at
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/.
1586
See the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Ratification Status for Kuwait’ at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID9̄2&LangĒN. See also
Human Rights Watch ‘Prisoners of the Past: Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness’ (June 13, 2011).
1587
See UNHCR, ‘States Party to the Statelessness Conventions as of 1st October 2017’ map at
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54576a754.pdf. See also United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
1588
305
Kuwait. Rather, documentation for stateless children in Kuwait has become simply another
tool in the continuation of that statelessness.
Mali has ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and
many regional human rights treaties, including the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child in Africa.1589 It acceded to the Statelessness Conventions in 2016.1590
Mali has therefore committed itself to ending statelessness.
Mali is also a member of ECOWAS, which has issued the non-binding Abidjan Declaration of
Ministers of ECOWAS Member States on Eradication of Statelessness. 1591 Of particular note,
the Abidjan Declaration states that ending statelessness is key to peace and security in the
region, recognition of the role statelessness plays in fuelling conflicts like the one occurring
in northern Mali.1592 The agreement has begun being implemented by states and it will be
interesting to see what effect, if any, it has on the Mali conflict and the documentation
problems of the Tuareg.1593
But so far Malian laws and adherence to international conventions has not resulted in
inclusion, enfranchisement, or identity documents for the Tuareg. “Although formal legal
nationality had been assured in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa at independence,
meaningful nationality has remained elusive for individuals who are members of particular
groups.”1594 The question is, why? Like many nomads in Africa, problems with registration,
failure to register, and stringent registration rules have left many Tuareg without
nationality documents to prove their nationality. But the situation in Mali goes beyond
poorly implemented laws and neglect. The Tuareg have been the victims of a deliberate
campaign of violence, forced removal, coercive settlement and disenfranchisement as a
perceived security risk to a level that arguably raises to the level of persecution. Today,
northern Mali resembles a failed state. As Part 2 showed, this conflict is deeply related the
question of Tuareg belonging, where their nationality is disputed. Though many rural
Commissioner at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCodeK̄ WT&LangĒN for
the reporting status of Kuwait on various treaties.
Information on Mali’s treaty status can be found at Claiming Human Rights, Guide to International
Procedures Available in Cases of Human Rights Violations in Africa at
http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/mali.html. See also African Commission para 82; UNHCR, ‘Global
Focus, Mali, Strategy for Each PPG’ (2016) at http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/10064.
1589
UNHCR, ‘Statelessness in West Africa Newsletter #9 (April – June 2016)’ at
https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/53849
1590
Regional Treaties, Agreements, Declarations and Related, Abidjan Declaration of Ministers of ECOWAS
Member States on Eradication of Statelessness, (25 February 2015) (hereinafter Abidjan Declaration).
1591
1592
Abidjan Declaration, 3.
1593
Manby, Citizenship, 2018.
1594
L. Smith, 21.
306
people in Africa lack documents, the Tuareg are facing a crisis of legitimacy and
membership that is intimately related to the question of Tuareg separatism, a larger
political question which has overshadowed the rights of ordinary Tuareg to a nationality.
Yet it is clear that providing a nationality for all Tuareg in the Sahara region will be a major
part of any sustainable peace agreement.
Malaysia is not a party to the Statelessness Conventions, though it is a party to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1595 But while
Malaysia is not a party to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
nevertheless, the Constitution of Malaysia provides for the nationality of otherwise
stateless persons in the Second Schedule.1596 Malaysia’s federal law also contains strong
protections against statelessness by granting a nationality to otherwise stateless children
born in Malaysia.1597 Yet, as Part 2 demonstrated, establishing before the courts that
children in Malaysia are being born stateless has not, so far, lead to real solutions.
See the website for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Ratification Status for
Malaysia’ at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID9̄2&LangĒN.
1595
1596 Malaysian Constitution, Second Schedule, Part 2 (1957) (c) states that nationals are, “every person born
within the Federation after September 1962, of whose parents one at least was at the time of the birth either
a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation, or who was not born a citizen of any other country..." and
Part 2, (e) states that nationals are those born after Malaysia day who are, “...born within the Federation who
(are) not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph.” Sinnadurai, 321, 332.
1597
Constitution of Malaysia (1957) 2nd Schedule, art. 1(c).
307
Pathway I: The Right to a Nationality During the Succession of States
Whether the creation of a new State on the territory of another results in
statelessness of the nationals of the previous State there resident, or an automatic
change in nationality, or in retention of the previous nationality until provision is
otherwise made by treaty or the law of the new state, is a matter of some
doubt.1598
Pathway I will look at the right to a nationality during the succession of states. As Part 2
showed, decolonization was a major cause of statelessness for some nomads. There are
populations of nomads who have been stateless for at least fifty or sixty years.
Decolonization is also an ongoing process that will continue to affect nomads in the future.
As a result, Pathway I will examine to what extent modern international law offers
solutions to prevent and resolve statelessness as a result of a succession of states. To do so,
it will explore proposed developments in international law to see if statelessness among
the Bedouin, the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut could have been prevented at the time, were
these developments to be adopted. It will also explore the extent to which international law
may offer solutions to intergenerational statelessness as a result of past decolonization.
In the examples explored above, some nomads entered the decolonization period with a
nationality under the colonial system. The Tuareg were granted a nationality under French
law prior to decolonization and some efforts were made towards civil registration, but the
process remained incomplete at the time of decolonization. Some Sama Dilaut received a
nationality under British law based on residence and jus soli immediately preceding
decolonization, but this law appears to have existed mostly on paper. In Kuwait, the Emir
also passed a law granting nationality based on residence, but mass civil registration did
not follow until later. As well, under British law, BPP status was available to some, though it
was not really a nationality status.
Despite often qualifying for a nationality under colonial-era laws, many nomads entered
the decolonization period without any civil documents or with documents that did not
establish nationality, but may have established residence. Many nomads had had bad
experiences with colonial registration programs that made them mis-trustful of postcolonial registration. As well, the power to issue documents had now vested with settled
and urban rulers, meaning that many nomads could not determine their own nationality.
Transitional laws passed by the new states establishing the first body of nationals were
usually based primarily on birth and residence within the newly established borders of the
state. 1599 Birth created a clear category upon which to grant nationality, though
1598
Crawford, 52-53.
In supporting the continuation of existing borders, the United Nations and international community were
following the doctrine of uti possidetis, a principle of international law that cements existing borders during
1599
308
documenting place of birth was not a priority for many nomads. The concept of habitual
residence, however, was vague, discriminatory and/or and undefined when applied to
nomads, particularly in what were now border areas. For laws based both on birth and
habitual residence, many nomads continued to have no documents to prove their eligibility.
Rather than setting up a committee or regional process to regulate the creation and
transfer of nationality to ensure that everyone received or retained one during
decolonization, nationality was left to the individual states. The United Nations and the
international community did not pay enough attention to the risk of statelessness during
decolonization for marginalized groups like nomads. While nationality as a question of
international relations was taken up by the League of Nations, and later by the United
Nations, for Mandate and Trust territories, neither the League of Nations, nor the United
Nations, were involved in determining the status of persons in other colonial entities such
as Protectorates and Protected States. 1600 When there was international involvement in the
decolonization process and the establishment of nationality, such as in Malaysia with the
Reid Commission, it was usually from the former colonial entity, in this case, the British
Commonwealth. As Part 2 explored, while aware of the problem of statelessness, most
colonial administrations were primarily concerned with shoring up borders and
centralized governments.
Some of these problems could have been resolved by regional or bilateral treaties, but, as
Weis points out, few cases of decolonization were governed by treaty. 1601 While the
International Court of Justice ruled on the nationality status of persons in Mandate
territories like South-West Africa, it was not asked to decide cases of disputed nationality
between sovereign states in most post-colonial states.1602 Today, there is some evidence
the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia may embark on such a process, including a recent
MOU signed by Malaysia and Indonesia, but nothing like this regional process was done at
the time. As a result, gaps were perhaps inevitable and there was a real danger of
discrimination against minorities and other vulnerable groups.
As Part 2 discussed, the nationality laws of post-colonial states were often drafted with the
help of international experts. Importantly, nationality was often treated during the
decolonization process as an aspect of state sovereignty for the newly emerging states, not
as an individual right. As Part 2 showed, the focus of the decolonization process was much
more on stabilizing borders and regulating relations between the new states than on
establishing a nationality for all or registering the population.1603 In the 1960s,
independence or state succession and discourages fuzzy or contested sovereignty. Shaw, Boundaries, 1997
478.
1600
For a summary of nationality in the Mandate and Trust territories, see Weis, 20-22.
1601
Weis, 153. The countries he cites are Algeria, Burma, Cyprus, and Indonesia.
See International Court of Justice, International Status of South-West Africa, I.C.J. Reports (1950) quoted
in Weis, 22.
1602
1603
For an overview of the decolonization process, see Crawford 384-388.
309
international law was also not particularly helpful in guiding states to enact universal
registration policies.1604 International law during decolonization was greatly concerned
with self-determination for former colonies, but not necessarily with nationality as an
individual right. For example, Article 1 of both the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights focused on the right to self-determination, not the right to a nationality. 1605
Yet, despite the lack of attention paid to the problem of statelessness as a result of
decolonization, the chances of statelessness and the problems with undocumented persons
during decolonization were known at the time. In 1949, the United Nations commissioned a
study on stateless refugees and displaced stateless persons.1606 The study, however, took
little note of stateless persons in their own countries, despite the fact that the risk of
statelessness occurring from decolonization was noted at the time by experts such as
Hannah Arendt.1607 One notable exception was the adoption, in 1954, of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless People, which mandated in Art. 10 that treaties of state
succession contain protections against statelessness.
For state succession without a treaty, however, the problem of statelessness did not receive
enough attention. Nationality could not automatically transfer where there was no
predecessor State, as was the case during decolonization in many places. 1608 As Weis
pointed out in 1979, towards the end of the decolonization period, “we cannot assume that
the nationality of the extinct State is ipso facto replaced by that of the successor State.”1609
Pathway I will examine the right to a nationality during state succession. As noted above,
the right to a nationality has developed extensively since the decolonization period. Could
statelessness have been prevented in the examples by the application of modern
international laws, norms and principles? Could international law today provide a
retroactive solution to nomad statelessness that resulted from the decolonization process?
For an overview of international law relating to proof of nationality at the time of decolonization and in
the decades following, see Weis, 204-236.
1604
U.N. General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 16 December
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, 3, with 171 states parties
1605
U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, ‘A Study of Statelessness’ United Nations,
August 1949, Lake Success - New York, 1 August 1949, E/1112; E/1112/Add.1.
1606
Arendt, 1976, 297. As Arendt had pointed out, speaking of Europe, “(s)ince the Peace Treaties of 1919 and
1920 the refugees and the stateless have attached themselves like a curse to all the newly established states
on earth which were created in the image of the state.” Arendt, 1976, 290. Arendt called the statelessness
created in Europe during WWII “the newest mass phenomenon in contemporary history.” Arendt, 1976, 277.
It should be noted, however, that Arendt did not distinguish between refugees and stateless persons.
Nevertheless, her point is compelling.
1607
1608
Weis, 136.
1609
Weis, 137.
310
The Norms of State Succession
Today, there is a clearly established right to a nationality during state succession.1610 This
right is supported by a number of international and regional laws that are binding on
states, as well as draft treaties and by the opinions of experts.1611 This dissertation will look
closely at proposed developments in the law, to see if changes to the law could have
prevented the statelessness of nomads and provide a pathway to a solution for existing
cases of statelessness that resulted from state succession.
Yet it is important to note that the international law of state succession was already quite
developed by the time of decolonization, though it had not yet been codified. The breakup
of empires had been common in Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries.1612 Prior to
decolonization, there had also been cases of transfers of territory within the colonial
system.1613
The general rule establishing nationality during state succession has long been that
nationality follows sovereignty.1614 Under this general rule, which was widely recognized at
the time of decolonization as well as today, nomads who held nationality under the colonial
system should have automatically received a nationality in the new state. Prior to
decolonization, international law cases relied heavily on birth and habitual residence to
determining nationality in cases where nationality was unclear or contested. 1615
Beginning at decolonization, international law has fleshed out the basic rules for the rollover of nationality during state succession. Relevant laws include the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness, non-binding instruments like the Venice Declaration on the
Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons of 1996 and the
Draft articles on nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States of
1999.1616 Regional laws include the Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in
1610
See generally Van Waas, Nationality, Chapter VI.
For a summary of the opinions of experts writing during the post-colonial period, see generally Weis,
published in 1979. See also M. Sanderson, ‘Statelessness and Mass Expulsion in Sudan: A Reassessment of the
International Law’ 12 Nw. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 74 (2014). For a summary of more recent developments in the
norms of state succession and dual nationality, see L. J. van der Baaren, Emigrant nationality. A comparative
analysis of the toleration of dual nationality from an emigrant perspective (PhD Maastricht 2020).
1611
1612
Van Waas, Nationality, 122.
Weis explores several colonial examples of transfers of colonial sovereignty during the late 1800s (Burma
and southern Africa). Weis, 139.
1613
Brownlie, Principles, 656. Van Waas says this reflects “the feudal concept of territorial sovereignty where
‘ownership’ of population and property follows ownership of the land.” Van Waas, Nationality, 126 .
1614
See for example, Agapios v. Sanitary and Quarantine Council of Egypt, Gazette des Tribunaux Mixtes
(1920) cited in Weis, 141.
1615
1616
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the
Succession of States with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, vol. II, Part
311
Relation to State Succession by the Council of Europe of 20091617, and regional draft laws
include the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in
Africa.1618
International law supports the regulation of nationality and the prevention of statelessness
by succession treaties. Article 10 of the 1961 Convention placed an affirmative duty on
states to prevent statelessness in treaty provisions. Draft laws lend further support,
including Article 20 of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of
Statelessness in Africa also addresses succession by treaty, as does the Venice Declaration
on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons of 1996 1619
also mandates that states respect human rights and avoid statelessness.
But what about succession in the absence of a treaty, a common occurrence during
decolonization? International law has created a duty for stateless to avoid creating
statelessness at succession, even in the absence of a treaty. Critically, however, these rules
applied only to the nationals of the predecessor state. The 1961 Convention placed a duty
on states in the absence of a treaty to confer nationality on those who would otherwise be
stateless as a result of succession.
In 1999, the International Law Commission drafted a set of specific articles on nationality
during state succession for persons with a nationality in the predecessor state regardless of
the existence of a treaty.1620 While non-binding on states, it is worth examining whether
these articles would have prevented nomad statelessness had they been applied at the
Two. The Draft articles were “adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-first session in 1999.
At its fifty-fifth session, in 2000, the General Assembly took note of the Articles... By resolution 66/92 in 2011,
the Assembly decided that, upon the request of any State, it will revert to the question of nationality of natural
persons in relation to the succession of States at an appropriate time, in the light of the development of State
practice in these matters.” Václav Mikulka, ‘Introductory note, Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in
Relation to the Succession of States 1999,’ Audiovisual Library of International Law (2020) at
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/annprss/annprss.html.
1617 Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession, CETS No.
200, Strasbourg, 19/05/2006, with 7 states parties.
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the Right to
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa (Draft September 2015) at
https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/draft_citizenship_protocol_en_sept2015_achpr.pdf
The draft protocol remains under consideration. https://au.int/en/newsevents/20180507/member-statesexperts-meeting-draft-protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018.
1618
1619
Declaration on the consequences of state succession for the nationality of natural persons, CDL-NAT
(1996)007rev-e, Adopted at its 28th Plenary Meeting, Venice, 13-14 September.
1620
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the
Succession of States with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, vol. II, Part
Two.
312
time, or if they provide for a solution to intergenerational statelessness today. Article 1
reaffirms the right to a nationality in one of the successor states, but only for persons who
had the nationality of the processor state. Article 2 states that:
‘Person concerned’ means every individual who, on the date of the succession of
States, had the nationality of the predecessor State and whose nationality may be
affected by such succession.
The Commentaries to Article 2 specify that:
Accordingly, the term ‘person concerned’ includes neither persons who are only
nationals of third States nor stateless persons who were present on the territory of
any of the ‘States concerned.’
(W)hen there is more than one successor State, not everyone has the obligation to
attribute its nationality to every single person concerned. Similarly, the predecessor
State does not have the obligation to retain all persons concerned as its nationals.
Otherwise, the result would be, first, dual or multiple nationality on a large scale
and, second, the creation, also on a large scale, of legal bonds of nationality without
appropriate connection.
Article 4 does not therefore encompass persons resident in the territory of the
successor State who had been stateless under the regime of the predecessor State.
The successor State has certainly a discretionary power to attribute its nationality to
such stateless persons. But this question is outside the scope of the present draft
articles.
The Commentaries then cite to O’Connell where he says, “[t]here is an ‘inchoate right’ on
the part of any State to naturalize stateless persons resident upon its territory.” In other
words, providing a nationality to stateless persons in their territory is not obligatory for
states. Article 2 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in
Relation to State Succession of 2006 and Article 20 of the Draft Protocol to the African
Charter, discussed above, likewise limit the right to a nationality in a successor state to
persons who had the nationality of the predecessor state.
How must states ensure that no one becomes stateless as a result of state succession?
Article 4 of the Draft Articles places an express duty on states to take “appropriate
measures” to prevent statelessness during the succession of states for persons with a
nationality in the processor state.1621 Article 19 reinforces the fact that states are not
required to grant nationality to persons with no qualifying “link” to their territory, unless
the person would become stateless.
The Commentaries to the Draft Articles cite to the ‘Report of the experts of the Council of Europe on the
citizenship laws of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and their implementation’ (Council of Europe, Strasbourg,
2 April 1996), document DIR/JUR(96)4), para. 54 stating that “there is an international obligation for the two
States (involved in a succession) to avoid statelessness.”
1621
313
Article 3 of the Council of Europe Convention also employs the language “appropriate
measures” to prevent statelessness for persons with a nationality in the predecessor state.
The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in General
Recommendation 30, has advised states to “(r)egularize the status of former citizens of
predecessor States who now reside within the jurisdiction of the State party.”1622
For persons who were nationals of the predecessor state, soft law supports the use of birth
and habitual residence as the “links” used to establish nationality in the new state. The
Draft Articles support the automatic transfer of nationality where possible. 1623 They go on
to establish in Art. 5 a presumption of nationality based on habitual residence during any
transitional period that may elapse prior to the enactment of nationality laws. According to
the Commentaries, this presumption is intended to establish nationality during the
transitional period if there is a time lag between succession and the passage of a nationality
law. It creates a rebuttable presumption of nationality. The use of birth, habitual residence,
or “another appropriate connection” are also evoked for cases of state dissolution and state
dismemberment in Articles 22 and 24.
For the nationals of the processor state who are habitually resident outside the successor
state, Article 8 mandates that successor states grant nationality to such non-residents only
to avoid statelessness. The Commentaries to the Draft Articles support the use of birth (if
the person would otherwise be stateless) in Article 11 and former habitual residents who
were forced to leave as a result of events arising out of the succession, in Article 14 as the
“links” upon which a bond of nationality should be founded.1624 For children of nationals of
the predecessor state born after succession, Article 13 mandates that they be granted
nationality in the state in which they were born.
Regional conventions also support the use of birth and habitual residence. The Council of
Europe Convention supports the right of automatic transfer of nationality during state
succession and codifies birth and habitual residence as the “links” to establish nationality
for persons holding the nationality of the predecessor state.1625 In Art. 6, it also creates a
duty on the part of the predecessor state not to withdraw nationality if the result would be
statelessness and in Art. 9, it supports the facilitation of nationality for habitual residents
who are stateless as a result of the succession. The Draft Protocol to the African Charter
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 64th Session, General
Recommendation 30, Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (23 February-12
March 2004).
1622
1623
See generally the Draft Articles. See also Donner, 51; Maury, 11.
Articles 5, 11, 14. “(P)ersons may have links to two or even more states involved in a succession. In this
event, a person may end up with a nationality in two or more states. Under no circumstances, however, shall a
person be denied the right to acquire at least one such nationality...” Commentaries, Commentary (5), 25. See
the commentary to Article 1 providing for the right to a nationality, the commentary to Articles 4 and 5 on the
prevention of statelessness, the commentary to Article 19 on page 40 and the commentary to Article 20,
which particular concerns nationality during decolonization. See also the Draft Articles, 28, 40.
1624
1625
Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession (2009).
314
creates a presumption of nationality for the holders of nationality in the predecessor state
based on habitual residence in the successor state.
The Venice Declaration, another non-binding instrument, also says that states must prevent
statelessness as a result of succession for the nationals of the predecessor state.
Specifically, it mandates that successor states grant nationality to permanent residents of
the territory and persons originating in the territory and resident outside the territory who
would otherwise become stateless as the result of the succession.1626 It is not clear what is
meant by the term “originating,”1627 but it is interesting to ask if this term might be defined
in a way more friendly to the practice of nomadism, as a replacement for habitual
residence. Might “originating” instead refer to pre-colonial histories and modes of
belonging?
The review of soft law and regional instruments above demonstrates that there is support
for the extension of nationality to those who had a nationality in the predecessor state and
would be otherwise left stateless, both when the process is governed by treaty and when it
is not,1628 as well as for birth and habitual residence as the two main “links” creating a duty
on the part of successor states to grant a nationality to the nationals of the predecessor
state.
While the term “reasonable measures” to ensure that statelessness is not created as a
result of state succession appears frequently in these instruments, there is less guidance on
what “reasonable measures” entail, even in soft law. Under the Draft Articles, the term
“reasonable measures” is not defined.1629 For example, the General Recommendation 30 of
the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination mandate states to
“(r)egularize the status of former citizens of predecessor States who now reside within the
jurisdiction of the State party.” The Draft Protocol to the African Charter, however, creates
a duty on the part of states to facilitate naturalization for persons with the nationality of
the predecessor state. As well, Articles 15 and 16 of the 1999 Draft Articles and Article 4 of
the Draft Protocol to the African Charter also mandate that the process of transferring
nationality during a succession of states be accomplished without discrimination. Taking
into account soft law sources, therefore, facilitated naturalization and non-discrimination
may therefore be regarded as two requirements of “reasonable measures.”
The duty of states to establish the nationality of those who are stateless or whose
nationality is unestablished or unclear in the predecessor state, however, finds little
support even in soft law. For persons who were stateless or of unclear nationality at
Venice Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons (14
September 1996) Article 10.
1626
Explanatory Report on the Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of
Natural Persons, adopted at its 28th Plenary Meeting, Venice, 13-14 September 1996.
1627
1628
Batchelor, Statelessness, 1998, 157.
1629
Draft Articles 5 and 8.
315
decolonization, there is only the general right to a nationality discussed in the preceding
section.
The Right of Option to Choose a Nationality
The right to a nationality for nomads during the decolonization process also raises the
issue of the right of option, or the right to choose nationality during a succession of states.
This is particularly relevant to nomads with links to two or more states.
At the time of decolonization, the right of option was far from being a universally accepted
principle of law in cases of state succession. As Weis noted, traditionally the right of option,
or election, was limited to “the right to decline the nationality of the acquiring State
implicitly by leaving the transferred territory after the change in sovereignty had taken
place.”1630 It did not traditionally include the right of positive, or affirmative, option,
whereby an individual would go through an administrative or judicial process to elect
nationality. 1631
A right of option was not always included in treaties of cession1632 and not always open to
all classes of people, though it had been used in countries as diverse as Canada, Cyprus and
Algeria.1633 It was also employed in the early 20th century in Europe1634 and to certain
former colonies.1635, but subsequent draft treaties have expanded on this right.
Weis, 156-157. There remains no clear, affirmative right of option under international law today due to
the non-uniform behavior of states and the lack of enforceable treaty law. Van Ert, 160 and sub.
1630
Weis, 156-159. Weis notes, citing Halleck, the problems with an implied option based on physical
presence. Weis, 157, quoting H. W. Halleck, International Law, or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in
Peace and War, 2 vols. 4th English edition (Baker 1908).
1631
The 1999 Draft Convention Commentaries cites to the right of option in treaties as a way to avoid
statelessness. It is a “technique used by the legislators of States concerned in the case of a succession of States
is to enlarge the circle of persons entitled to acquire their nationality by granting a right of option to that
effect to those who would otherwise become stateless. Examples of provisions of this nature includes section
2, subsection, of the Burma Independence Act, 37 article 6 of Law No. 40/1993 of29 December 1992 on the
acquisition and loss of citizen-ship of the Czech Republic,38 and article 47 of the Yugoslav Citizenship Law
(No. 33/96).”
1632
Weis, 157. For an exploration of the right of option in the Canadian context, see Van Ert, 151. See also the
summary in Weis, 158-159.
1633
Weis, 157. The problem of “which state” had come up frequently at the end of World War One. Van Ert
,157. See also Treaty of Peace with Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919) Arts. 70-82; UNHCR,
‘Nationality Laws of the Former Soviet Republics,’ (1 July 1993).
1634
A right of option based on the concept of “effective link” was applied during the decolonization process in
Vietnam. Van Ert, 158. See also Convention Between France and Vietnam on Nationality, (1959) Recueil des
traités et accords de la France 62 (16 August 1955).
1635
316
An affirmative right of option for persons with a nationality in the predecessor state who
would otherwise be stateless would be guaranteed by the 1999 Draft Articles. Article 11(2)
of the Draft Articles states,
Each State concerned shall grant a right to opt for its nationality to persons
concerned who have appropriate connection with that State if those persons
would otherwise become stateless as a result of the succession of States. 1636
An “appropriate connection” encompasses the “links” used to establish nationality, such as
birth and residence, but may also include other types of connections. The Commentaries
mention birth and habitual residence. Birth and habitual residence are also mentioned in
Art. 20, to be applied during a transfer of territory, in Art. 22, to be applied during the
dissolution of a state, and in Art. 24, to be applied during a separation of part of the
territory of the state. The Commentaries to Art. 20 cite to “prevailing state practice” in
using birth and habitual residence to determine states where an option may be taken.
Article 17 establishes that an administrative procedure is necessary for making an option
and mandates that such a procedure be made without undue delay. Decisions should be
made in writing and subject to review. An affirmative right of option is also provided for by
the Council of Europe Convention1637 and the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the
Eradication of Statelessness in Africa guarantees the right of option. 1638 The African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also recommended that states observe an affirmative
right of option in cases of state succession.1639 There is room in the right of option, as well,
for connections beyond birth and habitual residence to be used to establish nationality. As
a result, the right of option finds some support in soft law.
Gaps in the Laws and Norms of State Succession for Nomads Who Were Registered at the
time of Decolonization
Several gaps emerge from this analysis. First, it is important to point out that
decolonization is not necessarily best categorized as a succession of states. As Weis points
out, “decolonization may either be regarded as secession, dismemberment or even cession,
or as a special mode of State succession.”1640 Crawford uses the term “devolution,”1641
noting that decolonization was accomplished by a number of different means, including the
1636
Draft Articles Article 11.
1637
Venice Declaration para. 13.
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the Right to
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa, May 2017 art. 20.
1638
1639
1640
1641
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘The Right to Nationality in Africa’ (2015) 47.
Weis, 136. See also Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 39-41.
Crawford, 330-373.
317
passage of legislation, the termination of protection agreements, the signing of treaties, or a
combination of methods.1642 It is not the intention of this dissertation to debate to what
extent decolonization qualifies as a succession of states, but this dissertation will adopt the
view that the laws pertaining to the succession of states may be looked to for solutions to
statelessness as a result of decolonization, but the fact that colonies were not states
impacts the effectiveness of those laws.
Colonization was marked by a vacuum of state sovereignty, with vast empires existing
mostly on maps. Colonial administrators, as Part 2 discussed, did not see themselves as
administrating populations of nationals, but populations of colonized persons, many of
whom were regarded not as nationals of their colonies, but as the subjects of their local
leaders or tribal chiefs, even when the latter had no real authority. In some cases, colonized
persons were granted a nationality in the colonial state, but the lack of a civil registration
system meant that this nationality existed only on paper, complicating efforts to roll it over.
In some cases, nationality was based on jus soli but colonial era borders were almost
constantly fluid and changing, calling into question the applicability of jus soli in border
areas. Some forms of colonial personal status, like BPP status, were never intended to
function as a nationality except in the international context. In many cases, decolonization
was, at best, incomplete,1643 calling into question whether a succession had properly
occurred. This impacts the effectiveness of the laws on state succession. For example, while
the Draft Articles on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1974 specifically
applies to decolonization,1644 it may not be possible to “roll over” colonial era forms of
status that lacked the features of modern nationality.
Registration of all kinds, including civil registration, but also the taking of the census and
registration for various licenses and permits, was often done as part of coercive colonial
policy or simply to raise taxes, rather than to establish nationality or grant rights. Many
people had not been registered during the colonial period in any way. Many groups actively
resisted registration as part of the fight for independence, including some nomads, as the
Tuareg example above discussed in detail.1645 Nomads, in particular, tended to be left out of
registration. The usefulness of the international law framework is therefore lessened by the
1642
Crawford, 331.
R. Ryser, Indigenous Nations and Modern States; The Political Emergence of Nations Challenging State
Power (Routledge 2012) 199 (discussing its failure to take into account minority nations.)
1643
“The expression ‘newly independent State’, defined in paragraph 1(f), signifies a State which has arisen
from a succession of States in a territory which immediately before the date of the succession of States
was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was
responsible…After studying the various historical types of dependent territories (colonies, trusteeships,
mandates, protectorates, etc.), the Commission concluded that their characteristics do not today justify
differences in treatment from the standpoint of the general rules governing succession of States in respect of
treaties.” Draft Articles, Art. 2, Commentaries.
1644
1645
The issue of resistance to the centralized state is a fraught one for many nomads. See the section on the
Tuareg for more on this question.
318
uniqueness of decolonization, where colonial empires were not states with nationals, but
empires.
Nevertheless, the international framework, particularly within soft law, contains much that
may have been helpful to nomads at decolonization and could be helpful to nomads in
future cases of state succession. In particular, proposed international laws on the right to a
nationality during the succession of states divide persons into two groups: those with the
nationality of the predecessor state and those without. For the former group, the
international draft laws are quite specific. As stated above, some nomads entered the
decolonization process with colonial-era identity documents of various kinds. In cases like
these, applying soft law, nationality could “roll over”.
For example, the burden would be on the state to prove that nomads with documents in the
predecessor state were not nationals of that state and/or that their documents were invalid
for some reason. Should these draft laws be ratified, they would place a burden on member
states during future succession of states to allow nationality to roll over.
Yet, there is a not insignificant amount of vagueness in the draft laws described above,
particularly when applied to nomads, through which statelessness may occur.1646 As the
Commentaries to the 1999 Draft Articles point out, even in the soft law, reasonable
measures to prevent statelessness do not obligate each state to provide a nationality to
every person at risk of statelessness that may result from the succession.
Van Waas points to another serious gap in the proposed international norms of state
succession.1647 There is no clear duty on the predecessor state to refrain from withdrawing
nationality until possible cases of statelessness have been resolved. As Part 2 showed, there
was a rush to withdraw colonial forms of nationality and lay the problem squarely on the
shoulders of the new states. Post-colonial states were left with the enormous undertaking
of registering populations that had never been properly registered. The extent to which
predecessor states may have had more of an active role to play in preventing statelessness
is under-addressed in international law, even in draft conventions.
As Part 2 explored, many nomads live in contested border areas, making it difficult to
determine from which state they should receive a nationality. More could be done under
international law to expand “appropriate connections” for nomads.1648 Lack of birth
registration due to armed conflicts that so frequently occur as part of state successions
Van Waas, Nationality, 40. See also Conklin, 14; F. Costamagna, ‘Statelessness in the Context of State
Succession: An Appraisal Under International Law’ in A. Annoni and S. Forlati, The Changing Role of
Nationality in International Law (Routledge 2013) 36. See also I. Ziemele, ‘State Succession and Issues of
Nationality and Statelessness’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness under
International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 217.
1646
1647
Van Waas, Nationality, 132.
Brownlie, Principles, 657; Van Panhuys, 30, 75. “Those properly to be considered nationals of the new
state are those who have their permanent domicile in the territory, are born in the territory, or return soon
after the change of sovereignty.” Donner, 254.
1648
319
should be more explicitly addressed.1649 More conformity between refugee law and the
laws of state succession may be helpful to resolve gaps. For example, refugees displaced
during wars of state succession could have a right of option both in their state of refuge and
their state of origin or birth. The concept of residence could be expanded to include the
idea of “originating” in a state, mentioned above, which might include historical and precolonial connections to the territory that is now the state, moving beyond a focus on
borders.
Gaps in the Laws and Norms of State Succession for Nomads without a Nationality at
Decolonization
The most serious gap in the right to a nationality during state succession is the lack of
specificity even in the soft law as to how to resolve the statelessness of persons who did not
have the nationality of the predecessor state and/or who were stateless. Many nomads
were already stateless under the colonial system, having been entirely excluded or omitted
from colonial-era laws and civil registration and, in many cases, treated as naturally
stateless by colonial governments. With some populations of nomads still suffering from
inter-generational statelessness, as Part 2 showed, this is problem that may persist and
compound in future state successions. Yet, the 1961 Convention does not address how a
state should determine if it is the appropriate actor to resolve cases of statelessness.1650 As
Shaw noted, Article 10 lacks specifics as to how unclear or disputed nationality is to be
resolved during state succession.1651 Interestingly, the Draft Convention on the Reduction
of Future Statelessness of 1954 would have placed an affirmative duty on states to prevent
and resolve cases of statelessness during succession.1652 This language was removed in the
1961 Convention.
An earlier draft of the 1961 Convention, prepared by the International Law Commission,
placed a duty on states to avoid statelessness for their “inhabitants”,
1. Every treaty providing for the transfer of a territory shall include provisions for
ensuring that, subject to the exercise of the right of option, the inhabitants of that
territory shall not become stateless. 2. In the absence of such provisions, a State to
which territory is transferred, or which otherwise acquires territory, or a new
State formed on territory previously belonging to another State or States, shall
confer its nationality upon the inhabitants of such territory unless they retain
For a more recent example of the importance of birth registration for refugee children, see Refugees
International, ‘Senegal: Voluntary repatriation critical for protecting stateless Mauritanians’ (9 Feb. 2007).
1649
1650
See also Edwards, 14.
1651
Shaw, 2008, 1005. See also Weis, 144.
1652 UN General Assembly, Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 4 December 1954, A/RES/896,
Art. 10.
320
their former nationality by option or otherwise or have or acquire another
nationality. 1653
This clause was removed from the final version. There is evidence from the Commentaries
that this removal was deliberate, so as not to burden states by requiring them to
automatically grant nationality to all inhabitants in their territory following a state
succession, but rather to limit nationality to those who clearly had a nationality in the
predecessor state. 1654
Likewise, the Draft Articles limited themselves to preventing statelessness in persons who
had the nationality of the predecessor state. As the Commentaries to the Draft Articles put
it,
(a)ccordingly, the term ‘person concerned’ includes neither persons who are only
nationals of third States nor stateless persons who were present on the territory of
any of the ‘States concerned’.”1655
The commentaries cite to D. P. O’Connell, where he states that “(t)here is an ‘inchoate right’
on the part of any State to naturalize stateless persons resident upon its territory.”1656 The
Draft Articles, however, stop short of creating a duty on the part of states to grant
nationality to those who were already stateless at the time of succession.
As a result, there is a lack of specificity as to how existing cases of statelessness or unclear
nationality are to be resolved during a succession of states. Nevertheless, as Weis puts it,
for cases where nationality was not already established prior to succession, there is some
support for using birth and habitual residence as links to create a presumption of
nationality. 1657 Given the general obligation on states to resolve statelessness, might a duty
under international to grant nationality to stateless persons during a succession of states
be inferred as part of a progressive interpretation of the law? Could this duty be based on
birth and habitual residence in the territory of the state?
International Law Commission, sixth session, (1954), submitted to the General Assembly, para. 25,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II. The term “inhabitants” was not defined.
1653
“Mr. HARVEY (United Kingdom), explaining the reasons for the submission of his delegation’s amendment
to article 10...the Commission’s text went too far in providing that stateless persons resident in a ceded
territory would acquire automatically the nationality of the acquiring...The article should simply provide that
persons who possessed a nationality should not become stateless in consequence of a transfer of territory.”
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the
Nineteenth Meeting, 26 November 1951, A/C0NF.9/C.1/SR.9, page 2.
1654
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-ninth session, Commentary to
Art. 2., Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1997, Vol. II, Part 2 (1997).
1655
1656
D. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession (Cambridge UP 1956), 245, 258, cited in Commentary to Art. 2.
1657
Weis, 145-146.
321
Any solution based on birth or habitual residence is problematic for nomads. First, while
birth in the territory of the state is a clear category on which to base nationality and birth
registration is required by states in international law, place of birth for a nomadic family
may be difficult to establish in some cases. Registration centres may be in urban areas and
nomadic cultural practice may make registration more difficult than for other groups.
There is a risk that place of birth for some nomad families may actually be an inappropriate
way of establishing nationality if, for example, the family spends a period of the year
outside their state of primary residence. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has
recommended that states increase birth registration particularly for nomads, though, for
example, mobile registration clinics,1658 yet there is little guidance from international law
as to whether or not states must take extra steps to facilitate birth registration for nomads.
The concept of habitual residence for nomads is even more problematic. It is not a clear
category and, as a result, it may mean different things in different contexts, particularly for
nomads. It is also nowhere defined under international law. There is no doubt that nomads,
like all people, create links and connections to the territories they occupy, but habitual
residence implies an exclusive relationship that has always been difficult for mobile
peoples to establish, as explained in Part 2.1659
Defining “Habitual Residence” for Nomads Under International Law
Various attempts to define habitual residence by experts, treaties and draft laws and other
instruments have not been very successful, particular when applied to nomads. Weis
attempts to define habitual residence as “those usually called the inhabitants of the
territory, it being understood that physical presence at the material time is essential,” and
excluding “persons who happen to be in the territory accidentally or temporarily.”1660 He
notes the importance of some sort of intent on the part of the individual to establish
residence. For persons outside of the territory of the state at the time of transfer, “return or
travel to the transferred territory with the intention of establishing residence there may be
regarded as implicit acceptance (of nationality.)”1661
Yet for nomads, seasonal migrations should never be taken as evidence of an intent to
establish residence in a particular state to the exclusion of others. This is particularly true
under governments that were in conflict with nomadic populations, such as Mali in 19601962. Without a formal process to establish that an option has been taken, as discussed
above, a reliance on supposed intent as interpreted by the government is unlikely to
1658
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Algeria, para 36, quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 161.
See also Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 3-4 for a discussion on the challenges nomads face in proving
exclusive land use.
1659
Weis, 146. Here, he cites to a series of British cases on determining the nationality of citizens of Ireland
living in the UK.
1660
1661
Weis, 149.
322
produce a good result. Here, an affirmative right of option may be helpful, but once again,
an administrative or judicial procedure may not be easy for nomads to comply with.
Importantly for nomads, Weis defines residence as occurring in only a single location; it is
implied in Weis’s reasoning that one cannot be the resident of two or more places. Here,
the definition of residence begins to resemble exclusive allegiance, a concept that is difficult
for many mobile and nomadic peoples, as well as settled peoples who may maintain
multiple residences, such as in the example of former Bedouin. Conklin points out the
conceptual vagueness surrounding the use of habitual residence in establishing nationality.
“How long,” he asks, “does it take for residence to become habitual? What if there is not a
perfect fit between a state’s border and the habitual residents of its territory? What if a
person is unable to return to her/his state of habitual residence?”1662
The Draft Protocol to the African Charter, quoting the Council of Europe Convention,
defines habitual residence thus:
‘Habitual residence’ shall mean stable factual residence, or the place where a
person has established his or her permanent or habitual centre of interests. 1663
Once again, residence is presented as occurring in a single location. The Draft Articles
discuss habitual residence at length, also treating it as an either/or state of being.
Drawing more widely on international law to see if the meaning of habitual residence may
be further illuminated, the 1951 Refugee Convention, arguably an important human rights
document,1664 implies in article 10 that residence is a single location.1665 The European
Committee of Ministers defined habitual residence thus: “the place where the person had
Conklin, 224-228. Conklin goes on to discuss the concept of “own country” in international law. One may
ask what the concept of own country means for nomads.
1662
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018) at 6, citing to
Explanatory Report to EU Council of Ministers Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility
(known as “Brussels II”) prepared by Dr. Alegría Borrás, para. 32.
1663
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, 22 April 1954, No. 2545 with 146
states parties. J. McAdam, ‘The Refugee Convention as a Rights Blueprint for Persons in Need of International
Protection’ UNHCR Research Paper No. 125 (2006).
1664
UNHCR defines habitual residence as “stable, factual residence,” citing a number of international
instruments, including, “the Hague Conferences on Private International Law,… Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and) the Travaux Préparatoires of that treaty, (where) it refers
to ‘the country in which (the stateless applicant) has resided and where he had suffered or fears he would
suffer persecution if he returned’.” UNHCR Guidelines 9, citing UN Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Persons (Lake Success, New
York, 16 January to 16 February 1950), 17 February 1950, E/1618; E/AC.35/5, 39 and the UNHCR Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019,
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, paragraph 103.
1665
323
established, on a fixed basis, his permanent or habitual centre of interests, with all the
relevant facts being taken into account for the purpose of determining such residence.”1666
Such definitions, if adopted by international treaty, might be problematic for nomads.
Establishing Alternative “Links” for Nomads
International soft law has attempted to create rules for establishing “links” in the absence
of a clear, unitary habitual residence for nomads. The Council of Europe in 1983
recommended, for example, that states recognize a broader set of “links” for nomads:
For the establishment of such a link, one or more of the following criteria could in
particular be taken into consideration:
a. the state concerned is the state of birth or origin of the nomad or the state of
origin of his immediate family;
b. habitual residence or frequent periods of residence of the nomad in the state
concerned provided that the residence in question is not unlawful;
c. the presence in the state concerned of members of the nomad’s immediate family
lawfully staying in that state or possessing its nationality. 1667
While this introduces other elements, it is not clear how useful they are. It is not clear to
what extent there is a distinction between “frequent periods of residence” and “mere
physical presence,” which is not sufficient to create a nationality “link”. 1668 The focus on
“lawful” residence may also be problematic for stateless nomads. A government may argue
that the residency of nomads is illegal because they are stateless or foreign, as Part 2
showed, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of exclusion.1669
When writing definitions, international law, including crucial soft law, could do more to
take into account the actual modalities and practices of nomadism, including pastoralism,
hunter-gatherer lifestyles and peripatetic trade, rather than continuing to employ vague
terms like “residence”. Article 8 of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter attempts to do
so. “Links” for nomads include water points, seasonal grazing zones, and the burial sites of
ancestors. Such lists take into account the actual modalities of nomadism, as mentioned
above, but in so doing, they raise further concerns. It is not clear if and how having special
rules for establishing residence for nomads, a category of persons that has never been
Explanatory Report to EU Council of Ministers Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental
responsibility (known as “Brussels II”) prepared by Dr. Alegría Borrás, para 32) as quoted in the proposed
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a
Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum.
1666
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (83) 1 of the Committee of Ministers
to Member States on Statelessness Nomads and Nomads of Undetermined Nationality, 22 February 1983.
1667
1668
Verwilghen, 62. See also Maury, 14.
1669
Donner, 254. See also Brownlie, Principles, 655-656; Weis, 137.
324
defined under the law, is a good idea.1670 Who is the appropriate government authority for
determining when such connections between nomads and land become suitable grounds
for recognizing a “link” for the purposes of nationality? Using alternative evidence to prove
residence also raises the question of discrimination, as any system tailored towards
nomads’ risks placing nomads in a special category of persons that are treated differently
from other residents. The question of discrimination against nomads by states will be
discussed extensively in Pathway II.
Establishing “Links” and the Burden of Proof
The extent to which states have a burden to establish nomad residence is also somewhat
unclear. For example, the Council of Europe Recommendation 83(1) requires states to
“facilitate” the establishment of residence for nomads.1671 The Recommendation goes on to
say, however, that,
where the link of a nomad with a given state has been established in accordance
with principle No. 2 above, this state should take appropriate measures in order
to permit him to reside on its territory, to travel abroad and to return to its
territory.1672
In Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
recently mandated that in the African context, the burden is on the state to disprove
nationality for persons who have documents to prove nationality in the predecessor
state.1673 The recent Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on
the Specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in
Africa suggests that; “(t)he duty to ‘facilitate’ acquisition of nationality is a term used in
other international treaties that involves at least making such acquisition significantly
easier than for foreigners generally, for example by reaching out to communities known to
be lacking documentation of nationality, by providing a non-discretionary process of
acquisition, such as those known in different countries as declaration, registration or
option, or by reducing the period of residence required.”1674 The Draft Protocol also
suggests that states take into account oral testimony in determining nomad “links”.
International treaties could do more to mandate states parties to accept non-documentary
forms of proof to establish residence, including oral testimony, family records and the
1670
See Costamanga, 46. See also the section on definitions in Part 1, above.
1671
Council of Europe Recommendation 83(1) principle 2.
1672
Council of Europe Recommendation 83(1) principle 3.
See generally B. Manby, ‘Case Note: Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania (Judgement) (African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, APP No. 012/2015, 22 March 2018)’ 1 Statelessness and Citizenship Review 170
(2019).
1673
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018) para. 48.
1674
325
historical or present-day use of wells and moorage points, though doing so may not resolve
the question of residence. Such alternative proofs might also include the recognition of precolonial land arrangements, trade agreements, payment under traditional tax systems and
genealogies, though the necessity of establishing a single point of residence may continue
to be a barrier for nomads. Nevertheless, it would be good for international soft law and
legal experts to engage more systematically on this topic, perhaps in consultation with
nomad leaders. The 2007 Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists,
first mentioned in the Introduction, above, calls for the recognition of pastoral land
ownership, a potentially key step in helping to prove pastoral residence. The problem of
establishing nomad residence, therefore, is linked to the question of nomad land
ownership, discussed extensively in Part 2, above.
Experts continue to come up with new ways for nomads to prove land ownership, methods
which may provide nomads with a firmer footing to establish their residence for the
purpose of nationality. In a recent paper, Jérémie Gilbert and Ben Begbie-Clench argue that
a different system of proving land ownership, one they call “mapping,” may be used by
courts to establish land ownership for nomads.1675 In some court cases, like a recent case in
Sarawak, courts have rejected such efforts as unofficial, but in others, such testimony has
been accepted.1676
The Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists calls for the recognition
of, and compensation for, pastoral ownership and loss of land. Such recognition could also
be used to establish nomad “links” to the territory of the state for the purposes of proving
nationality based on residence. Yet, reliance on proof of land ownership to prove
nationality may create a dangerous cycle for nomads, privileging land owners over nonowners and further politicizing both the question of nomad nationality and the question of
nomad land ownership. Only intensive consultations with nomad communities can thread
this needle.
All of the above risks predicating nationality too much on nomads’ land claims and land
use. Given that statelessness is a human rights violation, the fact that the Bedouin, the
Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut have been present as communities in their regions for
centuries or longer renders an individualistic focus on water points and place of birth
somewhat bizarre. A more reasonable standard would be to apply a presumption of
nationality to all members of a nomadic community with a pre-colonial presence in a
certain region who are recognized as members by that community, through whatever
internal process that communities has or creates, based on a set of stringent principles and
subject to a due, transparent and deliberative process.
Inspiration could be taken from the French principle of possession d’état de national, or the
idea that a community who prior to colonization had always held themselves out as
nationals and been treated as such by their community should be granted state nationality,
1675
Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 9-11 citing a case over land ownership brought by the Batwa in Uganda.
1676
Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 20.
326
perhaps based on an agreement between the nomadic community and the state. 1677 If a
nomadic individual is accepted by his or her community as a member of that community,
nationality is automatically granted by the state. Under this system, civil registration by the
state would no longer be needed; validation by nomadic leaders would be enough to confer
nationality. This system would predicate nationality in a state on nomadic forms of
belonging.
Of particular importance is the question of colonial-era documents. International law does
not provide any guidance as to how colonial-era documents that did not explicitly establish
nationality were to be used, if at all, in helping nationality to “roll over” at
independence.1678 Even if other types of colonial documents were to be accepted as
evidence of colonial-era nationality, which colonial era documents should be used? What,
for example, is the role of British Protected Persons passports? What about persons whose
names appear in colonial-era registries, or who hold colonial-era land title documents, or
membership in colonial organizations? Might such documents be used as evidence of
probable colonial-era nationality in a place like the former French Soudan, where the
intention of the colonial government was to establish a universal nationality?
The Role of Regional and Bilateral Treaties in Resolving Statelessness Resulting from
Decolonization
States, through treaty norms, could also take a more pro-active role in mandating treaties
to resolve statelessness resulting from decolonization and other historical cases of
succession.1679 It is interesting to contemplate the potential role of UNHCR, as the
mandated agency for the Statelessness Conventions, in drafting model procedures for
resolving statelessness originating from the decolonization process. A Memorandum of
Understanding has been signed by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines to look into the
matter of cross-border statelessness has been reported in the press.1680 Increasingly,
regional organizations have been exploring the use of tripartite agreements and regional
action plans to resolve statelessness in such cases, though many of these agreements fall
short of directly addressing the problem of disputed and contested nationality of groups
that straddle borders, including nomads.1681 Most rely on the implementation of national
action plans and the focus of these efforts remains individualized at the nation-state level.
The Banjul Plan of Action for the ECOWAS system, of which Mali is a member, does contain
clauses pertaining to the nationality status of persons living in disputed border regions and
1677
Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 13. This concept is discussed in the Tuareg sections in Part 2.
1678
See for example the discussion in Crawford, 264.
1679
Batchelor, Statelessness, 1998, 156, 168-169. See also Conklin, 19; Costamanga, 44.
1680
Star Online ‘Malaysia, Indonesia to tackle Sabah stateless issue’ (24 Apr 2019).
See for example the Action Plan of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the
Eradication of Statelessness 2017-2019 and the Banjul Plan of Action of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) on the Eradication of Statelessness 2017 – 2024.
1681
327
those who became stateless as a result of the succession of states. 1682 Such clauses may
represent the first steps towards a negotiated regional solution for nomads in border zones
like the Tuareg (though in the case of the Tuareg, neither Libya nor Algeria are members of
ECOWAS).
Dual Nationality
As mentioned above, dual nationality may have been a solution for some nomads during
decolonization, particularly those in border zones. As Rubenstein and Lenagh-Magquire
note, the Nottebohm case served as an important touchstone in the debate over the legality
of dual nationality.1683 The ongoing debate shows the enduring quality of the concept of
exclusivity as a central component of nationality, a concept that, it is argued, strongly
affected the ability of nomads to claim nationality at decolonization, when their loyalty to a
single state was often questioned.
The issue of dual allegiance, or dual nationality, continues to be contentious in modern law,
though there has been some acceptance of it by states. 1684 Paul Weis considered dual
nationality to be a conflict of laws and a “problem.”1685 The level of acceptance by states of
dual nationality today could perhaps be best characterized as ranging from toleration to
hostility. As a reflection of this, early attempts to codify rules on nationality often adopted a
conservative approach to dual nationality. For example, the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws codifies the general principles
in cases where dual nationality is allowed, 1686 but the Convention falls well short of
establishing a right to dual nationality and, indeed, one of the goals of the Convention was
to reduce dual nationality. The Draft Articles on nationality of natural persons in relation to
the succession of States of 1999 also adopted the position that dual nationality on a large
“Establish a committee consisting of representatives from ECOWAS, and respective states to confirm the
nationality of affected populations living in border / disputed areas with the support of UNHCR.” Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Plan of
Action on Eradication of Statelessness, 2017 – 2024, 2017 (Banjul Plan of Action) Objective 5.3.
1682
K. Rubenstein and N. Lenagh-Maguire, ‘More or less secure? Nation laity questions, deportation and dual
nationality’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness under International Law
(Cambridge 2014) 266-269 (hereinafter Rubenstein and Lenagh-Maguire).
1683
“Historically, exclusivity has been an essential characteristic of nationality.” (The authors note the
continuing problem with determining an individual’s “own country.") Rubinstein and Lenagh-Magquire, 270271. See also generally P. Spiro, At Home in Two Countries: The Past and Future of Dual Citizenship (New York
U. 2016); Brownlie, Principles, 389. As Van Ert notes, the matter of dual nationality in cases of the succession
of states remains unsettled. “Attempts are being made to settle this area of law.” Van Ert, 152. See also L. J.
van der Baaren, Emigrant nationality. A comparative analysis of the toleration of dual nationality from an
emigrant perspective (PhD Maastricht 2020).
1684
1685
Weis, 170.
1686 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930) Art. 3. See also
Weis, 186.
328
scale is not something that international law wishes to promote. 1687 While dual nationality
is not prohibited by the Draft Articles,1688 it is not offered as a potential solution to cases of
contested nationality. 1689 As a result, while the implementation of the Draft Articles during
the decolonization process would have been greatly helpful to many nomads, much would
have still been left up to the discretion of states. Most problematically, dual nationality is
framed as something to be avoided, a position taken by the drafters that would have been
extremely unhelpful to nomads.
Historically, exclusivity has been an essential characteristic of nationality...(i)in
the absence of any international legal mechanism to regulate nationality in a
comprehensive way, dual nationality attracted various legal responses in the
international and domestic spheres. 1690
Today, there is greater acceptance in international law for dual nationality, but more could
be done to promote dual nationality as a solution to statelessness for nomads during state
succession. It is worth noting, however, that dual nationality would not automatically
provide a solution to the question of nomad land rights identified in Part 2. Nevertheless, it
could form part of a solution were it to gain greater acceptance under international law.
For example, the non-binding 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states
that indigenous peoples separated by borders have the right to “develop contacts" across
borders, but does not mention dual nationality nor does it present dual nationality as a
solution to the question of “which state” during a succession.1691 Even recent regional
instruments fall short of actively promoting dual nationality.1692 Meanwhile, international
law remains a long way from endorsing dual nationality or creating a right to dual
nationality and many countries continue to outlaw it or do not recognize it, including
Malaysia and Kuwait.
While government hostility to dual nationality may, at first, seem unrelated to their
hostility to nomadism, in actual fact, both hostilities stem from the traditional
1687
Draft Articles Commentaries, Commentary (6), 28.
“The recognition of the possibility of multiple nationality resulting from a succession of States does not
mean that the Commission intended to encourage a policy of dual or multiple nationality. The draft articles in
their entirety are completely neutral on this question, leaving it to the discretion of each and every State.”
Draft Articles Commentary to Art. 1.
1688
“When a person concerned who is qualified to acquire the nationality of a successor State has the
nationality of another State concerned, the former State may make the attribution of its nationality dependent
on the renunciation by such person of the nationality of the latter State.” Draft Articles Art. 9.
1689
1690
Rubinstein and Lenagh-Magquire, 265-266.
1691 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, August 2013, HR/PUB/13/2, Art. 36.
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018), discussing the
increasing acceptance of dual nationality in Africa para. 77.
1692
329
preoccupation in the European system of statehood with the concept of exclusivity,
discussed above in Part 2, and a corresponding dislike of mobility. Dual nationality could
have been part of a workable solution for many nomads during decolonization, but there is
no evidence it was ever seriously entertained, not only by national governments, but by the
international community.1693 In fact, the idea of granting the Tuareg nationalities in Algeria,
Mali and Niger would probably have been seen not as a solution but as tantamount to
creating an independent Tuareg state and a threat to regional security.
Nevertheless, the provision of dual nationality today could potentially be part of a solution
for nomads who straddle boarder regions and migrate across borders, and who therefore
lack clearly exclusive ties to a single state. The idea of dual nationality as a solution to
statelessness, rather than as a source of problems for state security, is not supported by
states in international law in its current form. Rather, dual nationality continues to be
framed as an unfortunate by product of the nation-state system, rather than a solution for
populations, like nomads, who may have ties to multiple states.
A grant of dual nationality could be part of a negotiated settlement between countries to
help resolve tensions over the border and ensure the right to a nationality for cross-border
groups like nomads. But this would require an enormous change of attitude on the part of
such states regarding the purpose and structure of exclusive nationality and how it relates
to allegiance, loyalty, national identity and other issues. Regional solutions are currently
under discussion in West Africa under the auspicious of ECOWAS, which might be
particularly relevant for Mali. In some cases, however, including Mali, the chance of a
negotiated solution seem dim as disputed border areas remain a sense of great tension.
Malaysia and the Philippines lack diplomatic relations, in large part because of disputes
over their border. A negotiated agreement on dual nationality for border populations is
therefore heavily reliant on a political solution.
Arguably, not enough has been done at the international level to promote dual nationality
as a solution for mobile and nomadic populations by highlighting dual nationality not
simply as a problem for the nation-state system, but as a potential solution in tense border
regions. For example, this dissertation was not able to uncover evidence that governments
like Mali have even been asked by international organizations to consider dual nationality
as part of negotiated peace agreements, for example.
Conclusion
Pathway I explored the right to a nationality at state succession as a solution to nomad
statelessness and to prevent possible future statelessness. In addition to the general right
to a nationality under international law, the 1961 Convention obligates states to prevent
stateless resulting from state succession by treaty. Soft law has also added much specificity
in the form of draft treaties and declarations. While the rules on succession of states under
these instruments would have much to offer nomads with a nationality in their colonial
states, the rules for establishing nationality for persons already stateless, or whose
1693
Once again, more research on this point is needed.
330
nationality was simply unclear, are far less articulated even in soft law instruments. These
gaps may have serious consequences for nomads in future cases of state succession as a
result of the ongoing decolonization process, particularly nomads who live in what may
become border zones. More could be done to articulate how a right of option would work
for nomads and to guarantee that refugee communities benefit from this right. In
particular, habitual residence, a key concept, is too vague even in soft law to properly guide
states when it comes to establishing the nationality of nomads, though as Spiro points out,
it may become more accepted as a grounds for granting nationality in the future. 1694
While more recent draft laws have attempted to come up with more precise definitions of
habitual residence for nomads, a lot more could be done to clarify to meaning of this term
and to move beyond a western-centric conception of how “links” between persons and
states are formed. In particular, habitual residence is often treated as occurring in only one
location, a problem for nomadic and mobile peoples. As a result, it is not clear that even soft
law contains enough specificity to truly resolve the problem.
States, through treaty norms, could promote the use of alternative methods of proof of
“links” between states and nomads, such as oral testimony, and revisit the relevance of
colonial era documents and records. Archives might prove a fruitful place to begin
constructing a history of nomad residence, alongside oral histories, cultural practices and
other sources of information that establish residence on a group basis. A holistic approach
might be necessary to establish long term nomad residence, though it remains an open
question as to whether or not special rules for nomads in the establishment of nationality
poses a risk to nomads. Placing questions of belonging in the hands of nomad communities
might be another approach. The value of such approaches, however, remains debatable.
One unexplored solution for many nomads would be the right to dual, or even multiple,
nationality. At the moment, a historical predilection for exclusive allegiance has done much
to harm nomad inclusion. Such a solution could have been offered at the time of
decolonization, but it could also be used today.
Finally, Pathway I explored the role of treaties under international law in establishing
nationality as a result of historical state succession. The 1961 Convention supports treaties
at the time of succession to resolve questions of nationality, but there is no clear
mechanism for resolving unclear nationality status retroactively. International law,
however, could do more to mandate bilateral, tripartite or regional cooperation today as a
means to resolving statelessness resulting from historical cases of succession.
As mentioned above, discrimination is prohibited in the rolling over of nationality at state
succession, yet the laws of state succession are less specific about prohibiting
discrimination against persons who are already stateless or whose nationality is unclear at
the time of state succession. The next section will look at to what extent international law
prohibits discrimination against nomads in the granting of nationality to see if anti-
1694
P. Spiro, ‘A New International Law of Citizenship’ 105 American Journal of International Law 694 (2011).
331
discrimination laws, if applied to cases of nomad exclusion during decolonization, could
have helped stateless nomads to challenge their continued exclusion.
332
Pathway II: Prohibiting Discrimination against Nomads in the Application of
Nationality
Rules which appear to apply equally...may, on closer examination, disadvantage
stateless children and so amount to indirect discrimination.1695
The examples showed that discrimination, defined as “(t)reating one or more members of a
specified group unfairly as compared with other people”, 1696 clearly played a role in the
failure of post-colonial governments to register nomads during decolonization. This
occurred despite the fact that the nationality laws in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia were nondiscriminatory on their face. In part, as the examples showed, this discrimination resulted
from the structure of European nationality itself, which required settlement in territory to
establish residence and a binary choice between discrete nation states. As well, the “broad
discretion" given to post-colonial administrators in determining nationality left room for
discrimination.1697 In some cases, discrimination was the result of the deliberate exclusion
of nomadic groups based on their history and culture of nomadism.
As the example of Kuwait demonstrated, discrimination against nomadism played a role
both in the granting of a lesser nationality status to mobile Bedouin tribes in general and in
the prioritization of certain Bedouin clans over others. It played a role in the targeting of
the Tuareg as a security threat and a threat to the integrity of Mali’s northern border. And it
might have also played a role in the exclusion of nomadic Sama Dilaut from registration,
though this is less clearly established by the review of literature in this dissertation.
The examples also demonstrated how discrimination continues to play a role in
government policy towards nomads, as governments branded nomads as de facto
criminals, non-nationals and threats to security. Statelessness itself has now become
grounds for the further marginalization of nomads and experts on statelessness have noted
that discrimination based on “nomadic lifestyles" plays a role in causing the statelessness
of nomads.1698
Given that discrimination was a cause of nomad statelessness, can international law offer a
solution? Pathway II will examine the international legal framework against discrimination
in the granting of nationality and if this framework can offer a solution to nomads. First,
Pathway II will summarize the international law relating to discrimination. Then, it will
look at the extent to which discrimination against nomads occurred. Finally, it will look at
the grounds upon which discrimination occurred and examine to what extent
1695
De Chickera and Whiteman, 100.
1696
This definition is taken from the Oxford Reference Dictionary at
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095721450
1697
De Chickera and Whiteman, 104.
1698
De Chickera and Whiteman, 103-104.
333
discrimination against nomadism as a cultural practice is prohibited under international
law.
The International and Regional Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in the Granting of Nationality
Non-discrimination has long been a founding principle of human rights law. International
law expressly prohibits discrimination in the granting and withdrawal of nationality for
enumerated reasons, in particular, that of race, ethnicity, religion, disability and gender or
other status.1699 Relevant instruments, some of which have been mentioned above in the
introduction to Part 3 and in Pathway I, include the Charter of the United Nations,1700 the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Other laws that establish the principle of non-discrimination include the ILO Convention
concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation No. 111 of 1958, 1701
the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960, 1702 the UNESCO
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice of 1978,1703 and UN declarations such as the UN
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on
Religion or Belief of 1981.1704 Non-discrimination is a founding principle of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child in Article 2. It is also a principle of Article 5 of the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 1705 and the indigenous rights framework, primarily
Human Rights Council, Thirty-first session, Impact of the arbitrary deprivation of nationality on the
enjoyment of the rights of children concerned, and existing laws and practices on accessibility for children to
acquire nationality, inter alia, of the country in which they are born, if they otherwise would be stateless,
Report of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/31/29 4. See also Human Rights Council Nineteenth session, Human
rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, Report of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/19/43 (December
2011). See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 2
1699
1700
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
1701
International Labor Organization, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No.
111), with 175 ratifications.
1702
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention against Discrimination in
Education 1960, Paris, 14 December 1960.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Declaration on Race and Racial
Prejudice, 27 November 1978.
1703
1704
United Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief, General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981.
1705 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York, 13 December 2006, 3
May 2008, No. 44910 with 182 parties.
334
ILO Convention 1691706 and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Arts.
15 and 22, discussed above in the introduction to Part 3.
Several international treaties expressly prohibit discrimination in the granting of
nationality. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination guarantees a right to a nationality without racial prejudice in Article 5,
though Article 1, paragraph 2 carefully preserves states’ rights to set nationality law. 1707
Non-discrimination on racial grounds expressly extends to non-citizens.1708 Nevertheless,
(a)rticle 1, paragraph 2, must be construed so as to avoid undermining the basic
prohibition of discrimination; hence, it should not be interpreted to detract in any
way from the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.1709
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits the withdrawal of
nationality for reasons of race, ethnicity, religion or on political grounds. Gender
discrimination in nationality law is prohibited by the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which in Article 9 guarantees women equal rights with men in obtaining
and maintaining their nationality, as well as passing it to their children. 1710 The Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Article 18 guarantees the right to a nationality
without discrimination based on disability and mandate that states provide for “reasonable
accommodation” to disabled persons.
1706
International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 169) concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in
independent countries, Geneva, 27/06/1989, with 23 ratifications.
See also Interights, ‘Non-Discrimination in International Law: A Handbook for Practitioners’ (2011) and
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for
Implementation’ (2010). See also R. Govil and A. Edwards, ‘Women, Nationality and Statelessness: The
Problem of Unequal Rights’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless: Children 169. See
also Van Waas, Nationality, 59; Edwards, 25.
1707
1708
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Sixty-fifth session (2005), General
recommendation XXX on discrimination against non-citizens.
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30, Discrimination
against Non-citizens (Sixty-fourth session, 2004), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004).
1709
Prohibitions on discrimination in the granting of nationality for reasons of gender are also supported by
resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council. Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Resolution
adopted by the Human Rights Council on 30 June 2016, A/HRC/RES/32/5 (15 July 2016). See also Human
Rights Council, Twenty-third session, ‘Report on discrimination against women on nationality-related
matters, including the impact on children’ A/HRC/23/23 (15 March 2013).
1710
335
Non-discrimination is a founding principle of international law when it comes to both law
and practice. Under international law, discrimination in both purpose and effect is
prohibited.
While these conventions deal only with cases of discrimination on
specific grounds, the Committee believes that the term ‘discrimination’
as used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.1711
Not only may a law violate the norm of non-discrimination on its face, but facially neutral
laws may be applied in discriminatory ways. Discrimination in the application of law may
take place at the national, regional or local level. It may be committed by all organs of
government, including the police, courts, government agencies and others.
Non-discrimination is also central to regional human rights law. It is contained within the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, to which Mali is a party, as well as
the Arab Charter on Human Rights, to which Kuwait is a party. 1712 Regional human rights
courts, including the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the African Commission and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, have
handed down decisions on discrimination in the application of nationality, which will be
discussed below.1713 Non-discrimination in the granting and withdrawal of nationality has
been claimed before regional courts and treaty bodies with some success. Litigation can be
a particularly effective tool in pressuring states to resolve cases of discrimination.1714
Many experts consider the principle of non-discrimination to be jus cogens.1715
Additionally, Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia are parties to several of the binding conventions
mentioned above, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 1716 Malaysia also
ratified the Child Act of 2001, however, where it noted its reservation to Article 7 on the
right to a nationality in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Kuwait and Mali are also
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination (10 November
1989) (my italics).
1711
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights (22 May 2004), reprinted in 12 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep.
893 (2005), entered into force March 15, 2008. Additional information on the specific treaty obligations of
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia is available above in the section on the international laws of nationality.
1712
1713
See for example the European Court of Human rights, K2 v. United Kingdom 42387 (2017).
See generally L. Bingham and L. Gamboa, ‘Litigating Against Statelessness’ in L. van Waas and M. Khanna,
Solving Statelessness (Wolf LP 2016).
1714
1715
Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session, A/69/10 (2014).
1716
See the above section on the international obligations of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia.
336
parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, though notably, Malaysia is not.1717 Mali is also a party to the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families, though Malaysia and Kuwait are not. Given the strength of support for nondiscrimination, would international law, if applied to nomads in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia
at decolonization, have assisted nomads to register as nationals? Could these laws provide
them with a means to challenge their statelessness today?
Applying the International Protections Against Discrimination to Nomads
(E)xclusion is often experienced in newly independent States that define
citizenship in a manner that excludes persons belonging to certain minority
groups who are considered as ‘outsiders’ despite long-standing ties to the
territory of the new State.1718
Nomads suffered from severe discrimination during the colonial period and post-colonial
period in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. Nomads continue to suffer from discrimination to the
present day. This discrimination has taken many forms. Colonial administrators used
registration and forced settlement as forms of coercive assimilation. Colonial borders split
nomadic communities, entrenching their status as minorities that were outnumbered and
dominated by settled communities.1719 As a result, nomadic communities entered the postcolonial period as minorities and wary of government registration. Nomads ended up with
ties to multiple states, making it more difficult to establish their loyalty and belonging in
the rush to register nationality that followed political independence. A lack of civil
registration, particularly in rural areas, left nomads without a way to prove their residence
or place of birth.
Discrimination against nomads would only continue into the post-colonial period, including
in the granting of nationality. While some nationality laws, like that of Mali, contained
explicitly, racially discriminatory language, there is no evidence these clauses were used to
exclude specific ethnic groups within Mali. Instead, as Part 2 discussed, many post-colonial
nationality laws appeared neutral on their face when it came to nomads, but these laws
reflected a systemic bias against mobility and nomadism inherent in nationality law. This
bias made it difficult for nomads to access at nationality. For example, a reliance on
habitual residence in granting nationality during a succession of states is permissible under
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, 195 ratified by Kuwait 15 October 1968, by Mali, 16 July 1974.
1717
1718
OHCHR, ‘Fact Sheet No.18 (Rev.1),’ Minority Rights 4-6.
Nomads are not always in the minority in all parts of the world, as the example of Mongolia shows. Even
today, one fourth of the population of Mongolia remains nomadic. The government has instituted a number of
programs to support nomadism in Mongolia, which is seen as an important part of the country’s heritage.
1719
337
international law, as Pathway I discussed. Yet, habitual residence, as Part 2 showed, may be
especially difficult for nomads to establish.
In addition, as Part 2 showed, nationality laws were often applied in a discriminatory way.
While in Mali, as Part 2 showed, there is evidence that some Tuareg may have rejected
Malian nationality, many others appear to have never had the opportunity to register due
to the military crackdown and armed conflict in their region. While some Tuareg leaders
resisted joining Mali, promises of an independent state by the former colonial power did
not come to fruition. Instead, the Tuareg found themselves being administered by a
military government with little interest in civil registration. Rather than reach out to
nomadic communities to make sure they were included in registration exercises, some
post-colonial governments, like that of Kuwait, actively prevented nomads from registering
as nationals and took advantage of many Bedouins’ feelings of ambivalence about
registering as Kuwaiti nationals. In other cases, like Malaysia, governments failed to reach
out to nomads, who were seen as unsuitable for nationality, even as they registered
sedentary members of the same community. No effort was made to present the Sama Dilaut
with an informed choice about the availability of Malaysian nationality and to what extent
registering with the state would remain open to them in the future.
Successive governments in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia came to view stateless nomads as
security threats, terrorists or criminals, while settled communities were not treated in this
way. Nomads were sometimes placed under military, rather than civilian rule, or their
territories were administered by the military, further restricting their access to civil
government and, as a result, civil registration. As Part 2 demonstrated, while many nomads
did not see the importance of registering as nationals in the immediate post-colonial
period, their descendants sometimes attempted to rectify this problem but found
themselves locked out by the introduction of strict jus sanguinis nationality laws or by
limitations on naturalizations and other restrictions.
Intent on promoting nationality unity, governments pushed to settle nomads and
assimilate them into the majority population, or to further isolate and exclude them. Places
to register were located in distant, urban areas and nomad forms of belonging were
ignored in favour of a system based on documents. The statelessness of many nomadic
families became entrenched and inter-generational as governments moved nomads off of
valuable lands containing oil and natural resources. As a result, nomads, often more than
other groups, were targeted for forced removal from their lands, worsening nomadgovernment relations.
Coercive settlement policies decimated nomadic populations, further reducing them to
minority status. While not tied to nationality on their face, coercive settlement policies and
removal from land often went hand-in-hand with civil registration, placing nomadic
communities in an impossible position and linking nationality to assimilation.
Is such discrimination against nomads and mobile groups prohibited by states in
international law and/or regional law? It is hard to charge individual states with
discrimination against nomads given the systemic bias against mobility in nationality law.
It is the purpose of nationality laws to draw a distinction between an in-group and an out338
group.1720 Drawing distinctions between foreigners and nationals is considered to be a
permissible function of nationality and, in fact, is one of the principle functions of
nationality. It is not required under international law that states grant a nationality to
immigrants,1721 only that they apply immigration laws without discrimination on the basis
of other grounds, such as race. The grounds on which distinctions are drawn are therefore
critically important to determining when a violation of international law has occurred. The
next sections will examine to what extent nomads were discriminated against in the
application of nationality on grounds that are not permissible under international law.
Discrimination Against Nomads Based on Race, Ethnicity, National Origins and Historical
Migration
The power to exclude foreigners as a class of people is not prohibited by states in
international law, unless such exclusion is discriminatory because it is on account of
certain prohibited grounds like race.1722 The United Nations Human Rights Council has
specified that failure to grant nationality to a child for reasons of discrimination based on
“race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, property, disability, birth or other status” amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of
nationality. 1723
Regional courts and commission have given guidance on how treaties prohibiting
discrimination should be applied to individual cases. In IHRDA v. Mauritania, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that illegal, racial discrimination was the
cause of the denationalization and expulsion of black Mauritanians from Mauritania that
began in 1989 under a racially targeted program of “Arabization”. 1724 Such expressly racial
As Van Waas puts it, an important function of nationality is to decide, “...who is ‘us’ and who is ‘them’..."
Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 31. See also E. Isin and P. Nyers, who call it “inside/outside logic.” Isin and Nyers,
2014, 4. For a detailed discussion of nationality’s innately discriminatory purpose, see also Habermas, 107;
Crawford, 263.
1720
Except in limited humanitarian circumstances, such as by providing a pathway to nationality for refugees
under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
1721
1722
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), CERD General Recommendation XXX
on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, (1 October 2002).
Human Rights Council, Thirty-first session, ‘Impact of the arbitrary deprivation of nationality on the
enjoyment of the rights of children concerned, and existing laws and practices on accessibility for children to
acquire nationality, inter alia, of the country in which they are born, if they otherwise would be stateless’
A/HRC/31/29 (16 December 2015) 3. See also Brownlie, Principles, 384.
1723
IHRDA v. Mauritania, African commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (May 11, 2000). In 2006,
applicants filed a case before the European Court of Human Rights arguing that the removal of at least 18,000
ethnic non-Slovenians from the civil registry, including many Roma, was discriminatory under Article 14 of
the European Convention. The Court applied other legal grounds and did not make a finding on the
discrimination claim. Case of Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, third section, European Court of Human Rights (13
July 2010) 80-82.
1724
339
grounds for failing to grant a group of nationality is clearly prohibited under international
law.
Indirect, or de facto, racial discrimination is also prohibited:
The Special Rapporteur would like to highlight that the prohibition on racial
discrimination in international human rights law aims at much more than a formal
vision of equality. Equality in the international human rights framework is
substantive, and requires States to take action to combat intentional or purposeful
racial discrimination, as well as to combat de facto or unintentional racial
discrimination.1725
Regional courts have also established that discrimination in the granting and withdrawal of
nationality is prohibited on the grounds of national origins. In Yean and Bosico v. Dominican
Republic, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights clarified that national origins cannot
be grounds for discrimination in the granting of nationality. The case concerned the
Dominican Republic, a country that follows jus soli. The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights addressed the issue of withdrawal of nationality from persons of Haitian descent
whom the government had labelled as being the descendants of “transients” not
permanently settled in the Dominican Republic, despite being born there. 1726 This case
dealt with both ethnic and racial discrimination, but also discrimination based on national
origins.
The Inter-American Commission had previously argued that the government had violated
the jus soli provision of its own Constitution by denying birth certificates to qualifying
children born in the territory of the state for improperly discriminatory reasons based on
race.1727 The Court argued that migratory status of one’s parents or grandparents can never
be a condition of nationality in a jus soli country.1728 It therefore concluded that the law was
discriminatory on the basis of national origins.
In 2011, the issue of discriminatory nationality laws for reasons of national origins and
ethnicity was also adjudicated by the African Committee of Experts and the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, the treaty body for the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child.1729 Nubians in Kenya were brought to the country by the British during the
colonial period. Because the government had decided that children of Nubian descent in
Kenya did not have an “ancestral homeland” in Kenya, they were deemed to not qualify as
Human Rights Council, Thirty-eighth session ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (18 June – 6 July 2018) 6.
1725
Jean and Bosico. The case dealt with the refusal of the government of the Dominican Republic to issue
birth certificates to certain children based on their national origin.
1726
1727
Jean and Bosico, paras. 111 and 112.
1728
Jean and Bosico, para. 156.
1729
See generally Nubian Children.
340
Kenyan nationals.1730 This case turned on the use of nationality to exclude an ethnic group
that was claimed to be an immigrant group by the Kenyan government, despite being long
settled in Kenya since prior to decolonization.
In this case, the government clearly pushed for a definition of nationality based on a
combination of ethnic grounds and national origins. The Committee, however, rejected the
argument that discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and national origins is permissible
under regional human rights law and found instead that discrimination against children of
Nubian descent clearly violated their human rights. The migration history of the ancestors
of the Nubian population was not enough to justify the continued denial of nationality. In
short, the historical migrations of a community going back several generations were simply
irrelevant to their current nationality status.
How might this case be applied to nomads? Under this case, discrimination in the granting
of nationality in jus sanguinis countries is impermissible when done on grounds of ethnicity
and/or historic migration to the region, where the migration stretched back to colonial or
pre-colonial times. Importantly, however, the non-nationals in this case were long settled
in the territory of the state, not practicing a mobile, cross-border lifestyle.
It is unacceptable to describe the alleged victims in this case as foreigners in transit,
since those who live for 10, 15 or more years in a country cannot be described as
transients.1731
In Nubian Children before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also discussed
above, the Nubian population in Kenya is clearly and indisputably long settled in Kenya, not
migrating across an international border. Beyond the vulnerability of cross-border
populations, even former nomads may find it difficult to prove their long-standing
settlement in the area. As well, labelling nomads as historical migrants or persons of a
different national origin risks reinforcing the idea that nomads are immigrants who lack
long-standing ties to the territories in which they now live, reinforcing government
arguments in favour of their exclusion and the seizure of their lands.
How might these cases be applied to nomads? Classifying nomads as racial or ethnic
minorities may be appropriate in some contexts but not in others, depending on the group
and the circumstances. As Part I showed, the concept of nomads as separate, distinct races
or ethnicities was a colonial construction. This is not to say that discrimination against
nomads as a perceived race or ethnicity is never useful, rather that classifying nomads as
separate ethnicities or races may not be universally accepted and may continue to impose
an external world-view on them. Also, it can be difficult to link the supposed race or
ethnicity of nomads, or their language or religion, to their statelessness because, as Part 2,
it is the practice of nomadism, more than any other factor, that has led to discrimination in
the granting of nationality by states. While race, ethnicity, language and religion may all be
factors contributing to discrimination against nomads, particularly as part of an
1730
Nubian Children, para. 3.
1731
Jean and Bosico, 111.
341
intersectional approach,1732 the centrality of discrimination against mobility and nomadism
as a way of life cannot and should not be overlooked.
Meanwhile, classifying nomads as “historical migrants” is also problematic as it implies that
nomads are from somewhere else, a claim that many states have used to justify persecution
of nomads and their removal from their lands. Such a “solution” therefore risks entrenching
anti-nomad bias, rather than supporting nomad rights. Furthermore, Jean and Bosico
reaffirms the principle under international law that nationality is tied to residence and
settlement, a principle that may be challenging for nomads who wish to continue practicing
a mobile lifestyle, particularly a cross-border mobile lifestyle. Because nationality is tied to
settlement and long-term residence, the international and regional laws of nationality
appear themselves to reinforce discrimination against mobility and nomadism. Labelling
nomads as historical migrants or persons of different national origins risks entrenching,
rather than solving, their exclusion.
What emerged most clearly from the analysis of the root causes of nomad statelessness is
the centrality of discrimination against nomadism and mobility as a way of life and cultural
practice in the three examples discussed above, yet nomadism is not articulated as one of
the grounds for protection from discrimination under international law. Discrimination
against nomadism is therefore often the central factor in nomad statelessness, though
other factors like ethnicity and religion play an important role. The question then becomes
whether or not discrimination in nationality law based primarily the practice of a mobile
lifestyle, particularly a cross-border mobile lifestyle, might be inferred under international
law? This question is particularly thorny, as was highlighted above, because of the systemic
bias against mobility and, by extension, nomadism that is baked into nationality law, even
at the international level.
Discrimination on the Grounds of Minority Status
Non-discrimination in international law is also closely tied to minority rights. Under the
non-binding United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, minority status may be protected on grounds of
nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion or language.1733 Discrimination frequently targets
minorities and, as Part 2 discussed, many nomads now find themselves as ethnic, religious,
or linguistic minorities in every state in which they live. They are also minorities based on
their nomadic lifestyle.
1732 Human Rights Council, Thirty-eighth session ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (18 June – 6 July 2018) 9-12.
U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, 3 February 1992, A/RES/47/135.
1733
342
Minorities may be simply defined as “[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the
population of a State...”1734 or as,
a non-dominant group of individuals who share certain national, ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics which are different from those of the
majority population.1735
Under the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, minorities have the right to fully exercise
their human rights and to practice their cultures, languages, religions, traditions and
customs.1736 Particularly important for nomads, cross-border minorities have the right to
participate in decision-making on both the national and regional level and maintain
contacts with one another across borders. Minorities have the right to participate in public
life.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), binding on states, in
Article 27 prohibits discrimination against ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities
specifically in the practicing of those minorities’ cultures, languages and religions. As the
Human Rights Council specified,
The terms used in article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be
protected are those who belong to a group and who share in common a
culture, a religion and/or language. Those terms also indicate that the
individuals designed to be protected need not be citizens of the State party...
migrant workers or even visitors in a State party constituting such minorities
are entitled not to be denied the exercise of those rights.1737
In the context of discrimination, minority status is often based on a characteristic such as
ethnicity, language or religion. Under Article 27 of the ICCPR, ethnic, linguistic and religious
minorities have the right to practice their own culture, languages and religions.
Castellino and Doyle, 16, quoting F. Capotorti, Special Rapporteur, Study on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1977).
1734
1735
OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.18 (Rev.1), Minority Rights.
U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, 3 February 1992, A/RES/47/135, Art. 4.
1736
Human Rights Committee general comment No. 23 (1994) on the rights of minorities, quoted in Note by
the Secretary-General, Effective promotion of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, A/74/160 (15 July 2019) 16. Minority may also be defined as
“[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State.” Castellino and Doyle, 16, quoting F.
Capotorti, Special Rapporteur, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1977).
1737
343
(A minority is a) non-dominant group of individuals who share certain
national, ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which are different
from those of the majority population.1738
Also:
An ethnic, religious or linguistic minority is any group of persons which
constitutes less than half of the population in the entire territory of a State
whose members share common characteristics of culture, religion or
language, or a combination of any of these. A person can freely belong to an
ethnic, religious or linguistic minority without any requirement of
citizenship, residence, official recognition or any other status.1739
Minority rights include special rights to protect against assimilation.1740 The 1992
Declaration supports the rights of minorities to their own cultures.1741 As well, the ICCPR
protects the rights of ethnic minorities to practice their cultures and minority status
regularly is defined by, among other attributes, the practice of a common culture. It is less
clear, however, to what extent minority rights protect the right to a nationality, the right to
civil registration and protect against statelessness.
As Part 2 discussed, many nomads became minorities during the colonial period, when
they were divided by colonial borders. Aggressive settlement tactics have only shrunk
many nomadic populations, further reducing them to minority status. Many nomads are
minorities and have suffered ancillary discrimination on account of their language or
religion, enumerated categories under minority rights. The link between nondiscrimination for minorities and their right to a nationality under international could be
clearer. This is particularly important for groups, like nomads, who do not always easily fit
under the categories of race or national origin. For nomads who identify as linguistic,
ethnic, religious and cultural minorities, protections against discrimination in the granting
of nationality on account of their minority status could be more strongly articulated under
international law. The minority rights framework could also do more to specifically
prohibit discrimination in the granting of nationality and accessing civil rights.
Minority rights could also be strengthened by specifically listing nomadism as a cultural
practice. While nomads are frequently discriminated against based on language, religion
and ethnicity, defining nomadism as a type of cultural practice would make this
1738
OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.18 (Rev.1), Minority Rights.
Note by the Secretary-General, Effective promotion of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, A/74/160 (15 July 2019).
1739
P. Brett, ‘Discrimination and Childhood Statelessness in the Work of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’
in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless: Children (Wolf 2017) 169-178. See also
Arendt 1976 273, where she discusses the dangers of assimilation for minorities.
1740
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
A/RES/47/135, 18 December 1992.
1741
344
discrimination, which was described at length in Part 2, above, clearly prohibited under
international law.
Nomadism and Indigenous Status
The indigenous rights framework protects indigenous persons from discrimination in the
granting of nationality. Over the course of the last few decades, international law has
increasingly recognized collective rights, or the rights of groups to make claims against
their governments on a group basis.1742 The theory of collective rights underpins the
indigenous rights framework, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, the flagship, though non-binding, international instrument
enumerating indigenous rights.1743
Article 6 of the non-binding 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
states that “every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.”1744 It goes on to
protect indigenous ways of life and outlaw discrimination based on indigenous status. The
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Article 2 prohibits discrimination
against indigenous persons on the bases of indigenous identity:
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and
individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the
exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or
identity.1745
The indigenous rights framework has assisted in raising the profile of indigenous rights,
including the rights of many nomads.1746 Nomadism may be framed as a protected cultural
practice under the indigenous rights framework. Nomadism as an indigenous cultural
practice may therefore be related to nomadism as a cultural practice for the purposes of
minority status. The two frameworks would therefore complement each other. Nomadism
1742
Kymlicka, 3, 7, 34. See also Miller, 86.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, resolution adopted by the General
Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. See also Crawford 112; Van Genugten et al., 2014, 98; Castellino
and Doyle, 8.
1743
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia all voted in favor of the Declaration. For more on indigenous rights, see generally
the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs at http://www.iwgia.org. Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia all
voted in favor of the Declaration. For more on indigenous rights, see generally the International Work Group
for Indigenous Affairs at http://www.iwgia.org.
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Article 6. 144 states voted in favor. See also Van
Genugten et al., 2014, 99.
1744
1745
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Article 2.
“(I)ndigenous groups have managed to establish alternative routes to recognition and voice, leading to
the creation, for example, of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the 2007 Indigenous
Declaration which aimed to alleviate this exclusion from international systems (e.g. see OHCHR 2013), as well
as through resistance and protest.” Bloom, Members, 2017, 166.
1746
345
could also be classified as a “traditional economic activity” protected under Articles 3, 5
and 20 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and under Article 27 of the
ICCPR.1747 As with the minority rights framework, however, the indigenous rights
framework could be more specific in defining nomadism in these ways.
While many nomads identify as indigenous peoples, however, this framing may not be ideal
for others. In cases where a group’s indigenous status may be disputed by the government,
it is important to note that there is no settled definition of indigenous, nor methods by
which such disputes could be settled.1748
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them.
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions
and legal systems.1749
Legal experts have offered varying opinions on how to define indigenous status. Some
scholars argue that first occupancy of land lies at the heart of the concept of indigenous, but
others dispute this claim.1750 Others argue strongly in favour of self-identification and of
identification by other indigenous groups, akin to the recognition that states give to other
states, the approach taking by ILO Convention 169, which emphasizes state recognition of
indigenous or tribal status.1751 The United Nations Development Group, which provides
guidance on mainstreaming the sustainable development goals, cites a variety of factors
that may be relevant to the identification of indigenous peoples, including most
importantly self-identification, but also historical continuity with pre-colonial societies,
priority in time, a strong link to particular territories and natural resources, distinct social
systems and culture from the majority population, and a history of discrimination. 1752
1747
Gilbert, Still, 2004-2005, 144-145, 159.
Concerns over the lack of a definition of indigenous status were raised during the drafting of the UN
Declaration. See Castellino and Doyle, 27.
1748
Statement of the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Discrimination against Indigenous
Populations, José Martínez Cobo at http://indigenousfoundations.web.arts.ubc.ca/global_actions/.
1749
1750
For a brief overview of the debate, see Castellino and Doyle, 17-18.
International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989, C169
(1989), Art. 1. See also Castellino and Doyle, 19.
1751
United Nations Development Group, ‘Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues’ (New York and Geneva
2009) 8-9. See also Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 12. Gilbert notes that the United Nations, World Bank and
1752
346
As Part 2 explored, governments often refuse to recognize nomads as indigenous, framing
them instead as immigrants. Using the indigenous rights framework as a pathway to a
solution for nomads therefore carries the risk that the right to a nationality for nomads gets
lost in a debate over the status of nomads as indigenous persons. The framework is
frequently applied in so-called “settler states,” where the majority population are recent
immigrants, but this is not the case in many parts of the world where nomads live. 1753 It is
not always easy to apply this framework in places like Malaysia and Mali, where the
government sometimes treats nomads like the Tuareg and Sama Dilaut as either
immigrants or foreigners.1754 As Castellino and Doyle point out, other international
frameworks, such as minority rights, might be more appropriate for nomads in some
cases.1755
In states like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, concepts of indigenous rights have often been
employed to justify nomad exclusion. Indigenous is often used as a synonym for native,
implying that an indigenous group was present in a location before colonization. 1756 This
view, that indigenous implies first in time, appears to have been at least implied by the
Government of Kenya in Endorois case.1757 “(P)articular importance is always placed on the
requirement that the group...must have occupied and used a fairly definable territory
before present day state borders...”1758 As Part 2 explored, the claim of being “first in time”
or present in a certain territory before a certain date may be difficult for nomads to defend.
Recently, however, indigenous rights have begun to move away from its classical colonial
framing of “first in time.”1759 For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
International Labor Organization have all offered working definitions, with self-identification as the
foundation. Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 14.
See generally Bloom, Members, 2017, 155-156 for a discussion of the usefulness of the indigenous rights
framework to indigenous statelessness.
1753
For a discussion of nomads as indigenous peoples, see Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 695. See also Gilbert,
Nomadic, 2014, 57; S. Imai and K. Buttery, ‘Indigenous Belonging: A Commentary on Membership and Identity
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People’ 49 York UP (working paper, 2013)
(hereinafter Imai and Buttery).
1754
1755
Castellino and Doyle, 25-27.
1756
Van Genugten et al., 2014, 100.
1757
Endorois, 139, 159-160.
M. Ahren, ‘The Provisions on Lands, Territories and National Resources in the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction’ cited in Castellino and Doyle, 30.
1758
See for example the courts language in Endorois, para. 154, where it says, “(t)he African Commission is
also aware that though some indigenous populations might be first inhabitants, validation of rights is not
automatically afforded to such pre-invasion and pre-colonial claims.”
1759
“Some suggest that a state has a right to territorial sovereignty if the individuals who constitute the state can
prove that they are the original occupants (or their rightful successors) of the territory in question.” C.
Hanjian, The Sovrien: An Exploration of the Right to Be Stateless (Polyspire 2003) 116-117. Hanjian goes on to
347
extended indigenous status to a group descended from African slaves brought to Suriname
in Saramaka v Suriname. This broadened the definition of indigenous to groups who
arrived to what is now Suriname during the colonial period. 1760
Speaking of the African context, Castellino and Doyle say,
(i)t is not the issue of aboriginality, who came first, that is a fundamental
aspect of the definition of indigenous peoples, as suggested by the states, but
rather the current relations of oppression within those African societies. 1761
The extension of indigenous rights to groups who were not “first in time” shows a possible
way forward for some nomads.1762 A progressive interpretation of indigenous may make
the indigenous rights framework helpful to a broader class of nomadic peoples.
As a practical matter, however, it can be difficult to establish indigenous status when
indigenous practices and lifestyles are gone. 1763 For example, as Part 2 explored in detail, it
may be difficult to define the bidoon as an indigenous group, since some bidoon are not
descended from Bedouin groups and are not indigenous to the region. In other cases,
bidoon families may have no way to prove their family history. Changes to group identity
over time may therefore complicate indigenous status. 1764
The point of this section is not to voice an opinion one way or another as to whether nor
not specific nomadic groups are indigenous, but to point out that many factors, including
government programs of assimilation, the risk of conflation between nomadism and
migration, the long-term removal of nomads from their lands, as well as the fact of mobility
itself, sometimes make the indigenous rights framework difficult, or maybe even risky, to
apply to nomads. Nevertheless, with state buy-in, the indigenous rights framework remains
a potential tool to preventing discrimination and, critically, assimilation for some nomads.
It may be used in tandem with minority rights to protect nomads from discrimination in
the granting of nationality.
ask, “Which...criteria (are) to be used to determine the first occupants? Who has the legitimate authority to
decide this matter?”
Endorois, 159-160. For more on recent developments on this question, see F. MacKay, ‘The Rights of
Maroons in International Human Rights Law’ Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine (December 2001); C.
Tavani, Collective Rights and the Cultural Identity of the Roma: A Case Study of Italy (Brill 2020) 48-49.
1760
1761
Castellino and Doyle, quoting Regino, Montes and Cisneros, 29.
F. MacKay, ‘The Rights of Maroons in International Human Rights Law’ Cultural Survival Quarterly
Magazine, (December 2001).
1762
1763
Endorois, para. 161.
For more on how governments themselves construct and influence indigenous identities, see the
discussion in Bloom, Members, 2017, 166.
1764
348
Nomadism as an “Other Status” under International Law
Does international law provide other solutions? Under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Art. 2 and the International Covenants, the inclusion of a category for “other status”
has potentially opened up protections from discrimination to a broader class of persons.
Could nomadism be considered to be an “other status” under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and a progressive interpretation of international law? This approach has had
clear success when it comes to discrimination based on sexual orientation, in part because
the United Nations has made such a progressive interpretation a focus of its work. 1765
Could a similar progressive interpretation be made for nomadism? Put another way, is
there an express right to be nomadic under international law?
Freedom of movement is a fundamental human right. Does it support the right to be
nomadic? For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees
freedom of movement in Article 12, including the right to enter and leave one’s country.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does so likewise in Article 13. The American
Declaration of 1948 in Article 8 guarantees that; “every person has the right to fix his
residence within the territory of the state of which he’s a national...” Freedom of movement
in the 1951 Refugee Convention is closely tied to the establishment of a residence in Article
26.
Though the right to freedom of movement, in the sense of changing residence within a
state, is well established in international law, the right to engage in a mobile lifestyle
arguably is not.1766 Gilbert notes that right to freedom of movement is designed not to
support a mobile lifestyle but to allow settled people to change residence.1767 As Gilbert
points out, “international law is fundamentally in favour of settled societies in supporting
predominantly sedentarist States to the detriment of nomadic forms of organization.”1768
Gilbert also notes that “(f)ree movement being the essence of nomadism, it is surprising
how little the right to free movement has been associated with a nomadic lifestyle.”1769
The Council of Europe Recommendations on Stateless Nomads and Nomads of
Undetermined Nationality (R 83(1)) and on the Social Situation of Nomads in Europe (R
75(13)) contain support for nomadism as a way of life, a right that is supported by the
freedom of movement generally enjoyed within the European Union. These Council of
J. Gary and N. Rubin, ‘Are LGBT rights human rights? Recent developments at the United Nations UN
Matters,’ Psychology International (June 2012).
1765
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article
40,’ Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Addendum General Comment No.
27(67): Freedom of Movement (article 12).
1766
1767
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 75.
1768
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 58.
1769
Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 72.
349
Europe Recommendations are two of the few instruments that expressly mention a right to
be nomadic.
Some support for the right to cross borders and maintain a mobile lifestyle as part of
seasonal transhumance may be found under the ECOWAS framework, such as in the
ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting Regulation (2003), where it
states that ECOWAS should take measures to “facilitate” transhumance.1770 As well, there
has been some acknowledgment of nomadic peoples’ rights to cross international borders
as part of the freedom to enter or leave one’s country, such as via the Jay Treaty between
the United States and Canada.1771 The International Labor Organization Recommendation
104 recommends that government protect tribal rights to cross borders.1772 In general,
however, the practice of nomadism and/or a mobile lifestyle lacks clear protections under
both regional and international law. The rarity of such clauses points to a gap in
international law on guaranteeing the right to be nomadic. This is not a coincidence, but is
deeply related to the systemic bias against nomadism in nationality law.
While support for protections for a mobile lifestyle or cultural practice remains thin under
international law, there are signs this is beginning to change. In Europe, with respect to the
nomadic Roma, there has been some acknowledgment that freedom of movement might
entail freedom to maintain a mobile residence and practice a mobile lifestyle as a cultural
practice and identity. This progression may be assisted by a growing right to freedom of
movement in the European Union, though more research on this topic is needed. Such
developments point to growing recognition of the Roma not only as an ethnic minority, but
also as a mobile minority, where mobility is central to their minority status. For example,
Recommendation 14 (2004) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
recommended expanding freedom of movement to include the right to maintain a mobile
residence.1773 Much more could be done, however, to expressly prohibit the discrimination
in nationality law on the basis of mobility and nomadism.
It is quite possible that a progressive interpretation of international law would find that
nomadism is protected as a type of “other status,” but this requires stronger articulation. In
particular, any classification of nomadism as a protected status when it comes to the
granting of nationality should be explicit under international law to combat the systemic
bias against mobility in nationality law and the nation-state system. Strong, unequivocal
support from United Nations organs in the recognition of nomadism as a protected cultural
Forty-ninth Session of the Council of Ministers, Regulation C/REG.3/01/03 Relating to the
implementation of the regulations on Transhumance between the ECOWAS Member States (Dakar 26-28
January, 2003) Article 2(5).
1770
See generally Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, ‘Border Crossing Issues and the Jay
Treaty’ Senate of Canada (June 2016).
1771
1772
ILO Recommendation 104, quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 82-83.
Recommendation no. 14 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the movement and
encampment of Travelers in Europe (2004), quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 77.
1773
350
and economic practice is needed. In particular, a right to dual or multiple nationality for
nomadic and mobile peoples may be necessary in order to preserve and protect the right to
be nomadic as part of nomadic peoples’ special status or indigenous status. The right to
freely cross borders may need to be asserted. There remains the open question as to what
extent a special package of rights for nomads may need to be given special status, or
whether all human beings have the right to maintain a mobile lifestyle if we choose.
Statelessness as “Other Status”
An important body of law also protects both recent migrants and stateless persons from
discrimination vis a vis other non-nationals. Might this framework offer additional
protections to nomads from discrimination in the granting of nationality? Under a
progressive interpretation of international law, might statelessness itself be a kind of
“other status”?
As the examples showed, statelessness itself is often used as a justification for
discriminating against nomads in the granting of nationality, by inferring that these groups
are somehow naturally criminal or transgressive and, therefore, not deserving of
nationality. This can be seen in the example of the Sama Dilaut, whose historic migration
has been branded by governments as inherently criminal since the colonial period.
This circular logic has a long history. As Arendt points out, “(t)he stateless person, without
right to residence and without the right to work, had of course constantly to transgress the
law."1774 The labelling of stateless people as criminals today is frequently linked to public
rhetoric against undocumented people more generally, including immigrants, where the
lack of a government status is, itself, used as evidence of criminality and foreignness.
States may limit the enjoyment of certain human rights to nationals, but any
such restriction must nevertheless meet stringent conditions so as to comply
with the principle of non-discrimination.1775
While stateless persons and non-citizens are not entitled to be granted the nationality of a
specific state, they must be treated the same as other immigrants. Article 29 of the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families1776 prohibits discrimination against migrants and protects the
right to a nationality for the children of migrants. The Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination in General Recommendation 30 recommended to states
that they ensure non-citizens and stateless persons were also protected from racial
1774
Arendt, 1976, 286.
Human Rights Council Nineteenth session, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, Report
of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/19/43 (December 2011) 3. See also the Guidance Note of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations and Statelessness (June 2011).
1775
1776
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2220, p. 3; Doc. A/RES/45/158, with 55 states parties.
351
discrimination.1777 The Committee advised states to remove discrimination against groups
with regard to access to nationality and naturalization and to regularize the status of the
nationals of predecessor states. Article 32 of the Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons mandates states to facilitate the naturalization of stateless persons and
the Statelessness Conventions require that children born otherwise stateless be granted a
nationality. According to the Committee, states must not create unreasonable barriers to
naturalization for long-term residents. Finally, international law mandates that states
protect the basic human rights of non-nationals and stateless persons.1778
As De Chickera and Whiteman point out, however, prohibiting discrimination against
stateless persons does not find the same level of obvious support in international law as
race, ethnicity and the other factors described above. 1779 The Statelessness Conventions
lack a treaty body of their own, meaning that the issue of discrimination against stateless
persons must be addressed through other treaty bodies such as the Committee on the
Rights of the Child.1780 As the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has
observed, freedom from discrimination against stateless persons does not require that the
state in question grant stateless persons a nationality, only that they be given the same
treatment as other non-nationals.1781 As a result, the failure of governments to provide a
nationality to nomads because of their statelessness is not prohibited under international
law unless this failure is on account of their race, religion, ethnicity or another prohibited
ground discussed above.
Rather than providing a pathway to a solution, the Statelessness Conventions would only
place nomads in the same position as other foreigners, reinforcing their status not as de
facto nationals but as foreign. As well, labelling nomads as stateless risks perpetuating the
view that they are “naturally stateless” and unable to form or participate in states, a view
that has done incalculable damage to nomads, as discussed at length in Part 2.
Conclusion
Part 2 exposed a substantial bias against mobility and nomadism in nationality law.
Inevitably, this bias encouraged the assimilation and settlement of nomads. As Pathway II
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 64th Session, General
Recommendation 30, Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (23 February-12
March 2004).
1777
See generally the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 (16 December 2005). See also Donner
194; Van Waas, Nationality, 15, 28, 36, 40, 50; Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions; Donner, 29; Verzijl, 48.
1778
1779
De Chickera and Whiteman, 111.
1780
See generally Handbook, 2014.
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev.1), Minority Rights,
February 1998, No. 18 (Rev.1).
1781
352
has shown, this bias extends into international law. While discrimination against nomadism
is often a central cause of nomad statelessness, international law does not directly address
this discrimination. Stronger and more specific protections for nomadism are needed.
Specific protections for nomadism are largely missing from the international laws and
declarations prohibiting discrimination in the granting of nationality. Nomadism is not
expressly defined as a cultural practice under the ICCPR or as a type of indigenous identity
under the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Other areas of human rights law
do not necessarily support the right to maintain a mobile or cross-border lifestyle.
Meanwhile, requiring that nomadism be framed as a type of historical migration or national
origins risks promoting settlement as the “solution” to the problem of nomad statelessness.
While anti-discrimination laws have much to offer nomads, it is not always easy to link the
statelessness of nomads to their status as ethnic, religious, linguistic or racial groups
without acknowledging the centrality of nomadism as the cause of their exclusion. In order
to resolve this oversight, language protecting nomadism as a way of life and prohibiting
discrimination against nomads on account of their mobile way of life, including in the
granting of nationality, would need to be included in an international treaty or other
binding instrument of law.
This dissertation advocates that nomadism and mobile lifestyles be more clearly treated
under international law not as types of cross-border mobility, but instead as a cultural
practice and economic activity firmly distinct from immigration or migration and protected
from discrimination under international law, particularly when it comes to the granting of
nationality. A progressive approach, like that encouraged by the U.N. General Assembly,1782
to indigenous and minority rights might more clearly frame nomadism as a group identity
and a cultural practice in need of protection.
Such express support for nomadism is particularly necessary given the powerful bias
against mobility that is baked into nationality law at every level. Simply drafting a new
treaty to protect nomads from discrimination, however, may not be enough to remove this
bias. Nationality law has proven to be, in and of itself, an engine of nomad assimilation and
settlement in many places. Nomad nationality in existing nation-states tends to be
accompanied by settlement and the abandonment of nomadism. Even explicit protections
for nomadism as a cultural practice may not be enough to counteract the bias against
mobility and, in particular, cross-border mobility that is a founding principle of nationality
law.
1782
The UN General Assembly is mandated to encourage a progressive approach to international law under
Article 13, paragraph (1)(a), of the Charter of the United Nations. See Codification and Progressive
Development of International Law website at https://legal.un.org/cod/.
353
Pathway III: Identifying and Resolving Inter-generational Statelessness
The adoption of sanguinis by post-World War, newly independent states, has
often had a discriminatory impact in favour of the dominant ethnic group on the
states’ territories.1783
As Part 2 discussed, the modern concept of jus sanguinis fit well with the systems of
belonging in many pre-colonial societies, particularly those based on Islam, where
belonging was passed down along the paternal line. Yet, jus sanguinis in post-colonial states
often followed a relatively short period creating the first body of nationals, a period that
was marked by unclear laws, poor administration and rampant discrimination against
certain groups like nomads. As the examples showed, the feasibility and appropriateness of
the rapid and strict adoption of jus sanguinis by numerous post-colonial states was never
questioned during the decolonization process, despite the arguably high risk of creating
statelessness as a result.1784 As a result, minority populations, border groups and many
nomads were locked out of a nationality.
As Part 2 demonstrated, the enactment of strict jus sanguinis laws without exceptions to
prevent statelessness was a cause of inter-generational statelessness for nomads and
former nomads in countries like Kuwait. In other countries, like Malaysia, limits on jus
sanguinis have either not been implemented or are implemented in a way that excludes
many nomads and former nomads.
Pathway III will look at breaking the chain of inter-generational statelessness for nomads
through the application of international law. Pathway III may be necessary to resolve cases
of nomad statelessness that cannot be resolved by the first two Pathways, though, for
reasons explored below, it carries considerable risks. Pathway III will first look at solutions
for persons who would be otherwise stateless at birth. Pathway III next will look at
facilitated naturalization for stateless persons to see if identifying nomads as stateless can
lead to a solution.
Beyond looking at treaties, Pathway III will also look at court cases on establishing
statelessness at birth, and guidance from UNHCR. Highly relevant to understanding how
treaty law might be applied to the benefit of nomadic communities are the UNHCR
Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, Ensuring Every Child’s Right to Acquire a Nationality
through Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.1785 Also
1783
Conklin, 98.
A widely cited risk factor for statelessness is the strict application of jus sanguinis. See for example, C.
Dumbrava and R. Bauböck (eds.) ‘Bloodlines and belonging: Time to abandon ius sanguinis?’ European Union
Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (2015). It should here be noted that the use of jus soli nationality law
does not preclude statelessness, nor does jus sanguinis automatically result in statelessness. But in some
cases, jus sanguinis can add to the risk.
1784
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, Ensuring Every Child’s Right to Acquire a nationality through
Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, HCR/BS/12/04 (21 December 2012) 3
1785
354
relevant, the European Court of Human Rights recognized that nationality was an integral
part of a child’s identity,1786 as did the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child in Nubian Children, discussed above in Pathway II.
The International Laws Applicable to Children Born Otherwise Stateless
Pathway III will first focus on the body of laws that mandate that children born otherwise
stateless in the territory of the state be granted a nationality. These laws include the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961, which mandates in Article 1 that all
persons born in the territory of the state who would otherwise be stateless be granted a
nationality. 1787 Other relevant treaties include the American Convention on Human
Rights1788 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.1789 Important soft
law contributions include the Draft Protocol to the African Charter.
It should be noted that this process may be automatic under Art. 1(1)(a), or subject to
conditions, like habitual residence, under Art. 1(1)(b). 1790 According to UNHCR, which
provides guidance on the implementation of the 1961 Convention, if a state imposes
conditions, they must not result in leaving the child stateless for a “considerable” period of
time.1791 The condition of habitual residence cannot be for longer than 5 years and lawful
residence is not required.1792
The first step in applying international legal limits on strict jus sanguinis for children born
otherwise stateless is the granting of a birth certificate. It is important to note that absence
of birth registration should not be a barrier to implementing Article 1 of the 1961
(hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4), citing the American Convention Art. 20(2) and the
African Charter Art. 6(4).
1786
1787
Menesson c. France, 65192/11, Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, 5e sect., (26 juin 2014).
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
1788
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force
July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). For a list of states parties see:
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f10e1
1789 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 July 1990,
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). For a list of states parties see: https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36804slAFRICAN%20CHARTER%20ON%20THE%20RIGHTS%20AND%20WELFARE%20OF%20THE%20CHILD.pdf.
For example, the state may fix a period of 3 to 10 years of habitual residence depending on the
circumstances. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Article 1(1)b.
1790
1791
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 8.
1792
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 9.
355
Convention, but in practice, birth registration is likely to be an important part of ending
intergenerational statelessness for nomads under Article 1 of the 1961 Convention. 1793
The birth certificate is crucial to proving the child was born in the territory of the state and
establishing the child’s parentage for the purposes of establishing their statelessness. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child mandates in Article 7 that all children born in the
territory of a state be issued with a birth certificate and establishes the principle of the
“best interests of the child” in Article 3.1794
Establishing that Children are Born Otherwise Stateless
Assuming the Convention on the Rights of the Child were implemented, no nomad child in
countries like Kuwait, Mali or Malaysia would be unable to prove their birth in the territory
of the state, establishing the first part of the conditions laid out in Article 1 of the 1961
Convention. Most nomad children with birth certificates also have important evidence of
their parent’s nationality, or demonstrate that they cannot establish a link to their parents
that satisfies the law, for example, in countries where parents must be married to pass on
their nationality or where only fathers can pass on nationality.
The child must also be established as having been born otherwise stateless, fact which
usually requires more inquiry into the circumstances than is provided on a birth certificate.
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4 provide guidance on how such an inquiry should
be made. The definition of statelessness for children is that found in the 1954
Convention.1795 Importantly, the standard “best interests of the child” applies and, as
interpreted by UNHCR, requires that the child’s statelessness must be resolved as quickly
as possible.1796
According to UNHCR,
a Contracting State must accept that a person is not a national of a particular
State if the authorities of that State refuse to recognize that person as a
national. A State can refuse to recognize a person as a national either by
explicitly stating that he or she is not a national or by failing to respond to
inquiries to confirm an individual as a national. A Contracting State to the
1961 Convention cannot avoid the obligations to grant its nationality to a
person who would otherwise be stateless under Articles 1 and 4 based on its
own interpretation of another State’s nationality laws where this conflicts
with the interpretation applied by the State concerned.1797
1793
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 12.
1794
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 7(2).
1795
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 4. See also 1954 Convention.
1796
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 3.
1797
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 4.
356
Following this guidance, Malaysia’s national laws, discussed above in Part II, should have
led to the granting of Malaysian nationality to adopted children born otherwise stateless,
once the court and parents had made a good faith attempt to establish the children’s
nationality elsewhere. But important gaps remain in UNHCR’s Guidance. It is not clear,
however, what qualifies as a “failure to respond” to inquiries. Here, the UNHCR Guidelines
could better take into account the guidance from the Committee on the Rights of the Child
and better harmonize the 1961 Convention with the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the standard of “best interests of the child.”
The example of Kuwait is also instructive on this issue. Many bidoon children are now
registered as bidoon at birth.1798 Were Kuwait to ratify them, this would violate Article 1 of
the 1961 Convention and Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yet, even
were the Kuwaiti government to ratify and follow the 1961 Convention and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the fact of birth in Kuwait by itself would not automatically
establish the rights of bidoon children to Kuwaiti nationality. Some sort of procedure
involving communications with neighbouring states Saudi Arabia and Iraq would be
required. When countries do not have bilateral relations with the necessary states, or when
relations are strained, the process of establishing that a child is stateless risks become
snarled in international relations.
UNHCR also permits states to give children a designation of “undetermined nationality”
while a determination of their nationality or statelessness takes place.1799 This “solution,”
however, may contradict the 1961 Convention if the procedure becomes an excuse to delay
a resolution. It weakens the protections of the 1961 Convention if the nationality of
children at birth becomes bound up in red tape and negotiations between governments. It
should be noted that a finding of “undetermined nationality” is not possible under Art. 20 of
the American Convention on Human Rights or Art. 6 of the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child.1800
Crucially, under the 1961 Convention, states may also require parents to satisfy a residency
requirement. Yet, as discussed at length above, it may be difficult for nomadic families to
satisfy the residency requirements under the law.
According to UNHCR,
It follows from the factual character of “habitual residence” that in cases
where it is difficult to determine whether an individual is habitually resident
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Sixty-fourth session, ‘Item 4 of the provisional agenda:
Consideration of reports of States parties: List of issues in relation to the second periodic report of Kuwait’
(CRC/C/KWT/2) (16 September – 4 October 2013).
1798
1799
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 6.
Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, ‘Pact of San Jose,’ Costa
Rica, 22 November 1969 Art. 23.1(b). Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). See also UNHCR Guidelines on
Statelessness No. 4, 8.
1800
357
in one or another State, for example due to a nomadic way of life, such
persons are to be considered as habitual residents in both States. 1801
Given the challenges in establishing residence for nomads, discussed above, UNHCR could
provide more guidance on this point.
The International Norms on the Identification of Statelessness and Facilitated Naturalization
International law also provides facilitated naturalization as a solution for stateless persons
under the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.1802 This process may
provide a solution via the identification of stateless persons in Article 1 and access to
facilitated naturalization in Article 32. While this solution is highly problematic for nomads
for a variety of reasons discussed below, it remains a possible solution under international
law that should be explored.
In addition to the international norms discussed above, this solution draws on the soft law
guidance of the UNHCR Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons and case law. Also
relevant are the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa
and the Draft Articles on the Protection of Stateless Persons and the Facilities for their
Naturalization.
Recent support for the naturalization of stateless persons is found in draft laws such as the
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects
of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa. 1803 In 2017,
UNHCR issued Draft Articles on the Protection of Stateless Persons and the Facilities for
their Naturalization.1804 The Draft Articles provide, in addition to other benefits, the
removal of residency and language requirements for stateless persons in order that they
may naturalize.
1801
1802
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 10 (my italics).
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa May 2017 art. 18. Recent developments in
international law further support a pathway to facilitated naturalization for stateless migrants. The Draft
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a
Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa would place a clear duty on states to facilitate
naturalization for stateless migrants.
1803
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Draft Articles on the Protection of Stateless Persons and the
Facilities for their Naturalization, February 2017. “The duty to ‘facilitate’ acquisition of nationality is a term
used in other international treaties that involves at least making such acquisition significantly easier than for
foreigners generally, for example by reaching out to communities known to be lacking documentation of
nationality, by providing a non-discretionary process of acquisition, such as those known in different
countries as declaration, registration or option, or by reducing the period of residence required.” Draft
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a
Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018) para. 48.
1804
358
UNHCR advises, however, that statelessness determination procedures “may only be
appropriate for the minority of the world’s stateless persons who are in a migratory
situation” and “a different approach is called for in the case of stateless persons who are in
their own country, recognizing their profound connection with that State through, for
example, birth or longstanding residence.” 1805 According to UNHCR guidance, in situ
populations should instead be treated as de facto nationals.1806
Yet, the difference between in situ stateless populations and those in a migratory context is
often difficult to delineate, 1807 particularly, as Part 2 showed, for nomads. As Part 2
discussed at length, the question of nomad “residence” is a fraught one. If a nomad
community has been split by a colonial border, which country is their “own country”? Is it
the responsibility of one state or another to decide this question? There are few guidelines
as to when “being in a migratory state” ends and in situ status begins.1808 As these terms are
not defined under international law, there is a risk of compounding or validating the
tendency of states to class nomads as foreigners, as was discussed at length in Part 2. It is
imperative to note as well that this solution requires labelling nomads as stateless, a
practice with a long and troubled history, as also described in Part 2. Without identifying
nomads as stateless, however, facilitated naturalization under the 1954 Convention does
not appear possible without further developments the law.
Establishing Statelessness and the Burden of Proof
Proving statelessness for either children or adults raises the question of the burden of
proof, a question that is not answered by either the 1954 or 1961 Convention. The process
of establishing statelessness often requires that the individual or family provide extensive
documentary evidence which might be very difficult for many nomads. The question of the
burden of proof for children born otherwise stateless has been addressed both by UNHCR
and by national courts.
In most legal systems, a claimant bears the initial responsibility of
substantiating his or her claim. Because of the difficulties that often arise
when determining whether an individual has acquired a nationality, the
burden of proof must be shared between the claimant and the authorities of
Handbook, 2014, 3, 25-26, 57. The phrase “own country” is taken from the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Art. 12(4). See also European Network on Statelessness, ‘Statelessness Determination
and the Protection Status of Stateless Individuals’ (2013) 5, citing UNHCR guidelines. For a detailed
discussion of the concept of “own country” in international law, see C. Vlieks, ‘Contexts of statelessness: the
concepts “statelessness in situ” and “statelessness in the migratory context”’ in T. Bloom, K. Tonkiss, P. Cole
(eds.) Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 40-42 (hereinafter Vlieks).
1805
1806
Handbook, 2014, 1.
1807 This observation is made by Oakeshott in his article on statelessness in Southeast Asia. N. Oakeshott, ‘The
Search for Solutions to statelessness in Southeast Asia: State practice and recent developments’ in L. van
Waas and M. Khanna (eds.) Solving Statelessness (Wolf L.P. 2016) 349.
1808
Vlieks, 41.
359
the Contracting State to obtain evidence and to establish the facts as to
whether an individual would otherwise be stateless. The claimant and his or
her parents/guardians have the responsibility to cooperate and to provide all
documentation and information reasonably available to them while the
relevant authority is required to obtain and present all relevant evidence
reasonably available to it.1809
This appears to shift the burden of proof somewhat from the child to the government. For a
statelessness determination procedure, according to the UNHCR Handbook on the
Protection of Stateless Persons, the burden of proof to prove statelessness is “shared,” part
of a “collaborative” effort, and that statelessness should be established to a “reasonable”
degree.1810 This sentence is vague. It is not clear what the standard for reasonableness
should be.
It is not clear if a different standard of proof should be applied to a statelessness
determination procedure for an adult versus determining if a child would be otherwise
stateless. Are these different standards, or the same? For children, the human rights norm
of the “best interests of the child” would seem to weigh in favour of a lower standard of
proof for children. As UNHCR goes on to stipulate, to be in compliance with the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the burden placed on the family to provide evidence of a child’s
statelessness must be reasonable,1811 but once again, there is little clarity of what this stand
means in general, or what it might mean for nomads.
In both cases, there is the additional problem of types of proof, which tend to involve
documents that nomads may struggle to provide. The UNHCR Handbook, section D, lists the
types of evidence used to establish statelessness, including responses from foreign
governments on the question of nationality, identity documents, including travel
documents, immigration documents, employment documents and school records. 1812 On
the list of forms of evidence, only the testimony of the applicant and of neighbours and
community members are things that many nomads will be able to provide. In the end,
however, such a document-focused determination procedure may be impossible for
stateless persons and families to comply with.
Courts have often imposed a high burden of proof on stateless persons to prove their
statelessness. In Hoti v Croatia,1813 the European Court of Human Rights determined the
applicant to be stateless based on a thorough investigation into his various attempts to
establish his status in multiple countries following the dissolution of the former
1809
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 5.
1810
Handbook, 2014, 34-35.
1811
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 5.
1812
Handbook, 2014, 32-22.
1813 Hoti v Croatia, European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 63311/14 26, 26 April
2018.)
360
Yugoslavia.1814 The court undertook a thorough review of the individual’s documentation
and interactions with various authorities. What is notable about this case is the high
burden of proof placed on the stateless person to prove their own statelessness. The
applicant interacted with various consulates and government agencies in multiple
countries, creating an administrative trail that could be evaluated by the courts.
What burden of proof might national courts impose on stateless children to establish their
statelessness as part of a procedure under the 1961 Convention? As Part 2 noted, in 2017,
the Malaysian Federal Court and Home Ministry granted nationality under Malaysia’s
Constitution to stateless children who had been adopted by Malaysian parents and had no
documents, showing a path forward for some stateless children, even those who did not
have a birth certificate. Yet the burden placed on the families in these cases was very high
and some families were not able to prove their children were stateless.
Recent court cases in Australia have shown that the burden often falls on children to
establish their own statelessness. In Re DLSV and Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection, the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that while a child was
eligible for a nationality in another country (Zimbabwe,) established as the country of
nationality for the parents, the policies of various Zimbabwean authorities had made it
impossible for the child to obtain proof of this nationality even after repeated attempts at
different offices/consulates in different countries. As a result, the Court held that child was
stateless. 1815 This case placed a high evidentiary burden on the child to furnish
considerable evidence of the attempts made on the child’s behalf to establish its nationality.
Placing the burden clearly on states in international treaties to prove cases of statelessness
and mandate a bilateral or regional process where necessary would do much to make this
process fairer to nomads. UNHCR has advocated for limiting to five years the period that a
state has to establish the child’s nationality in another country.1816 Such limitations should
be codified in international law to provide clear limits on the ability of states to drag out
the process through burdensome litigation. Some experts argue for an even higher burden
on states. Worster, for example, argues that, “(t)he burden is on the birth state to show that
another state has definitively exercised jurisdiction, for example, by acquiring a passport in
hand.”1817 There is also the question of whether the standard of proof should be lower for
certain groups like nomads. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women has noted that naturalization procedures may be particularly burdensome
Cited in K. Swider, ‘Case Note: Hoti v Croatia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application
No 63311/14 26, 26 April 2018)’ 1 Statelessness and Citizenship Review 184 (2018).
1814
Re DLSV and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) AATA 2999 (27 November 2017),
cited in K. Rubenstein and E. Harris, ‘Case Note: Re DLSV and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
(2017) AATA 2999 (27 November 2017)’ 1 Statelessness and Citizenship Review 177 (2019).
1815
1816
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 6.
1817 W. Worster, ‘The Obligation to Grant Nationality to Stateless Children Under Treaty Law,’ 24 Tilburg L. R.
204 (2019).
361
on specific groups or categories of persons, creating discrimination even when appearing
to be facially neutral.1818
Finally, it is again worth noting here the risks for nomad communities in establishing
statelessness, whether at birth or later in life. While most nomads would likely be
considered in situ populations by the international community, many states frequently
label nomads as foreign. Establishing that a nomadic individual is stateless risks lending
credence to this framing, whether at birth or later in life.
Conclusion
Pathway III looked at solutions to inter-generational statelessness. In particular, it looked
at solutions that would resolve statelessness for nomad communities who are currently
stateless. In some cases, this inter-generational statelessness is caused by the strict
application of jus sanguinis. International law has created a solution to the intergenerational statelessness caused by strict jus sanguinis by requiring that children born in
the territory of the state have birth certificates and acquire a nationality if otherwise
stateless. International law has also created a procedure for the identification of stateless
individuals and their facilitated naturalization. Pathway III explored the extent to which
these solutions might work for nomads. It is not clear which route is preferable for nomads,
but stronger protections clearly exist for statelessness children and for resolving
statelessness at birth.
Mandating that all children be issued with birth certificates has done much to guarantee
that solutions are available for nomad children to break out of inter-generational
statelessness, but birth certificates alone cannot resolve the problem in jus sanguinis
countries because such countries may require under international law that a child first
establish he or she is stateless. Under the “best interests of the child” standard, the burden
to establish statelessness would be mostly on the government and the procedures must be
designed to resolve the status of the child as quickly as possible. UNHCR and other soft law
guidance, however, could be even stronger on this point and states could codify a low
burden of proof for children in these cases.
A high burden of proof may be placed on stateless individuals to prove their statelessness
in order to access facilitated naturalization. The burden may unfairly disadvantage certain
groups, like nomads, even while appearing neutral on its face. States could be clearer in
placing the burden squarely on themselves in treaties and norms, perhaps by creating
bilateral or regional processes or by creating a rule that states reach out on behalf of
applicants within a certain time frame. Such a solution could form part of a progressive
interpretation of the Statelessness Conventions by courts.
Any solution that relies on identifying a nomadic individual as stateless also risks
entrenching the widely held view, much documented in Part 2, that nomads are, by their
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General recommendation No. 32 on
the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women,
CEDAW/C/GC/32, 5 November 2014.
1818
362
nature, stateless. Solutions for nomads that involve formal identification as stateless, even
at birth, should therefore be treated with extreme caution.
363
Conclusion
(Nomads’) occupational and social relationships lack the fixed territorial
situs presupposed in treaty and customary doctrinal norms.1819
This dissertation sought to make a contribution towards answering the following
questions: (1) What are some of the root causes of nomad statelessness? (2) Why does
nomad statelessness persist? (3) Does international law provide solutions to nomad
statelessness? (4) Are these solutions consistent with the human rights of nomads?
Part 2 identified some of the root causes of nomad statelessness by exploring nomadic and
previously nomad groups in three example countries: Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. It
explored nationality and belonging for nomads in the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial periods and summarized how nationality developed as a concept and as an area of
law in tandem with the colonial and de-colonial processes.
Part 2 came to a number of important conclusions. Colonial policy was extremely biased
against nomadism. Nomad areas were declared empty and many colonial governments and
administrators sought to settle nomads and convert them to so-called productive activities
like farming. Nomad areas were divided by borders, transforming many nomads into
minorities. Colonial registration favoured settled peoples and registration was often used
to coerce nomad settlement. As a result, many nomads entered the post-colonial period
with no identity documents and unclear residence and belonging, though some nomads
had gained colonial-era nationality.
The international community mostly ignored the problem of nomad statelessness during
the period of decolonization, even as millions of colonized peoples gained a nationality for
the first time. Many nomads could not prove habitual residence in order to qualify for
nationality and many of those with colonial-era documents were not issued post-colonial
documents. The power to draft nationality laws had often vested with settled, urban rulers
who adopted forced and coercive settlement policies towards nomad minorities, as had
their colonial predecessors. Registration and access to nationality were tightened over time
as discrimination against nomads only increased. Nomads who had been practicing their
way of life for centuries as linch-pins of the economy were often branded a threat to
nationality unity and national security.
The post-colonial period also saw the wholesale seizure of nomad lands as these previously
remote areas in border zones were now found to contain huge quantities of natural
resources. Nomad economic importance declined, while their lands became extremely
valuable to the state. The link between the seizure of nomad territories and nomad
1819
Conklin, 122.
364
nationality and statelessness remains underexplored, but this dissertation uncovered a
correlation between the two.
Synthesizing the conclusions enumerated above, Part 2 therefore uncovered the following
root causes of nomad statelessness: (1) the failure to resolve the statelessness of nomads at
decolonization or, in the case of the Tuareg, the failure to “roll-over” colonial-era
nationality, (2) the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones (3)
discrimination against nomads in the granting of nationality, (4) a bias against nomads that
is inherent in nationality laws due to an over-reliance on residence, proof of place of birth
and documentation.
Part 2 also examined why nomad statelessness persists to the present day in Kuwait, Mali
and Malaysia. It uncovered several root causes, including (5) the application of strict jus
sanguinis in Malaysia and Kuwait that locked nomads into inter-generational statelessness,
(6) the settlement and assimilation of nomads in order to seize their lands for resource
extraction and (7) the link between nomad statelessness and armed conflict in Mali.
Part 3 was devoted to examining the solutions currently available under international law,
focusing particularly on those being promoted by UNHCR and the international community,
such as the right to a nationality, the prohibitions against statelessness and relevant parts
of the human rights framework. The solutions explored included the right to a nationality
during state succession, the laws prohibiting discrimination in the granting of nationality,
the granting of nationality to children born otherwise stateless and facilitated
naturalization for stateless persons. Part 3 also examined to what extent these solutions
are consistent with the human rights of nomads.
As Part 3 showed, international law, if and when implemented, has much to offer nomads
by way of solutions. In spite of the articulation on paper of the right to a nationality as a
fundamental human right, to be enjoyed by everyone, the substance of this norm does not
fully account for the specific challenges that arise in protecting nomads from statelessness.
International law has evolved such that, for example, there is clear recognition for the
prohibition of racial discrimination in the regulation of nationality. However, when it
comes to guaranteeing the right to a nationality in the context of nomadism, the relevant
treaty norms, jurisprudential precedents and soft law standards are not sufficiently
pronounced.
Many of the binding norms may be useful to nomads. For example, the norms prohibiting
discrimination in the granting of nationality for reasons of race, ethnicity or religion could,
if implemented by states parties, help some nomads to gain a nationality. Mali, for example,
has ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, discussed above. If discrimination against a nomadic group like the Tuareg
is framed in racial terms, this Convention has much to offer by way of a solution. Given that
much of the discrimination suffered by nomads is on account of their nomadic way of life
and not necessarily on account of their race, ethnicity or religion, however, the
international framework could be updated by states to specifically include nomadism as a
way of life. Yet a review of the soft law pertaining to discrimination shows that nomadism
as a discriminatory category is missing from the broader discussion amongst experts and
365
UN bodies. Likewise, the attempts in soft law to define the meaning of “habitual residence”
for nomads, while potentially helpful in some regards, stop well short of resolving the
tension between the exclusivity that lies at the heart of the nationality “link” between
individual and state and the necessities of the nomadic lifestyle.
Pathway I established that the right to a nationality during state succession may provide
an important solution to prevent statelessness for nomads as a result of successions of
states and may do much to help avoid nomad statelessness during future cases of
succession, particularly if the standards articulated in draft conventions were adopted by
states. But serious normative gaps remain. Most importantly, for nomads who were already
stateless at decolonization, such as many Sama Dilaut, and who may be stateless during
future state successions, the laws on the succession of states provide few solutions. For
nomads with a nationality in the predecessor state, the emphasis on birth and habitual
residence creates barriers to a solution for nomads. Alternative modes of proof of
residence tailored to nomads might be necessary, yet this would move away from the
universality of the right to a nationality. International law, including soft law, provides only
nascent authority on this point.
There are also implementation problems in crafting a solution based on the norms of state
succession. Bilateral or tripartite agreements between states during state succession may
prevent the creation of statelessness, but international law does not provide clear guidance
on how such a process might work retroactively. International law, including soft law, does
not provide a straightforward pathway to a solution for intergenerational statelessness
resulting from state successions in the past.
Pathway II explored the laws prohibiting discrimination in the granting of nationality. This
framework currently offers what are likely the strongest and most explicit prohibitions
against nomad statelessness. The anti-discrimination framework, however, could be
stronger and more specific when it comes to nomads. There are several normative gaps, in
particular, because one of the key functions of nationality law is to discriminate against
cross-border mobility. Anti-discrimination laws could be more successful for nomads when
nomadism is framed as a cultural and economic activity. Such protections exist under the
indigenous rights framework, the minority rights framework and human rights more
generally, but could be incorporated more clearly into treaty law.
Automatically granting nationality to nomad children born otherwise stateless is another
possible solution that was explored in Pathway III. States should re-examine the legitimacy
of jus sanguinis following a succession of states. It would be helpful to update clauses from
the 1961 Convention that allow states to place additional burdens of proof for stateless
children. Apart from these normative issues, there are problems with the implementation
of this solution. Currently, courts place a high burden of proof on stateless children to
prove that they do not qualify for a nationality in a foreign country. This creates a high bar
for many nomad families.
Pathway III also explored facilitated naturalization for stateless nomads. Once again, there
are serious problems in implementing this solution. A statelessness determination
procedure risks labelling in situ populations as stateless, particularly for nomads, who have
366
frequently been labelled foreigners or as naturally stateless throughout their history. Part
2, above, explored this painful and harmful history for nomads and the many ways it has
harmed their rights, particularly their rights to land. Such a solution should not be put into
place in countries with stateless or at-risk nomadic populations without consultations with
this community and without a hard look at the possible risks involved.
Most importantly, Part 3 uncovered a bias against mobility and nomadism inherent to
nationality which also influences international law and makes solutions for nomad
statelessness difficult to construct out of existing principles. There is something odd in
finding a solution to nomad statelessness in the very legal tradition that created nomad
statelessness in the first place and is derived, as Part 2 showed, from a school of thought
that often branded nomads as incapable of statehood. It is perhaps therefore not surprising
that Part 3 uncovered several serious normative gaps, even within soft law instruments. As
explored in Part 2, examples of this bias include the long-standing and entrenched
preference for exclusive allegiance and long-term settlement on land, particularly the
productive use of land.
This bias also manifests as a preference for habitual residence in the territory of the state,
centralized administrative structures located in towns and cities and hard borders that cut
across areas not being used for agriculture. As a result, nomad statelessness is often
entrenched and the barriers to solutions are systemic and are present in international law
as well as in municipal law. This deep, structural bias against nomadism is inherent in
nationality law writ large and therefore cannot be easily overcome by drafting new treaties
or strengthening existing principles within the international legal system. One overarching
conclusion of this dissertation is that the very system of nationality, including within the
international legal framework, is structured to limit mobility, promote settlement and
support state sovereignty over borders and is therefore at odds with nomadism.
Nevertheless, advances in international law are possible and a great deal may still be done
to protect the right to a nationality for nomads. Protecting nomad rights might require
significant advances in international law, including for example support for a right to dual,
or multiple, nationality and greater support for special rights, like the freedom to pursue a
mobile lifestyle, the right to cross borders and the right to be registered by nomad
community leaders, rather than government authorities. Such solutions should be the
subject of further study.
Important advances in international law may also be made through addressing areas of
nomad rights that are currently overlooked. The Pathways did not clearly address all of the
gaps identified in Part 2 in part because the current international norms do not address
these issues in any systematic way. For example, Part 2 also discussed the long-standing,
historical connection between nationality and land ownership. It exposed a strong
correlation between nomad statelessness and the seizure of nomad lands. Importantly,
sometimes nomad lands were taken by governments in exchange for nationality. Yet, not
only does international law, as Gilbert points out, lack “specificity,” on how nomad land
367
rights might be achieved in general,1820 it has little that is specific on the correlation
between nomad stateless, nomad nationality and nomad land rights. While nomad land
rights are included under the indigenous rights framework, even here, the link to
nationality is under-articulated. The intersection between nationality and nomad land
rights is something that could be addressed more specifically by states in international law.
In particular, the use of nationality as a tool to assimilate and settle nomads is in urgent
need of examination.
The question of to what extent nomad nationality must contain extra, group-based rights is
particularly salient for nomads, who have often been subjected to nationality as part of
coercive assimilation, rather than as a pathway to their human rights. For nomads,
nationality should provide protection and support for their way of life, a right to be
nomadic, along with access to mechanisms, like voting and the courts, that can be used to
protect nomadism. For example, a nationality for nomads should guarantee them not only
access to education, but the ability to shape and influence that education to include
nomadism. Yet the current international framework does not acknowledge that nationality
may, in and of itself, serve as a form of assimilation for nomads and the link between group
rights and nationality remains underarticulated. As Part 2 explored, nationality and, in
particular, civil registration has often been offered to nomads in exchange for settlement
and the abandonment of nomadism as a way of life, yet this problem is not addressed by
the current normative framework, even in soft law.
The question of group rights for nomads and how they link to nationality also raises the
question of parallel systems of indigenous, or nomadic, citizenship, an issue not explored in
the Pathways above.1821 The indigenous rights framework points to a possibly way forward
for nomads who wish to both have a nationality but avoid its assimilative affects, but to
date, international law falls well short of providing explicit and detailed solutions.
International law is mostly silent on whether nomad nationality should be the same, or
different, from nationality for other groups. While nationality is a universal right, it may be
necessary to ensure this universal right through a framework that provides extra
protections for nomads.
One further, vital conclusion of this dissertation is that only nomads and mobile peoples
themselves can articulate what the right to a nationality would look like to them. This
dissertation has focused mainly on the actions and legal frameworks created by states, both
at the municipal level and through the medium of international law. This dissertation has
1820
Gilbert, Still, 2004-2005, 159.
For example, Article 36 of the 2007 Indigenous Rights Declaration specifies that states must support the
rights of indigenous peoples separated by borders to retain contacts with each other through a system of
indigenous passports. It is not clear what sort of contacts are mandated or how this requirement would fit
with border restrictions, but indigenous passports can provide a method for nomads to travel freely across a
border under a special agreement, though in practice, many indigenous, nomadic groups cannot maintain ties
across borders, even with indigenous passports. Imai and Buttery, 18.
1821
368
attempted to highlight some possible solutions under international law that would make
accessing the right to a nationality easier for some nomads and bring the institution of
nationality more into line with the human rights of nomads. As explained, however, the
international system of laws is derived from the very state-centric system that rendered
some nomads stateless. Fully articulating the right to a nationality for nomads, one that
truly comports with nomadism and a mobile way of life, will require a substantial
rethinking of the entire institution of nationality from the nomadic, and not from the state,
perspective.
369
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Treaties, National Laws and Cases
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• Aboriginal Peoples Act (1954) (revised 1974), Malaysia Act 134
• Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 4,
Permanent Court of International Justice, (7 February 1923)
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Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of
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• Administrative Decree of 7 February 1897 (France)
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• American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San José, Costa Rica", 18 July 1978,
UNTS 1144, 123
• American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) (Adopted at the Ninth
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• British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, U.K. Public General Acts, c. 14 (1914)
• British Nationality Act 1981, Chapter 61 (30 October 1981)
• North Borneo Ordinance No. 1 of 1931, Sandakan (11 September 1931)
• Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a
• Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 ER 1045 (1774)
399
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Charte Pastorale du Mali, Loi N. 01-004 of 27 Feb. 2001
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Constitution of Malaysia 1957
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(1999)
Convention Between France and Vietnam on Nationality 1959, Recueil des Traites et
Accords de la France 62 (16 August 1955)
Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York (20 November 1989, entry into
force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49(1)) 1577 United Nations
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Convention Between the United States of America and Great Britain Delimiting the
Boundary Between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo
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président de la République le 4 octobre (France)
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400
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Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
A/RES/25/2625, 24 October 1970
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General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)
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Based on Religion or Belief, General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November
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Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, made between His late Majesty King George
VI and Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States
Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance (1952)
Foreign Jurisdiction Act (1890 UK)
Florence Strunsky Mergé vs. The Italian Republic, Case No. 3, Decision No. 55 and
Mazzonis Case, Decision No. 56 (10 June 1955) XIV 249-251
Hague Convention on Civil Procedure; Hague Convention on Private International
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401
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua (judgment of 31 August 2001)
International Court of Justice, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
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(Indonesia/Malaysia), (2002) ICJ Rep. 625
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League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 15 September 1994
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Loi N. 57-27 du 10 Janvier 1957, Créant une Organisation Commune des Régions
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Loi n° 46-940 du 7 mai 1946, tendant à proclamer citoyens tous les ressortissants
des territoires d'outre-mer
Loi n. 56-619 du 23 juin 1956 autorisant le gouvernement à mettre en œuvre les
réformes et à prendre les mesures propres à assurer l'évolution des territoires
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Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed at Montevideo, 26
December 1933, entered into force, 26 December 1934, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933)
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Napoléon)
Mali Ordonnance No. 02-062/P.RM of 7 June 2002 of the Code of the Protection of
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402
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Mali Ordonnance No. 55 du 24 novembre 1960 « relative à l’attribution de la
nationalité malienne à tous les ressortissants de la République du Mali » Journal
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3
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United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
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United Nations, August 1949, Lake Success - New York, 1 August 1949, E/1112;
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UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
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UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
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195
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U.N. General Assembly, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August
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U.N. General Assembly, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948,
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Sources by Topic
Sources on Nationality Law
This dissertation relied on a number of academic sources on the relevant nationality laws,
including the laws of the British and French empires and of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. A
non-exhaustive list of sources includes: Jacques Maury, Nationalité: Théorie générale et
droit français (Paris Recueil Sirey 1931); Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Droit de la nationalité et
des étrangers (Presses universitaires de France 2015); Ko Swan Sik, (ed). Nationality and
International Law in Asian Perspective Martinus Nijhoff (1990); Anh Nga Longva
“Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice" in Citizenship and the State
in the Middle East (Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis and Manuel Hassassian (eds.) Syracuse
2000); Maximilian Koessler, ‘Subject, Citizen, National and Permanent Allegiance’ 56 Yale
Law Journal 58 (1946); Patrick Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un français? histoire de la nationalité
française depuis la Révolution (Bernard Grasset 2002); L. Fransman, Fransman’s British
Nationality Law: Third Edition 3rd (ed.) Edition (Bloomsbury 2011); C. Parry,
Commonwealth Citizenship with Special Reference to India (Indian Council of World Affairs
1954); R. Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain (Oxford UP 2000); D. O.
McGovney, ‘French Nationality Laws Imposing Nationality at Birth’ 5 Am. J. of Int’l L. 325; B.
Manby, Citizenship in Africa: The Law of Belonging (Hart 2018); J. Hampshire, Citizenship
and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of Demographic Governance in Postwar Britain
(Palgrave Macmillan 2005); Frederick Cooper, (Princeton UP 2014); Paul Decheix, “Le Code
de la nationalité Malienne" 697 Penant 300 (1963); G. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World
(Amsterdam UP 2009).
Sources on Nationality Theory and History
Many of the sources for this dissertation are drawn from the fields of history, geography,
anthropology, ethnology, philosophy and sociology. These provide context to the legal
404
analysis of Part 2, and are not exhaustive. In part, these sources reflect the fact that much of
the scholarship on nomads is limited to the fields of anthropology and ethnology.
Works from philosophy, anthropology and history on state formation and the application of
European nationality during and after colonization include;
R. D. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge UP 1986); Will
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford UP 1995);
David Miller On Nationality (Oxford UP 1997); Jeremy Larkins, From Hierarchy to Anarchy;
Territory and Politics before Westphalia (Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Kenneth Baynes, ‘Kant
on Property Rights and the Social Contract,’ 72 The Monist 433 (1989); James C. Scott, The
Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (Yale 2009).
Key sources on colonial and post-colonial theory and policy towards nomads include;
Salwa Alghanim, The Reign of Mubarak-Al-Sabah: Shaikh of Kuwait 1896-1915 (Tauris
1998); Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, the Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
Qatar (Columbia U. Press 1997); B. J. Slot, Mubarak Al-Sabah: Founder of Modern Kuwait:
1896-1915 (Arabian Publishing 2005); Bruce Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire
1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History (Cambridge UP 2013); Anthony Toth, “Tribes and
Tribulations: Bedouin Losses in the Saudi and Iraqi Struggles over Kuwait’s Frontiers,
1918-1943" 32 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 145 (2005); M. Casey, The History
of Kuwait (Greenwood Publishing Group 2007); Dawn Chatty (ed.), Nomadic Societies in the
Middle East And North Africa: Entering the 21st Century (Brill 2006); A. N. Longva (2005)
‘Neither Autocracy nor Democracy’ in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori Monarchies and Nations:
Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (Tauris 2005); Moh Pribadi ‘Ibn
Khaldun’s Social Thought on Bedouin and Hadar’ 52 Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies
417 (2014); Osman Salih, K. E., ‘Kuwait Primary (Tribal) Elections 1975-2008: An
Evaluative Study’ 38 British J. of Middle Eastern Studies 141 (2011); Paul Dresch and James
Piscatori, (eds.) Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the
Gulf (Tauris 2005).
Cristophe Wondji, ‘Symbolismes Culturels Traditionnels et Indépendances Africaines’
(Institut d’histoire du temps présent, colloque international sur La France et les
indépendance des pays d’Afrique Noire et de Madagascar 1990); J. Chipman, French Power
in Africa (Basil Blackwell 1989); F. Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation:
Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960 (Princeton UP 2014); W. J. Foltz, From
French West Africa to the Mali Federation (Yale U P 1965); Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch,
‘Nationalité et Citoyenneté en Afrique Occidentale français : Originaires et Citoyens dans le
Sénégal Colonial, 42 The Journal of African History 285 (2001); Ruth Dickens, ‘Defining
French Citizenship Policy in West Africa’ (doctoral thesis, Emory U. 2001); Cheich O.
Diarrah, Vers La IIIe République Du Mali (L’Harmattan 1991); Bakari Kamian, ‘La
dynamique des intégrations, de la période coloniale à nos jours’ in Lydie Moudileno Les
États-nations face à l’intégration régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest - Le cas du Mali (Karthala
2007); T. Benetti, Entwicklung des Verhältnisses zwischen Tuareg und staatlichen Strukturen
in Mali (University of Vienna 2008); Attilio Gaudio, Le Mali (Karthala 2nd (ed.) Paris 1988);
Michal Tymowski, The Origins and Structures of Political Institutions in Pre-Colonial Black
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Africa; Dynastic Monarchy, Taxes and Tributes, War and Slavery, Kinship and Territory
(Edwin Mellen Press 2009); Pierre Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh: dépendances et révoltes:
du français au Mali contemporain (Karthala 1999); Baz Lecocq, Disputed Desert:
Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali (Brill
2010); Dodo Boureima, ‘La constitution d’un réseau régional avec les communautés
pastorales d’Afrique de l’Oust : le Réseau Billital Maroobe’ in Pasteurs Nomades et
Transhumants Autochtones (L’Harmattan 2010).
Leigh Wright, ‘Historical Notes on the North Borneo Dispute’ 25 J. of Asian Studies 471
(1966); James Francis Warren, The Sulu Zone: 1768-1898 (Singapore UP 1981); James
Francis Warren, ‘Looking Back on ‘The Sulu Zone’: State Formation, Slave Raiding and
Ethnic Diversity in Southeast Asia’ Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society Vol. 69, No. 1 (270) (1996); J. Warren, The North Borneo Chartered Company's
administration of the Bajau, 1878-1909; the pacification of a maritime, nomadic people (Ohio
U. 1971); Stefan Eklof, Pirates in Paradise, A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime
Marauders (Nias Press 2006); Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of
Malaysia, (3rd ed., Red Globe Press 2016); Virginia Matheson Hooker, A Short History of
Malaysia: Linking East and West (Allen and Unwin 2003); Clifford Sather, ‘Commodity,
Trade, Gift Exchange, and the History of Maritime Nomadism in Southeastern Sabah’ 6
Nomadic Peoples 20 (2002); Clifford Sather, The Sama Dilaut; Adaptation, History, and Fate
in a Maritime Fishing Society of South-eastern Sabah (Oxford U. P. 1997); Lioba Lenhart,
‘Recent research on Southeast Asian sea nomads’ 36 and 37 Nomadic Peoples 245 (1995);
Carol Warren, ‘Consciousness in Social Transformation: The Sama Dilaut of East Malaysia’ 5
Dialectical Anthropology 227 (1980); Charles Hirschman, ‘The Meaning and Measurement
of Ethnicity in Malaysia,’ 46 Journal of Asian Studies 555 (1987); H. Ting, ‘Malaysian history
textbooks and the discourse of ketuanan Melayu’ in Daniel Goh, Matilda Gabriel Pillai,
Philip Holden, Gaik Cheng Khoo, Race and Multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore
(Routledge 2009); Fausto Barlocco, Identity and the State in Malaysia (Routledge 2014).
Sources on Land Rights, Armed Conflict and Resource Extraction
Dawn Chatty, ‘Adapting to Multinational Oil Exploration: the Mobile Pastoralists of Oman’
in Stefan Leder, Bernhard Streck, (eds.) Akkulturation und Selbstbehauptung, Beiträge des
Kolloquiums am (Halle 2002 Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte 4, Mitteilungen des SFB
“Differenz und Integration"); Abdulkarim Al-Dekhayel Kuwait: Oil, State and Political
Legitimization (Ithaca Press 2000) 1; Jacqueline Ismael Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a
Rentier State (U Press of Florida 1993); D. J. Stewart, What’s next for Mali? The Roots of
Conflict and Challenges to Stability (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2013).
Sources on Statelessness and Nationality in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia
Claire Beatrix Marie Beaugrand Statelessness and Transnationalism in Northern Arabia:
Biduns and State Building in Kuwait, 1959-2009 (London School of Economics, PhD
dissertation 2010); Marie Brokstad Lund-Johansen, Fighting for Citizenship in Kuwait
(University of Oslo 2014); Claire Beaugrand, ‘Framing Nationality in the Migratory Context:
The Elusive Category of Biduns in Kuwait’ (Author’s Manuscript) 6 Middle East Law and
Governance 1 (2014); C. Beaugrand Stateless in the Gulf: Migration, Nationality and Society
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in Kuwait (Tauris 2018). M. Offermann, « Les risques d'apatridie au Mali et pour les Maliens
vivant à l’étranger en application des législations et pratiques relatives à la nationalité, au
Mali et dans les pays d’accueil de Maliens » (UNHCR 2020).
Helen Brunt, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) Children in Sabah, Malaysia’
Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (2015); Julian Clifton, Greg Acciaioli, Helen Brunt,
Wolfram Dressler, Michael Fabinyi, Sarinda Singh, ‘Statelessness and Conservation:
Exploring the Implications of an International Governance Agenda’ 19 Tilburg Law Review
81 (2014). Greg Acciaioli, Helen Brunt and Julian Clifton, ‘Foreigners Everywhere, Nationals
Nowhere: Exclusion, Irregularity, and Invisibility of Stateless Bajau Laut in Eastern Sabah,
Malaysia’ 15 J. of Imm. and Ref. Studies 232 (2017).
Non-academic Sources
Where necessary to flesh out academic materials, this dissertation will also cite to NGO
reports, reports by economists, security services and others, as well as articles by the
media and others to provide context.
Sources on International Law
Important sources on the international laws of nationality and the right to a nationality
under international law include:
Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Brill 1979); Anthony Smith,
National Identity (U. of Nevada 1991); Patrick Courbe, Le nouveau droit de la nationalité
(Dalloz 1994); G. Benko and U. Strohmayer, Human Geography: A History for the 21st
Century (Arnold 2004); Willem van Genugten, Anna Meijknecht, Bas Rombouts, ‘Stateless
Indigenous People(s): The Right to a Nationality, Including Their Own’ 19 Tilburg Law
Review 98 (2014); J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, (Martinus
Nijhoff 1998); James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn.,
Oxford University Press, 2006); Van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality in International Law:
An Outline (A. W. Sythoff 1959); Michel Verwilghen, Conflits de nationalités, Plurinationalité
et apatridie, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, vol. 277 (1999);
G. R. de Groot and O. W. Vonk, International Standards on Nationality Law: Texts, Cases and
Materials (Wolf 2016); C. Batchelor, ‘Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving
Nationality Status’ 10 Int’l J. of Refugee L. 156 (1998); Eric Fripp, Nationality and
Statelessness in the International Law of Refugee Status (Hart 2016); I. Brownlie, ‘Relations
of Nationality in Int’l L.’ 39 British Yearbook of Int’l L. 284 (1963); Manby, B. ‘Who Belongs?
Statelessness and Nationality in West Africa’ Migration Policy Institute (7 April 2016).
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Summary
The United Nations has identified nomadic groups around the world as stateless or at risk of
statelessness. While research exists on the statelessness of individual nomadic populations, less has
been done to compare the experiences of various groups to uncover the root causes of nomad
statelessness and explore why nomad statelessness persists. As well, international law is often proposed
by actors such as the United Nations as a solution for statelessness, but little research has been done as
to whether international law can provide a solution for nomads.
This PhD dissertation draws together existing research on former Bedouin in Kuwait, the Tuareg in Mali
and the Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) in Malaysia to answer the following questions: (1) What are some of
the root causes of nomad statelessness? (2) Why does nomad statelessness persist? (3) Does
international law provide solutions to nomad statelessness? (4) Are these solutions consistent with the
human rights of nomads?
As this dissertation explores through an examination of existing research in law, the social sciences and
other disciplines, the root causes of nomad statelessness include: (1) the failure to resolve the
statelessness of nomads at decolonization or, in some cases, the failure to “roll-over” colonial-era
nationality, (2) the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones, (3) discrimination
against nomads in the granting of nationality, (4) a reliance on residence, place of birth and
documentation to establish nationality, (5) the application of strict jus sanguinis in some countries, (6) a
correlation between statelessness and the seizure of nomad lands for resource extraction and (7) the
link between nomad statelessness and armed conflict in some countries. Most importantly, this
dissertation identifies a significant and systemic bias against nomadism in nationality law. Nationality as
a modern institution is simply not working for nomads at a very basic level.
This dissertation goes on to examine possible solutions to nomad statelessness under international law.
In particular, this dissertation examines the following areas of international law that have often been
invoked by international actors and states as solutions for statelessness: (1) the right to a nationality
under international law, (2) the laws to identify, prevent and reduce statelessness, including through
registration and the issuance of birth certificates (3) the prohibitions against discrimination in the
granting of nationality and (4) the prevention of statelessness during the succession of states.
This dissertation identifies several specific ways in which international law could be reformed to better
protect the right to a nationality for nomads. Some of these recommendations include: States should reexamine the legitimacy of jus sanguinis laws following a succession of states. International law should
provide clear guidance on the prevention and resolution of statelessness during state succession. Antidiscrimination laws should more clearly prohibit discrimination against nomadism and strengthen
existing protections. The intersection between nationality, statelessness and nomad land rights is
something that could be addressed more specifically in international law. In particular, the use of
nationality as a tool to assimilate and settle nomads is in urgent need of examination. Due to the
systemic bias against nomadism in nationality law, however, even were international human rights
norms and the right to a nationality applied perfectly by all states, significant gaps for nomads would
likely remain.
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Maps
Kuwait, 1954
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West Africa, 1887-1889
British North Borneo
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Possible Location of Bedouin Tribes During the Colonial Period
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Tuareg Today
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Sama Dilaut Today (in green)
Kuwait Oil Fields
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Mali minerals and oil – possible/speculative locations
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Oil Blocks for Sale: Malaysia and Philippines
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Tun Mustapha Marine Park
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